

The Power *and* Value *of* Music

ITS EFFECT AND ETHOS
IN CLASSICAL AUTHORS AND
CONTEMPORARY MUSIC THEORY



MEDIEVAL INTERVENTIONS

ANDREAS KRAMARZ

Nobody doubts that music has a special, somewhat mysterious power. Less clear is how we can evaluate that power. What makes music good or bad? Are there objective criteria for such a distinction? What impact can or should music have on individuals and on society as a whole? What are the factors responsible for the effect of music? This book summarizes and discusses how authors of classical antiquity addressed these questions on musical “ethos” and how they can be approached from a modern-day perspective.

After systematically assembling and assessing the value-carrying characterizations of music in poetic literature, the author reviews all noteworthy Greek and Latin writings which enlighten musical “ethos” from the theoretical-philosophical perspective. He then carries the intuitions of the ancients into our time by proposing a coherent model to explain the relationship between music, ethos, and emotions based on the results of contemporary research in the disciplines of music psychology and philosophy. The concept of harmony, understood as the appropriate measure or as the balance of opposites and so central to the reflections of the ancient authors, plays a key role in shedding light on the value and impact, both positive and negative, of music in human existence.

This book provides the most comprehensive overview available about the effect and ethos of music in antiquity and discusses many related questions of scholarly interest. It includes numerous references provided in the original language with translation, ample empirical material for further research, and an extensive bibliography.

Andreas Kramarz holds a Ph.D. in classical civilization (University of Florida), an M.A. in philosophy (Pontifical Athenaeum Regina Apostolorum, Rome), as well as an M.A. in German language and literature and an M.A. in Catholic theology (University of Münster). During the final year of writing his dissertation, he was awarded the Langadas Graduate Fellowship. At present, he is the Dean of Studies and teaches humanities at the Legion of Christ College of Humanities in Cheshire, Connecticut. For many years he has been involved in music as a pianist, organist, and director of various choral and instrumental ensembles.

ADVANCE PRAISE FOR

The Power *and* Value of Music

“This book is a substantial and wide-ranging treatment of the ancients’ theories on music’s effect on individuals and society. Andreas Kramarz investigates both ancient and modern methodologies for placing value on music, giving readers an excellent sense of the diachronic attention given to music’s power over human emotions. It should be of interest not only to classicists and musicologists but to anyone who wants to know more about the role of music in everyday life in antiquity, and especially to those who study human psychology and ethics.”

—Jennifer A. Rea, Associate Professor of Classics
and Graduate Coordinator, University of Florida, Gainesville

“This thorough monograph is a welcome addition to the literature on ancient Greek and Roman music. With impressive erudition, Andreas Kramarz draws from a large corpus of ancient authors to investigate the notion of ‘musical value’ and explore the notoriously slippery concept of musical ethos. The originality of the book lies in putting modern aesthetic theory, music philosophy, and psychology in conversation with ancient musical writings, to discuss the fascinating topic of musical emotions in the context of ancient music.”

—Pauline LeVen, Associate Professor of Classics, Yale University

“Andreas Kramarz has done a great service to several fields with this corpus of ancient ideas about ‘good and bad music’—from Homer to the end of antiquity, including early Christian reception—that will stand as a fundamental resource for all further work on the subject. More than this, Kramarz offers a stimulating and original critical synthesis that draws on modern scholarship in aesthetics, philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science to demonstrate the continuing relevance of the ancient thinkers.”

—John C. Franklin, Associate Professor of Classics,
University of Vermont, Burlington

The Power *and* Value *of* Music

MEDIEVAL INTERVENTIONS

New Light on Traditional Thinking

Stephen G. Nichols
General Editor

Vol. 1

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Andreas Kramarz

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Its Effect and Ethos in Classical Authors
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“For Goethe, Carus has devised a mystical ‘earth-life painting’ in which the music of the spheres, the harmony of the cosmos, presides over the harmonious complementarity of geological and meteorological interests.”
—Oskar Bätschmann in C. G. Carus, *Nine Letters on Landscape Painting*

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To my past, present, and future students

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Preface

The question of whether music could be considered “good” or “bad,” not just as a matter of taste but due to its powerful impact on the human psyche, has fascinated me for many years. In the course of my studies I realized that a respectable number of the ancient authors had elaborated on this issue. Many of these writers claimed that the effect of music on individuals and society stems from specific characteristics (also called “ethos”) of musical features. Unfortunately, the various positions and their underlying arguments were not easy to find but scattered throughout many different works. Excellent scholarship has explored individual authors, texts, and issues, but only a few monographs, the majority of them written decades ago, addressed the theme in a more comprehensive fashion. Even these, however, remained limited in the historical scope, and I found it difficult to gain from them a sufficiently clear and concise description of each author’s position and its implications. They also dealt little with the question of how the ancients’ observations would relate to modern-day considerations about the power and effect of music within music psychology and philosophy.

So I decided to combine my preparation in classical languages and philosophy on the one hand with my experience in music theory and practice on the other and began, at first as a doctoral thesis, to put together the book that I had been missing: a systematic study of what the ancient Greek or Latin texts have to say about musical ethos. In this work, which is now thoroughly revised and updated, the

student of music in ancient Greece and Rome will find clearly defined concepts, a synthesis of the way how the power of music was experienced or imagined, an empirically grounded vocabulary survey of musical characteristics in poetic texts, and an exposition of all noteworthy individual contributions from ancient theorists on the effect and ethos of music, stretching over a period of roughly 1,200 years, from the Pythagoreans down to Isidore of Seville, and including many citations in the original language along with an English translation. For the advanced reader, the review of pertinent scholarly discussion regarding the issues most related to the general theme of this book, especially in the footnotes, updates the earlier studies and collects references to recent contributions. I also look at how the ancients' pioneering intuitions about the effect of music on human beings fits with the recent developments in musicology and in the modern social and psychological sciences. In this context, I sketch out a possible way of explaining the impact of music, especially on the emotional level, that includes the empirical data contemporary science provides us with. Anyone interested in the key factors to be considered when speaking of the influence and ethical value of music can profit from exploring the ideas of the fathers of Western culture and bringing them in relation to the scientific investigations of our own age.

The admittedly ambitious project of assembling the contributions of *all* ancient key players in the discussion of musical ethos into one volume requires abridgment and omissions on other ends: my treatment of the literary and theoretical sources addresses historical, ideological, socio-political, or philological questions only to the degree necessary for extracting and understanding properly the relevant ideas and arguments. Also, an in-depth study of the ancients' perspective of the ethos of individual musical parameters (melody, rhythm, instruments, etc.) or of concrete ancient musical fragments and performance cannot be provided here. The main focus remains on gathering what kinds of effects the ancients ascribed to music, how they tried to explain these effects, how they evaluated them, and what we are able to say about all of this today.

In the course of the years, during which this book took shape, many people have directly or indirectly lent me support, for which my gratitude would have to extend to far more persons than can be mentioned here. I wish to thank, first and foremost, the Faculty of Classics at the University of Florida where most of my research was carried out, especially Dr. Jennifer Rea, Dr. Gonda Van Steen, and Dr. Konstantinos Kapparis, for all their help and advice with my dissertation project. I received much valuable counsel from experts in the field of ancient music and classics: Dr. Eleonora Rocconi (Pavia, Italy), Dr. John Franklin (Burlington, VT), and Dr. Charles Mercier (New Haven, CT). In a special way I would like to thank Prof. Andrew Barker (Birmingham, England) who was available for personal

consultation, provided me with the as yet unpublished English original of his work *Psicomusicologia nella Grecia Antica*, and made very valuable suggestions especially for the first two chapters. I also thank Dr. Stefan Hagel (Vienna, Austria) for providing me with the manuscript of an article before its official publication. Andrea Katzenburg (Langerwehe, Germany), Melanie Schmitz (Köln, Germany), and Dr. Peter Hoffmann (Bochum, Germany) assisted with information on music therapy. For any faults and errors in my work, none of the persons mentioned is responsible but solely the author.

I am also very grateful to all who have helped me with proofreading and made suggestions for improvement: Dr. Kathleen Marks who so generously added this task to her full schedule at St. John's University New York, as well as Michael Luxbacher; further Joseph Houser, Jonathan Flemings, Eric Gilhooly, Sameer Advani, and Joseph A'Hearn, who each reviewed individual sections. Walker Pratt, Thomas White, and Matías Garmendia aided with much needed technical support, and I am greatly indebted to the librarians at the Inter Library Loan Office at the University of Florida who processed my many requests for materials so efficiently. Then there are my friends in Slatersville, RI, who allowed me to take refuge with them several times in order to be able to dedicate myself completely to the work in its most intense stages, and all my colleagues and collaborators at the Legion of Christ College of Humanities whom I thank for their support in so many ways, especially for generously filling in for me when my availability was limited. Last not least I thank the series editor Dr. Steven Nichols, Michelle Salyga, Jackie Pavlovic and the staff of Peter Lang Publishing for all their help in getting this book through its final stages and out to the public.

At first, I thought of dedicating this work to my father, Johannes Kramarz, who died in 2004; to him I owe in great part my love both for the classics and for music. I came to believe, though, that he himself would have preferred to see it dedicated to my students to whom I hope to transmit something of the wealth of cultural achievements, past and present, which can contribute to building a truly human civilization for the future.

Cheshire, November 22, 2015
Feast of Saint Caecilia, Patroness of Music

Abbreviations

<i>Anon. Bell.</i>	<i>Anonymous Bellermann</i> (= <i>Anonymi scriptio de musica</i> ed. F. Bellermann)
AQ	Aristides Quintilianus, <i>De Musica</i>
Boeth.	Boethius
c.	century
CCC	<i>Catechism of the Catholic Church</i>
Cens.	Censorinus
cf.	<i>confer</i> (compare with)
ch(s)	chapter(s)
EB	<i>Encyclopædia Britannica</i>
ed(s).	edition/editor(s)
ff	following (pages, lines, or numbers)
fr(s).	fragment(s)
GL	<i>Grammatici Latini</i> (Keil)
GMM	<i>The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians</i>
GMW	<i>Greek Musical Writings</i> (followed by volume and page number)
HH	<i>Homeric Hymn</i> (followed by the number, not by the name)
MSG	<i>Musici scriptores graeci</i> (Jan 1895)
<i>Mus.</i>	<i>De musica</i> (for all works with that title)

n./nn.	footnote(s) or endnote(s)
OCD	<i>Oxford Classical Dictionary</i> , 3 rd edition (1996)
OED	<i>Oxford English Dictionary</i>
OHME	<i>Oxford Handbook of Music and Emotion</i> (2010)
OHMP	<i>Oxford Handbook of Music Psychology</i>
OHPME	<i>Oxford Handbook of Philosophy in Music Education</i>
OLD	<i>Oxford Latin Dictionary</i>
PG	<i>Patrologia Graeca</i> (Migne)
PL	<i>Patrologia Latina</i> (Migne)
p(p).	page(s)
TML	<i>Thesaurus Musicarum Latinarum</i> (online)
tr.	translation
vol.	volume

All other abbreviations, especially for classical authors and their works, follow the standard of the OCD.

Biblical books, versions, or sections are abbreviated according to the shorter forms of *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 16th edition, 2010, sections 10.45–51 pp. 510–514.

For full bibliographic information of abbreviated titles, see the Bibliography.

Introduction

There was Eru, the One, who in Arda is called Ilúvatar; and he made first the Ainur (...). And he spoke to them, propounding to them themes of music; and they sang before him, and he was glad. (...)

Then Ilúvatar said to them: “Of the theme that I have declared to you, I will now that ye make in harmony together a Great Music. (...) Ye shall show forth your powers in adorning this theme (...). But I will sit and hearken, and be glad that through you great beauty has been wakened into song.”

Then the voices of the Ainur, like unto harps and lutes, and pipes and trumpets, and viols and organs, and like unto countless choirs singing with words, began to fashion the theme of Ilúvatar to a great music; and a sound arose of endless interchanging melodies woven in harmony that passed beyond hearing into the depths and into the heights, (...) and the music and the echo of the music went out into the Void, and it was not void. (...)

But when they were come into the Void, Ilúvatar said to them: “Behold your Music!” And he showed to them a vision, giving to them sight where before was only hearing; and they saw a new World made visible before them (...). And they saw with amazement the coming of the Children of Ilúvatar, and the habitation that was prepared for them; and they perceived that they themselves in the labour of their music had been

busy with the preparation of this dwelling, and yet knew not that it had any purpose beyond its own beauty.¹

In solemn tone, weaving images of old into a new mythological language, J. R. R. Tolkien's *Silmarillion* commences with the "Music of the Ainur" forming the universe and molding its history.² Why does Tolkien choose music as the bridge from void to creation in this contemporary epic?³ Seemingly it is based on the assumption that music possesses organizing principles and an intrinsic power analogous to those underlying the makeup of the world and guiding its unfolding; this idea is already contained in the theory of cosmic harmony found in the writings of ancient civilizations and reiterated throughout time.⁴

This parallelism is further advanced in the *Silmarillion* by introducing another musical phenomenon, which in the story line will then also mark the world in its own way:

But as the theme progressed, it came into the heart of Melkor to interweave matters of his own imagining that were not in accord with the theme of Ilúvatar; for he sought therein to increase the power and glory of the part assigned to himself (...), and straightway discord arose about him, and many that sang nigh him grew despondent and their thought was disturbed and their music faltered (...).

Then Ilúvatar arose, (...) and a new theme began amid the storm, like and yet unlike the former theme, and it gathered power and had new beauty. But the discord of

1. Tolkien 1977/2001, 15–18 (excerpts).

2. Strictly speaking, only Ilúvatar's word brings the world ontologically into being (id., 20), but this does not affect the perfect correlation (and transmutability) between the music and the world and its development, with the exception of the free actions of men, which are precisely *not* contained in the music; see Flieger 2009.

3. Tolkien is not the only one who does this: C. S. Lewis, for example, in the sixth book of his *Narnia* series (*The Magician's Nephew*, which in the story line is the first), includes a similar account about creation through song (1955/1970, 96–108). Tolkien conceived his story between 1918 and 1920 (see Flieger 2009, 160); since he never published it in his lifetime, it is not certain to what degree Lewis may have been inspired by Tolkien. The topos of music at the origin of creation is old: cf. e.g. ps.-Plut. *Mus.* 44.1147: "Everything was constructed by God on the basis of *harmonia*". Cf. Pl. *Cra.* 405a–e with reference to Apollo; *Ti.* 32b–c; Strabo, *Geographica* 10.3.10 (referring back to the Pythagoreans and Plato): "The universe has been assembled according to harmony." An example from a Christian author: Athanasius of Alexandria, *Contra Gentes* 42.3–43.1, 4.

4. See e.g. Barker 2007, 278–286; 318–326; and especially the long tradition about the harmony of the spheres; an anthology of relevant texts throughout history is provided by Joscelyn 1993.

Melkor rose in uproar and contended with it, and again there was a war of sound more violent than before (...).⁵

The story subsequently reaches its climax with a third theme:

And it seemed at last that there were two musics progressing at one time before the seat of Ilúvatar, and they were utterly at variance. The one was deep and wide and beautiful, but slow and blended with an immeasurable sorrow, from, which its beauty chiefly came. The other had now achieved a unity of its own; but it was loud, and vain, and endlessly repeated; and it had little harmony, but rather a clamorous unison as of many trumpets braying upon a few notes. And it essayed to drown the other music by the violence of its voice (...).⁶

Few literary texts describe music's polyvalence so insightfully: apparently purposeless beauty, evoking joy; greatness in melodic and harmonic consonance as a communal experience; creative power and correspondence to other realities in the world; but then especially the duality of consonant and discordant (but not "dissonant") character.⁷ Tolkien encapsulates the eternal battle between good and evil in musical terms, painting a suggestive picture of music based on its value and its power to move and create—or destroy. In this study we shall home in on the theme of the polyvalence of music and what meaning the terms "good" and "bad" could have in relation to it.

Good and Bad Music—An Old and New Debate

The classification of music as "good" or "bad," independent of text that may be linked to it, is by no means of only academic interest (literary, historical, or philosophical). In past decades, a lot of adrenaline and ink have flowed in discussions

5. Tolkien *ibid.*, 16.

6. *Id.*, 16–17. C. S. Lewis introduces the element of discord into his story by means of the annoying disruptions of the creating song by the Witch who "had felt that this whole world was filled with a Magic different from hers and stronger. She hated it" (*id.* 101), but thus it remains extrinsic to the music.

7. It is very significant that Tolkien uses the word "discord" and not "dissonance," the confusion of which is one of several flaws in the article of Jensen 2010. A careful reading of Tolkien's text reveals that not dissonance in terms of tense harmonic intervals but a disruptive and destructive musical pattern as a whole, prompted by morally negative intentions (hence: discord), is posing the *casus belli* and causes Ilúvatar's face to become "terrible to behold" after the third theme has been aborted. This has important consequences for the interpretation of Tolkien's concept of God and men's free will along with their narrative and theological purpose, which cannot be pursued further here.

about whether certain rock bands or pop stars have corrupted with their style not only music itself but also human life, morals, and even society in general.⁸ In his bestseller *The Closing of the American Mind*, Allan Bloom's pathology of post-sixties-students includes the following observations:

Rock music has one appeal only, a barbaric appeal, to sexual desire—not love, not *eros*, but sexual desire undeveloped and untutored. (...) In alliance with some real art and a lot of pseudo-art, an enormous industry cultivates the taste for the orgiastic state of feeling connected with sex, providing a constant flood of fresh material for voracious appetites. (...) The inevitable corollary of such sexual interest is rebellion against the parental authority that represses it. Selfishness thus becomes indignation and then transforms itself into morality. The sexual revolution must overthrow all the forces of domination, the enemies of nature and happiness. From love comes hate, masquerading as social reform. A world-view is balanced on the sexual fulcrum. (...) Nothing noble, sublime, profound, delicate, tasteful or even decent can find a place in such tableaux. There is room only for the intense, changing, crude and immediate.⁹

According to Bloom, this leads to emotional drain, irrationality, and the lost ability to engage in true human relationships, and further:

The result is nothing less than parents' loss of control over their children's moral education at a time when no one else is seriously concerned with it. This has been achieved by an alliance between the strange young males who have the gift of divining the mob's emergent wishes—our versions of Thrasymachus, Socrates' rhetorical adversary—and the record-company executives, the new robber barons, who mine gold out of rock.¹⁰

8. Disputes between the attackers and defenders of particular groups or styles is carried on mainly in magazines, papers, and blogs, and is normally of little scientific interest. There are, however, a number of books that deal with the subject on a more serious plane; to mention just a few: Pattison 1987 (analyzing vulgarity as a tendency that, according to the author, unites Romanticism and the twentieth-century popular music trends), Walser 1993 (explaining the role of Heavy Metal), Jones 1994 (whose analysis leads to conclude that the front lines should not be drawn between classical and rock/pop, but according to what the music is intended to do and does with those engaged in it), and Brackett 2009 (an anthology of rock music testimony and prevalently positive criticism). Gatten 1995 offers an extensive bibliography for which unfortunately no updated version exists. Those who study the influence of music on formation and education especially of the young also deal with the theme in some depth, e.g. the Council on Communications and Media 2009; Kilpatrick 1992, 172–189.

9. Bloom 1987, 73–74 (excerpts).

10. Id., 76.

He goes on to say that rock music “ruins the imagination of young people and makes it very difficult for them to have a passionate relationship to the art and thought that are the substance of liberal education.” While aesthetic education previously consisted in being “attracted by the beauty of heroes whose very bodies expressed their nobility,” now this music “encourages passions and provides models that have no relation to any life the young people who go to universities can possibly lead.” The addictive, drug-like effect of the music flowing through the earbuds impedes them from hearing “what the great tradition has to say”¹¹ and so unmasking the emptiness of the life they are leading.

Of course, not everyone subscribes to such a somber view on rock-music (nor to the more general criticism of present-day popular music culture at large that can also be found in other authors).¹² The reactions of many defenders of contemporary musical developments and styles are unfortunately often characterized more by emotional, polemical and hostile counter-attacks rather than actual argumentation, which relativizes their worth for scientific analysis.¹³

The English philosopher Roger Scruton, in a similar analysis and in the context of deploring the eclipse of taste, asserts that much of modern pop “is also a kind of negation of music, a dehumanizing of the spirit of song”¹⁴ and, at the same time, has developed into an idolatrous star cult, “endowing the singer with the epiphanous aura of the shaman, dancing before his tribe,” wherefore “any criticism

11. Id., 80–81. It is worth reading Bloom’s entire chapter on music (id. 68–81) in order to fully appreciate the strong and weak points of his argumentation, which the quoted fragments can only represent imperfectly.

12. See for some criticism of “classical” music e.g. Jones 1994 as mentioned; Ross 2007.

13. E.g. Zappa 198: while classifying Bloom’s assertions as “such nonsense” or “ivory tower intellectualism”, Zappa displays insufficient understanding of the psychological mechanisms working in music when he reduces psychoacoustics to identifying “wiggling air molecules” or when he dismisses “dark forces of the soul” as just “another product of Lucasfilm.” But objections *could* be raised, among others, against Bloom’s exclusive focus on sexuality and a not always accurate representation of the ancients’ views. Kinzel 2002 gathers and evaluates criticism on Bloom in a balanced manner, detecting well the philosophical underpinnings; he refers to the subject of music on pp. 143–144.

Bloom, observing that Plato’s musical criticism, which “seems to want to rob them of their most intimate pleasure,” aroused strong feelings, even of anger, among his students, concludes sharply: “Indignation is the soul’s defense against the wound of doubt about its own” (pp. 70–71).

14. 1997, 502; see also 499: “Dancing has become a sexual exhibition, since the music available for dancing has no other means besides release. It requires neither knowledge nor self-control.”

of the music is received by the fan as an assault upon himself and his identity.” The music itself then

exists in order to blow away the external world, to create an imaginary living-space, where the fan can move freely, endowed with miraculous powers. If the music sounds ugly, this is of no significance: it is not there to be listened to, but to take revenge on the world.¹⁵

The underlying thesis is this: a decay of music leads to a decay of morals, which, in turn, leads to a decay of society as a whole. Not without a hint of foreboding, Scruton introduces the last chapter about musical aesthetics with a quote from Plato: “The ways of poetry and music are not changed anywhere without change in the most important laws of the city.”¹⁶ This does raise the question of what evidence such a statement is based upon. Why should such a common form of entertainment be made responsible for the proper or improper functioning of what usually would seem the business of education, economy, politics, or perhaps philosophy? Is not music merely a manifestation rather than the actual cause of moral and social change?

In arguing their cases, both Bloom and Scruton and, on that account, many other music theorists refer at least incidentally to the Greek and Latin classical tradition, which held that “we must separate virtue from vice, which means distinguishing music that fulfills our nature, from music, which destroys it.”¹⁷ And indeed, already the ancients deplored the demise of musical culture. Plato, in his endeavor to promote virtue in the citizens, draws a clear distinction between music which enriches and that which corrupts:

As time went on, there appeared as instigators of unmusical law-breaking composers who, though by nature skilled at composition, were ignorant of what is right and lawful in music. In a Bacchic frenzy, and enthralled beyond what is right by pleasure, they mixed lamentations with hymns and paeans with dithyrambs, imitated *aulos* songs with their *cithara* songs, and put everything together with everything else, thus unintentionally, through their stupidity, giving false witness against music, alleging

15. Id., 500.

16. Id. 457, quoting Pl. *Resp.* 424c: “οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ κινεῖνται μουσικῆς τρόποι ἄνευ πολιτικῶν νόμων τῶν μεγίστων;” the Greek “μουσικῆς τρόποι” means “styles of music” which most probably denotes the musical expression of poetry; regarding the definition of “μουσική” see further below. Plato, through the mouth of Socrates, presents this statement as the conviction of the musician Damon and expresses his consent. The concept, as we shall see, is taken up again by later authors, e.g. Cicero in *Leg.* 2.15.38–39.

17. Scruton 1997, 496.

that music possesses no standard of correctness, but is most correctly judged by the pleasure of the person who enjoys it, whether he is a better man or a worse. By creating compositions of these kinds and by choosing corresponding words, they inspired the masses with lawlessness towards music, and the effrontery to suppose that they were capable of judging it. As a result the audiences, which had been silent, became noisy, as if they understood what is good in music and what is not, and a musical aristocracy was displaced by a degenerate theocracy. Now no doubt it would have been no very terrible thing if a democracy of free men had arisen just in the field of music: but in fact, from a starting-point in music, everyone came to believe in their own wisdom about everything, and to reject the law, and liberty followed immediately. Believing themselves knowledgeable, people became fearless, and fearlessness bred shamelessness.¹⁸

Several centuries later, now in Roman times, a text (falsely) attributed to Plutarch criticizes the current state of music in similar terms:

In ancient times people treated music in accordance with its proper status, just as they treated all their other activities. Nowadays musicians have rejected its more dignified aspects, and in place of that manly and inspired music, beloved of the gods, they bring into the theatres a music of effeminate twittering.¹⁹

Then, at the beginning of the 3rd century AD, roughly a century after this, Athenaeus, invoking the authority of Aristoxenus, a music scholar who was Aristotle's pupil, observes how the degeneration of music is cause or at least part of a common cultural decline:

In the old days a noble beauty was carefully preserved in music, and every aspect kept to the orderliness proper to it, in conformity with the principles of the art. (...) Nowadays people approach music in a random and unprincipled way. (...) Performers nowadays make popularity with the spectators the goal of their art. (...) Now that the theatres have been utterly barbarized, and this vulgar music has advanced into the extremity of corruption, we too, few as we are, come together by ourselves and remember what music used to be like. (...)

It happened that in ancient times the Greeks were music-lovers; but later, with the breakdown of order, when practically all the ancient customs fell into decay, this devotion to principle ceased, and debased fashions in music came to light, wherein everyone who practiced them substituted effeminacy for gentleness, and license and

18. *Leg.* 700a–701b, tr. GMW 1.156–157.

19. *Ps-Plut. Mus.* 15 1136b, tr. GMW 1.220.

looseness for moderation. What is more, this fashion will doubtless be carried further if someone does not bring the music of our forebears once more to open practice.²⁰

The contrast drawn between a vulgar “theatrocracy” and an older “noble” and “beautiful” music tradition strikingly parallel Bloom and Scruton’s concerns over today’s pop-culture. One could ascribe this to the idea that conservatives of all times have always ranted against innovation or progress in art as “corruption,” themselves overlooking the fact that their own preferences at one time might also have been regarded as a “perilous novelty” that appalled *their* ancestors.²¹ Important to note, however, is that ancient and modern critics do not speak in terms of old and new alone but refer to something more perennial, asserting that there is music that “fulfills our nature” and other that “destroys it.” The word is of musical laws, order, and principles of the art, qualities of gentleness, “manliness,” and moderation in contrast to “effeminacy,” looseness, lawlessness, individualism, and performers only straining for effect on the masses in the place of pursuing “noble beauty.”²² These are elements that go beyond individual preferences and suggest the possibility of some sort of objective assessment.

Summarizing what has been said so far, we can harvest two main observations. Music can be considered to possess a particular power over rational beings,²³ and

20. Ath. 631e–632b, tr. GMW 1.291; 633bc, tr. Gulick 1950, both with slight adaptations. These complaints will be discussed with more detail in the first section of ch. 3.

21. This last point continues to be true throughout the history of music: from Bach’s chromatic complexities to Stravinsky’s tone language and rhythmical spontaneity (to mention only two of many examples), any innovation first raised eyebrows (to say the least) before becoming itself part of the tradition defended by posterior generations. With regard to popular music, Scruton admits that “whatever argument can be leveled against grunge and Heavy Metal will surely leave the *innocent melodies* of our parents and grandparents quite unaffected” (italics are mine)—melodies against which Theodor Adorno had vigorously raised his voice (id., 497).

22. Already here be noted that the Greek term τὸ καλόν, as Barker justly points out in n. 158 to the text quoted above (see n. 20), implies, beyond the English meaning of “beauty,” aspects of nobility and moral excellence (“virtue”); see e.g. Jaeger 1936, 24 and 36. The sociological implications of an aristocratic ideal, explicit in Plato’s statement above and dominant in Jaeger’s analysis, are not part of our discussion; what matters is that “good” music is seen as promoting of what is considered “proper” in a given context.

Characterizations such as “manliness” and “effeminacy” reflect terminology that ancient authors have used but are problematic from a modern point of view; we shall discuss this further below (pp. 345–347).

23. We shall leave aside the question whether music has any significant impact on plants or animals.

further than this, it seems to be capable of both evoking and causing good and evil. We shall now review each of these points.

Challenges to Explain the Power of Music

Music obviously can exert a powerful effect on the human person, but it is no easy task to explain in what this power consists of, where it stems from, why and how it works, let alone how and why this power translates into value.²⁴ Is the effect that music has on humans (and other creatures) based on anything “objective,” that is, on something inherent to the physical makeup of music and on the physiological-psychological perception and reception process, with the result that certain musical features would prompt particular reactions within the being that is producing or listening to them? Or is all of this effect merely “created” by the receiving being through conditioning, custom, convention, etc.?²⁵

Music seems to act principally on the human subject on the level of passions or emotions, though how exactly music and emotions are linked remains a complex and much debated question, which ties into various issues. Regardless of whether the capacity of human beings to organize sound in an appealing way is a result of evolutionary processes or a “divine gift” bestowed on them by the gods—or a Creator-God—²⁶ philosophers, neurologists, and psychologists remain perplexed when trying to explain why the self-produced acoustic stimuli can be so

24. Although “value” may translate Greek *δύναμις* or Latin *vis* (or *virtus*), terms that again can mean simply “power,” here we shall use this word to indicate whether the power of music leads to a good or bad effect. The term “value” will be defined more precisely for our context a bit further on.

Countless publications endeavor to show and explain the effect of music in popular terms; just to name a few: Tame 1984, Storr 1992, Jourdain 1997, Levitin 2006, Powell 2010, Ball 2010, Mannes 2011. Scientific literature in areas such as neurophysiology, music psychology, and music therapy will be referenced in ch. 4.

25. Anderson 1966, 180 thinks that the Hellenic theorists carefully avoided “the attributing of ethical qualities to music itself”: “Even when Aristotle argues for the affective ethical power of nonvocal music, he means to maintain not that melody as such is good or bad but that music has the power to influence the deliberate actions of men without a sung text.” What this power would be based on remains unanswered.

26. Attempts to explain the origin of music due to survival advantages in Darwinian terms remain rather unconvincing. See e.g. Cross in OHMP 3–13; for criticism, see e.g. Budd 1985, 55ff. The idea of creation is found both in the classical Greek tradition (e.g. ps.-Plut. 14.1136b: “music is in all respects a noble thing, and the invention [εὑρημα] of the gods”) as in the Christian (e.g. Augustine as referenced on p. 382; see Düring 1958, 176). Of course,

emotionally charged, stimulating an emotional response much more immediately and universally than works based on language or than pieces of art which address other senses.²⁷ It is also not yet clear whether specific characteristics within music in and of themselves elicit particular emotional reactions, or whether the reactions are conditioned by extra-musical factors such as acquired associations, habits, or cultural conventions. It may be already noted that if all emotions aroused by music were externally conditioned, the singular emotional effect of music would remain utterly unexplained because the effect would depend on anything but music itself, similar to the primitive behaviorist fallacy that any human action could be explained merely from without. The problem is a false one, based on an “all or nothing”-dichotomy. In any case the challenge remains to show what music’s immediate and own specific contribution to emotion is and how this works.

Furthermore, are the emotions in question principally those of the composer, of the performer, of the listener, or those which somehow lie in the music itself? A further theme of investigation is which type of emotions are associated with music and whether they are actually identical to the emotions stimulated by other events, merely similar to them, or else in a in some way “memories” of those other emotions experienced outside the sphere of music.²⁸ For the purposes of this study,

more explanations for the origin of music than evolution and creation have been suggested by ancient authors, e.g. the imitation of birds, insects (cf. Roscalla 1998), etc.

27. Oliver Sacks states that, despite huge advances in the study of music perception over the past decades, “we have, as yet, scarcely touched the question of why music, for better or worse, has so much power” (2006, 2532). On the comparison with language see e.g. Patel 2008. Schopenhauer 1818/1844 (Eng. 1966) offers a very original explanation, not to be discussed here, of why music is much more powerful than other arts: it supposedly connects us directly to the will that acts behind all things while other arts connect only to individual ideas. Just one observation shall be made: at times, certain pieces of literature or visual products in forms of images move the emotions more powerfully than music, but this is because of some drastic *content* they display; ordinarily it seems true that visual arts leave us much more unaffected than music, which may arouse strongly even without any specific content. Kivy 1990, 3–12, attempts an explanation of this based on the evolutionary-anthropological significance of each of the senses; he concludes that our ear has just enough discriminative power to interpret meaning (although not so much a representational one like the eyes) while sharing the non-interpretational quality of touch, taste, and smell, all of which leads to what Kivy calls “music alone”: music without specific content or “message.” The Greeks saw the common denominator for the senses in their conformity with *harmonia*, with sight and hearing being dominant (e.g. ps.-Plut. *Mus.* 25.1140a–b).
28. All of these questions are discussed by present-day psychological and musicological research as reviewed in the OHME and by music philosophers as in Kivy 1990 and Budd 1985 who review the main positions held by music theorists throughout the past hundred years.

however, the most interesting and important issue is how the nexus between music and emotion impacts upon the “value” of music and whether it can be understood, at least in some aspects, as contributing to making music “better” or “worse”. In general, emotions certainly can have a positive or negative influence on human life and behavior; those linked to music seem to be no exception. Plato, some two thousand years ago, certainly felt that this was so:

Rhythm and melodic order penetrate most deeply into the recesses of the soul and take a powerful hold on it, bringing gracefulness and making a man graceful if he is correctly trained, but the opposite, if he is not. (...) The man who has been properly trained in these matters would perceive most sharply things that were defective, and badly crafted or badly grown, and his displeasure would be justified. He would praise and rejoice in fine things, and would receive them into his soul and be nourished by them, becoming fine and good: but he would rightly condemn ugly things, and hate them even when he was young, before he was able to lay hold on reason. And when reason grew, the person trained in this way would embrace it with enthusiasm, recognising it as a familiar friend.²⁹

Bloom, following Plato, finds that these ideas seem to hold also in contemporary culture:

Civilization or, to say the same thing, education is the taming or domestication of the soul's raw passions—not suppressing or excising them, which would deprive the soul of its energy—but forming and informing them as art. The goal of harmonizing the enthusiastic part of the soul with what develops later, the rational part, is perhaps impossible to attain. But without it, man can never be whole. Music, or poetry, which is what music becomes as reason emerges, always involves a delicate balance between passion and reason. (...) Music, as everyone experiences, provides an unquestionable justification and a fulfilling pleasure for the activities it accompanies: the soldier who hears the marching band is enthralled and reassured; the religious man is exalted in his prayer by the sound of the organ in the church; and the lover is carried away and his conscience stilled by the romantic guitar. Armed with music, man can damn rational doubt. Out of the music emerge the gods that suit it, and they educate men by their example and their commandments.³⁰

Both of these texts suggest that music connects with human passions in a multifaceted way, in part arousing them, in part ordering them, in any case significantly

29. *Resp.* 401d–402a, tr. GMW 1.135 with a slight adaptation; similarly *Arist. Pol.* 8.5.5–10. Bloom's point, of course, is precisely that he—being himself a translator of Plato's *Republic*—finds Plato's assertions proven valid in view of modern culture.

30. Bloom 1987, 71–72.

influencing the interior dispositions and behavior of human beings for the good and for the bad.

Terminological Clarifications About the Value of Music

At this point it is necessary to define and explain first some of the main terms employed and in this context delineate further the scope of the present study.

Music

The objective of this study is to investigate, with the focus on authors of classical antiquity, whether music possesses *intrinsic* characteristics that may have a positive or negative effect on the human person. We therefore prescind from analyzing the role that lyrics (here meaning the text sung in musical pieces) and other concomitant factors play and look at what music does by its inner qualities. Such a distinction can only be theoretical and methodologically motivated, and its very possibility has been seriously questioned. Nevertheless, a discourse about the effect of music *alone* should still be allowed and has in fact taken place on a large scale.³¹ We shall give due attention to the various factors that affect the ethical and emotional influence of music.

Yet even a general and clear-cut definition of what exactly music is and what pertains to it is difficult to come by.³² In Plato's time and still later in antiquity, “μουσική”, as contrasted to sports, could refer to culture in general, comprised of poetry (“letters,” spoken or sung), song, dance, the theoretical science of harmonics, and even philosophy. The meaning shifts depending on the context.³³ This

31. Bonds 2014 summarizes well the history and problems of the concept of “absolute music,” a term coined by Richard Wagner. For a more detailed elaboration on what could also be called “music alone,” see, for instance, Kivy 1990, 15–29.

32. See e.g. Ball 2010, 9–34; 340–343; Nettle in the article “music” in the GMM 17.425–436 offers multiple possible definitions from various vantage points such as dictionaries, encyclopedias, authorities, different cultural contexts, and scholarship. For our purpose we do not need to enter too deeply into the debate of delineating the boundaries of what could or should be considered music at all and what not and for what reasons; I shall only try to demarcate the field which this study intends to address.

33. Cf. Pl. *Resp.* 376e (see also Shorey 1930 and Emlyn-Jones/Predy 2013 *ad loc.*); for what we would rather call “music,” Plato uses the term “μέλος” (*Resp.* 398d: including words, tune, and rhythm). Plato's etymological derivation in *Cra.* 406a (as from “μῶσθαι” signifying “searching, philosophy”) is discussed in Moutsopoulos 2002, 39 n. 1 and is not the most probable. Aristotle (*Pol.* 8.2 1341b23–24) defines music as comprising melody—(or

broad concept of μουσική reflects the interconnectedness of music as we commonly understand it with other acts of human expression. We shall certainly have to look at these connections, but for our purposes we need to use the term “music” in a narrower sense, as rhythmic-melodic sound produced by voice or instruments. This concept of music is also already well known to the ancients, and while it is true that music in early times most frequently includes text, they do reflect on music as such, even if it is not always clear when “melody” or “tune” should refer to “music alone” or to music including text or other elements.³⁴ In general, music is categorized either as a science (ἐπιστήμη, *scientia*), in view of its mathematical underpinnings, or as an art (τέχνη, *ars*), due to its practical application.³⁵ Sextus Empiricus speaks of music as the “science about melodies and tones and making of rhythm and similar things concerned.”³⁶ Aristides Quintilianus writes that musical is certainly “ἐπιστήμη,”³⁷ because it contains both definitions and propositions,

song) making and rhythm: “μουσικὴν ὁρῶμεν διὰ μελοποιίας καὶ ῥυθμῶν οὖσαν.” About the scientific status of music in Plato and Aristotle see Richter 1961. The wide meaning for “μουσική” is still attested for Plutarch (*Per.* 4).

34. For instance, in the *Republic*, Plato clearly discusses the ethos of musical elements (especially the *harmoniai*) separate from the lyrics, and so does Aristotle in *Pol.* 8, as we shall see.
35. In Aristotle’s definition, ἐπιστήμη is the “habit capable of demonstration” (*Eth. Nic.* 6.3.4 1139b32: “ἔξις ἀποδεικτική”), meaning the deduction from certainly known first principles; scientific knowledge does not change and can be taught. The mathematical side of music is considered since the Pythagoreans and can still be seen in the definition in Cassiod. *Mus.* 4 “*Musica est disciplina quae de numeris loquitur.*” “*Numerus*” in such context means “rhythm” (as in Augustine), but mathematically described. τέχνη is the “habit capable of making [something] according to true reasoning” (*Eth. Nic.* 6.4.3 1140a11: “ἔξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική”), which brings something contingent into being (γένεσις) with the maker (as opposed to necessity or nature) as its *causa efficiens*.
36. *Mus.* 1 “ἐπιστήμη τις περιπελῶδις καὶ φθόγγους καὶ ῥυθμοποιίας καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια καταγιγνομένη πράγματα.” He offers a second definition more related to the actual practice of music: “ἡ περὶ ὀργανικὴν ἐμπειρία” (“the craft/practice regarding instruments”). A third definition refers in the widest sense to all the arts; cf. on this AQ 1.1 1.18–2–10 and Greaves 1986, 125 n. 8.
37. Aristides actually works with four definitions (1.4 4.18–25), but his preferred one is: “knowledge of what is appropriate in sounds and in the movements of bodies” (“γνώσις τοῦ πρέποντος ἐν <φωναῖς τε καὶ> σωματικαῖς κινήσεσιν”) (tr. GMW 2.402, see *ibid.* n. 13 on the argument and the textual emendation), emphasizing explicitly Aristotle’s characteristics of science as secure, without change, and the deduction of principles. At some point he says that music is the art that separates goodness from badness regarding harmonies and rhythms: “τέχνην ἀρμονιῶν τε καὶ ῥυθμῶν ἀρετὰς τε καὶ κακίας διορίθουσιν” (2.6 61.8–9).

but insists at the same time that music is also a “τέχνη,”³⁸ involving the practical aspects of composition and performance (1.4 4.20–1.5 6–27).

The most common ancient (though post-classical) definition holds music to be the *scientia bene modulandi* (Cens. DN 10.3; Aug. *Mus.* 1.2.2; Mart. Cap. 9.930).³⁹ In this definition, the term “*bene*” calls our attention, while “*modulari*” indicates the melodic, rhythmic, and harmonic creation of music.⁴⁰ This definition narrows the scope of music to that of musical science; which for the ancients deals mainly with the mathematical rules and proportions that underly the different musical parameters. Complying with these would render a composition *bene modulata*. In this line, in the Latin tradition of the *artes liberales*, music formed part of the *quadrivium*, consisting of the mathematically-based subjects, of which the others were arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy. Although treating music as “art” is not unproblematic,⁴¹ music is nowadays commonly considered “both art and science—involving both talent and creativity as well as knowledge;” “its principal manifestation is composing music (with rational principles).”⁴²

Discussing music as art or science will already lead to evaluation judgments, but since we are looking for the effect of music on the human person, we need to focus on music not so much as a theoretical system but rather as an actual sonic reality along with the functions that such a musical event may fulfill. The ancients sometimes offer simple definitions in this direction. According to Strabo 10.3.9, for instance, music is “about dance, and rhythm, and melody”—but the context of music at religious festivals prompts the author to immediately add enjoyment and

38. Id. 1.4 5.1–2. In agreement with two of the abovementioned definitions, being “an organization of perceptions, and of perceptions trained to accuracy” (σύστημα ... καταλήψεων, καὶ τούτων ἐπ’ ἀκριβὲς ἡσκημένων) (tr. GMW 2.403).

39. Wille 1967, 416 and 594 assumes that this definition goes back to Varro (116–28 BC) as part of his lost treatise on music; so also Hentschel (in August. *Mus.* 2002, 178, n.8). Hentschel (in August. *Mus.* 2002, 178) n. 10 *ad loc.* clarifies that “science” here means the ability to acquire or have acquired and to process certain knowledge.

40. Cf. Wille 1967, 416, n. 106 and 605 with a commentary on the definition; Wille points out that Augustine includes here the movement of dance as part of musical rhythm; cf. also Richter 1965, 90–91.

41. MGG 17.433–434 points out two problems: that not all music seems to be “art,” and the difference between “vernacular” (popular and folk) music and art music, which is of an order distinct from the difference between everyday language and literature. For the general distinction, see also Budd 1985, ix–x who, for the purpose of his study, defines music as “essentially the art of uninterpreted sounds.” For the ancient “science of harmonics,” see *in extenso* Barker 2007.

42. GMM “Music”, I, 3, summarizing thus the substantial agreement between dictionaries and authoritative general encyclopedias in Western nations.

beauty since happiness makes humans more alike to the gods. Plato, at some point (*Leg.* 673a), calls music “what [concerns] the voice regarding the education of the soul towards virtue” (“τὰ μὲν τοίνυν τῆς φωνῆς μέχρι τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς ἀρετῆς παιδείαν (...) ὠνομάσαμεν μουσικὴν”).

Also modern definitions refer to functional aspects for music. An entry in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* reveals some important questions in this regard. Here we read that music is the “art concerned with combining vocal or instrumental sounds for beauty of form or emotional expression, usually according to cultural standards of rhythm, melody, and, in most Western music, harmony,” adding later that, at least early in the twentieth century, music is commonly “characterized by the regularity of its vibrations.”⁴³ This definition contains various problems: it is ambiguous about verbal sound (whether spoken or only sung text are part of it or not) and it does not attempt to cover all that anyone ever has declared music,⁴⁴ but rather what most people in past and present would consider so. In the subsequent sentence, the *Britannica* states the factors of “conceptual” and “auditory” as being universal for human music of all times and places—indeed, the conscious combining of elements for expression seems to be limited to the rational activity of human persons. The whole definition implies that music is here understood as produced by human beings only. Hence, animal or natural sounds deserve musical description only in analogy because they are lacking the rational component that human music virtually always possesses.⁴⁵

What most matters to us, however, is that this definition remarkably asserts that music may have two distinct purposes: to be “for,” i.e. aim at, “beauty of form,” that is, to provide a positive aesthetical experience, or the “expression of emotion.”⁴⁶ Later on we shall touch upon the relationship between music and aesthetics, but for the moment we should notice that the combination of sounds is not always intended to create beauty. The analysis of ancient authors will reveal instances of music where beauty is precisely excluded (e.g. in the context of mourning). The other purpose mentioned in the definition, “emotional expression,” is a concept highly disputed among scholars and requires further qualification, which we shall pursue further on. The *Britannica* does not contemplate other functions such as

43. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/398918/music> (accessed on November 22, 2015) or in the *Macropædia* ed. 2010, vol. 24, 493.

44. See about this point e.g. Ball 2010, 10.

45. For a further discussion, of this distinction, see Wallin 2000 and in the MGG the lemma “Animal Music.”

46. The “or” is probably not meant strictly disjunctive as if these two effects could not occur together; the same applies to “vocal or instrumental” in the definition—it is obvious that both also may be combined.

group integration essential enough to be included in a general definition even though the social dimension might be music's primary function in some cultures.⁴⁷

When the *Britannica* speaks of "cultural standards," we arrive at assumption that there are certain objective criteria of judgment to evaluate music, at least within a specific cultural context. That, for its part, raises the question whether music in itself is something objective or rather subjective, or, in other words, whether it is bound to the human mind as such or just to an individual mind. Is music simply the accumulation of sound-waves with specific characteristics and in a certain order (which might serve as a physical description of music), or is it rather their *interpretation* according to reasonable (and perhaps even meaningful, "conceptual") patterns which are imposed by the human mind onto these physical phenomena in their production and perception?⁴⁸ Would there be any music if the human species didn't exist?⁴⁹ And how is the ontological (or metaphysical) status of music related to the effect that music is said to have on human beings? Since

47. See Clayton in the OHMP, 35–42. The definition also fails to consider dance, which the ancient Greeks considered, at least ideally, an essential factor in music (see e.g. Lippman 1963, 195) and which is also an integrated part of music in many other cultures. The exclusion of dance in the current study has its own reasons, see below in n. 50.

48. Music and meaning is another great field of dispute, related to the one on expression: does music (independently of lyrics or extrinsic associative context) *mean* anything (i.e., correspond to something that could be translated into language terms), or does its meaning exhaust itself in its own form (like a number game), or does it not have any meaning at all (but in what would its rationality then consist)? To respond to this problem, the use of the term "purpose" or "function" might help (see below). For a general overview see Cross/Tolbert in OHMP, 24–32 and Patel 2008, 300–351.

See for the distinction between a *sonic* and a *musical* event Kivy 1990, 100. The subjectivity problem is, of course, related to the general tenet of transcendental philosophy since Kant, which holds that reality for us exists only according to our perception filtered by the categories of the intellect. To our question, however, does not pertain the gnoseological status but the inquiry to what degree music, and therefore its effect, is created by our mind and to what degree there is at least an objective foundation for its evaluation.

49. Even though one may exclude non-human music by definition, the sonic phenomenon may still exist apart from humanity. This question may appear merely speculative or marginal but it opens interesting horizons in view of what is objective in music. The Pythagoreans certainly would respond affirmatively, at least as far as the harmony of the spheres goes, eternally resounding with man usually being unable to hear it consciously. The (Neo-) Platonic School, taking its cue from Plato's *Timaeus*, sees the whole cosmos designed in a musical order, and Christian authors speak of the celestial music of the angels (see below in ch. 2 n. 46; Ringenbach 1986; Schadel 1995)—but this latter music, just as Tolkien's "music of the Ainur," would have to be based on non-material processes since the angels are conceived as spirits whose essence is without physical matter.

we are not in a position to answer these questions yet, we shall have to leave our definition of music open enough to allow for any direction in which the solution of these problems may be found.

Given the manifold uses of “music” in ancient and modern culture, I propose for our study the following twofold definition: *music* (a), in the proper sense, is organized vocal or instrumental sound as produced and perceived by rational beings;⁵⁰ *music* (b), in a wider and analogous sense, is non-human sound (e.g. bird “songs”) that resembles music (a), and/or it is a structure composed of the same or similar organizing principles as music (a). With “resemble” I am not making any statement about the origin of music (a): Even if man “discovered” music by imitating nature, its ontological status needs to remain anthropocentric. “Resemble” means that the structure of non-human sound must possess sufficient similarity to music (a) in order to allow for the analogy. The last part in the definition of music (b) enables us to apply the term “music” to something like the “harmony of the spheres,” unintentionally produced musical sound, or even to the non-physical world (angels, God, etc.).

Neither definition contains by itself a direct demand for a specific moral, aesthetical, or expressive value in order to speak of music.⁵¹ Music (a) is then both the acoustical phenomenon and the object to be considered in the science or art of music; while art will logically only be able to deal with music (a), science may discuss music (b) as well. In the present study, the topic will be primarily concerned with the evaluation of music (a) and, as mentioned above, not of “μουσική” according the wider sense of that ancient concept but in abstraction from lyrics and other elements that often accompany music. At the same time, it will be important to examine to what degree the evaluation of music (a) does depend on extra-musical realities which influence the effect of music through some sort of relationship (e.g.

50. “Organized” means that it is formed by a defined set of rules or patterns (scales, systems, etc.). Of course, this definition could also apply to speaking, and given the melodiousness of some languages the boundaries between singing and speaking are fluid. However, I do not need to treat the distinction between music and language (for this see e.g. Raffman 1993; Kivy 2007; Patel 2008; Hodges/Sebald 2011, 150–152) since I am excluding from my study the pronunciation of text. The same applies to dance as the physical “acting out” (or visualizing) of musical and/or textual content, but occasionally I shall include some reflections about it.

“Rational beings” leaves the option to extend music to the ancient gods or other rational (mythological) creatures.

51. Otherwise “bad” music would need to be called non-music, but this would complicate unnecessarily the terminological handling of our topic, because such “non-music” would possess all other characteristics of music except for that it would be “bad” in some sense.

through *mimēsis*—which refers to music (b)). We shall find that the evaluation of music cannot be divorced from the *purpose* or *function* attached to music. Therefore, the concept of these last two terms now needs some further explanation.

Purpose and Function

I have found it very helpful to make a clear distinction between distinction between “purpose” and “function”.⁵² A purpose is the consciously intended goal of a thing or an activity, whereas the term “function” refers to effects produced that are independent of the specific intention or interest of those particular persons creating something or performing a certain activity. For example, a children’s game is usually considered to have no purpose at all (or, at the most, simply the enjoyment of the game itself),⁵³ but it can at the same time serve various functions such as relaxation or the training of social interaction. Likewise, music may or may not be composed or performed for a particular purpose (these could be as disparate as pain relief or being a stimulant for buying Christmas trees, or to contribute to a healthy culture and society), but it will always fulfill some sort of function. We need to understand “function” here in the widest sense, for even something like the aesthetical enjoyment of pure music is included. Applying the distinction between “purpose” and “function” to music serves to avoid a mere utilitarian or functionalistic concept of art—precisely the possibility of not pursuing any “purpose” safeguards the non-functional essence of the musical experience. The fact that music *does* in fact exercise multiple functions and is often purposefully put into the service of exterior objectives will be important, however, for the attempt to see in what sense musical experience might be evaluated.

The Value of Music

This leads us to a brief consideration of what “evaluation” and “value” could mean in the context of music. In general, we can identify three levels according to which music might be evaluated:⁵⁴

52. I owe this point to my reading of Scruton 1997, 458.

53. I mean with “purpose” primarily the pursuit of a goal *outside* of the thing or action; insofar as even children “intend” to play (in contrast to simple instincts or subconscious reactions), I shall not use the term “purpose” for this aspect which is present in any conscious human action.

54. There is a rough parallelism between these levels and the distinction Plato draws in *Leg.* 667b–e, that between delight—*χάρις* (rendered by the artistic performance), usefulness—*ωφέλεια* (purpose), and correctness—*ὀρθότης* (related to the ethical dimension), only the

- 1) *artistic value*: inasmuch as a musical piece, style, performance, etc. corresponds to the standards established within a particular cultural or at least musical tradition. The value can depend on intrinsic or extrinsic factors; intrinsic is whether or not the music in itself and objectively follows the appropriate rules and conventions and possesses the corresponding aesthetic qualities; extrinsic factors are the expectations, which either the artist himself, his manager (if there is one), or the audience have and how they are met by the skill shown in the composition or during the performance, including the context or any circumstance that may render a performance successful and enjoyable;⁵⁵
- 2) *value for a purpose*:⁵⁶ inasmuch as music serves one or more particular purposes (outside of itself), which can lie on the individual, social, cosmic, or supernatural level—here enter examples such as the usefulness of music to coordinate manual labor, instigate to battle, open the heart of a beloved one, entertain, heal, put to sleep, etc., all depending on the desired effect;⁵⁷
- 3) *moral value*: inasmuch as music influences or even conditions directly human dispositions and actions that themselves underlie a moral judgment⁵⁸—in

last two of which Plato really considers important for being related to the truth, while the first is no more than a game. Another passage could be *Grg.* 474d–e: something is called “καλός” according to some “purpose” (“κατὰ τὴν χρείαν”, later “τὰ ὠφέλιμα”) or some “pleasure” (“κατὰ ἡδονὴν τινα, ἐὰν ... χαίρειν ποιῇ”) (also in 475a: “ἡδονῇ τε καὶ ἀγαθῷ ὁριζόμενος τὸ καλόν”); adding to these “τὰ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα” (“according to the laws and the customs”), which applies to the moral level, we have all three levels present. It is interesting that Plato here even makes explicit reference to music as an example.

55. See e.g. Ball 2010, 278–281 who explains how emotion arises from met or unmet expectation, and Huron 2006.
56. I am not saying “function” here because one would hardly judge music negatively for not fulfilling a non-intended function: it makes no sense to say that a certain dirge or some fugue by Bach is a bad national anthem.
57. Notice that the value of music in this category does not depend on the moral value of the purpose to which the music should serve. A war song is good if it instigates the soldiers well to fight—we are not evaluating here the (moral) value that the battle in itself may have. A music piece that instigates undesired aggression would be called “bad” according to the following third level.
58. “Moral” is here understood as referring to good or bad if according or contrary to established norms of character or behavior. In some cases, this third level could overlap with the second when the moral effect is directly intended (if, for example, certain music is composed to have a moral impact on others); but since this is not always so or not even in the majority of the cases, and because of the importance of the third category, I am treating it as a separate level. Of course, levels two and three also depend to a certain degree on the

this category fall especially the considerations about character formation developed by authors such as Plato and Aristides Quintilianus. The moral impact of music might be conceived as universal, i.e. being in effect always, either without any restrictions (total), or within a specific socio-cultural setting (limited in place or time), or it might be based on certain anthropological predispositions (brain functions, the interrelation between affectivity and reason, etc.). Such an effect might also exist for a particular person or context only, without claim to be in force elsewhere. It is obvious that not every musical piece or feature elicits such an effect in a noticeable way; to assess the conditions for the possibility of this effect is precisely one of the objectives of this study. To prove an individual case is, of course, much easier (as all that is needed is to find a clear example) than to show any sort of universal pattern—but the latter would be required if music is to truly have any moral impact on society or even on the political stability of a State.

We can observe that in a certain way these levels build upon each other: the first level (especially the emotional response to music) is the condition for the second—for a particular effect of music can only be achieved on the general basis of an existing nexus—and the third can be considered a special case of the second by adding the moral aspect.

A musical piece might undergo a modification or even a change of value from concomitant factors, e.g. from text or other extra-musical elements such as dance or images that are associated with it and might impose their own value on the compound product. As mentioned above, this study will attempt to consider only the analyses of the value of music in itself, excluding those other factors as much as possible. We need to recognize, however, that it is at times rather difficult to distill the arguments having to do with the musical value of pieces that involve extra-musical elements as well.⁵⁹

first level; for instance, a poor musical performance might diminish the effectiveness of the music on the other levels (unless it were part of a comedy about bad musicians ...). As with any distinction, in real life all these aspects are interrelated.

59. The logic of this principle is obvious when nowadays certain music is by some judged as “bad” because the lyrics contain, for instance, satanic or immoral messages. How would the same music be judged if it were sung or played to accompany a religious text such as a psalm?

"Good" and "Bad"

The terms "good" and "bad" undergo deeper philosophical reflection in antiquity especially through Plato and Aristotle who, to a certain extent, became aware of their equivocality.⁶⁰ To describe the value of music, we have thus far been using the term "good" generically to mean something like "having a positive effect," and conversely "bad" to mean "having a negative effect."⁶¹ We are now able to draw up more precise definitions. All three levels of the value of music laid out above have in common that the value depends on some "function," that is, the resulting effect or effects, regardless whether intended or not, which music elicits. Whether music is good or bad is then equivalent to whether or not it fulfills a specific function. If the effect is welcomed, music is "good," and if the effect is not desired, it is "bad."

The first level concerns mostly the musicians themselves within their art insofar as they are to produce music which meets certain expectations.⁶² Here the whole debate about aesthetics (What is "beautiful"? When is music beautiful? Does it need to be beautiful, and by what standards?) and the value of music in its own right without any intended exterior purpose come into play.⁶³ Music is good or bad according to the enjoyment (the pleasure felt by a human being because of met expectations, on the aesthetical or emotional level), which playing or listening to it provides. Even though music, on this level, may not have any other purpose outside of itself, its function as a source of enjoyment is what makes it relevant and

60. Mostly καλός and τὸ καλόν or ἀγαθός as opposed to κακός/τὸ κακόν/κακία or πονηρία; in Plato above all *Hp mai.* 293a–300c, *Grg.* 474d–e, and *Symp.* 210a–212a; in Aristotle *Top.* 1.15 106a21–23 (opposite: τὸ αἰσχρόν), 107a3–12, and, along with the concept of virtue (ἀρετή), in *Rh.* 1.5.6–15 1361a–b and 1.9.1–35 1366a–1367b and in *Eth. Nic.* 2.2.6–2.6.20 1104a14–1107a.27. See a more detailed discussion in Horn/Rapp 2002, 227–231.

61. I am aware that "positive" and "negative" likewise might beg a definition, but in order to avoid an infinite regress of definitions, I am appealing to the common meaning of these words.

62. Ancient musicians were not less subject to criticism, sometimes quite mordant, than contemporary ones when they performed poorly; e.g. *Hor. Ars P.* 347–349; Wille 1967, 332–336.

63. Some modern artists will not find the cause of enjoyment in beauty (as traditionally understood) but in some other satisfaction stemming from the piece's correspondence to certain rational (or irrational) principles or even ideological, political, or religious tenets. This again approaches the "ethical triangle."

For the study of antiquity in general, of course, the discussion does matter whether music as l'art pour l'art or mere enjoyment existed at the time, or whether the ancients knew of a purely aesthetic experience; about this see below pp. 55ff and also Wille 1967, 431–434 on enjoyment in Roman times.

appealing in the first place. The highly interesting questions of why human beings enjoy music so much at all and why *certain* people prefer *certain* forms of music beg for a clarification of the mechanisms behind these preferences, and these bear consequences for the other two levels as well. Much of the argument here depends on individual or common conventions and tastes and is treated in (ethno-) musicology, music psychology, and music philosophy.

The second level supposes an explicit purpose directly pursued in view of a particular effect, for in specific contexts music is intentionally employed as a means for another end; and the efficiency of achieving this end depends clearly on what music does with the human being. In antiquity, we shall see how musical tunes help to coordinate actions such as rowing, to heal sickness, to incite love, to appease divinities, or to gather courage in battle. In our modern world, music is no less utilized in areas such as music therapy, the advertising business, religious ceremonies, or to add emotional spice to movies. In all of these, the value of music can be held as directly proportional to its effectiveness in achieving the extrinsic end aimed for. Good film music, for instance, consists of melodies that match the images and deepen their affective impact without annoying or distracting from what happens on the screen. Good liturgical music helps to pray and celebrate the faith,⁶⁴ while bad liturgical music distracts from prayer through irritating or distracting elements or by transporting feelings which do not foster worship.⁶⁵ The same piece might be good for helping get work done but bad for pain therapy. Hence, for each “application” there will exist different rules or criteria, again depending on culture and circumstances or on the immediate context, which will indicate the precise musical features fitting for the purpose in question. Musicology and music psychology are investigating why music has such a power that it stimulates or intensifies certain actions or processes and why *certain* music is apt for *certain* goals and not for others.

The third level concerns the moral or (strictly speaking) “ethical” dimension, which received particular attention among the ancient theorists. Music is thought

64. The phrase “*qui (bene) cantat bis orat*” is often attributed to Augustine, but none of his preserved works contains such a quote, which seems to summarize ideas from *Sermo* 336.1.1 (“*cantare amantis est*”); see also CCC 1156 with reference to *Enarratio in Ps* 72.1 (see below n. 829).

65. The Catholic Church, for example, has issued documents (see e.g. Predmore 1936 or the Church documents assembled at <http://musicasacra.com/resource-lists/>, accessed on January 18, 2014) which establish criteria about the style of music fitting for Mass or other liturgical celebrations. The judgment about what is deemed pleasing to the divinity usually depends on the aesthetical tastes of the adherents within each belief-system; we shall discuss some of these points in the context of Christian authors below.

to be able to predispose the human being towards morally good or bad actions, either in the short term, by awakening an immediate reaction to a musical stimulus in a given situation, or in the long term, by educating or forming the character of children—and indeed persons of any age—through regular and conscious exposure to certain music. Upon deeper analysis it becomes clear that it is specific parameters such as instruments, modes, melodies, rhythms, etc.—each on its own or in combination with other elements—which are held responsible for leading people to either constructive or destructive actions or reactions in the interior or exterior of the person. “Good” music promotes attitudes or actions seen as positive within the ruling moral value system, whereas “bad” music fosters the opposite. Ancient authors discussed (and on occasion denied) these effects and their consequences for the individual and society. Our study is primarily concerned with these issues: the power the ancients ascribe to music and how they argue their positions. We shall also see to what extent these positions are or could be substantiated by modern scientific research.

It is perhaps important to note that the evaluative terms “good” and “bad” are not employed as absolute, antithetical terms but rather as the extreme points on a continuum (“best-good-less good” or “problematic-bad-worst”). The value “neutral” would also be included, indicating that a particular music piece or parameter has no significant effect in the value scale.

Obviously, one single musical piece or feature may be considered on all three levels and can produce multiple effects; therefore, the value judgment would need to be differentiated, specifying which effect or function one is concerned about. It is possible to imagine a musical piece that is characterized by a positive aesthetic value (first-level consideration) but triggers a negative moral reaction on the part of the listeners (third-level analysis).⁶⁶ A tune may be stirring enough to raise emotions during a political propaganda rally (second level) but rather primitive from an artistic point of view (first level). A meaningful communication of value judgments about music, therefore, would require a specification of the purpose or function according to which a musical piece, performance, or element is being evaluated.

The following diagram intends to summarize and illustrate the distinctions that we have made and the applications that we have pointed out in this section.

66. An example from another artistic field would be the movie *Jud Süß* (1940), which at the time was considered a cinematographic masterpiece but ought to be judged morally reprehensible because of its abhorrent anti-Semitism.




Figure 1–1. Good and bad music—subdivisions.

Musical Ethos

Classical scholars, drawing on the usage of the ancient authors themselves,⁶⁷ have frequently employed the term “ethos” in discussing characteristics and effects of music.⁶⁸ We need to explain the exact meaning of this term as the concept is rather complex and not always used in the same way.

The OED⁶⁹ defines the English word “ethos,” with reference to Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, as “the characteristic spirit, prevalent tone of sentiment, of a people or community.” The term “spirit” in English is not precise; the sense of the word can be better understood by looking at the two Greek words on which the English

67. For one example see Arist. *Pol.* 8.5.8 1340a39: “ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέλεσιν αὐτοῖς ἐστὶ μιμήματα τῶν ἡθῶν—in the tunes themselves are representations of *ēthē* [gr. plural of ethos].”

68. Mentioned here may be especially Abert’s groundbreaking work *Die Lehre vom Ethos in der griechischen Musik* (1899/1962) and Anderson’s *Ethos and Education in Greek Music* (1966). There are, of course, more and also some recent publications, e.g. Lippman 1963 and 1992, 3–16; Zoltai 1970; Mathiesen 1984; Boccadoro 2002; others treat musical ethos in particular authors or regarding specific aspects (e.g. Hornbostel 1929; Wilkonson 1938; Solomon 1981; Rossi 1988; Pagliara 2000).

69. <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/64840?redirectedFrom=ethos#eid>, accessed on August 18, 2012.

etymologically depends: ἔθος⁷⁰ (“custom, habit”) and the older ἥθος⁷¹ (“custom; manners; (moral) character” as action patterns congealed into a person or society). These terms are closely related, but the second is prevalent in the context of education (e.g. in Pl. *Resp.* 375a–e; 500d and in Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 2.1.1ff 1102a14ff) and of music when its role in character formation (e.g. Pl. *Resp.* 400d; Arist. *Pol.* 8.5.4–10 1339b43–1340b19) or when the nature of elements such as modes are discussed.⁷²

The usage of the English term “ethos” is not always clear. Anderson conceives its essential meaning in the context of music for the ancient authors as “the double power of expressing and also of influencing our moral nature.”⁷³ The texts which Anderson discusses reveal, however, a spectrum comprising other elements of “character” (a word which Anderson justly rejects as a proper translation of “ethos”)⁷⁴ not limited to morality. “Relaxedness,” for example, by itself does not necessarily imply a specific ethical value and could be seen positive in the context of an eased state of mind,⁷⁵ while to the contrary it could appear negative (and does so more frequently in ancient texts) as a lack of self-control or fortitude.⁷⁶

70. In opposition to “φύσει—by nature” in Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1179b21; LSJ 480 assumes that this word is rather a *falsa lectio* for “ἥθος.” It is documented since the 5th century BC, but both terms are also used together, especially by Plato and Aristotle, with distinct meanings (e.g. “ἡ δ’ ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους” in Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 2.1 1103a17, cf. Pl. *Leg.* 792e); see for this and the following Horn/Rapp 2002, 155–157.

71. In opposition to πάθος, among others, in Longinus 9.15 and in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*. A brief history of the term can be found in Anderson 1994, 135–136. He calls it a “habitual human behavior,” first (in Homer) used with a metaphor of place, then qualified with adjectives expressing moral evaluation (Hes. *Op.* 67f) and being able to be taught (id. 699). Aristotle is the first to apply the term explicitly to music, even though the Pythagoreans and Plato do talk, even though in other terms, about the moral value of music. Anderson leaves it open whether the idea of the ethical dimension of music stems from Greece or is a foreign import, or both. Since ethos in music is documented for China and India, an Eastern origin is possible, but the idea may also have developed in Greece independently.

72. E.g. Pl. *Resp.* 398c–401b; Cleonides 206.3–18; AQ 1.8 (W-I 15.19–20) *et passim*; 1.9 (W-I 19.7–10) with n. 116 in GMW 2.420; 1.11 (W-I 22.11–12, using χαράκτηρ) with n. 126 in GMW 2.424; 1.12 (W-I 30.9); Sext. Emp. *Math.* 6.49. See about this also GMW 2.432–433 n. 150.

73. Anderson 1966, 32. “Moral nature” seems to mean the (changeable) disposition of a human being towards moral (good or bad) attitudes or actions.

74. “Ethos” in the Greek sense indeed contains both possibly neutral character traits and moral elements, but then Anderson’s reduction of ethos to “moral nature” is not adequate. See similar Strunk 1998, 13–14 n. 21. Barker (e.g. GMW 2.432–433) often translates “ἥθος” with “character.”

75. For instance, ἀνάπαυσις in Arist. *Pol.* 1339b13–27, or διάχυσις in Ptol. *Harm.* 100.2.

76. For instance, ἀνεσις in Ath. 633c or χαλαρός in ps.-Plut. *Mus.* 1141e.

Whenever the ancients intend to form a certain character trait through musical education, they give this trait—and the music that fosters it—a value judgment on the third (moral) level as introduced above, for being a disposition towards good behavior. However, the concept of musical ethos is not limited to the context of education and so does not necessarily have a moral dimension.⁷⁷ Both expressing and creating ethos through music would actually belong to the second level unless the effect consists in influencing character or dispositions in the moral sense (by forming, habituating, or inclining in a specific manner towards morally relevant actions), which we have reserved for the third level.

In the present study, “ethos”—with “*ēthē*” as a transliteration of the Greek plural “ἦθη—and “ethical” in the context of music will be used in a wide sense to make it applicable to character (i.e. individual patterns of being or behavior, including, but not limited to, the moral dimension) or nature of a person or of a group of persons (a society) and, in analogy, of music or musical features insofar as they are conceptually comparable to human behavior (and, hence, held to either express or influence the character of a person or of society).⁷⁸ Now, whenever music is expected to fulfill, on the second level, the function of expressing an equivalent

77. Still, Anderson’s entry, written together with Mathiesen, in the GMM 8.403, suggests a rather narrow definition of ethos: “sense of ‘character’, more precisely ‘moral character’, often regarded as the result of habituation.” But in the context of music therapy, for instance, we would not speak of a moral context.

78. For the point of expression see Lippman 1963, 194: “cultural values are embodied in words, dance, and melody, becoming the basis of specific musical genres—of closely defined styles and types of melody with particular ethical natures.” Lippman goes on to emphasize that this sort of music is representational and cannot be comprehended “from the vantage point of pure art” (see also ch. 2, pp. 55ff).

Although he justly remarks a little after that the Greek concept of “μουσική” is originally complete only comprising text, melody, and dance, confusion arises when on the one hand he later (197ff) talks about “poetry” and “music” again in separate terms, but on the other attributes to music educational value or “moral influence” based on examples (e.g. the singing of “great heroic exploits”) where the ethical impact is clearly due to the text and not to the musical elements, and even the glory immortalized in “song” refers much more to the text than the melody which, in almost all cases, in fact has vanished (and even more has the corresponding dance). This shows that it is not helpful to study the ethical force of music by including into its definition text and dance (even though for the Greeks only all of these together may have been the ideal musical “event”), for otherwise the part music (in our definition) plays becomes confused with what poetry means and achieves already on its own. Our question is: What is the specifically musical contribution to “ethos”? The only clear examples Lippman gives are the “directly stimulating effect” of military music (199) and the “medical purification of the soul” in the Pythagorean Brotherhood (200).

aspect of ethos (e.g. “quietness”), and it does so effectively and properly, then this music is good (and if it does not, it is bad), and the value judgment would depend on an analysis of the correspondence between the musical ability of expressing ethos and the expressed ethos. Whether such an expression is actually possible is part of the debate about music and expressivity, which will be looked at in the course of chapters 3 and 4. But in the context of influencing morality (third level), the value of music depends exclusively on the resulting moral effect, and the only reason for music to have a value here is that it is avowed to provoke these dispositions or actions with moral relevance in a person or a group of persons.

These distinctions may sound rather abstract at this stage, but it has been necessary to introduce them for clarity of language and concept. As soon as we shall discuss the particular cases contributed by the various authors, the different applications of “ethos” will become more tangible.

Summary

Music then, defined as an acoustical phenomenon of organized vocal (sung) or instrumental sound, consciously composed and perceived by human or other rational beings, is subject to value judgments on at least three distinct levels: art (or aesthetics), exterior purpose, and morals. On each of these levels each musical piece or parameter can be evaluated based on a specific effect that the musical phenomenon exerts on the human person (in general or in an individual case) and whether this fulfills well or badly an expected function. Ancient Greek theorists apply the term “ἦθος/ethos” to characteristics of music that belong to the third and, in certain cases, to the second level of evaluation; they sought to apply the effects of these functions of music in areas such as music education and therapy.

Reasons for Studying Greek and Roman Sources

The discussion about what music can be considered “good” or “bad,” is probably as old as the ability of humans to produce music.⁷⁹ This study will be dedicated to great extent to explore specifically the views of ancient Greek and Latin authors. Music was a dominant ingredient of everyday life during antiquity, which resembles somewhat our current situation.⁸⁰ The classical authors developed a

79. Düring 1958, 175: “The distinction between good and bad music is something we can follow as far back as our literary sources bring us.”

80. The universality of music as such for the ancients is a commonplace; e.g. Quint 2.17.10: “*Cantatur ac saltatur per omnis gentes aliquot modo.*”

quite sophisticated music theory, both regarding the technical and the ethical dimension, which has been extremely influential on the development of music in the Western tradition.⁸¹ Human sciences such as philosophy, psychology, history, ethnology, etc., continue to profit from their theoretical groundwork, given their keen insights into human nature and society. Especially in the area of philosophy, the recourse to Greco-Roman antiquity has been constant. Regarding music, the amount of reference to ancient authors during the Renaissance and growing interest in recent scholarship⁸² indicate that the investigation of the power and effects of music should take into account what ancient music theory had to say about it. Fortunately, many of the surviving pertinent texts of ancient authors about music are by now readily accessible and have been commented on and discussed.⁸³

The Greeks systematically theorized about music in all its dimensions—except, apparently, for harmony as developed in the modern Western tradition. Scholarship has explored ancient Greek (and, to a lesser degree, Roman) music already to a great extent,⁸⁴ but what ancient theorists expounded concerning the moral or ethical implications and consequences of music has been studied relatively little.⁸⁵ It has

81. Anderson 1966, 32, states that the Greeks' "doctrines on ethos possess a maturity and philosophical interest beyond those of all other peoples." This statement is strengthened by the fact that later authors, especially since the Renaissance, depend directly on Greek and Latin writers and carried their ideas further. Those later contributions must for the most part remain outside of the scope of the present work; in addition, they have added little regarding the ethical aspects of music. Other cultures such as China or India have developed their own theory on music and ethos, which, despite its natural differences, runs astoundingly parallel to the Mediterranean but would also exceed the limits of this study. For a first reference see NOHM 1.86–87 (China), 196–199 (India), and Tame 1984 (33–71 China; 170–186 India) who gathers much material but whose evidence is poorly referenced and lacking a scientific apparatus; see also Sachs 1943, 105–194. Virtue education through music in China is well described by Yuhwen Wang in the OHPME, ch. 15. The developments in Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Egypt are for a good part interrelated with Greece and Rome. A completely separate study would need to be made on the theories of musical ethos from the Renaissance onward (considering figures such as Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499), Gioseffo Zarline (1517–1590), or Athanasio Kircher (1602–1680); see a summary by Thram in the OHPME 195–200, beginning with Hildegard of Bingen (1098–1179); Gouk 2000, 183–192, and Gouk 2004.

82. See for a brief summary Mathiesen 1999, 1–6.

83. Especially in Barker 1984/2004, Strunk 1998, and Mark 2008 as well as Mathiesen 1999 and Wille 1967; for Christian authors see McKinnon 1987.

84. For an extensive bibliography with the most prominent scholarship on Greek music see Mathiesen 1999; for more recent publications, to my knowledge, no comprehensive bibliography exists.

85. Mainly in Abert 1899; Lippman 1963 and 1964; Anderson 1966; Mathiesen 1984; Barker 2005. All of these works proceed in chronological order and do not provide a systematic approach (except, to a certain extent, the ones by Abert and Barker).

been almost 50 years since the last full monograph on the topic in English—that of Anderson—was published. Furthermore, the major works by Abert, Lippman, and Anderson are each in their own way limited. Abert holds the merit of having pioneered the field in a remarkable way, but posterior scholarship had much to add and correct; also, his historical overview does suffer from the lack of analysis in the detail. Lippman and Anderson discuss only some of the relevant authors and texts and do not always proceed with the terminological or methodical clarity that one would desire for a clear-cut understanding of the matter. Above all, I have not found much research that would have undertaken a systematic philosophical evaluation of the ancients' tenets regarding the power and value of music. It seems of interest, therefore, to offer as complete a collection as possible of the various positions and arguments so as to gain a solid grasp of and appreciation for their ideas on musical ethos.

Recent Interest and Progress in Understanding the Power of Music

Over the past few decades, the amount of contemporary scientific research and popular literature on the power and effect of music has mushroomed. In the public square, the issue of the ethical value of music or at least of certain musical forms has been the object of considerable polemics. Perhaps more importantly, there has been a wealth of empirical material gathered in the areas of neurophysiological brain analysis,⁸⁶ ethnomusicology, and music psychology.⁸⁷ A host of field studies accompanies the sustained rise of music therapy as an attractive alternative or complement to traditional medical treatment for certain pathological phenomena.⁸⁸ A multitude of other branches benefits from the results of these sciences, among them education,⁸⁹ the movie industry, and advertising.⁹⁰ One should expect, therefore, that modern human science contributes important answers to the above-mentioned questions regarding evaluating music and the nexus of music and emotion.

86. E.g. Koelsch 2005, Thaut 2005, Patel 2008, and the pertaining chapters in the OHME and OHMP.

87. A good survey on the current state of research give the OHMP and OHME. A well-structured diagram of the sciences involved in the study of music can be found in Hodges/Sebald 2011, 4.

88. For a first overview on this vast field may serve Wigram/Pedersen/Bonde 2002 and Wheeler 2005.

89. E.g. Mark 2008 and McPherson 2006.

90. E.g. Packard 1957.

In view of this development, it seems important to create the basis for a dialogue between the considerations of the ancient authors as regards the evaluation of music and related research results in the various scientific fields.⁹¹ On the one hand, the analysis and interpretation of the ancients can be enriched by contrasting their ideas with modern approaches; on the other hand, today's highly specialized academic world is at times hampered by a compartmentalization that runs the danger of losing that holistic view which allowed peoples of the past to connect realities from different sectors of learning and from there again find deeper and perhaps more complete explanations for each of these realities.⁹²

The present study attempts to prepare an encounter between these hitherto largely unconnected disciplines of classical philology and those sciences mentioned above, so as to integrate the valid contributions of each towards a better general understanding of musical ethos. I do not pretend to offer a full-fledged interdisciplinary analysis; instead, I seek to provide a new and—to the extent of what is possible—complete presentation of the ancients' views on good and bad music and, more specifically, what can be called “musical ethos,” together with a critical evaluation of each author in general and points that require further reflection and input from science. To facilitate the latter, the study includes an account of the general state of affairs in the sciences mentioned above as related to our topic.

The Prospective of the Present Work

After all these preliminary comments we are now finally in conditions to describe more completely the objective and course of our study. The point of departure is the desire to understand better the power of music on human beings, particularly

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91. Contemporary authors who elaborate on music and its power in general (see those mentioned above in n. 24) do draw at times from both ancient texts and the experimental sciences but often in a rather eclectic way and without sufficient methodological or philosophical penetration. Günther Wille's essay from as early as 1962 on music and healing in antiquity could have been a good starting point but, published in the not very high-profile journal of the German Orff Society, does not appear to have found any resonance (even though also published in English translation). Other isolated studies are Meinecke 1948 and Gamberini 1996. The standard works on Music Therapy, music and emotion, and music and education almost completely pass over authors of antiquity, apart from occasional generic references to Plato's dispositions on music in the *Republic* and *Laws* or Aristotle's comments in the last book of his *Politics*. Very few seem to have taken note of other relevant contributors such as Aristides Quintilianus.
 92. Cf. Plato's explanation for the need to consider the whole so as to discover the proper function of the part, in *Chrm.* 156e–157a.

whether music can have ethical value and how this can be established if music does have it. Given the fact that ancient Greek and Latin authors treated the question of musical ethos with quite some dedication and insight in the context of a culture in which music played a dominant role, in a first step we shall dedicate ample space to provide an adequate picture of the descriptions and evaluations of musical ethos in antiquity. To achieve this, we shall glean insights into the role and power of music in by analyzing references to music found in Greek and Roman literary works (ch. 2). We shall then present and discuss in some detail all noteworthy writings that explicitly deal with the impact and ethical value of music. The panorama will stretch from the Pythagoreans down to Christian antiquity until Isidore of Seville (ch. 3). This exposition seeks to be in tune and dialogue with relevant scholarship; this is the reason for the rather extensive footnote apparatus.

In a second step (ch. 4), we turn to considerations that mostly stem from modern-day studies in music philosophy and psychology. An integrated system concerning music, ethos, and emotion will be proposed and certain questions identified to be considered by the sciences involved. In this way, the stage will be opened for further research that can contribute to a full interdisciplinary approach to these issues. The ultimate objective is to shed light on the discussion about “good” and “bad” music by clarifying and sorting terminology, concepts, experiences, and theories, and by elucidating the factors that come into play—or at least should—when music is subjected to ethical judgment.

Due to the necessity to narrow the subject matter, here is not the place to explain in detail the nature of Greek music with respect to its history, the different genres, instruments, and the technical intricacies of harmonic systems, tones, modes, and notation. For all of this, very competent guides are available in abundance.⁹³

93. Barker (GMW volumes 1 & 2) assembles an anthology of primary texts on Greek music with very detailed and instructive introductions and footnotes. West 1992 presents the first thorough discussion of Greek music in all its different aspects. Anderson 1994 gives a survey on Greek music performance based on archeological and literary records. Comotti's book (1989, an amplified English translation of an original work in Italian from 1979) represents a rather general overview but also includes Roman music, though only in rather generic terms. Good and concise is Neubecker 1994 (in Ger.). Mathiesen 1999 offers another detailed description of music in Greek life, dedicating more than half of his sizeable volume to the discussion of music theory from Aristoxenus down to Byzantine times. Power 2010 presents an in-depth-study of the whole cultural context of the citharede throughout antiquity. See also the OCD 1003–1012 and GMM 10.327–348. These and Wille (see below n. 95) have been my main sources for the material presented in the following pages.

Literature on Roman music is much scarcer,⁹⁴ but Günther Wille provides in his monumental study⁹⁵ most of the necessary information.

In recent decades, there have been interesting advances in the study and performance of actual ancient pieces. A number of original documents of music notation and composition were unearthed and edited.⁹⁶ Likewise, several musical groups have undertaken to perform and record these songs on reconstructed ancient instruments, which can give us a quite accurate impression of how some of those pieces that ancient authors discuss actually sounded.⁹⁷ As interesting as these discoveries and reconstructions in themselves are, they do not in themselves make easier the attempt to evaluate objectively the ethical judgments of ancient authors

94. For an overview and bibliographical references in general see GMM 21.606–614. Some more recent titles are Scoditti 2009, Rocconi 2010, and Moore 2012.

95. In his 799 page opus, Wille 1967 has exhaustively collected and systematically presented over 4000 literary references on music in ancient Rome along with archaeological, epigraphic and numismatic evidence. Unfortunately to date no English translation of this study has ever been provided. His work has been included dutifully in the pertinent bibliographies, but few scholars seem to have ploughed through this treasure-box and drawn the corresponding conclusions (see e.g. Landels 1999, 172 who still holds that “the role of music in Roman life and literature was very limited indeed compared with its all-pervading influence in Greek culture”, similar still Barker in OCD 1003; Sachs 1943, 272–273 handles Rome’s relevance for music on one page; Wille is considered adequately in GMM 21.606). While the main thrust of the work aims at disproving the Romans’ alleged lack of musicality (as a response to positions held as in Mountford 1965), its great value lies in detailed descriptions of Roman musical life and thought along with all original Latin and Greek fulltext quotations in the footnotes.

One problem in Wille’s work consists in that he does not consider sufficiently that terms such as *carmen* or *cantare* do not always signify music but may refer to something spoken or recited. Wille addresses this briefly at the beginning (38–39) and admits that the distinction is difficult; this brings about that some of his witnesses may lose their conclusiveness. However, a vast majority of undisputable references keeps most of his arguments fully intact.

In Wille 1977 this documentation is molded into a chronological account, including a survey of scholarship up to the date of publication.

96. The most recent and complete collections of these are in West 1992b and West/Egert Pöhlmann 2001.

97. See e.g. Mathiesen 2007 in a (rather negative) review of Hagel/Harrauer 2005. There are various recordings on the market and on the internet, e.g. http://www.kerylos.fr/index_en.php (Ensemble Kérylos), <http://www.oeaw.ac.at/kal/agm/> (computer-generated by Hagel), http://www.melpomen.ch/home_english.html (Melpomen), <http://classics.uc.edu/music/> (William A. Johnson, University of Cincinnati); <http://www.northpacificmusic.com/Greeks.html> (De Organographia) (all accessed August 14, 2014).

about the music of their time. We still cannot know with certainty to what degree that a present-day performance mirrors what the ancients would have heard; there are simply too many elements related to the musical fragments which are not definitively settled and may always remain subject to various hypotheses. Beyond that, though, how the sound of such music affects the modern listener would in any case differ greatly from the impression it made on the ancient audience, just considering the very different and much more developed musical styles and genres that we have grown up with and gotten used to. It would be futile to try simulating an effect for which the parameters of culture, expectations, and conditioning cannot be sufficiently restored. We are bound, therefore, to stick to the testimonies from the ancients themselves and how they report that music of their time was experienced and judged.

It would certainly have been desirable to analyze and compare the various views on the ethical value not only of music as a whole but of each of the individual elements that form part of the musical experience, such as rhythm,⁹⁸ melody, instruments, etc. Even though I have gathered much corresponding material, a complete discussion would have exceeded the possibilities of time and space. Hopefully these lacking pieces can be provided at a later date. The above notwithstanding, in the course of the discussion of the various authors there will be necessarily references to the ethical value of concrete musical elements.

A few technical notes: I have included many original language citations and terms so as to allow the knowledgeable reader to have access to the precise original formulation and terminology. In the Latin texts cited the following orthographic rules are applied: “u” and “v” are distinguished; “j” (as used in some editions) is written as “i”; sentences begin with a capital letter. For spellings of proper names I follow the OCD. All translations given are my own unless otherwise stated. Reference to modern language translations is made in footnotes by translator and year of publication, even though in the bibliography each item is listed under the name of the ancient author. When applicable, special citation formats are indicated at the beginning of the section where the corresponding author is discussed (in ch. 3).

98. Moore 2012, 171, dismisses the ancients’ theories on the ethos of rhythmical meters as “often based on false etymologies and naïve assumptions about the ethical effects of musical patterns (...), for no ancient meter can we assume a fixed, unchanging character,” but in the following he does discuss the various meters of Roman comedy, their traditional ethical associations and the effect they produced in contrasting with each other. Moore’s appendix II offers statistics for meters by characters (gender, social status and other roles) which does reveal certain preferences. The only systematic work reviewing ancient theories on rhythmical ethos seems to be Amsel 1887.

The Effect of Music in Greek and Latin Literature

What Music Does—Phenomenological Survey

The Place of Music in Greek and Roman Culture

Music has been an integral component of life in all cultures and throughout all ages.¹ It plays a particularly large role in the ancient Greek way of life, much more than is usually acknowledged.² About seventeen centuries ago, Aristides Quintilianus describes the presence of music within the life of the ancient Greeks in these terms:

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1. The article “Music” in the GMM concludes that music can be considered a “human universal” (at the end of section 3.7), or a cultural universal (at the end of 1.5). Hodges/Sebald 2011, 19 go as far as to say: “Musicality is at the core of what it means to be human.”
 2. What will be said about Greece applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to Rome as well, insofar as there was a direct continuation of Greek culture transmitted through the Hellenistic educational system, which was in place with few variations until the end of antiquity (cf. Marrou 1956, 95–96). Roman particularities will receive mention wherever serving the purposes of the present work.

West 1992, 1–2 lists some embarrassing flaws in scholarship due to “the average classicist’s unconcern with the realities of music”, such as “the ubiquitous rendering of *aulos*, a reed-blown instrument, by ‘flute’.”

There is certainly no action among men that is carried out without music. Sacred hymns and offerings are adorned with music, specific feasts and the festal assemblies of cities exult in it, wars and marches are both aroused and composed through music. It makes sailing and rowing and the most difficult of the handicrafts not burdensome by providing an encouragement for the work. It has even been employed by some of the barbarians in their funeral rites to break off the extreme of passion by means of melody.³

In antiquity, lack of musical knowledge equaled lack of education; in ancient Greece, instruction in lyre playing, for example, “was considered indispensable to education, not merely at Athens but throughout the Greek city-states,” and all educated youths learned to play lyre between the ages “between the ages of fourteen to sixteen.”⁴

Marrou asserts that “Greek culture and education were artistic rather than scientific, and Greek art was musical before it became literary and plastic.” The Greeks “looked upon themselves first and foremost as musicians.”⁵ Lohmann even traces the development of the Greek alphabet, an adaptation of the Semitic consonant characters, back to the musical sense of the Greeks.⁶ Nietzsche saw in the spirit of music the birthplace for Greek poetry (and tragedy in particular) because for him music “is something like a transcendental precondition for the possibility of language,”⁷ and his often cited intuition about the opposite poles of Apollonian

3. *Mus.* 2.4 57.23–31, tr. Mathiesen 1983, 120. Barker in *GMW* 2.461 translates τελείται in the first sentence with “is complete” (instead of Mathiesen’s simple and technical “carried out”); from what follows the verb does seem to imply that the fullness of an action is only brought about by music; “accomplished” would perhaps reflect best this ambiguity in English. In the second sentence, no English translation can mirror the association that κοσμοῦνται carries beyond “adorning” (Mathiesen) or “beautifying” (Barker), which is the order of the cosmos into which music transports the worshiper.

The fact that Aristides uses stock examples for his affirmation of music’s universality does not need to mean that the author wrote without direct observation or experience.

4. Anderson 1994, 160; cf. *Ar. Eq.* 985–995; *Cic. Tusc.* 1.2.4; *Arch.* 9.20; *Quint.* 1.10.19–21; see also Wille 1967, 452; Wilson 2003, 184–185.

5. Marrou 1956, 41.

6. Lohmann 1980, 168–169. He goes so far to call this a nodal point in world history, comparable to the detonation of the first atomic bomb or the landing on the moon, because in his view it led to the “musical” development of the Athenian form of *polis* (in contrast to the Semitic-Phoenician) and also to the logic-analytical way of thought.

7. Higgins 1986, 663; see Nietzsche 1872.

and Dionysian character describes two extremes between which not only Greek music, but all of Greek life oscillates.⁸

The Romans for their part inherit the rich Hellenistic form of Greek musical and poetic tradition but also make their own contributions.⁹ One typically Roman characteristic of musical performance is the tendency to magnify everything up to bombastic dimensions.¹⁰

In order to get a more concrete picture of exactly how the ancients experienced music in their lives, it seemed fitting to survey representative texts which convey a sense of the various ways and contexts in which music was experienced. We shall begin our survey with Homer who served as the touchstone of culture during the whole classical period.¹¹ We shall then refer to a wide variety of other testimonies for a general overview of the presence of music in Greek and Roman society before passing on to a systematic listing and analysis of the concrete characteristics and the various effects of music found in the classical texts.

When, How, and to What Effect Music Is Used

Music enters the historical scene of the Mediterranean world through *aiodoi*, wandering bards who sing of epic battles and great adventures, referring to stories that were historical, semi-historical or mythological in character.¹² At royal courts or

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8. However, if “Apollonian” means “measure” and “Dionysian” “excess,” as Nietzsche seems to understand them, a balance between the two is not possible. Jaeger 1954, 248 (in vol. 2) gives a different interpretation (rational-irrational) and sees them harmonized in Plato’s *Symposium*.
 9. For a detailed discussion of the originality and presence of music in Roman culture see Wille 1967.
 10. This can be verified by comparing classical Greece and Hellenistic Rome in the variety and amount of instruments used (especially in the areas of cult, military, and theater), the lavishness and refinement of instrument production (see Wille 1967, 173–174), and the level of artistic virtuosity as guaranteed by professional artists (id. 327–332). Carinus maintained an orchestra with hundreds of musicians (Vopiscus, *Carus et Carinus et Numerianus* 19.2–3); for this we find Hellenistic precedents such as Ptolemy Philadelphos (Athen. 5.201f: a procession choir of 600, among them 300 kitharists). The accumulation of extremely large numbers of musicians in theaters seems common (cf. Sen *Ep.* 84.10).
 11. Kaimio 1977, 17, further justifies the preferential treatment of Homer’s epics (in her case for the analysis of sound vocabulary) with their rich quantity of sound characterizations hardly reached in later authors who, for their part, rely much on the Homeric tradition.
 12. Just as in the later medieval period they sing at the courts of the ancient kings and nobles. It may be pointed out that also in ancient India (referring to the first centuries BC) poetry was always recited and sung by bards accompanied by various instruments and at times by dancers (see MGG *Sachteil* 4.664).

during public celebrations, bards recite melodiously in verse, accompanying themselves on the *phorminx* or the *lyra*.¹³ Those performances constitute a privileged form of entertainment, which elicits excitement and not infrequently moves to tears (e.g. *Od.* 1.336; 8.83–95, 521–541). The possibly first of these bards whose texts have come down to us is known to us as Homer.¹⁴ From him we glean insights not only into his own profession,¹⁵ but also into the general role that music-making played at the time of which he narrates or at least in which he lived.

The *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*

The Iliad. The world of Homer, though more famous for its heroic battles and Odysseus' exotic travels, is full of music.¹⁶ In the *Iliad*, to be sure, the context is predominantly war: A whole day long young Achaeans sing and dance to secure the benevolence of the god Apollo (1.472–473); Trojan soldiers play instruments at the campfire (10.11–13); the Achaeans celebrate their victory with a paean (22.391–4); we learn about the custom of a war dance (7.241)¹⁷ and witness a terrorizing trumpet-like war-cry (18.219–222).¹⁸ It does not come across as unusual that a warrior like Achilles sings in the sole presence of his intimate friend Patroclus “of men’s

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13. For a detailed treatment of these and other stringed instruments of the time and the use of these terms by the ancient authors, see Barker 1984, 4–14; West 1992, 48–80; Anderson 1994, 171–179.
 14. Scholarly debate continues on whether there was a person named Homer or several unknown ones who wrote down texts long existing in oral tradition; West 1996 collects strong arguments for a later dating for the *Iliad* (between 678 and 630), declaring it younger than Hesiod. For the current state of the discussion about the authorship of *Iliad* and *Odyssey* see Powell 2007—who holds that the singer of both was the same man (xv)—and Morris 2011. West 2011 argues in favor of different authors. In general, the references to music in the *Odyssey* are mostly linked to joyous social gatherings and therefore transmit more of the pleasureable and delightful aspects related to music than those found in the *Iliad*. In this work I shall speak of “Homer” as the conventional name for whoever composed the written text of both epics.
 15. Cf., for instance, his frequent references to singers at banquets, especially in *Od.* 1.153–155, 325–326, 421–422; 4.17–19; 8.43–47, 62–61, 248–369, 471–541, 9.3–7, 17.261–271, 358–359, 605–606, 22.330–353, and his alleged self-references in *Od.* 8.62–65 and in the *Hom. Hymn to Apollo* 3.172.
 16. Textual quotes for Homer’s epics are from the Lattimore translations 1962 and 1967 respectively.
 17. At least interpreted as such by Barker 1984, 28 n. 28.
 18. In 3.1–9, there is a contrast between the yelling Trojans and the silent Achaeans; cf. the discussion of music in war in Gell. 1.11.1–7.

fame,” accompanying himself on the *phorminx* (9.186–191).¹⁹ At the same time, Paris’ music-making is associated rather to his effeminate character (3.54, 393–394); thus Priam, in his pain over his slain son Hector, curses in one breath “the disgraces, the liars and the dancers, champions of the chorus, the plunderers of their own people” (24.261).

Song also serves to express sorrow: Achilles’ mother along with the Nereids weeps over her son in a threnody (18.51–66), and so does Achilles himself over Patroclus (18.314–318; 23.17–23); Trojan women, led by Hector’s wife Andromache, lament his death with a dirge (24.721–776).

Although principally a war narrative, the *Iliad* also gives clues to the use of music in everyday life. On the shield of Achilles we find songs and dance at a wedding (18.493–496),²⁰ herdsmen making music (18.526), a musical harvest procession (18.569–572), and the dancing and singing of young men and girls in a festive celebration (18.593–605).²¹ Music features as a gift from the gods as much as warfare (13.730–731). This is because the gods themselves enjoy “the beautifully wrought lyre in the hands of Apollo” and “the antiphonal sweet sound of the Muses singing” during their banquets (1.601–604). Hence the Muse (or Muses) is to be invoked by the singing poet—as is first attested in Homer and thenceforth conventionally done.²² It is emblematic that the *Iliad*, the first great piece of ancient Greek literature, begins precisely with the words: “Sing, goddess.”

19. Ovid, however, has Briseis reproach Achilles for doing this instead of fighting: *Ep.* 3.113–116.

20. The use of the lyre for a wedding is also attested in 24.63.

21. A reference to girls dedicated to singing and dancing occurs in 16.179–183, as a sidenote while the Myrmidons are gathering for battle.

22. The Muses are often invoked in the singular (eg. *Il.* 1.1, *Od.* 1.1; Verg. *Aen.* 1.8), sometimes in the plural (e.g. Hes. *Theog.* 1ff, 36ff; *Op.* 1–4), depending on whether the poet has one particular Muse in mind such as Calliope, the “most eminent” (Hes. *Theog.* 79) Muse of epic poetry (*Ant. Pal.* 9.504, 505), or all nine, or “the Muse” as a collective noun for a plural; cf. OCD 1002.

Impiety towards the Muses is sanctioned with serious consequences. Homer tells us about the Thracian Thamyras, the only professional singer mentioned in the *Iliad*, who for his boasting was maimed and deprived of voice and memory (2.594–600). Anderson 1994, 29 holds him to be the first identifiable bard whatsoever. Whether the fact that professional singers do not otherwise appear in the *Iliad* (in contrast to the *Odyssey*) is due more to the difference in plot setting or to an actual different stage of musical development (as Anderson *ibid.*, 24 seems to suggest) cannot be clarified based on the evidence at hand.

The Odyssey. While in the *Iliad* these carefree and pleasant performances are restricted to the gods and meta-representations, the *Odyssey* offers copious examples of music performed at banquets and other joyful celebrations (8.253, 370–384),²³ including a (fake) wedding (23.133–136). At times the bards' names are mentioned (as in the case of Phemius and Demodocus). The Phaeacians practice a sort of musical ball-game (6.100–101).²⁴ We encounter two goddesses singing “with sweet voice” while weaving (Calpyso in 5.61 and Circe in 10.221, 227, 254–255), and the magical songs produced by the Sirens to such devastating effect (12.39–54, 183–198). At one point a wound is healed by singing a spell over it (ἐπαείδω) (19.457).²⁵

While in the *Iliad* musical ability is at times depreciated, in the *Odyssey* the singer is explicitly defended and praised (by Telemachus in 1.346–50, by Odysseus in 9.4–8); he is said to deserve special respect since his skill is of divine origin (8.44–45, 62–64, 73, 474–481, 487–500; 9.3–4; 17.270–271; 22.345–349).²⁶ Anderson explains the reason for this positive view of music: “Its catharsis, more commonly the release of joyful feelings, brings the singer affection, respect, and fame.”²⁷ At one point, this does not seem to be the case: Odysseus invites Demodocus to discontinue his performance since “it cannot be that he pleases all alike with this song” (8.539). This, however is not due to any disdain for the singer or his art but rather simply because the concrete lyrics have saddened Odysseus (and Penelope in 1.337–344).

23. For banquets see the references in n. 15 above; for singing and dancing: 14.463–465 (as a result of drinking wine); 18.304 (suitors).

24. Barker 1984, 24 classifies it as such, though the only indication to music is “μολπή”, (cf. *Il.* 18.606, the only other references in LSJ for this meaning as “dance or rhythmic movement with song”); the musical aspect is more explicit in the game description at *Od.* 8.473–484; West 1992, 28 supports Barker’s interpretation.

25. See the comment and the note on this passage in Anderson 1994, 30–31 with reference to similar customs in Russia and elsewhere in Europe. This passage is taken up as a first of several examples by Plin. *NH* 28.2.21. It remains to be seen what is supposed to elicit the effect: the charm or the tune, or the combination of both; the former seems to be the case in Cato *Agr.* 160, and a whole series of rites is found in Varro *Rust.* 1.2.17.

26. We are told that the lyre was made by the gods to be a companion of feasting: 17.271, also 8.99; the singer is “divine” (θεῖός ἀοιδός) (17.359), “divinely inspired (θέσπις ἀοιδή)” (8.499). “Bards combine the god-given gift of song with specific technical abilities” (Anderson 1994, 29, commenting on the “paradox” of Phemius in *Od.* 22.347–348).

27. Anderson 1994, 30. The term “catharsis” will require careful analysis; see below in ch. 3 the section on Aristotle.

Antiquity in General²⁸

Homer's epics give us quite a complete representation of the ways in which music is present in Greek and even later in Roman society (except for some more specialized forms that develop subsequently such as choral poetry and drama). A systematized survey without any encyclopedic ambitions may complete the picture we have gained so far.²⁹

As we can see from the examples given above, music in ancient Greece consisted generally of song, performed either solo or in a group or choir, often times accompanied by at least one instrument (commonly either the *phorminx*/lyre or the *aulos*), and on certain occasions it is attached to dance. Pure instrumental performances do not occur in Homer but appear to have existed.³⁰ Initially, the text prevails over the music, but from the fifth century BC onward, there is a tendency in the opposite direction.³¹ There may also have been ensemble music, but we know little about it.³² In Hellenistic and Roman times, the variety of instruments

28. In this section, references from primary sources are generally meant to be examples only, so I abstain from adding "e.g." in each occasion except for emphasis and secondary literature. Much other material from archeology or art (especially vase paintings) could be added, but for this I am deferring to the specialized literature listed in n. 93.

29. For a fuller account, see, for instance, Barker 1984 and West 1992, 13–38 (chapter "Music in Greek Life"). Barker proceeds chronologically, while West's description follows levels of publicity: public festivals, private ceremonial, domestic-personal use, and music accompanying activity. I proceed thematically since this better prepares the analysis of musical characteristics in the following section.

30. Mathiesen 1999, 24–25; Anderson 1994, 66, mentions the *nomos aulētikos* as an *aulos* solo apparently introduced in Sparta by Clonas but said to have originated with Olympus; he concludes perhaps with some exaggeration: "In other words, it had existed from time immemorial." Some hints about the development of solo performances are given by Ath. 14.637f–638a. For more on the interrelation between song and accompaniment see Barker 1984, 52–53. Anderson 1994, 37, and West 1992, 205, describe how songs were preluded on the *phorminx*.

31. Cf. Csapo 2004, 218–225. For the early stage, see e.g. Pind. *Ol.* 2.1: "hymns, ruling over the *phorminx*;" for the opposite see below Aristophanes' criticism. Wille 1967, 219, claims that the Romans had freed music from any subordination to the text; however, his witnesses do not seem to prove quite that much; that song melodies surpassed recitation and that in certain contexts the composer was different from the poet does not yet tell too much about the general nature of the text-melody relationship in Rome when compared to the classical Greek tradition.

32. See Anderson 1994, 141–142 and 183, with reference to vase paintings and Pindar's "mingled sound" of *aulos* and cithara (mentioned in *Ol.* 3.8–9, 7.11–12); but he also argues that the *aulos* would have overpowered the strings; see for positive evidence Sapph. fr. 44.24–25

and forms increases, as does the number of musicians present for grand occasions, right up until the time of Augustus.³³

Festivities. After the time of Homer, professional bards continue to sing songs with epic content in private or public settings, even though the rhapsodes limited themselves to recitation.³⁴ The bard or poet does not simply entertain, but rather perpetuates the fame of heroes—something the poets themselves, from Pindar to Horace, were very proud of.³⁵ The tradition of poets singing to the lyre is still attested to in Roman times (Pliny *Ep.* 1.15.2, 9.40.2).³⁶ We first read in Hesiod of singing contests among poets (*Op.* 651–657), and also instrumentalists competed for prizes.³⁷ Musical contests take on even greater dimensions during the sixth

(as rendered in Campbell's edition from 1982); GMW 1.12 n. 13 to Xen. *Symp.* 3.1 and even clearer "συναυλία" in Ath. 14.618a–b (see GMW 1.274–275 with nn. 66, 68, 71).

33. So the chronological account in Wille 1977.

34. The ancient bards are followed in the fifth century by the rhapsodes who would no longer sing but rather recite, although Plato applies "rhapsodes" already to Homer's time (*Ion* 533c for Phemius in *Od* 1.154, *passim*); cf. OCD 1005–1006. According to Barker 1984, 18–19, recitation of entire epics coexists with a musical rendering of shorter pieces: "In the hands of Terpander and Archilochus, and their successors, musical performances of Homeric excerpts were transformed from bard chanting into fully melodic pieces for a solo singer, accompanying himself on the cithara." Anderson 1994, 44, insists that during the Hellenic period Homer was no longer sung but recited.

35. Cf. Jaeger 1954, 276f; CHCL 1.190f; Hor. *Carm.* 4.9.25–28 "*caerent quia vate sacro*". For a discussion of this point, with particular reference to Homer's time, see Anderson 1994, 30 and 32.

36. Wille 1967 discusses whether poems by Catullus (220–222), Virgil (225–227), and Horace (234–253, 281) were sung, either by the poets themselves or by contemporaries; his conclusion in each case is affirmative. According to his analysis, Horace established in Rome the use of Aeolian lyric, as artistic song, together with instrumental accompaniment, and so created an original form of Roman music (*id.* 253). It may be added that Wille collects *improvisive* evidence to argue for a sustained tradition of singing ancient poetry throughout the Middle Ages down to the twentieth century. In this context, also the significance of ancient pagan poetry for the development of Christian hymnody should be mentioned, especially in Hilarion, Ambrose, and Prudentius (Wille 1967, 288–305).

37. West 1992, 19–20. This is a particularity of Greek culture, which was a thoroughly "agonistic society"—see the study by Cohen 1995 who contrasts this trait of Athenian ethos with customs in other cultural traditions. Mythology also includes examples of musical contests between divinities, e.g. the satyr Marsyas vs. Apollo (Paus. 2.22.8). Anderson 1994, 86: "Love of competition marked Greek music making from the beginning." Citharedes and others contested in Delphi (Strab. 9.3.10). Even shepherds supposedly engaged in singing competitions (Theoc. *Id.* 5; Verg. *Ecl.* 3, 5), something, which seems to have roots in real practice (see Wille 1967, 118). This spirit spilled over to Rome. Ovid tells the contest

century BC; at city festivals such as those held in Athens entire choirs begin to compete against each other.³⁸

As we can see from Homer's description of Achilles' shield and other textual evidence from the eighth century BC onward, public festivals include many musical elements, including processional songs (*prosodia*), hymns, and other choral performances, dedicated for the most part either, as a paean, to Apollo or, as a dithyramb, to Dionysius. These joyous cultic festivals, often connected with sports and games, reflect the feasts and musical celebrations of the gods as described in Hesiod (*Theog.* 1ff, 36ff) and in the Homeric Hymns (*Apollo* 3.182ff, 513ff).³⁹ Occasions are established periodic religious festivals, public and private celebrations of military or athletic victories (Pind. *Ol.* 9.1–4, *Pyth.* 5.106–107), and events honoring various heroes, be they mythological (Eur. *Heracl.* 678–684), historical (Isoc. 9.1), or eventually even contemporary. Preeminent among the authors of poems sung on these occasions are Simonides, Pindar, Bacchylides, who produced works in various places, and Alcman, whose activity was limited to Sparta. Song often goes along with dance and is accompanied by *syrix*, *phorminx*, or *aulos* players (Hes. *Sc.* 272–85). Choral song tends to be antiphonal; a choir singing a set refrain alternates with a leader/soloist who sings either the individual verses (Hom. *Il.* 18.51, 314–6, 24.720–76; Eur. *Ion* 112–183) or simply a different text (Aesch. *Pers.* 909–1077).⁴⁰

between the Pierides and Muses (Ov. *Met.* 5.308–664). With Nero, musical competition found a particularly enthusiastic promoter and even participant (Tac. *Ann.* 14.14–33; Suet. *Ner.* 20–5; Dio Cass. 61–3; Wille 1967, 338–50, see also below on p. 181), which was continued under several emperors; Domitian introduced the Capitoline music competitions (Suet. *Dom.* 4.4).

38. See West 1992, 16–20 and CHCL 1.222.

39. The concept of humans imitating divine music is found in a number of ancient authors, e.g. Cic. *Leg.* 6.18.18, Quint. 1.10.12. Appeasing or pleasing the divinity (and at the same time engaging the religious assembly) through music was central throughout antiquity (cf. Wille 1967, 26–73) and, despite some criticism, is continued in Christianity (id. 385–386): God has, according to Augustine, a very fine “musical sense” (*Enarratio II in Ps* 32.8; cf. also *Enarratio in Ps* 147.5: “*voce cantamus, ut nos excitemus, corde cantamus, ut illi [Deo] placeamus*” we sing with the voice to stir us up; we sing with the heart to please God”). The parallelism between divine celebration and festive earthly cult finds an analogy in the liturgy of the Catholic Church, which unfolds explicitly sharing “a foretaste of that heavenly liturgy, which is celebrated in the Holy City of Jerusalem toward, which we journey as pilgrims” (CCC 1090).

40. This form, again, is not exclusive to Greece, see e.g. the antiphonal structure of a number of Psalms in the Old Testament (e.g. 42/43, 67, 118, 136), which was continued by the Liturgy of the Hours in the Catholic Church and other forms in Gregorian chant (cf. GMM

In Latin Italy, Greek influence certainly shapes the use of public music from the third century BC onward, but even before this time there are many similarities. We know of musically-enriched rituals and sacral poems performed at festivals (cf. Catull. 63.19–30, Lucr. 2.618ff) that were mostly based on Greek or Egyptian cults.⁴¹ Songs with mythological-historical content were sung at banquets, accompanied by the *tibia* (the equivalent to the Greek *aulos*). The old ways of citharody and the corresponding competitions are given a new promotion by the Roman emperors of the first century AD (cf. Suet. *Ner.* 20ff). While it is certain that Greek musicians are prominent in Rome, we have much proof that the Romans themselves engage extensively in musical activity, even in the private sphere of the home (Plin. *Ep.* 4.19.4, 7.4.89–90).⁴² Mythology knows of the intercessory function of chant and dance,⁴³ and in general, song devoted to worship has a firm place within pagan Roman celebrations.⁴⁴ It blossoms anew in Christian hymnody, which was always customary in the East, but in the West apparently just since the fourth century AD.⁴⁵

5.767–9). Notice that the term “antiphonal” is not used in this meaning before Philo of Alexandria (cf. GMM 1.736). More on antiphony in different cultures in OHM 424 (Arabia), 131f (China), 307–11 (Christianity), 260, 262 (Egypt), 234f (Mesopotamia), 139f (Tibet); cf. also Sachs 1943, 92–95; Comotti, 1989, 55; for antiphonal singing of psalms at the time of Augustine see Wille 1967, 373–374; Isidor of Seville attributes the invention of antiphonal singing to the Greeks (*De ecclesiasticis officiis* 1.7.1; *Etym.* 6.19.7); Wille (ibid., 377) contests the idea that the Christians imported from the East the melodic pattern as well and holds instead that they used local ones.

41. See Comotti, 1989, 54.

42. Wille 1967, 287 and *passim*.

43. E.g. the Nereids in Verg. *Aen.* 5.239f; Prop. 1.17.25f (see Wille 556–557).

44. See Wille 1976 26–74 with a detailed discussion of the different occasions, instruments, and musical groups involved; e.g. Liv. 27.37.7–13 (chorus procession), 30.8–15 (Bacchus).

45. See n. 36 above; according to Augustine *Conf.* 9.7, it was Ambrose who first introduced hymnic singing in the West. Prudentius (*Cathemerina* 3.81–90, 9.1–6) even mentions the use of instruments (also in Paulinus Nolensis *Carmina* 22.9–13 and Venantius Fortunatus *Carmina.* 2.9.53–62), towards which the Church fathers had ambiguous feelings (see below the section on Christian authors). Particularly rich is the singing culture in the monastic tradition, beginning with the rule of Caesarius from 534 (Wille 167, 301–302), which then culminates in the development of Gregorian chant and related forms. On the development of Christian hymnody in general, see Wille 167, 376–378. Significant is the explicit condemnation of the *rejection* of non-biblical hymns (Fourth Council of Toledo 633 AD, can. 13, as cited in Wille 1967, 378 n. 118). Hymns are meant to accompany the faithful throughout the whole day and thus praise God always (Prud. *Cathemerina: Praef.* 37–39); the *Liturgia horarum* of the Catholic Church continues this tradition into our days, fitfully including hymn texts written by Prudentius and Ambrose.

Death and Drama. Choral chant is not restricted to cheerful occasions but applies also to dirges at funeral processions and lamentations over the dead (Aesch. *Pers.* 935–940, *Sept.* 861ff; Pl. *Leg.* 800e, 947b–c).⁴⁶ The earliest attested use of lyre and *aulos* and song in general seems to be linked to the celebration of the dead and the cult offered to divinized heroes.⁴⁷ Later on, the combination between Dionysian choir lyric (the dithyramb and Satyric dances and acting) and commemorative dirges for heroes (connected with mythology) apparently leads to the development of the chorus part within Greek tragedy.⁴⁸ In dramatic works, the chorus, placed in the *orchestra*, generally sings and dances, but at times also recites. In Sophocles, modal shifts draw out abrupt changes of mood (such as from joy to grief). Euripides unfolds a sophisticated musical and poetic texture.⁴⁹ Only later does the

46. AQ 2.4 57.29–31 (as quoted in the introduction to this chapter) seems to exclude Greeks from using music when mourning, but Barker clarifies that “funeral music was particularly associated with Eastern peoples” (GMW 2.462 n. 19; Mathiesen 1983, 120 n. 46 proposes as an example for this Mt 9:23). For Roman times, elegiac lamentations are attested in the context of death, exile, or similar circumstances (Prop. 4.1.73–74; Ov. *Pont.* 3.4.45–46; elegy personified sings in Ov. *Rem Am.* 379), cf. Wille 1967, 282–286, again with many examples for musical settings beyond antiquity. Sorrow may be so strong that song is no longer possible; cf. in the case of Orpheus Stat. *Silv.* 5.1.204f. In the Christian context, dirges were slowly substituted by Psalms or even joyous hymns due to the faith in the resurrection, so much so that the Martyr vigils converted into a substitution of the pagan pervigil, with excesses that Church leaders hastened to quench (cf. id. 381–383).

In addition to accompanying the dead, especially the Romans thought that music would still be found in the underworld: Verg. *Aen.* 6.642–644; Tib. 1.3.59–60; Prop. 1.19.13–14; 4.7.61–62; Stat. *Silv.* 5.3.27; Claud. *De raptu Proserpinae* 1.328–329. Depictions of Muses on sarcophagi indicate in Greek times that the defunct was an artist; in Roman times that they will help him towards eternal life since music purifies the soul for heaven (Schol. Verg. *Aen.* 6.119, an idea that is linked to the concept of the music of the spheres). For the Christian context see August. *Ep.* 159.3; angels: Hier. *Ep.* 98.1; saints: Claud. *Carmina* 22.421–422. See also Wille 1967, 544–545.

47. See Anderson 1994, 20–23. Of interest are solemn lyric laments in the face of death, as referenced by Anderson 1994, 72, for Arion (in Hdt. 1.24.2–6) and in classic tragedy. This long tradition reaches an apex in the elaborate opera arias that characters sing before their demise, e.g. Isolde’s *Liebestod* in Richard Wagner’s *Tristan und Isolde* (1865).

48. See Lesky 1966, 223–232, who discusses with much detail the different strains that converge in the final product of the tragedy. According to Anderson 1994, 86, ancient drama takes over both choral song and monody.

49. Anderson 1994 (on Sophocles: 120–121, Euripides 122–124) analyses Euripides’ innovations, among them Mozart-like chorus “libretti”, words and rhythm imitating instruments (e.g. *Hel.* 1338–1352), and the unheard-of introduction of singing a syllable to more than

recitative (spoken) element come to prevail. The only instrument accompanying drama during the fifth century is the *aulos*; at times a lyre or *tympna* are employed on the stage, but then only as required by the action.⁵⁰ The chorus originally constitutes an essential element in comedy as well, although Aristophanes himself begins to reduce its role in his later plays, and it will eventually lose all participation in the dramatic action during the Hellenistic period.⁵¹

In Rome exists the old tradition of funeral lamentations (*neniae*) and popular dramatic presentations with song, *tibia* accompaniment, and dance, adding to ancient Etruscan traditions original elements of music. According to Livy, Roman drama originates in expiation for a plague (Liv. 7.2.4–12). Later, Greek dramatic plays were adapted following the traditions of the Dionysian artistic companies; recited and sung parts alternate both in tragedy and comedy with no or little. The Romans seem to have dedicated much more room to individual song and instrumental accompaniment, converting drama into a sort of operetta-style experience and developing the place of artistic virtuosity.⁵² Sung parts predominate over spoken passages, and instrumental interludes divide up the acts. From the first century BC onward, dramatic performances are reduced to spectacular, comic-satiric mimes with orchestral and choir arrangements that at times are quite pompous.⁵³

one tone—a practice that “struck fifth-century Athenian conservatives as being radical to a degree that we can scarcely comprehend.” Borrowing melodies from such “secular” contexts as symposia for paraliturgical tragedy seems to have called for criticism as did the practice of Renaissance composers such as Giovanni Pierluigi da Palestrina (1525/6–1594) to employ secular madrigal tunes for polyphonic Masses or motets (see OHM IV 317, 325f; GMM XVIII 938–947). The Council of Trent decreed in its 22nd session (1562 AD): *‘Ab ecclesiis vero musicas eas, ubi sive organo sive cantu lascivum aut impurum aliquid miscetur, item saeculares omnes actiones, vana atque adeo profana colloquia, deambulationes, strepitus, clamores arceant, ut domus Dei vere domus orationis esse videatur ac dici possit.’* (Schroeder 1950, 424; Eng. tr. 151. “They shall also banish from the churches all such music which, whether by the organ or in the singing, contains things that are lascivious or impure; likewise all worldly conduct, vain and profane conversations, wandering around, noise and clamor, so that the house of God may be seen to be and may be truly called a house of prayer”).

50. See Anderson 1994, 113–119, who subsequently describes how music during a dramatic performance may have taken place.

51. Cf. CHCL I, 398–402; Comotti, 1989, 40–41; Anderson 1994, 118.

52. Cf. Wille 1967, 158–166 who gives a detailed account of how the different Roman dramatic performances may have taken place (id. 166–187); see also Comotti, 1989, 49; Moore 2012.

53. Cf. Comotti, 50–54; Wille 178–187.

Social Settings. Weddings present an important venue for choral lyric in Greek life. Choirs sing during the procession of the bride to the house of the groom as well as later outside the house of the spouses during their first night together (*epithalamium*).⁵⁴ We still have texts for these type of songs preserved, written by Alcman, Sappho, Pindar, and others. References to such celebrations can be found in the tragedies (Eur. *Tro.* 304–341, *HF* 10–12, *IA* 1036–1057) and comedies (Ar. *Pax* 1316–1359, *Av.* 1728–1765). In Roman times, these traditions take on at times gigantic dimensions, even including complete orchestral performances (Claud. *Carm. min. app.* 5.55–63). An analogous Roman practice are the *fescennia*, songs originally intended to avert evil spirits from the newlywed (Fest. *Gloss. Lat.* 76) but which later assume a more coarse character (Hor. *Ep.* 2.1.145–146).⁵⁵ Hymenaeus, the god of marriage, son of Dionysius and Aphrodite (or in Roman rendering the Muse Camena), is praised as a singer himself (Mart. *Cap.* 1.1).

In other contexts we have the maiden-songs (*partheneia*) by Alcman and Sappho, poets who are also protagonists in composing monody, i.e. the individual expression of sentiments in a solo performance.⁵⁶ In all of antiquity (and probably all of human history), music and love are natural companions:⁵⁷ Thus we find the lover at night singing under the window of his sweetheart (“*paraklausithyron*”: Catull. 67; Ov. *Fast.* 4.109–112; Prop. 3.3.48ff; at times unsuccessful as in Plaut. *Persa* 569–570), young people making music in the streets (Stat. *Silv.* 1.2.172–173), couples singing and dancing together (Ov. *Fast.* 3.535–538), and obscenities (Ov. *Fast.* 4.695; Quint. 1.2.8). Ovid declares he loves women who either sing, play, or dance well (*Am.* 2.4.25–30). Music may help in being social to begin with.⁵⁸ Songs may be employed for abuse, something that was severely punished in

54. At times the theme are mythological weddings, like Sappho’s famous fr. 44 about the marriage feast of Hector and Andromache, which does not necessarily exclude that these were also composed for actual marriage feasts. See also Catull. 64 (Bacchus and Ariadne), Ov. *Met.* 4.758–764 (Perseus and Andromeda), 12.214–215 (Peirithoos and Hippodame), Sen. *Tro.* 202, Apul. *Met.* 4.33 (Psyche).

55. For more details and quotes from Roman times see Wille 1967, 126–135 who at the end points out the contrast employed by some authors between the joyful wedding music and tunes for battle or funerals (Ov. *Met.* 5.3–4, *Ep.* 12.137–140; Dracontius *Romulea* 10.523–525).

56. Cf. Anderson 1994, 75–76.

57. *Anth. Lat.* 277.1–2: “*Cantica gignit amor et amorem cantica gignunt. Cantandum est, ut ametur, et ut cantetur, amandum.*” Love brings forth songs, and songs bring forth love. Singing is needed to love, and loving to sing.” Similar August. *Serm.* 336.1.1: “*Cantare amantis est.*” Singing belongs to the lover.”

58. Manil. 4.152–155, 525–529; Ov. *Ars* 1.595–596; to please the beloved one, to find a lover: Ov. *Ars* 3.315–28. See Wille 1967, 351.

early Roman times (Cic. *Rep.* 4.10.12; Ulp. *Digesta* 47.10.15.27–28), but not if it occurred in harmless contexts (Auson. *Mos.* 18.165–8).

Banquets (symposia) offer favorite opportunities for singing and playing the *aulos* or *barbitos* (Ar. *Vesp.* 1208–1250, Eur. *Ion* 1177–8, Ath. 627e–628b). The participants usually follow a certain procedure; West describes it in these words:

They took it in turns to sing whatever they cared to: a little hymn to a god, a piece of political comment or exhortation, reflections on the joys of wine or the pains of love, moral advice, humorous abuse. At the end of the evening the merry guests were liable to carouse through the streets, still singing and dancing.⁵⁹

They intone drinking-songs (*skolia*)⁶⁰ or elegiac and lyric poems by authors such as Stesichorus, Anacreon, Alcaeus, Simonides, or Theognis, or or their own inventions; they may be accompanied by an *aulētēs* or play along themselves on the lyre or harp, given that playing the lyre is common as part of a good education (Ar. *Vesp.* 959, 989 and above n. 4). As in the case of Alcaeus, banquet songs could also serve to promote political propaganda.⁶¹ Rich Roman households maintain a luxurious abundance of musicians for any sort of entertainment (Petron. *passim*, Cic. 2 *Verr.* 5.35.92, and still in Sid. *Ep.* 1.2.9).⁶² They adopt the Greek custom of musically embellishing banquets but develop it often to exorbitant concert performances during upper-class dinner parties (Cic. *Tusc.* 4.2.4, Prop. 2.30.13–16)⁶³ to the point that they overshadow the banquet itself. Martial looks forward to parties without them (5.778.22–27; 9.77.5–6.), while Quintilian reproaches their obscenities (1.2.8). *Aulētrides*, girls hired to play the *aulos* on these occasions, often have a reputation for their loose morals; in fact, song accompanies the erotic “business”

59. West 1992, 25; see also e.g. Polyb. 4.20.10.

60. An illustrative description of singing *skolia* in particular can be found in Barker 1984, 103 n. 16.

61. Cf. Comotti, 1989, 20.

62. For a discussion of the social status of these and other musicians (slaves, freedmen, foreigners, or free citizens), see Wille 1967, 304–308, 311–324. That musical luxury was nothing reserved to the Romans but a Hellenistic phenomenon attests Just *Epit.* 30.1.8–9 for Ptolemy II Philadelphos of Egypt. Musical corporations, especially for ritual and military purposes, enjoyed high esteem (see Wille 1967, 357–366). Christian authors continued to favor religious song during banquets but rejected instrumental bombast (id. 380–381).

63. Apuleius presents a quite particular case in the Cupid-Psyche story (*Met.* 5.3ff) where Psyche has invisible musicians play during the meal for her sisters, something which Wille compares with turning on the radio (1967, 146).

(Prop. 4.8.45–58, Juv. *Sat.* 6.14–15, Ov. *Ars Am.* 2.305–306), and in Roman comedy prostitute and musician become largely synonymous.⁶⁴

Other musical moments attested to include birthday serenades (Hor. *Carm.* 4.11; Prop. 3.10.23; Gell. 19.9.1–10), banquet songs to honor national heroes or paladins of the past (Hor. *Carm.* 4.15.29–32), children's songs (Porph. *Hor. Epist.* 1.1.62), and tunes to which one could fall asleep (Hor. *Ep.* 1.2.27–31).⁶⁵

Work and War. Women hum or sing along while they weave or grind barley (Ar. *Nub.* 1358), lull their little ones to sleep (Pl. *Leg.* 790d–e, Theoc. *Id.* 24.7–9, Quint. 1.10.32), or simply have fun singing and playing along with other women (Pl. *Symp.* 176e).⁶⁶ Men do the same during manual labor⁶⁷, such as shepherds who, while tending their flocks, often play the panpipes (Soph. *Phil.* 213, Eur. *Alc.* 576f; Pl. *Resp.* 399d).⁶⁸ Apart from ritual purposes (e.g. to praise Dionysius/Bacchus for the wine harvest: Tib. 2.1.51–56), such songs may serve to overcome boredom (Ennodius, *Carm.* 1.8 praef.), alleviate labor (Hor. *Carm.* 1.32.13–16) or express

64. Wille 1967, 308–311 with plenty of references in Plautus and Terence; Rocconi 2006. Respectable women in contrast are never shown playing the *aulos* in Greek art—with the obvious exception of the Muses; cf. Anderson 1994, 143.

65. Wille 1967, 139–153.

66. Spontaneous singing in a random context is mentioned in Hor. *Carm.* 1.22.9–12; Petr. 62. Making music merely *ad delectationem* becomes a point of dispute in Christian times, favored by Ambrose and Augustine but repudiated by Lactantius (cf. Wille 1967, 384–385 and 434); see also below.

67. See e.g. the parody of a rope-maker's song in Ar. *Ran.* 1284–1293.

68. Ath. 618d–620a compiles the particular song names for various occupations and occasions. For a wealth of references to *Arbeitslieder* in Latin literature, see Wille 1967, 105–125 including all sorts of professions: gravediggers, sailors, fishermen, shepherds, weavers, tailors, fullers, winegrowers, peasants, *calcatores torcularis*, vendors (each with his own *modulatio*), slave works of different kind and even beggars; see e.g. Ov. *Trist.* 4.1.5–16; August. *Enarratio II in Ps* 32.8.3: “*Illi qui cantant, sive in messe, sive in vinea, sive in aliquo opere ferventi, cum coeperint in verbis canticorum exsultare laetitia, veluti impleti tanta laetitia, ut eam verbis explicare non possint, avertunt se a syllabis verborum, et eunt in sonum iubilationis.*” Those who sing either at harvest or in the vineyard or at some other intense work, when they begin to exult in joy with the words of song, just as if they were filled with so much joy, that they cannot express it with words, they turn away from syllables of words and engage in the sound of jubilation.” Isid. *Etym.* 3.17.2: “*Ad tolerandos quoque labores muscia animum mulcet, et singulorum operum fatigationem modulatio vocis solatur.*” In order to endure also toils, music soothes the mind, and the weariness of labors is eased by the singing of the voice.”

joy, especially over work completed.⁶⁹ Song or instrumental tunes serve to synchronize and to lighten up repetitive mechanical labor (Quint. 1.10.16), such as kneading dough,⁷⁰ treading grapes (Callixenus *FGrH* 627 F 2; Calp. *Ecl.* 4.124), laying bricks for a wall (Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.23), rowing (Ar. *Ach.* 554, parodied in *Ran.* 206–267), traveling (Calp. *Ecl.* 1.28f; Hor. *Sat.* 1.7.30f; Auson. *Mos.* 18.165–7; August. *Serm.* 256.3), marching into battle (Thuc. 5.70, Plut. *Instituta Laconica* 16 = *Mor.* 238b,⁷¹ ps.-Plut. *Mus.* 26.1140c, Ath. 626b–d, 627d–e, Cic. *Tusc.* 2.16.37), or athletic exercise (Hipponax fr. 118c), even during Olympic Games (Paus. 5.7.10, ps.-Plut. *Mus.* 26.1140c–d).⁷²

The use of music in war and battle are only particular applications of this more general usage of music in accompanying some particular action. Stimulating war dances are customary;⁷³ religious dance apparently even serves as a useful training for battle: “Those who most beautifully honor the gods with choral dances are best in war” (Ath. 628–629, quoting Socrates). Whether battlefield verses like those of Tyrtaeus (e.g. fr. 11) are actually employed in the thick of battle or whether the role of music in these situations is limited to rousing trumpet signals and *aulos* tunes is not clear. We do hear though of Roman soldiers breaking into spontaneous victory songs (Liv. 45.38.12).

69. “Gladdened about the finished work in the vineyard, the vine-grower expressed the mood of his soul in song” (tr. from Wille 1967, 110, with reference to Verg. *G.* 2.417: „*Iam canit effectos extremus vinitor antes.*“/Already sings the vine-dresser, having completed the last rows.” Some of the bucolic poems were elevated to concert performances in the theater, e.g. Donat. *Vita Verg.* 26, which serves, according to Wille 1967, 115, as a proof that the bucolic genre was indeed musical. Wille 1967, 121 and 152, points out the melismatic *iubilus*, which is still custom in the Alps (*Jodeln*) and was common among shepherds, vinedressers, and reapers. About its import into Christian liturgy see id. 375–376 with references to Augustine (see previous note) and Hilarius.

70. A nice illustration for this can be seen on plate 8 in West 1992.

71. “ὁ γὰρ Λυκούργος παρέζευξε τῇ κατὰ πόλεμον ἀσκήσει τὴν φιλομουσίαν, ὅπως τὸ ἄγαν πολεμικὸν τῷ ἐμμελεῖ κερασθὲν συμφωνίαν καὶ ἁρμονίαν ἔχη/Lycurgus coupled love for music with drill for battle, so that the excessive fighting spirit, mingled with melody, have ‘symphony’ and ‘harmony.’”

72. Lists indicating multiple applications of work songs (and others) can be found in Ath. 5.199a, 14.618c–619c; Pollux 4.55. All these examples are already reported for the Etruscans: multiple quotes in Wille 1967, 569–570 n. 129.

73. AQ 2.6 61.26–62.19 with reference to Cicero; Ar. *Ran.* 151; Pl. *Leg.* 815a–b; Ath. 630d–631c. On the other hand, the Argive army led by Ares in Eur. *Phoen.* 784–794 is described as a κῶμος ἀναυλότατος, unfit to dancing.

Music for Change. Finally, the Greeks also use music in the attempt to change persons, society as a whole, or even material realities in order to achieve some specific result. They seek to foster, among other things, an improvement in health (through the proper order of the interior state) or a growth in virtue; thus they appreciate music education as a tool in the service of character formation.⁷⁴ As early as the seventh century BC, when musical life is flourishing particularly in Sparta, choral song assumes a paideutic function that reinforces “essential values of public morality, such as love for the fatherland and respect for the law.”⁷⁵ In the circle around Sappho, the education of girls is essentially characterized by “music, dance, and song, strictly connected to the community’s rituals and to wedding initiation ceremonies.”⁷⁶ Later, the role that music could play in education is approached in different ways. For Plato and Aristotle, among others, the educational value of music is found in actually learning to sing and to play music; for other authors such as Quintilian, Aristides Quintilianus, and Augustine, the aim of musical education is to acquire theoretical knowledge about music as an art or even as a science. These two positions aim at quite different goals; it is not clear how much and to what extent they actually were translated into practice in the educational process.⁷⁷

The role of music in society is sometimes linked to decadence or social upheaval,⁷⁸ but more often, music is used in the opposite direction to promote

74. Pl. *Prt.* 326a–b; *Resp.* 401–425; *Leg.* 653–671; 799e–802; Arist. *Pol.* 8.5; ps.-Plut. *Mus.* 41.1146a–b: the great advantages reaped by music render a person “beneficial to himself and to his city: he will have no truck with discordant deeds or words, and will maintain always and in all circumstances what is suitable, moderate and orderly” (tr. GMW 1.247). Learning music seems to have had a prominent place from the very beginnings of Greek education, cf. Ath. 626b–d; Marrou 1956, 17–18 and 41.

75. Comotti, 1989, 17.

76. Id. 21; cf. Marrou 1956, 34.

77. Cf. Wille 1967, 456–457, here in the context of music education for a rhetor. On a more technical level, the ancients believed that musical training sharpens the intelligence (Ath. 628b–d). See later p. 456.

78. Cf. Pl. *Resp.* 4.424c–d, *Leg.* 700a–701b; Ath. 626e–f, 631e–632b, 633b, although the examples given do not necessarily imply an intentional use of music in this sense but rather a consequence of a development. Another question is whether music associated to “revolution” is really a cause or rather just a manifestation of an ongoing social-political change that is occurring for other reasons (see on this West 1992, 26 and 246). The story goes that there were times in Sparta when adding more strings was prosecuted by the State: Paus. 3.12.10; Ath. 636e (Timotheus, even though acquitted because a statue of Apollo had the same amount of strings as his *lyra*; GMW 1.96 n. 13 follows Pausanias in that it was a cithara, Athenaeus calls it *μαγάδις*, a sort of harp; about this instrument, see West 1992, 72–73); also mentioned in Cic. *Leg.* 2.15.39. Something similar happened to Phrynis (Plut. *Quomodo quis*

peace or consolidate tradition.⁷⁹ Tyrants promote the dithyramb so as to favor the Dionysian cult in contrast to other deities linked to the opposing aristocracy.⁸⁰ In the late Roman Republic songs are employed in political campaigns and in order to spread propaganda (Cic. *Quint.* 2.3.2; *Sest.* 55.118; Suet. *Iul.* 80.2). Furthermore, musical elements such as melodic flow, voice pitch and timbre, rhythm, etc. make up an important part of oratorical theory and practice throughout antiquity so as to render speech more effective and delightful in order to transmit a message successfully.⁸¹

Music as a reflection of cosmic order is also employed in the field of medicine, in order to restore and foster good health which in antiquity is often described as the proper order of a living being's interior components.⁸² Ps.-Plutarch (*Mus.* 42.1146c) speaks of healing songs being known in Crete and relates that Thaletas released Sparta from a plague "through music" (though without revealing how).⁸³ *Aulos* music allegedly helps against snake bites (Gell 4.13.3) and other ills such as

suos in virtute sentiat profectus 13 = *Mor.* 84a, *Apophthegmata Laconica* 8 = *Mor.* 220c) and Terpander (id. *Instituta Laconica* 17 = *Mor.* 238c—because the Spartans preferred the "simpler (ἀπλόος) melodies"). We shall have to see why this appeared so dangerous (cf. below p. 155).

79. Cf. ps.-Plut. *Mus.* 42.1146b: Terpander, a famous musician from the early seventh century, allegedly resolved civil war in Sparta by cultivating music of the noble kind—we are not told how exactly; the *Suda* tells that he "brought their souls into harmony and stopped their strife" (quoted from Campbell 1982, vol. 2, 303–304, see there also n. 1 for further references). On the positive political function of music see especially Pl. *Leg.* 799e–802e who employs the proper exposure to music, among other reasons, precisely to ensure the stability of his State.

80. Cf. Comotti, 1989, 23.

81. For the Greeks see especially Aristotle (*Rh.* 3.1 1403b26 and 3.12 1413b30); in Roman times esp. Quintilian in 1.10 who engages to show how deeply rooted the art and practice of music is in the ancient ideal of educating the accomplished *sapiens*; an extensive discussion of this can be found in Wille 1967, 447–489. We shall not discuss Quintilian's point that orators should know music theory so as to be able to deal with cases that involve knowledge of music since this does not affect our question. However, his sustained parallelism between music and rhetoric sheds some light on the "rhetorical" function of music itself, which does not mean that speeches are supposed to be sung (Cicero and others reject this "Asianic" practice, notwithstanding the *cantus obscurior*, the intrinsically melodic character of speech; see Wille 1967, 471–473); also Boethius sees a close relationship between music and rhetoric: *Consolatio philosophiae* 2.18; 2.3.2.

82. So e.g. in Anaximander, Pythagoras, and in the *Corpus Hippocraticum*; see Jaeger 1.214–225; 2.14ff, especially 36–39; Wille 1962. See later our discussion especially of the Pythagoreans, Plato, and Aristides Quintilianus.

83. This last event is also mentioned elsewhere (e.g. Paus. 1.14.1; more references in GMW 1.247 n. 255, cf. also 214 n. 66 where Barker considers that "plague" may also mean

sciatica (Boeth. *Mus.* 1.1), and the sound of a trumpet should fittingly overcome deafness (Mart. Cap. 9.926). Many report that musical incantations can offer relief for corporal suffering,⁸⁴ although some are skeptical of these claims.⁸⁵ Less disputed is music's influence on the soul. At least since the time of the Pythagoreans, music is often praised for its soothing effect on agitated minds, for overcoming fear (Apul. *Met.* 2.25) and anxieties (Hes. *Theog.* 55, 98–103; Eur. *Hel.* 1342–1345, *Bacch.* 381; Iuv. 10.210–211).⁸⁶ Music is believed to offer security: Horace confides in the protection that Muses provide against any evil (*Carm.* 3.4). In Pindar, song

“unhealthy political unrest”. A further example where Apollo is appeased through music can be found the *Hymn to Hermes* 416–512.

84. E.g. Pind. *Pyth.* 3.51 (μαλακαῖς ἐπαοιδαῖς, a sung charm—see below in the context of magic); Theophrastus in Ath. 624a–b, there again especially the *aulos*; Mart. Cap. 9.926.
85. Gulick 1950, 364 n. a, cites some authors denying that Theophrastus should have believed what was attested in the reference from our previous n. 84. Barker in GMW 1.35 n. 8, and 89 n. 178, sees the healing power of music being denied in Eur. *Med.* 190–203 (although the argument does not go directly against healing power, rather: music can't stop death and misfortune; it is even criticized as useless in joyful situations); cf. also Soph. *Aj.* 581f (the doctor should use a knife instead of wailing or “medical incantation”, cf. line 632). Serenus Sammonicus declares all musical healing clearly as superstition (50.930–931), similar Soran in Caelius Aurelianus *Chronicae passionum* 5.1.23 and Oribasius 1.5.
86. About the soothing effect: Mart. Cap. 9.923: “*Pythagorei etiam docuerunt ferociam animi tibiis aut fidibus mollientes cum corporibus adhaerere nexum foedus animarum.*”/The Pythagoreans too assuaged the ferocity of men's spirits with pipes and strings and taught that there is a firmly binding relationship between souls and bodies” (tr. Stahl/Johnson 1977, 357). Ps.-Plut. *Mus.* 40.1145e–f, makes this point in the often cited case of Achilles who is “digesting his anger with the help of music” (to *Il.* 9.186–9), thus showing that it is a “valuable and pleasant exercise” “to sharpen his spirit with the noblest songs”—a teaching that is supposed to stem from the centaur Cheiron (who educated Heracles, Achilles, and others), cf. GMW 1.246–247). In the place of many others: Arist. *Pol.* 8.7 1342a9–15. The comforting effect of music is given as a reason why the Spartans cultivated it in their austere life (Ath. 633a). In Latin authors we find frequently expressions like these: “*levant et carmina curas*/songs alleviate worries” (Nemes. *Ecl.* 4.19); “*carminibus dulcisque parant relevare querella*/and with sweet songs they provide to relieve grievances” (id. 2.14–16; cf. also 1.58–59); see further Culex 99–101; Varro *Sat. Men.* 394: “*demitis acris pectore curas cantu castaque poesii*/you remove from the heart bitter worries through chant and pure poetry;” Manil. 5.329–36; Schol. Hor. *Carm.* 1.32.15: “*malorum enim levamen est citharae cantus*/for the play of the cithara is solace against evils.” Cf. Wille 1967, 219; 437; 444; 537–539 with more references. Against fear: cf. also Horace: “*illic omne malum vino cantuque levato, deformis aegrimoniae dulcibus adloquitur*/There, relieve all evil through wine and song, loathsome anxieties with sweet words” (*Epod.* 13.17–18). Against anxiety, music works even for the gods; Jupiter praises Harmonia for this in Mart. Cap. 9.899.

is the best healer after the toils of a combat (*Nem.* 4.1–8, 8.49–50). Music is widely regarded as capable of putting one to sleep and defeating insomnia.⁸⁷

Perhaps the most ancient idea of music's power to bring about change is that it can be done by magic.⁸⁸ Some of the above-mentioned healing methods based on music may in fact have more to do with magic than with the therapeutic effects of music itself.⁸⁹ The most prominent representative of this magic "art" is the mythological figure of Orpheus—after all the son of the Muse Calliope (see below n. 341)—whom Greeks of every period took "to be literally a magician, an enchanter."⁹⁰ The topos of his irresistible melodies is one often referred to throughout ancient literature.⁹¹ Then there is the Sibyl at Cumae, known for her prophetic song (Verg.

87. Provoking sleep: Aesch. *PV* 574–575; Hor. *Carm.* 3.1.20f; Sextus Empiricus *Adversus medicos* 24; Sen. *Dial.* 1.3.10; Hor. *Epist.* 1.2.27–31; Quint. 1.10.32. Against insomnia: Hor. *Carm.* 3.1.20f; Sen. *Dial.* 1.3.10. Wille 1967, 148 refers as a prominent example from later times to the case of Johann Sebastian Bach's (1685–1750) thirty *Goldberg Variations* (BWV 988); however they were not composed for the purpose of putting someone to sleep but rather that his young student and talented harpsichord player Johann Gottlieb Goldberg (1727–1756) could cheer up Count Hermann Carl von Keyserlingk (1696–1764) during his hours of insomnia. This story is reported by Johann Nikolaus Forkel (1749–1818) in his biographical work *Über Johann Sebastian Bachs Leben, Kunst, und Kunstwerke* (1802, 51f); the historicity of the episode has been questioned (see GMM 10.93–94 and MGG P 7.1234).

88. See Wille 1967, 545. On the general topic of magic in Greek-Roman antiquity see Dickie 2001. For a longer discussion of the combination between music and magic in Rome, see id. 38–43 and 540–542. Collections of powerful musical deeds can be found in Prop. 3.2.1–8; Ov. *Ars Am.* 3.311–326 (especially for love) and especially in Sil. 11.440–480. A host of mythological protagonists in music is assembled in Apul. *Met.* 6.24; Mart. Cap. 9.899–929; Sid. *Carm.* 1.7–20 (see Wille 1967, 558–559).

89. Several examples in Plin. *NH* 28.2.21; in general see Wille 1967, 42 and 445–446, and id. 1962, 51.

90. Anderson 1994, 27, with reference to West 1983, stating that the magic function is no longer attached to the songs of the bards already at Homer's time (id. 30–31) while it remains vibrant in both myth and medicine. On Orpheus and his musical achievements (especially overcoming the boundary between life and death through music, e.g. Eur. *Alc.* 357–60; Ov. *Met.* 10.1–105; 11.1–66; Hor. *Carm.* 2.13.33–40) see Wille 1967, 545–551. Orpheus is said to have overcome the Sirens' chant with his cithara (Apoll. Rhod. 4.903–909) and almost made them follow him: Sen. *Medea* 355–360.

91. Aesch. *Ag.* 1630 (all things that hear his melodious voice are roused and led in ecstasy of joy); Eur. *IA* 1211–1215 (rocks follow his "magical incantations" (ἐπαοιδεῖν), *Alc.* 357–60 (the desire to possess the tongue and song of Orpheus to snatch someone back from Hades), *Bacch.* 560–564 (when Orpheus plays the lyre, the trees awake and the wild animals gather to him: *App. Verg. Cul.* 278–282; *Anth. Pal.* 7.8–10; Dio Chrys. *Or.* 32.62–66; see

Aen. 3.457, 6.74–76),⁹² and the enchantress Circe (id. *Aen.* 7.10–12 and *Ecl.* 8.70) who transforms men through her singing. At some occasion, by playing his harp and singing, Apollo makes the Parces' spindle of fate run, thus prolonging an individual's life span.⁹³ Dionysian frenzy evoked by music in ritual and other contexts leads human beings to the point of drawing from divine forces.⁹⁴

Further examples for the charming power of music can be found in Pindar,⁹⁵ in the magical incantations of barbaric songs (Eur. *IT* 1336–1338, Hdt. 7.191), in expressions like “sing upon this land” (Aesch. *Eum.* 902: ἐπύμνεσαι) and “psychagogic” wailing (Aesch. *Pers.* 686–688).⁹⁶

also Varro *Rust.* 3.13.3: animals assemble at the blow of the *bucina* by a music slave called Orpheus; similar in Verg. *Ecl.* 8.1–5). The term “ἐπαιδιή” is also used in Aesch. *PV* 173 and Pl. *passim*, e.g. *Phd.* 114d, *Resp.* 608a, *Phdr.* 267d, *Thet.* 157c, *Leg.* 812c (cf. GMW 1.90 n. 185). Multiple Latin references to Orpheus are assembled in Wille 1967, 545–551 and 558–559, summarized in Mart. Cap. 9.907 where Harmonia is epitomized as origin of all this power over nature.

Such phenomena are not restricted to Orpheus: there are Arion (Ov. *Fast.* 2.83–118 and Wille 1967, 553), the nymph Canens (Ov. *Met.* 14.337–340), Silenus (Verg. *Ecl.* 6.18–30), or herdsmen in general (id. 8.1–5; in this eclogue there is also reference to musical adjuration of moon and snakes—and the singer hopes that his song may have that same power to stir up love in Daphne: 69–72); see also AQ 2.5 58.12–14 (for *syrix* [pipe] and *pektis* [harp]); Pliny *NH* 8.50.114; 8.64.157 (horses dancing to music, similar Sext. Emp. *Mus.* 20; Solin. 45.12); Varro *Rust.* 3.17.4 (fish). The power of the pastoral pipe is given by Apollo in Sil. 14.465–473 (cf. Wille 1967, 536). The whole idea is immortalized in Mozart's *Magic Flute* (see Jones 1994, 22).

Paus. 9.30.4 demythologizes the figure of Orpheus and interprets all the legends as expression of Orpheus excelling in artistic beauty and power through divine mysteries and ways to purify, cure, and please the gods.

92. The prophetic chant of the fauns is mentioned in Cic. *Div.* 1.50.114. Wille 1967, 529, explains how the term *vates* originally conflated soothsayer, poet, cult singer, and shaman and was surely linked to singing.
93. Sen. *Apocol.* 4.15–23—the satirical context does not affect the general idea that music may have power over fate and life.
94. This is analyzed by Rouget 1985 (esp. in his chapter *Music and Trance among the Greeks* 187–226). Rouget believes that there is “no mention whatsoever of incantation in either Plato or Aristotle” (239) and denies the thesis that magic and pagan religion, in contrast to Christianity, are closely related. I disagree with this point of view, which would require further discussion but cannot be pursued further here.
95. *Pyth.* 1, 1–14 (esp.: 1.12: the “shafts” of the golden lyre “charm even the gods”; 3.51, 63–65; fr. 61.1–21 (music calls forth the gods in their power); *Nem.* 8.49–50 mentions ἐπαιδιή, which occurs in the context of soothing toil. See also Anderson 1994, 103.
96. Calling forth the ghost of Darius; see for this the comment by Barker 1984, 89 n. 184.

The walls of Thebes are said to have risen up at the sound of the *phorminx* and Amphion, the same singer who makes rocks move (Hor. *Carm.* 3.11.13–14) is said to have raised up towers through the playing of the *lyra* (Eur. *Phoen.* 822–824)⁹⁷ Islands at the Nymphaeum in Lydia reportedly moved with musical rhythm (Plin. *NH* 2.95.209), and a spring gushes forth at the sound of the *tibia* (Solin. 5.20). Music's effect on animals may be mentioned here, as it is able to create in them both fear and attraction (Eur. *Bacch.* 560–564: Orpheus; Ael. *NA* 12.45 and Sext. *Emp. Mus.* 32: dolphins).⁹⁸ This effect is applied especially for hunting or self-protection: Orpheus is said to have expelled by his song a wolf in the forest (Hor. *Carm.* 1.22), or Faunus, who with his music protects from wild animals (*Mart.* 9.61.11–12; Hor. *Carm.* 1.17.10–12).

Aesthetics? One way of dealing with music which we nowadays are most familiar with has not yet been mentioned: the simple enjoyment of music for what it is. A good number of scholars tends to deny Greeks or Romans an aesthetic sense for music (and art in general) with the argument that this concept developed only in the late eighteenth century.⁹⁹ While “aesthetics” is an equivocal term, here we are mainly concerned with the ability first to appreciate and enjoy something insofar as it is beautiful, and second to reflect (philosophically) about this appreciation. A truly aesthetic experience can well be associated with objective principles, or else one would have to concede that such an experience were entirely subjective, unexplainable, and devoid of any foundation. It is not possible to enter here into a thorough discussion of the status of aesthetics prior to the Enlightenment,¹⁰⁰ but

97. More about this story in Paus. 2.6.4, 9.5–9, ps.–Plut. *Mus.* 3.1131f–1132a; Dio Chrys. *Or.* 32.62; Prop. 3.2.3–4; Sen. *Phoen.* 566–570; cf. GMW 1.90 n. 188. About how Apollo's lyre contributed to the construction of Troy's city wall see Ov. *Ep.* 5.139; 16, 182; *Mart.* 8.6.6. Megara's walls become musical through Apollo's lyre (Ov. *Met.* 8.14–16).

98. Aelianus' magical descriptions exaggerate a phenomenon which today would be interpreted as animals' natural reaction to certain sounds.

99. E.g. Cross/Tolbert in OHMP 2009, 26–27, attributing to Hume and Kant the “new” idea of a fundamentally “disinterested” aesthetic contemplation and “not reducible to any specific set of principles.” More references in Porter 2010, 26–40.

100. A good introduction to these questions give Bychov/Sheppard 2010, xi–xiv, a convincing justification for publishing a full volume of primary texts on *Greek and Roman Aesthetics*. A fuller treatment is Halliwell 2002 who shows that the eighteenth century conception of aesthetics can be seen “partly as a secularized derivative of much older (originally Platonic, later Christian) ideas of the disinterested contemplation of transcendent (i.e., divine) beauty and goodness” (9). Porter 2010 dedicates an ample volume to trace aesthetic thought in ancient Greece by a careful terminological analysis and reviewing much evidence about aesthetic *perception* according to the various senses. Some of his central objections against

I would like to reason briefly why I side with those scholars who hold that people of earlier times were receptive to beauty as such. There is, first of all, abundant evidence for both appreciation of beauty and theories about it throughout the history of Western civilization.¹⁰¹ Regarding antiquity, Abert divides up cultural development into sensual, ethical, and aesthetical stages and claims that the Greeks disregarded the aesthetical dimension in favor of the ethical.¹⁰² Lippman, in a much more differentiated assessment, shows how aesthetics—in the sense of appreciating harmonic proportion and order—is certainly explicitly present in ancient literature. Also Beardsley shows how, in the *Philebus*, “Socrates is examining

the denial of ancient aesthetic thought are that such an argument “is hostile to a view of the arts as interactive, that is, as borrowing across their own closed boundaries. It is art-centered—and therefore lacks any notion of the experience of aesthetics. It has a reductive and monolithic view of the “modern” (and so too of its antithesis, the pre-modern). And it ignores the formative role of the senses” (p. 29).

101. See e.g. Beardsley 1975, 22–28 who points out the difference between ancient Egypt and Greece. While the Egyptians seem to have hidden away their finest works in tombs and expressed mainly magnificence and eternity, the Greeks began to value art as such and produced a wealth of it, which keeps impressing us today. Mathiesen 1990 pursues the Greek roots of aesthetic reflections within Neo-Platonism, which imports the Pythagorean understanding of harmony (as present in Plato’s *Timaeus* and elsewhere; see Lippman 1964, 26–35 and 87–110) into the Middle Ages. Barker 2010 contributes an analysis of aesthetic categories for music in multiple texts, applied to harmony and *συμμετρνία* understood both mathematically and acoustically. Notice also that “unity of ethical and artistic pursuits is actually a distinctive feature in Chinese tradition” (Wang in the OHPME 273; I disagree when Wang affirms that, in contrast to Chinese traditions, “the Greek philosophers did not connect their musical-ethical view with artistic beauty.” We shall find much evidence that, in the teaching of Plato, Aristotle, and the others, the ethically relevant propriety of music is not possible without beauty and harmony on the artistic or aesthetic level; however, it is true that the Chinese aesthetic rules in the context of music performance are much more developed and complex).
102. Abert 1968, 1. Even though this classification contains some truth, it simplifies the real situation too much, as do most attempts within the philosophy of history to divide history into triadic periods (e.g. Auguste Comte’s “Law of three stages” in his *Cours de Philosophie Positive* from 1830–1842). When Abert writes (p. 5): “*das rein Ästhetische trat vollständig zurück vor dem Ethischen*/what is purely aesthetic withdrew completely before what is ethical,” then it strikes us as strange that the subtitle of his work reads “*Ein Beitrag zur Musikästhetik des klassischen Altertums*/A contribution to the aesthetics of music in classical antiquity,” at the same time declaring then that the Greeks could not develop musical aesthetics “in the modern sense,” i.e. they dealt only with the good, not the beautiful. Henceforth he uses the word “aesthetic” equivocally as a hypernym for “ethical” (Pythagoras, Plato, etc.) and “formalistic” (Philodemus, Sextus Empiricus, etc.).

beauty in a sense pretty close to what the modern aesthete is interested in;” for instance, “audible sounds, which are smooth and clear, and deliver a single series of pure notes, are beautiful, not relative to something else, but in themselves” (*Phlb.* 51d).¹⁰³ Aristotle does know the concept of art having an end in itself (*Eth. Nic.* 1.1.2 1094a5: “τὰ δὲ παρ’ αὐτὰς ἔργα τινά”) and uses the example of *aulos* playing (*Mag. mor.* 1211b27). The fact that the appreciation of art often has ethical significance need not detract from the concrete aesthetic perception. When the Greek philosophers, in specific contexts, indicate “purposes” for music (and beauty), they do not betray the general ability to have a “disinterested” aesthetical approach; on the contrary, as Lippman shows, the ethical and the aesthetical dimensions of the musical experience are correlative.¹⁰⁴

Beauty is never purely sensuous pleasure, but will depend on the rational element of order; it is greatest when the order is metaphysically and ethically most significant, and declines when structural complexity goes beyond the pattern of nature.

Understanding music (and any art) does not diminish but rather deepen the aesthetic experience.¹⁰⁵ However, when Mathiesen asserts that for Hellenistic music theorists “aesthetic judgment is not based on the sound of music but rather on the higher principles that reason discovers in music,”¹⁰⁶ he points at the phenomenon that “aesthetic judgment” becomes independent from “aesthetic experience”—the judgment may be based on reason only, but the experience is necessarily bound to the senses. An extreme is reached when “music” becomes completely divorced from actual sound and morphs into mathematical-metaphysical speculation. This happens when Theon of Smyrna declares:

We have no need of a musical instrument, as Plato himself explains, when he says that it is not necessary to agitate the strings of an instrument (with hand to ear) like curious folk trying to overhear something. What we desire is to understand harmony and the celestial music.¹⁰⁷

103. Beardsley 1975, 42–43; see the whole context of 39–51. Lippman’s brilliant analysis (1964, 87–110, especially 104–110) excavates from Plato’s dialogues how sensual beauty reflects the true idea of rational beauty, which, through proper imitation, becomes virtue.

104. Lippman 1964, 107. Schäfer 1934, 93–156, directly criticizing Abert, offers another valuable approach that shows the interconnectedness between ethical and aesthetical thinking, at least in post-Pythagorean systems.

105. See e.g. the expositions of Scruton 1997; Kivy 1990 and 2001; Budd 2008.

106. Mathiesen 1990, 42.

107. Quoted from Mathiesen 1990, 45.

Such a stand does not likely represent that of common people at any time, but among theorists in the neo-Platonic tradition it is fairly prominent, and we still encounter traces of it in some of the Christian Church Fathers such as Jerome.

To resolve the issue on an empirical level we could ask whether the ancients ever had instrumental¹⁰⁸ concerts where they simply sat down and listened to music for its own sake. All those uses of music mentioned above aim at a purpose outside of music itself.¹⁰⁹ At least in classical Greece, there seem to be no direct records for instrumental “concerts” in our modern sense.¹¹⁰ Plato and others are suspicious of music that does not accompany and is not submitted to text.¹¹¹ But this does not mean that the Greeks did not perceive beauty in music itself, though, since Plato’s remarks might be merely prescriptive, written as a reaction to contrary

108. I am saying “instrumental” because, as we have seen, there were performances with (sung) text, but there both the melody setting and instrumental accompaniment were wholly at the service of the text. The question now is whether they possessed an aesthetic sense for “music alone.”

109. The musical performances during the symposia or festivals will most closely approach “purposelessness,” even though again these are mostly vocal with accompaniment, with the respective intention of entertainment or cult. In Hellenistic and Roman times we find *Tafelmusik* (musical presentations during meals), which we can imagine as simple background music for conversation or, at least at times, object of attentive listening; the latter is quite probable, especially given the artistic proficiency that had developed by that time (Wille 1967, 143–147). Then there is also the theater where musical overtures and interludes come into play (id. 169–175); dance and mime give music again a more subordinate function (id. 175–202).

110. See Lippman 1964, 52: “Pure instrumental music was not only relatively unimportant, but also either explicitly programmatic or doubtless in its form, melody, and rhythm especially full of meaning derived from visual and verbal and kinesthetic experience.” There is, however, some evidence for pure instrumental performances, e.g. the Delphic contests about which Strabo reports (9.3.10): he distinguishes κιθαρωδοί (singers with cithara) and κιθαρισταί along with pipers who played without chant (χωρίς ᾠδῆς). With the latter, he might refer to the performance of the *Pythikos nomos*, a famous repertory piece at the Pythian festival at Delphi, which had become a grand musical event from 586 BC onward (see West 1992, 214; 336–338).

111. See below the section on Plato. Plato’s exclusion of all instruments except the lyre and the cithara for accompaniment clearly implies this; he allows as the only exception the *syrinx* for shepherds (*Rep.* 399d). Aristotle is more lenient, even though also he censures the *aulos* in the educational context, among other reasons because it cannot go along with text (*Pol.* 8.6.1341a17–28)—, which then explains that the *aulos* became more a solo instrument without chant (except to accompany choruses, see West 1992, 105; 373), although we do know about aulodes (singers who were accompanied by a pipe or *aulos* (see West 1992, 18 n. 23).

customs.¹¹² Aristotle's question whether it is convenient that people often make or listen to music for sheer enjoyment indicates that such a practice must have been known (*Pol.* 8.3).¹¹³ Wille speaks of a transition from Plato's ethical view of beauty to an objective aesthetic judgment in Aristotle,¹¹⁴ but even if there was a change of emphasis in the philosophical reflection on the value of music, that does not prove a sudden appearance of aesthetical receptivity in the culture of the time but rather a response to its previous existence.

A last point may be added to enlighten this debate. As long as ancient civilization lasts, music (as much as poetry) has never ceased to be attributed to divine origin and inspiration, in general to the Muses, who are always to be invoked before engaging in musical activity (*Hes. Theog.* 48).¹¹⁵ Barker explains that "the Muses not only give the power of song, but inspire the poet with knowledge, insight into

112. Anderson (1994, 42) sees already in Homer's *Iliad* (9.186–189, Achilles) "the first known aesthetic response to music in Western literary tradition, and it concerns the affective capacities of an instrument, not those of the human voice." The text uses twice the word *τέρπειν* ("to give delight/pleasure"). See also Strabo 10.3.9 who mentions pleasure and beautiful execution, associating us with the divine ("ἡδονῇ τε ἅμα καὶ καλλιτεχνία πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ἡμᾶς συνάπτει").

113. Especially in 1337b28: "Nowadays most are taking part [in music] for pleasure (ὡς ἡδονῆς χάριν)", as an activity for "leisure" (σχολή/σχολάζειν)—, which does not have any further purpose than pleasure, true joy (εὐδαιμονία) and blessed life (τό ζῆν μακαρίως): 1338a2–3. See also Busse 1928. Even Abert 1899, 14 & 17, admits that Aristotle's theory contains a part in which he comes closest to the modern aesthetic view of art.

114. Wille 2001, 13: "*Das ästhetische Erlebnis ist von ethischen, akustischen und hörphysiologischen Bedingungen des Hörens weitgehend unabhängig*/The aesthetic experience is mostly independent from the ethical, acustical, and audio-physiological conditions of the listener." And yet," according to Wille (*ibid.*) the aesthetic judgment becomes for Aristotle the most important goal of formation and education —, which attests that aesthetics and ethics remain intimately related. Lord 1982, 84–85, is correct in diminishing the distance between Plato and Aristotle given their common educational interest, but even if it is true that Aristotle sacrificed the pleasure-motivation for music for the sake of rescuing music education, this does not prove the non-existence of aesthetical appreciation at the time but rather confirms it.

115. E.g. Hesiod's "vocation story" in *Theog.* 24–34 and 43ff, also *Op.* 658–662, where their song substantially becomes his own; Pindar, *Nem.* 2.1–3; and many others. Among the exceptions is Alcman who claimed his art as his own achievement (cf. fr. 39/40), without, however, omitting the invocation of the Muses elsewhere; cf. CHCL 1.184–185. Lucretius offers a solely nature-based history of the origin of music: 5.1379–1891. Notwithstanding, "Μοῦσα" is also used signifying simply "music", so e.g. in the case of Terpander (at Paus. 4.33.3 and Plut. *Lyc.* 21 as quoted in Anderson 1994, 60 & 64).

the mind of Zeus. Such claims continued to be taken seriously, and became a subject for philosophical investigation; see e.g. Plato, *Ion* 553bff.”¹¹⁶

Why did the gods invent and make music? Beardsley, in his history of aesthetics, puts it in these terms: “Greek theology taught that poetry and music had been invented by the gods *for their own delectation*, then taught to men.”¹¹⁷ It indeed seems likely that this description of the origin of music relates to the concrete experience of joy and happiness that human beings do indeed have when engaged in music-making. This indicates that the ancients were aware of the beauty of the musical experience in and of itself. The exaltation of “pure art” has led some modern authors to assume that aesthetics are lacking in ages when social, ethical, or religious factors were linked to art in general and music in particular. However, Scruton notes that wherever music is present, aesthetics are de facto also at least implicitly understood as being present as well:

The art of music (...) could not exist without the aesthetic experience through which we perceive it. Music is *intrinsically* aesthetic; and any society that makes music is already taking an interest, however primitive, in something that has no purpose but itself.¹¹⁸

As Lippman points out, “in the characteristic Greek setting, music is given the utmost force by social tradition and religious belief.”¹¹⁹ In other words the focus on the other elements heightens rather than diminishes or destroys a genuine holistic “artistic experience.”

116. GMW 1.34 n. 2. About the depiction of the Muses in Roman times see Wille 1967, 520–524, esp. the reference to Ps-Cato *Mus.* 1–11 in n. 297. For Rome see also Tib. 2.5.1–4; Ov. *Rem. am.* 703–705; Hor. *Carm.* 4.15.1–2.

117. 1975, 26 (italics are mine). See also Comotti 1989, 13–14; Lippman 1964, 19; Wille 1967, 514–540. For examples see Hes. *Theog.* 61; Arn. *Adv. nat.* 3.21: “*In caelo enim cantatur et psallitur: ut intervalla et numerus vocum novem conserant scitule ac modulenter sorores*” For in heaven there is singing and cithara playing; when the nine sisters join in intervals and rhythms of voices neatly and well-measured;” similar id. 4.33. For divinities engaged in music and dance, see Hor. *Carm.* 1.4.5–7 (Venus, Graces, Nymphs), Apul. *Met.* 5.24 (Venus, choir of Muses, and other divine musicians), similar Verg. *Aen.* 1.498–500 and Ov. *Met.* 2.441–442 (Artemis/Diana) and the musical celebration in Mart. Cap. 9.888–920. As one example for the later continuation of this topos may serve John Milton in *Paradise Lost*: “Thus they in Heaven, above the starry sphere,/Their happy hours in joy and hymning spent.” (3.416–7). Milton, himself very prone to music, applied pervasive musical symbolism to his work (cf. Steggle, 2001).

118. 1997, 478.

119. 1964, 52.

The following table (2–1) summarizes the various ways in which music has been employed in antiquity as discussed in this section, and the purpose (or effect) that was sought for.

Table 2–1. Usage of music in ancient Greece and Rome.

Context	Effect	Sample References
singing poetry (bards)	entertainment, sentiments from the text	Hom. <i>Od. passim</i> ; Hes.
contests at festivals (<i>prosodion</i>)	praise	Hes. <i>Op.</i> 651–7; Pind. <i>Pyth.</i> 12
joyous celebrations of victory or city (choral, odes, <i>epinikia</i>)	happiness; immortalizing glory	Hom. <i>Il.</i> 22.391–4; Pind. <i>Odes</i> , Suet. <i>Iul.</i> 49.4, Liv. 45.38.12, 45.43.8.
praise and memory of people or events (paean, encomia, <i>carmina triumphalia</i>)	appreciation, affiliation, unity	Hom. <i>passim</i> , Pind. <i>Nem.</i> 7.12–16; <i>Ol.</i> 10.91–6
praise of the dead	appreciation, affiliation	Hom. <i>Il.</i> 9.186–191
cult, praise of the gods (hymn, paean, dithyramb)	awe, gratitude, ensure benevolence and support of the god(s), ecstatic union with god(s), prophesy	Hes. <i>Op.</i> ; Alc. fr. 1, 3; Aes., Eur.; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 437e Hor. <i>Carm.</i> 1.36.1–3 Cic. <i>Har. resp.</i> 11.23
lamentation over death, defeat, etc. (<i>threnos</i> , dirge; in tragedy; <i>neniae</i>)	expression of sorrow, consolation	Aesch. <i>Sept.</i> 5–8, Pl. <i>Leg.</i> 947bc; Verg. <i>Georg.</i> 4.464–472
lamentation <i>before</i> death	expression of anguish, at times heroism	Hdt. 1.24.2–6
drama (chorus)	dramatic-emotional expression; evocation of evil; balancing emotions	Eur. and Aesch. <i>passim</i>
wedding (<i>hymenaeus</i> , <i>epithalamium</i> , <i>fescennina</i>)	averting evil spirits, joy	Sappho frs. 44, 103–109; Pind. <i>Pyth.</i> 3 Theoc. <i>Id.</i> 18, Plaut. <i>Cas.</i> 798–806, Catull. 61, 62; Hor. <i>Epist.</i> 2.1.145f
maiden-songs (<i>partheneion</i>)	love, union	Alc. fr. 1, Sappho fr. 132, Pind. frs. 94a–c

Context	Effect	Sample References
love (lover to beloved) (e.g. <i>paraclausithyron</i>)	love	Alcm.; Alc.; Anac.; Theocr. <i>Id.</i> 3; <i>Anth. Lat.</i> 227.1–2; Hor. <i>Carm.</i> 3.9, 10; Ov. <i>Am.</i> 1.6
banquets, symposia (<i>skolia</i> , <i>carmina convivalia</i>)	entertainment, competition	Archil.; Ar. <i>Vesp.</i> 1208–1250, Xenophon <i>Symp.</i>
private circles (friendship, birthday...)	expression of joy and friendship	Archil.; Sappho; Hor. <i>Carm.</i> 4.11; Gell. 19.9.1–10
satirical song	abuse, anger	Paul. <i>Sent.</i> 5.4.6, 15; Catull. 23, 25, 29, 33, etc.
private song	personal expression of sentiments; tuning in with nature	Hom. <i>Il.</i> 9.186–191; HH 19.14–26
work, rowing, sports	equal rhythm, higher spirits	Ar. <i>Ran</i> 206–267; Ov. <i>Trist.</i> 4.1.5–16; <i>Anth. Lat.</i> 388a
shepherding	pasttime, love, control and dressage of animals, honor (in competitions)	Hom. <i>Il.</i> 18.526; Soph. <i>Phil.</i> 212–213; Eur. <i>Alc.</i> 569–587, Theoc. <i>Id.</i> 5, 6; Polyb. 12.3.5ff, Verg. <i>Ecl.</i> passim; Varro <i>Rust.</i> 3.13.1
harvesting	praise of gods (esp. Dionysius); joy over accomplished work	Hom. <i>Il.</i> 18.569–72, Verg. <i>G.</i> 2.417
hunting	joy (?); luring animals	Terentianus Maurus GL 6.383.1031–1038; Ael. <i>NA</i> 1.39; 6.31–33; 12.46; 17.18
traveling	motivation, joy	Hor. <i>Sat.</i> 1.7.30–31; Verg. <i>Ecl.</i> 9.64–65
sailing	joy, courage	Hor. <i>Sat.</i> 1.5.15ff; Paul. Nol. <i>Carm.</i> 17.109–110
begging	mercy	Porph. <i>Hor. ep.</i> 1.17.48; Pers. 1.88ff
war, battle, torture	arousing courage, aggressiveness, signals, joy over victory, abuse of the defeated	Tyrtaeus; Aesch. <i>Pers.</i> 388–95, <i>Sept.</i> 267–270
politics	promotion of public order	Thaletas (Plut. <i>Lyc.</i> 4.21)
revolution	lawlessness	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 424c

Context	Effect	Sample References
oratory	sentiments to convince	Quint. 1.10
education	character formation, <i>sophrosyne</i> , tuning of the soul, reverence	Democritus; Ar. <i>Ran</i> 729, Pl. <i>Resp.</i> , <i>Leg.</i> , Aristotle
healing	cure, sleep, tranquility	Theog 8; Pindar; Aes, Eur; Quint. 9.4.12
magic	enchantment, “psychagogic,” conjure divine power	Od 12.36–200/ Cass; Aes; Eur
aesthetics	enjoyment of music	Pl. <i>Phlb.</i> 51d; Arist. <i>Pol.</i> 1337b28–29

This list follows the same order as the description within the section “Antiquity in general.”

Summary. For the ancient Greeks and Romans, music is present in virtually all aspects of their lives.¹²⁰ Originating in the sphere of divine delight and beauty, it manifests itself in the cosmic order itself, in the harmonious movement of celestial bodies and in the sounds of nature. It serves as a primary instrument for relating to the divinities through cult as well as to conjure supernatural powers. In human social life, music is to be found everywhere, on the level of both public or private festivals and celebrations. In general, it serves to unite and to inspire people for work and lesiure, although at times it can also lead to discord and negative effects. Closely associated to the poetic word, it facilitates the transmission of sentiments or ideas and forms a part of the educational process. Individuals may be emotionally touched by music or find in it a venue to express feelings themselves; they may engage in aesthetic enjoyment of pleasing music or get irritated over unpleasant sounds; they may use music to simply entertain themselves or grow in virtue; music may help them to overcome physical or psychological ailment or give them strength to address a difficult task; and they may be professionals who earn a living playing music—all of this not without experiencing in a mysterious way a specific kind of pleasure, at least in most cases, in each of these moments of encounter with the Muse. It may be left open whether music can ever happen without any purpose at all, but the evident functions and purposes are all-encompassing. Figure 2–1 shows these functions in a structured fashion.

120. In Mart. Cap. 9.923–929, we find a compendium of close to all usages described above. Wille’s summarizing account of information on other ancient peoples such as the Etruscans (whose culture developed much under Greek influence), Celts, Gauls, Germans (mostly war music and epics sung by bards), and Iberians, suggests that music had was also important to them and occured in comparable social contexts (Wille 1967, 562–580).




Figure 2–1. Functions of music within ancient culture.¹²¹

121. A classification from today’s perspective, but reflecting most cultures, is offered by Davis/Gfeller/Thaut 2008, 53, with reference to Alan Merriam: “(1) music as an influence on physical response, (2) music as a form of communication, (3) music as a form of emotional expression, (4) music as symbolic representation, (5) music to enforce conformity to social

Characterizing Music

Now that we have before us the general panorama of musical usage, we can begin to take a closer look at what the ancients considered to be positive and negative regarding music. In a first step, we shall analyze the way in which ancient poets describe musical sound, either directly or else metaphorically, in their epithets and through their descriptions of musicians, songs, and instruments. Although not perhaps exactly representing the mainstream, they provide our best approach to it. They are generally not working under the influence of the more specialized ideas pursued by philosophers and music theorists; only few such as Aristophanes take an explicit stand in the emerging debate on music.

In most instances when ancient authors, especially the Latin ones, mention music, it is not characterized in any particular way. But once they do characterize it, we can observe a wide range of descriptions. Before the developments of the later fifth century, justly called by Barker a “musical revolution,”¹²² Greek poetry gives the impression of serenely indulging in the sweet and harmonious music of the lyre and *aulos*, simple in rhythms and structure,¹²³ consisting of both individual and choral song. Musicians varied in their level of skill, and reports are given of their victories or defeats in contests, but music style in itself does not seem to be an issue.¹²⁴ After Timotheus of Miletus and others introduced new patterns of music, however, those who preferred the traditions of the past openly criticized the new styles.¹²⁵ Polarization and polemics arose, as illustrated in Aristophanes’ caustic remarks on the “new” music—and drama—, and continued from then on.

norms, (6) music to validate social institutions and religious rituals, (7) music to contribute to the continuity and stability of culture, (8) music to contribute to the integration of society, (9) music for aesthetic enjoyment, and (10) music for entertainment” (I have eliminated bold font in the original).

122. GMW 1.93.

123. See West 1992, 355. This observation comes from the explicit characteristics we have about music from this time. There are indications for another side as well, such as the discontinuation of the auledic contest that featured elegiac songs, although West 1992, 337, dismisses Pausanias’ speculation that “the laments were considered too gloomy and inauspicious” by saying that “there was plenty of scope for cheerful aulody.”

124. Multiple innovations occurred during the seventh century, attributed especially to Terpander and Olympus, but apparently they were not debated but rather praised (see the first section in ch. 3); cf. West 1992, 329–336, who, on p. 343 n. 65, refers to Pratinas’ comment on innovations to the dithyramb (the “toad metaphor”) as the “earliest instance of a commonplace of modern music critics.”

125. For details about the protagonists and features of the new trend, see e.g. West 1992, 356–368, LeVen 2014, and later in our ch. 3.

Not coincidentally, theoretical-philosophical reflection about music also began at about the same time, and the ethical value of music was consciously perceived, systematically analyzed, and vigorously promoted.¹²⁶ Damonian education theory, followed by the highly influential positions of Plato and Aristotle, are just some prime examples.

The current section, however, will mainly consider poetic expressions about music which precede or seem to be unaffected by debate. Our first interest lies in the “flavor”, which music has for those authors who, each in his own way, reflect the positive or negative import that music and its elements have on the common people. The following survey cannot claim to be exhaustive but intends to offer at least a representative spectrum of characteristics, positive and negative, attributed to music in both Greek and Latin. Excluded remain texts drawn from the musical treatises, theoretical considerations, and the characterizations that are made in such contexts.¹²⁷

The material presented here is compiled from passages referred to in those works on ancient music I include in the bibliography; Latin terms are collected for a good part with the help of the material gathered in Wille 1956. For both

126. A fundamental objection to this thesis could be the Pythagorean tradition, which, according to Aristotle and Iamblicus, developed a sophisticated approach already since the sixth century, especially with regard to music's healing power, within a determined cosmological theory. Nevertheless, we possess no written account of these theories until two centuries later, and traces of a debate on these issues at that earlier time are conspicuous in their absence. While people had certainly been aware and made use of the power of music for many centuries, explicit records of a systematic reflection about it are unavailable and maybe non-existing before the need for such expositions due to the emerging public debate occasioned by style changes of the “New Music.” The point of an inverted causality, that the greater theoretical awareness about the value of music only created the conditions within which criticism and debate would flourish, could also be made; even the *kind* of innovation brought forth (in contrast to earlier changes) may have played a role, but it is significant that (written) criticism arises only half a century later, after the first reflections on ethos in music had been proclaimed (after all, most innovators had won at competitions!). It is probably impossible to reconstruct the exact process. I am inclined to assume a reciprocal stimulation between the emerging music theory and criticism, with the first impulse coming from the theorists—there has to be a certain awareness about established principles before they can become an object of dispute.

127. Some references to authors such as Plato and Aristotle who theorize on music did find entry here, but only from narrative sections that are not controversial and comparable to other literary sources.

languages, the standard dictionaries and their references were consulted as well.¹²⁸ More systematically collected are expressions in Homer, the Homeric Hymns, Pindar, and some lyric poets, so as to cover well the early stages of literature.

Parameters for the Term Survey

The most instructive way to illustrate the relevant characterizations of music seems to be a systematic vocabulary list, in order to facilitate an overview and comparison of the terms in question.¹²⁹ In order to combine the different parameters of analysis such as word fields, chronology, and elements of music on one side and ethical value on the other, I have chosen to divide the material into two main tables: one for positive (or neutral) and one for negative evaluation, since this distinction is our main concern. A musical characteristic is generally considered “positive” if in the related quotes music serves a “function” (in the wide sense, as explained on p. 39) that is perceived as pleasing or constructive; otherwise, it is “negative.” Merely descriptive (or “neutral”) contexts are also included in the “positive” section. Terms and references which are ambiguous or which fall into both categories are generally listed only in the table corresponding to their predominant employment,

128. It would be very interesting, but far beyond the possibilities of the present work, to undertake a complete study of all terms attributed to music and to register them statistically, so as to map the whole word field that the ancients used for describing the value of music. Kaimio 1977 offers a chronological study of the characterization of sound in Early Greek Literature (down to Aristophanes but excluding Plato); that study is wider in scope than mine because it treats any acoustic phenomenon; it is narrower insofar as it does not consider later or Latin sources. Another helpful work is Steinmayer 1985.

Günther Wille, in his second monumental work *Akroasis* (written between 1956 and 1958 but published posthumously only in 2001), includes descriptions of the perceptive process and extends the historical overview down to Aristotle. No English translation exists to this point and the work has found little attention; for a review see Lindenlauf 2005. The study on Greek musical terms by Rocconi (2003) includes also many technical terms but contains for our purpose a useful survey of metaphorical descriptions of sounds, especially related to different senses. See further García López 1969; Pizzani 1997; Calderón 1999.

129. Notice that qualities which do not contribute to evaluate music as such, e.g. those attributed to the physical appearance of instruments or terms such as “famous” or “long” or simply “great,” are not included, neither is the merely technical vocabulary of music theory with very few exceptions (e.g. βαρύς/*gravis* and *acutus* because in some contexts they are descriptive beyond the technical meaning).

Other ways than vocabulary to express value judgments on music are dealt with elsewhere in this book, especially in the context of criticism expressed against musical styles, musicians, performances, etc.

remarking in footnotes or in the text itself if there are contrary applications.¹³⁰ Within each table, the concepts are grouped according to similar meanings and, within these, to cognates. The flow of the semantic spectrum within the table is evidenced in the explanation following each table. The most basic, important, or frequent terms are underlined. Latin terms are placed next to their closest Greek counterpart. In some relevant cases, an etymological explanation is given.

The characterization terms had to be listed in the Greek or Latin original because the English translation is generally incapable of reproducing the full meaning of each term, especially the many Greek compounds. A simple example for this inadequacy of the English language (and probably of any other) can be the semantic field of “sweet,” as illustrated below. For Latin, this problem is diminished by the more precise circumscriptions of meaning found in the OLD—but these can hardly be used for translations. And thus one will notice quickly that the translations within these semantic fields seem almost arbitrary; for instance, many translators use “sweet” for all sorts of Greek words or change καλός “beautiful” to “glorious” or “lovely.”¹³¹

Each lemma is documented by one or more sample references in an approximate chronological order,¹³² and only those referring to music directly or by analogy are included, together with the concept they describe, be it the voice of a human being or a god/goddess/Muse, a chorus, an instrument, a melody, a song, etc.¹³³ Upon selecting references, the difficulty arose that the boundary between the singing and speaking voice (or other sounds) is blurry. For instance, “wailing” can refer either to simple groans and shrieks or to a more formal lamentation including melody and even text. Similarly, references to poetic performances may or may not imply singing. Hence some of the characteristics given below are floating in a grey zone between both. On the other hand, epithets exclusively applied to speech¹³⁴ or other non-musical utterings are not included.

130. Often times the characteristic is determined by the nature of the context and/or the corresponding musical genre (e.g.: victory hymn → positive characteristics; dirge → negative).

131. E.g. Evelyn-White 1936 for Hes. *Theog.* 22 and 68.

132. The order is approximate because the authors' life dates are sometimes disputed or not known for certain; the *Anthologia Palatina* and the *Anthologia Latina* are always placed at the end without considering the life dates of the authors and texts quoted therein.

133. Occasionally characterizations of animals (especially birds and here especially the nightingale) are given as long as the word is used at least also for music strictly speaking; this is done because it helps to grasp some of the connotations that these terms possess when applied to music.

134. See e.g. Arist. *Top.* 1.15.106a–107b; Plin. *HN* 28.6.58: *vox candida*; see on this also Stanford 1969, 7.

Most revealing are the characteristics that the authors explicitly declare responsible for a certain effect, which then is indicated in the corresponding column. Often times, however, no such effect is mentioned, although many of the attributes in themselves already imply an effect (e.g.: a “sweet” perception elicits a particular emotional reaction).

Not surprisingly, most characterizations occur in the form of adjectival attributes or of adverbs modifying an action of making music. Genitive attribute constructions, such as “sweetness of sound” in the place of “sweet sound” are very rarely found in literary texts, and as a result the table contains almost exclusively adjectives. References with an adverb directly derived from the adjective are listed under the same lemma. In a few instances, I have included nouns (e.g. *καναχή*) but more for the specific connotations which might be attached to them or their interrelation with other qualifying adjectives in specific passages. There are also verbs that imply a characterization of the sound produced, but with rare exceptions these are not included because they usually do not contribute directly to the question of musical value. Some references on dance can be found—since dance very often supposes musical accompaniment—when the characterization could plausibly refer to both elements.

A last preliminary comment may be made about the nature of the adjectives found to describe musical sound. As Kaimio (1977, 11) observes, there are “very few, if any, adjectives in Greek, which are primarily used to describe a sound, most words having been borrowed from other fields of sensory perception. And it is even more problematic to describe music in words.”¹³⁵ This observation, which will be of importance later on (see p. 436), is in fact backed up by the empirical material. Most terms used to describe music are either applicable to other senses as well (e.g. “beautiful,” “great,” etc.),¹³⁶ or they derive from technical terms which in themselves do not reveal a positive or negative characteristic (e.g. “melodious,” meaning simply that something possesses a melody, without in itself revealing

135. LeVen 2013, 232–233, points at the perception patterns of ancient Greeks (both in the visual and the acoustic sense) which are different from ours today: while today we focus on hues or pitch/volume, the ancients paid more attention to texture (e.g. a “mottled or dapple appearance”) or, in sound, to qualities “such as liquidness, clearness, articulation, timbre.” Such characteristics lend themselves to be used “across the senses (...) without being used metaphorically.”

136. A case in which the opposite may have happened is the attribution of “Phrygian” to smell; see Ath. 14.626f and the note by Gulick *ad loc.* who considers the possibility of understanding it “in the sense of strong and pungent, having the same stimulating effect as the Phrygian mode in music.”

whether the melody is pleasing or not).¹³⁷ The value of music is, for the most part, described metaphorically or in analogy to other senses.¹³⁸ In order to corroborate this, the tables below indicate in a specific column those senses other than hearing, for which the adjective is also (or even primarily) used.¹³⁹ The same column also shows if an adjective finds further usage apart from sensual perception, and also specifies whether a word may particularly describe human character, since the ancient theorists claimed the influence of music on character, a linguistic bridge between the two could serve as an empirical hint that the connection is backed up by experience. Care needs to be taken, however, not to confuse a simple “inter-sensal metaphor”¹⁴⁰ with the psychological (or neurological) phenomenon

137. Barker 2002b, 24–27, illustrates this phenomenon well, e.g. how adjectives often mingle acoustic description with psychological features of perception. He also shows, with reference to Aristotle, how the sense of hearing was considered derivative or metaphorical (e.g. to touch: Arist. *De an.* 2.8.420a28–b4).

Those words that are exclusive for music are so because they contain an element signifying a basic musical element: “sound,” “voice,” or the like, e.g. ἡδυβόης (“sweet-sounding,” from βοή “loud cry, shout, sound,” or βοάω “to cry aloud, shout, resound”), with the exception of λιγύς/λιγυρός.

138. This seems to be true not only for Greek or Latin, but for English and other Indo-European languages as well. Even the technical vocabulary, apart from the most basic (“tone”, “voice”, etc.), is widely loaned from other semantic fields (“scale”, “chromatic”, “key”, “harmony”, etc.). The connection is particularly close between visual and acoustic phenomena; see also the interesting German terms *Klangfarbe* (“timbre,” literally: “sound color”) and *Farbton* (“hue,” literally: “color tone”). See Kaimio 1977, 234–237 in particular on the visual field. See also Arist. *De an.* 2.8 420a28–30: “acute” and “grave” derive from touch; *De audib.* 801a22–32.

139. Entries in this column follow generally the order in which they are listed in LSJ or the OLD.

140. Stanford 1936, 47–62 argues against “explaining away” as catachresis, rhetorical trope, or etymological resemblance the imaginative force and beauty of expressions such as λευκή φωνή (“white voice”) and defends them as metaphors, which deliberately induce an “inter-sensory effect” (54, 56–57) beyond mere “association.” He speculates about an earlier stage of humanity when “men had a unity of perception, a constant and immediate co-ordination of several senses in every sensation.” These “primitive beauties of synaesthesia,” reflected in the “primeval vitality of language,” are, so Stanford, preserved in the “poets alone” (58). Whether such a type of perception would actually be superior to our distinguished one is questionable—does not the force of these images live from the fact that we usually do *not* compose them? In any case, his phylogenetic hypothesis is devoid of any corroboration, and although he mentions the “psychological peculiarity” of involuntary synesthesia in a concluding footnote, he leaves us without explaining what an “intersensal experience” without psychological synesthesia would consist of more than a (poetically certainly valuable) composite sensation-image or an analogical expression (that is when a language does not

of synesthesia.¹⁴¹ We need to distinguish the involuntary (interior) perception from one sense (e.g. colors) while actually perceiving another (e.g. sound), which is “synesthesia” strictly speaking, from the metaphorical-rhetorical evocation of a two-sense-experience by means of creating one complex image by means of a poetic association of terms (e.g. “white voice”);¹⁴² and thirdly from the conventional usage of describing the perception of one sense with vocabulary from another (e.g. “deep tone”).¹⁴³ We are mostly concerned with the third type.

The observation of a very limited originally musical vocabulary does not hinder the Greek language from employing a real wealth of words to characterize sound in general and musical sound in particular, especially by means of compounds.¹⁴⁴ The Greeks must have possessed a very fine ear to have employed such a

possess words to describe an experience in one sense and takes recourse to a term describing an experience of another sense).

141. *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, s. v. “synesthesia,” accessed March 27, 2012, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/578457/synesthesia>: “Colours associated with sounds, where a person experiences a visual sensation when receiving an auditory signal (for example, hearing the musical tone C and perceiving the colour red), is also quite common. Although tone-colour relationships are not identical for all people, there are general uniformities: the deeper a musical note, the darker the colour.” and: *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, s. v. “illusion,” accessed March 27, 2012, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/283066/illusion>: “Some musicians and others report that they see particular colours whenever they hear given tones and musical passages; poets sometimes claim to hear sounds or musical tones when they see words, images, and colours.” For example, the composer Olivier Messiaen (1908–1992) was known for his association between certain chords and colors while Wassily Kandinsky (1866–1944) used to hear what he painted. See Marks 1975; Peacock 1985; Jonathan 1986; Bernard 1986; OHMP 407. An ample bibliography can be found here: <http://leonardo.info/isast/spec.projects/synesthesiabib.html>, accessed April 19, 2012.

The distinction between the psychological phenomenon and the stylistic device is, for example, not reflected in Waern 1952.

142. Into this category may fall the comment in Ath. 14.626f about the “Phrygian” smell for Dionysius in the orchestras at his festivals, see above in n. 136.
143. Nobody would truly visualize “depth” in this expression except perhaps for particular associations from experience (such as produced at the “lower” end of an instrument or coming out of the depths of a corpulent bass soloist). There was certainly a reason for loaning the technical musical vocabulary mostly from terms for other senses when language was formed; however, I cannot help but think that these transfers are widely arbitrary and conventional because the musical experience is so different from the other senses, and the corresponding emotions fail to be effectively explained outside of it (more on this later in ch. 4). The ancients were well aware of the inter-sensual transfer for descriptions, e.g. Sext. Emp. *Mus.* 30, 33; AQ 1.9 16.1–4.
144. The fact that Latin possesses fewer words for this than Greek rests for a good part on its narrow ability to form compounds and in its smaller semantic diversification at large.

nuanced vocabulary to describe sounds. Their perceptiveness may also explain why these sounds had such an apparently deep effect on them and the psychological, educational, and moral impact that they ascribed to and apparently experienced in music.¹⁴⁵ The Romans, as Wille proves with innumerable examples, continued on that road and developed a refined sense for natural and human musical sound, to the point that one would relish a relaxing concert combining all sorts of “music,” as Sidonius Apollinaris describes in his lavish acoustical evening experience.¹⁴⁶

A few technical notes: For unifying purposes, Greek terms are always given in the Attic lexical form, according to LSJ, and for Latin “u” and “v” are distinguished (in this I am deviating from the OLD). The definitions given almost always follow LSJ or the OLD respectively even though they often do not satisfy for not sufficiently reflecting the etymological connotations. From the definitions offered I selected the ones that fit the musical context best. The entries in the columns “attributed to” and “effect” align precisely with the reference next to them, while the text in the first three columns is not specific to any particular reference. Within the references, underlined quotes have forms in the comparative, double underlined in the superlative. Bold type entries in the Greek/Latin column show the words with which a new section in the explanatory text begins. The lists follow the same order as the explanation later in the text.

Abbreviations: for senses (hearing applies to any listed): a = all; b = touch; s = smell; t = taste; v = sight; f = feeling x = extra-sensual; c = character; for attributions: a = *aulos/tibia*; d = dance; h = hymn; i = multiple instruments; k = cithara; l = lyre/*chora*, etc.; M = Muse; p = *phorminx*; S = Siren; s = song; v = voice; y = syrinx. The effect is given if it is recognizable and significant in the context of the reference.

Characteristics of Positive or Neutral Value

The vast majority of texts present music in a favorable light. Here is the summary list:

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145. It is true that Greek (and Latin) texts show also a lot of “stereotypes,” conventional set terms that are repeated again and again (Kaimio 1977, 238–245). Nevertheless, the authors believed these images to be effective and kept drawing from them.
146. *Epist.* 2.2.14: “It is delightful to sit here and listen to the shrill cicada at noon, the croak of frogs in the gloaming, the clangour of swans and geese in the earlier night or the crow of cocks in the dead of it, the ominous voice of rooks saluting the rosy face of Dawn in chorus, or, in the half-light, nightingales fluting in the bushes and swallows twittering under the leaves. To this concert you may add the seven-stopped pipe of the pastoral Muse, on which the very wakeful Tityri of our hills will often vie one with another, while the herds about them low to the cow-bells as they graze along the pastures. All these tuneful songs and sounds will but charm you into deeper slumbers” (tr. Dalton 1915, 40–41).

Greek/Latin	English	Senses	Attributed to	Effect	Sample Ref.
<i>bonus/bene</i>	good, satisfying, agreeable, pleasant	x,c,a	v i/ <i>musicus</i> singing singing (Nero) v <i>cantator</i> singing (Sulla) <i>fistula</i>	<i>instruo</i> <i>placeo</i>	Manilius 4.528 Sen. <i>Ep.</i> 87.12 Plin. <i>Ep.</i> 3.18.9 ¹⁵¹ Suet. <i>Ner.</i> 39.3 ¹⁵² Lucian, <i>Imagines</i> 13 ¹⁵³ August. <i>De vera</i> <i>religione</i> 47.90 Macrobian. <i>Sat.</i> <u>3.14.10</u> Commodianus <i>Instructiones</i> 1.17.15
<i>bellus/belle</i>	fine, excel lent, nice	x,c,v	s singing/l		Petron. 64 Mart. 2.7.5–6
εὖ	well	x,c	d d/s	sooth, charm	Ath. 14.628e Ael. <i>NA</i> 1.39
εὐηχής/-ητος/ -ος ¹⁵⁴	well- sounding		h h/k (M) h (marriage) cymbal i v v		Pind. <i>Pyth.</i> 2.14 Eur. <i>Ion</i> 884 Callim. <i>Hymn</i> 4.296 LXX <i>Ps</i> 150.5 Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 437d ¹⁵⁵ Phld. <i>De poemata</i> 994.24 Ath. 3.80d Philo 511 ¹⁵⁶

151. Pliny mentions opposite effects of the theater: “*olim theatra male musicos canere docuerunt, ita nunc in spem adducor posse fieri, ut eadem theatra bene canere musicos doceant.*”/Once, the theaters taught musicians to sing badly; thus now I entertain the hope that it could be that the same theaters teach musicians to sing well.”

152. “...*quod... mala bene canitaret, sua bona male disponderet.*”/That he sang bad things well but dealt with his goods badly.”

153. “τὸκαλόν,” stands for the beautiful voice of the woman (Pentheia) described, which exceeds all halcyons, cicadas, and swans, which are ἄμουσα in comparison, likewise the “many-toned” (πολυηχέα) nightingale.

154. In reference to the ocean “loud-sounding” in Eur. *Hipp.* 1272.

155. Here: “well-tuned”, along with ἐξηρτύμενος (“prepared”).

156. The prophet is described as an instrument on which God plays well-sounding and all-harmonious (παναρμόνια) music.

Greek/Latin	English	Senses	Attributed to	Effect	Sample Ref.
εὐκέλαδος ¹⁵⁷	well sounding, melodious		a (lotos) s (chorus) l (strings)		Eur. <i>Bacch.</i> 160 ¹⁵⁸ Ar. <i>Nub.</i> 312 <i>Anth. Pal.</i> 2.397
εὐμελής ¹⁵⁹	melodious		music		Arist. <i>Pol.</i> 1341b26
ἔμμελής	harmonious	x, c	note (<i>mese</i>) v (Thamyris) v/s		Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 445e ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 3.1132b Ath. 14.623c
εὐμόλπος/ εὐμόλπεω	sweetly singing		Apollo “lord of the l”		HH 4.478 <i>Anth. Pal.</i> 9.396.6
εὐγηνρς	sweet-sounding		s (frogs) contest		Ar. <i>Ran.</i> 213 Oppianus <i>Halieutica</i> 5.617
εὐγλωττία ¹⁶⁰	sweetness of song		bird/S		Ael. <i>NA</i> 17.23
εὐστομία ¹⁶¹	sweet singing	t	bird/S		Ael. <i>NA</i> 17.23
μουσικῶς	harmoniously	x	d/s	sooth, charm	Ael. <i>NA</i> 1.39
εὐμουρος	musical, melodious		s (μολπή)		Eur. <i>IT</i> 145 ¹⁶²
εὐφημος	fair-sounding		s M/s		Aesch. <i>Supp.</i> 694 Ar. <i>Av.</i> 1719

157. Used for a locust in *Anth. Pal.* 7.194. See the noun κέλαδος (“loud noise”, originally from rushing waters), for the lyre in Eur. *IT* 1129; *Cyc.* 489 and elsewhere for shouting, cicadas, and birds.

158. Here interestingly together with a verb for “roar/murmur” (βρέμω), which is also used for the lyre in Pind. *Nem.* 11.7.

159. The context raises the question whether it is preferable (i.e. more important) that music be “well” with regards to melody or rhythm. See for this word occurs also id. 1341b26 (together with εὐρυθμος) in Ath. 13.577d (citing the comic poet Machon).

160. The unchallenged beauty of this bird’s melody is identified with the Sirens. See also εὐστομία.

161. Cf. εὐστομέω: “sing sweetly” (nightingale in Soph. *OC* 18; Ael. *NA* 1.20 (songbird); Philostr. *VS* 2.10.5 589 (comparing Hadrian with it); also id. *VA* 5.21 εὐπνοια “skill with the lips” and εὐχρεια “skill with the hands” (*aulos* player). For our reference in the table, see εὐγλωττία.

162. Here the absence of it; see below p. 120.

Greek/Latin	English	Senses	Attributed to	Effect	Sample Ref.
εὐθογγος	well-sounding, cheerful		l sounds y birds grasshoppers l	delight ¹⁶³	Thgn. 534 Aesch. <i>Cho.</i> 341 ¹⁶⁴ Eur. <i>Tro.</i> 127 Strabo 1.1.69; Strabo 6.1.9 <i>Anth. Pal.</i> 2.396
εὐφόρμινξ	with beautiful <i>phorminx</i>		Apollo s (Apollo)		<i>Anth. Pal.</i> 7.5 Oppian <i>Halieutica</i> 5.618
εὐφωνος ¹⁶⁵	sweet-voiced		M s (chorus) l festivity v (Thamyris)	lift	Pind. <i>Isthm.</i> 1.64 Aesch. <i>Ag.</i> 1187 ¹⁶⁶ Arist. <i>Metaph.</i> 1019b15 ¹⁶⁷ Pind. <i>Pyth.</i> 1.38 ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 3.1132a
<i>benesonans</i> ¹⁶⁸	well sounding		cymbal		Vulgate <i>Ps.</i> 150.5
περικαλλής ¹⁶⁹	very beautiful	v,x	p (Apollo) p v		Hom. <i>Il.</i> 1.603 Hom. <i>Od.</i> 1.153 Hes. <i>Theog.</i> 10
καλλιβόας	beautiful-sounding		a ¹⁷⁰ a ¹⁷¹		Soph. <i>Trach.</i> 640 Ar. <i>Av.</i> 682

163. Χαίρω: “holding the well-sounding lyre in my hand”, but the same delight is expressed before about drinking and singing, and the singer’s ἤτορ (heart, passion) is warmed/melted (ιαίνεται) by the *aulos*.

164. A paean is to be sung rather than a dirge.

165. See also εὐφωνέω (“have a good voice”); εὐφωνία (“goodness of voice, excellence of tone”). Isid. *Etym.* 3.20.4: “*Euphonia est suauitas vocis.*”

166. Negated positive terms (the chorus is neither σύμφωνος nor ξύμφογος, depending on the reading of the text, nor εὐφωνος, and the reason is: οὐγὰρ εὐλέγει; later they chant their hymn: πρῶταρχονᾶτην.

167. Aristotle says that a lyre is not “potent” (i.e. in conditions) to be played if it is not εὐφωνος.

168. Neither in the OLD nor in LSJ, for in classical times the separate writing “*bene sonans*” is used, applied to speech (e.g. Cic. *Orat.* 163.4; Tib. 3.6.36) and to music (Serv. *Aen.* 6.120.1, to *fidibusque canoris*). August. *Enarratio in Ps* 150.8 equals *bene sonantia* with *consonantia*.

169. This word used for instruments might describe the external appearance rather than the sound. Else it is used for things, places, eyes, and women.

Greek/Latin	English	Senses	Attributed to	Effect	Sample Ref.
κάλλιμος	beautiful	v,x	S (v)		Hom. <i>Od.</i> 12.192
καλλίνικος	adorning the victory	x	s s s		Pind. <i>Pyth.</i> 5.106 Pind. <i>Ol.</i> 9.2 Eur. <i>El.</i> 865
καλλίρ(ρ)οος	beautiful- flowering	x (v)	breathings/v		Pind. <i>Ol.</i> 6.83
καλλίφθογγος	beautiful- sounding		s		Eur. <i>Ion</i> 169
καλλίχορος	of beauti- ful dances	v	d (Graces) d (Fates) d (maidens) d (dolphins)		Pind. <i>Pyth.</i> 12.26 Eur. fr. 453.7 Ar. <i>Ran.</i> 452 Eur. <i>HF</i> 690 Eur. <i>Hel.</i> 1454
καλλίφωνος	with a fine voice	v	poet		Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 973a
χαρίεις	gracious	v,c,x	s s d/s s		Hom. <i>Od.</i> 9.5–8 ¹⁷² Hom. <i>Od.</i> 24.197 Alcm. in Heph. <i>Ench.</i> 7.4 Pind. <i>Pyth.</i> 5.107
χαριζόμενος	gratifying	x	s/p		Hom. <i>Od.</i> 8,538 ¹⁷³
εὐτρέπης	delightful	x	v		<i>Anth. Pal.</i> 9.364
<i>gratus</i>	pleasant, attractive, charming	x,c	l (Apollo) k (<i>modulatio</i>)	<i>in altum rapere</i>	Apul. <i>Flor.</i> 3.38 ¹⁷⁴ Cassiod. <i>Psalm.</i> 150.3 ¹⁷⁵
ἐρόεις ¹⁷⁶	lovely, charming	x	mouth of singer		HH 32.20

170. Here in its quality of responding to the lyre of the divine Muse.

171. Here the voice of the *aulos* is compared with the nightingale; cf. similar in ps.-Theoc. *Id.* 8.39; Simon. 46.3.

172. “Nothing is more gracious” than listening to a bard in a banquet.

173. Even though the effect is negative here (Odysseus weeping), the concept is meant to be positive.

174. See also under *doctus*.

175. Later he writes that the cithara “*in unam gratiam iucunditatis emittit.*”

176. This and the following words are all etymologically related to “ἔρος” (“love, desire”).

Greek/Latin	English	Senses	Attributed to	Effect	Sample Ref.
ἐρατός	lovely	v,x	k l/k v v,d (Graces) s a (melody of) v d/s (μολπή) h (Nymphs) l (Orpheus)	longing ¹⁷⁷	HH 3.515 HH 4.153,423,455 HH 4.426 Hes. <i>Theog.</i> 65,70 Pind. fr. 124a Pind. fr. 140b17 Bacchyl. 17.129 Eur <i>El.</i> 718 Ar. <i>Thesm.</i> 993 <i>Anth. Pal.</i> 7.10
ἐπεραστός	lovely, loveable	x	v (Graces)		Hes. <i>Theog.</i> 67
<i>amandus</i>	to be loved	x	v	relief	Hor. <i>Carm.</i> 4.11.34
<i>dilectus</i>	beloved	x	l (Achilles)	compesco	Sil. 11.451
<i>carus</i> ¹⁷⁸	beloved, dear	x,f	s (M)		Prop. 3.2.13
ἱμερτός ¹⁷⁹	lovely, desired		k a s s (marriage; with d)		HH 4.510 Thgn. 532 Pind. <i>Ol.</i> 6.7 Apoll. Rhod. 4.1197
ἱμερόεις	exciting desire, lovely, charming	x	p s p a s s k (Apollo) d/p chorus		Hom. <i>Il.</i> 18.569- 570 Hom. <i>Od.</i> 18.304 HH 3.185 HH 4.452 HH 10.5 Hes. <i>Theog.</i> 104 Hes. <i>Sc.</i> 202 Hes. <i>Sc.</i> 280 <i>Anth. Pal.</i> 6.313

177. This passage describes the sound of the lyre, which goes to Apollo's heart and evokes a sweet (γλυκύς) longing in his soul (θυμός) and, the third time with Hermes' voice, is able to appease Apollo.

178. Literally: "expensive, costly."

179. Cf. ἱμείρω "long for, desire"; i(μ)ερόφωνος "of lovely voice or song" in Sappho 136 (nightingale), Aclm. 26 (girls), Theoc. *Id.* 28.7 (Nicias).

Greek/Latin	English	Senses	Attributed to	Effect	Sample Ref.
ἐφίμερος	delightful, desired	x	chorus h h v (Daphnis)		Archil. 21 Thgn. 993 Theoc. 1.61 ps-Theoc. <i>Id.</i> 8.82
<i>lepidus</i>	agreeable, charming, delightful	c,x	m/a <i>melos</i>	<i>perpru risco</i>	Plaut. <i>Stich.</i> 757 ¹⁸⁰ Sid. Apoll. <i>Carm.</i> 1.16
<i>iucundus</i>	agreeable	x,c,t,b	v v/s s s (modus) k		Quint. 1.10.16 Juv. 7.82 Novius 56 Gell. 19.9.4 Cassiod. <i>Psalm.</i> 150.3 ¹⁸¹
πρεπόντως	gracefully	x	p/a/v (mix)		Pind. <i>Ol.</i> 3.9
<i>venustus</i>	graceful	x,c	s (erotic) s		Gell. 19.9.4 Apul. 11.9
λαρός ¹⁸²	pleasant	t,s,v	l		Anacreont. 58.18
τερπνός	delightful	x,c	organ	advert, enchant	Ath. 4.174a

180. The *cantio* is here also characterized as *cinaedica*, within an erotic context in which the *tibia* player is seen stimulating.

181. “*Gratia iucunditatis*,” see also id. *Psalm. Praef.* 2.

182. From: ἀπολαύω: “to have enjoyment of, benefit from.” In the first reference, the lyre is praised beyond the temptations of gold.

Greek/Latin	English	Senses	Attributed to	Effect	Sample Ref.
ἡδύς	pleasant	s, t, f, x	v (gift of M) v (M) singer v d/a/Aphro- dite s (Agathon) s (Sophocles) sounds (a, k) S desires in l strings mouth/v v s organ <i>monaulos</i> ; <i>harmonia</i> Anacreon rain of s	τέρπω advert, enchant	Hom <i>Od.</i> 8.64 Hes. <i>Theog.</i> 40 HH <u>3.169</u> Pind. <i>Nem.</i> 10.33 Eur. <i>Heracl.</i> 892–894 Ar. <i>Thesm.</i> 130 ¹⁸³ <i>Schol.</i> Ar. <i>Pax</i> 531 Xen. <i>Symp.</i> <u>2.3</u> Apoll. Rhod. 4.893–894 Theoc. <i>Id.</i> 1.1–3. ps.-Theoc. <i>Id.</i> 8.82 Anacreont. 48.22 Plut. <i>Mor.</i> <u>973a</u> ¹⁸⁴ Ath. 4.174a Ath. <u>4.176b</u> Ath. 13.600d–e ¹⁸⁵ <i>Anth. Pal.</i> 9.364

183. This is certainly meant in an ironic sense.

184. The comparison is between the sweetest songs and poems of compared to swans and night-
ingales, cf. Bacchyl. 3.97; *Anth. Pal.* 7.414.

185. Notice that Anacreon is also said to be an enemy of the *aulos* (αὐλῶνάντιπαλος) but a
lover of the *barbitos* (φιλοβάρβιτος). Gulick's translation (1950, 237) "healer of pain" for
"ἄλυπος" seems too free; it should simply say "free from pain."

Greek/Latin	English	Senses	Attributed to	Effect	Sample Ref.
			birds a/s i s v i a/v <i>moduli</i> (l) <i>modulatio</i> s s h s (Alleluia) chorus (M) <i>sonus</i> l (Orpheus) s (chorus) s/v	 charms joy domo mulceo various	Apul. <i>Met.</i> 6.6 Apul. <i>Met.</i> 10.32 ¹⁸⁸ Apul. <i>Met.</i> 11.9 Gell. 19.9.4 Gell. 19.9.12 Tert. <i>Ad nat.</i> 2.5 Solin. 5.20 Amm. Marc. 15.9.8 Firm. Mat. 5.5.6 ¹⁸⁹ August. <i>Conf.</i> 10.6.8 Macrobian. <i>Sat.</i> 2.1.5 ¹⁹⁰ Prudent. <i>Cathemerina</i> 5.123 ps. - August. <i>Decantico novo</i> 2 Mart. Cap. 2.117, 127, 209, 9.996 Cassiod. <i>Var.</i> 2.40.17 ¹⁹¹ Ven. Fort. <i>Carm.</i> 7.1.3 <i>Anth. Lat.</i> 111.5 <i>Anth. Lat.</i> 658.1 ¹⁹²
<i>dulcisonus</i> ¹⁹³	sweetly sounding		k/v l melody (Pan) v	 oblecto	Firm. Mat. 8.25,2 Sid. <i>Carm.</i> 6.5 Cassiod. <i>Praefatio</i> <i>in Psalmis</i> ¹⁹⁴ Optatianus 12.4 <i>Anth. Lat.</i> 658.25

188. The context is a whole description of a dramatic “ballet” with multiple characterizations of which I included into this table only the ones most obviously referring to music itself.

189. The same also in id. 7.26.7 and similar 5.2.12, 6.30.9, 6.31.84 (with cithara/song)

190. The expression is *dulcedo canora*, attributed to a dancing girl, bringing about *inlecebra*.

191. Cassiodorus requests from Boethius a citharede for King Clovis who, like Orpheus, “*cum dulci sono gentilium fera corda domuerit*/tame the wild hearts of the barbarians with sweet sound.” The whole letter describes the beauty and harmony of music and the effect it has on the different levels; see below in the section on Cassiodorus. See for this word also Cassiod. *Var.* 1.31.4 (vox, comparative); 4.51.11 (*sonus*, superlative); 9.21.3 (*melos*, superlative).

192. This *carmen de filomena* turns the name of the praised woman to *filomela* whose voice is superior to the cithara or any bird.

193. Not in the OLD; definition here from LSJ.

194. More frequently in this work, e.g. 80.3 (with *melos*); also in *Var.* 2.40.10 (Sirens).

Greek/Latin	English	Senses	Attributed to	Effect	Sample Ref.
<i>suavis</i>	pleasant, sweet- sounding, melodi- ous	t,s,v,f,x	v s/a a (Marsyas) birds birds music a/s <i>symphoniae</i> v (poets) s,l <i>cantilena</i> h (Ambrose) s (saints) m (planets) chorus (M) s	<i>perpru- risco</i> <i>mulceo</i> praise <i>solor</i> tears contrition	Plaut. <i>Cass.</i> 799 Plaut. <i>Stich.</i> 757 Hyg. <i>Fab.</i> 165 Prop. 1.2.14 ¹⁹⁵ Apul. <i>Met.</i> 6.6 Apul. <i>Met.</i> 6.24 Apul. <i>Met.</i> 10.32 Apul. <i>Met.</i> 11.9 Gell. 19.9.10 Prudent. <i>Catheme- rina</i> 9.2, passim Ambrosius <i>Hexameron</i> 5.24.85 August. <i>Conf.</i> 9.6.14 August. <i>Ep.</i> 159.3 ¹⁹⁶ Mart. Cap. 1.27 Mart. Cap. 2.117 ¹⁹⁷ Isid. <i>De ecclesiasticis officiis</i> 1.5.1 ¹⁹⁸

195. Interesting is that the exaltation of natural beauty vs. what an *artifex* could do, leads here to conclude that “*volucres nulla dulcius arte canunt*”—the sweetest sound comes from nature and does not need art.

196. Further emphasized by “*ultra solitam notamque suavitatem.*”

197. “*Dulcis sonus multifidis suavitatibus cietur, quem Musarum convenientium chorus...concinebat*/ Sweet sound is roused with many-stringed sweetnesses, which the choir of the harmonizing (or joining) Muses sang together.”

198. Isidore provides a detailed description of how the voice of a psalmist is supposed to be (ibid. 2.12.2): “*psalmistam autem et voce et arte praeclarum illustremque esse oportet, ita ut oblectamento dulcedinis animos incitet auditorum. Vox enim eius non aspera, vel rauca, vel dissonans, sed canora erit, suavis, liquida, atque acuta, habens sonum, et melodiam sanctae religioni congruentem, non quae tragica exclamet arte, sed quae christianam simplicitatem et in ipsa modulatione demonstret, nec quae musico gestu vel theatri arte redolet, sed quae compunctionem magis auditibus faciat.*” But the psalmist ought to be very clear and lucid in voice and art, so that he arouse the spirits of the listeners with the delight of sweetness. For his voice will be neither harsh nor hoarse nor dissonant, but sonorous, pleasant, limpid, also high-pitched, having sound and a melody in agreement with the holy religion, not one that shouts out like the tragic art, but one that shows Christian simplicity also in the melody itself; not one that is odorous of musical gesture or theatrical art but one that creates more compunction in the listeners.” See similar Nicetas *De psalmodiae bono* 13 (“*vox nostra non dissona debet esse sed consona*”/our voice must not be dissonant but consonant,” etc. I did not include references to all these characteristics in the tables as they are applied only in a strictly Christian-liturgical context; this quote shows well, however, the aesthetic ideal held at Isidor’s time.

Greek/Latin	English	Senses	Attributed to	Effect	Sample Ref.
<i>suavisonus</i> ¹⁹⁹	sweet-sounding		s		<i>Naev. fr. trag.</i> 6.4 (20)
ἡδυβόης	sweet-sounding		a (Corybantes) bird		<i>Eur. Bacch.</i> 127 <i>Anth. Pal.</i> 9.396.2
ἡδύγλωσσος	sweet-tongued		herald's shout (cf. song) s		<i>Pind. Ol.</i> 13.100 <i>Ar. Av.</i> 908
<i>dulciloquus</i>	speaking sweetly		a (Euterpe) a ars	<i>urgueo</i> <i>vinco</i> <i>mollio</i>	<i>ps-Cato Mus.</i> 2 <i>Apul. Apol.</i> 9.44 <i>Sid. Apoll. Epist.</i> 8.11.3.21
ἡδυεπής	sweet-sounding		M M l h Homer s (cf. honey)		<i>HH</i> 32.2 <i>Hes. Theog.</i> 965, 1021 <i>Pind. Ol.</i> 10.93 <i>Pind. Nem.</i> 1.4 <i>Pind. Nem.</i> 7.22 <i>Theoc. Id.</i> 1.145
ἡδύθορος	sweet-strained		M (Pan on reed)		<i>Eur. El.</i> 702–703
ἡδυλόγος	sweet voiced	x	l/s		<i>Pind. Ol.</i> 6.97
ἡδυλύρης	sweetly singing to the lyre		l/s (Pindar) Apollo		<i>Anth. Pal.</i> 11.370 <i>Philol.</i> 71.6
ἡδυμελής	sweet singing		h v Charis, i. swallow a l l, magadis s	²⁰⁰	<i>Pind. Isthm.</i> 7.20 <i>Pind. Ol.</i> 2.25 <i>Pind. Ol.</i> 7.11–12 <i>Anac.</i> 67 <i>Sappho</i> 44.24 ²⁰¹ <i>Soph. fr.</i> 238 <i>Ath.</i> 637a (Soph.) <i>Nonnus Dion.</i> 29.287

199. Once more used by Accius in a tragic fragment (572), referring to water waves.

200. Within a whole context of sweetness: id. 7–8 (nectar as gift of the Muses, “sweet (γλυκύς) fruit of heart/mind”).

201. Kaimio 1977, 130–132 gives a detailed analysis of all the musical descriptions of fr. 44.

Greek/Latin	English	Senses	Attributed to	Effect	Sample Ref.
(ν)ήδυμος	sweet	x	M		HH 19.16
ήδύπνοος	sweet breathing	s	M		Pind. <i>Ol.</i> 13.22
ήδύφωνος	sweet- voiced		girl		Sappho 153
ήδυμελίφθογγος	of honey- sweet voice		Simonides		<i>Anth. Pal.</i> 9.571
μελίγλωσσος	honey- tongued		s incantation h	charm	Bacchyl. fr. 4.63 Aesch. <i>PV</i> 173 ²⁰² Ar. <i>Av.</i> 908
μελίφθογγος ²⁰³	honey- voiced		M Terpsichore s		Pind. <i>Ol.</i> 6.21 Pind. <i>Isthm.</i> 2.7 Pind. <i>Isthm.</i> 6.9
μελίφωνος	honey- voiced		Sappho singers		Sappho fr. 30 Philostr. <i>Imag.</i> 2.1 <i>Anth. Pal.</i> 9.66
μελίβδας	with honeyed tones		swan s		Eur. fr. 773.34 Ath. 14.624
μελίβρομος	sweet- toned		a (Marsyas)		<i>Anth. Pal.</i> 7.696
μελίγδουπος	sweet- sounding		s/v		Pind. <i>Nem.</i> 11.18

202. Negative, but Prometheus denies that the enchantment will come to effect.

203 See also in Bacchyl. 3.97 (nightingale). Another lemma that would belong here but is left out for formatting reasons is μελισσιδωνοφρυνιχήρατα in Ar. *Vesp.* 220 (with μέλη): “honey-sweet Sidonian lays of Phrynichus.”

Greek/Latin	English	Senses	Attributed to	Effect	Sample Ref.
μελίγηρως ²⁰⁴	honey-voiced		S s (from M) bird h h h h h h revel v		Hom. <i>Od.</i> 12.187 HH 3.519 HH 19.18 ²⁰⁵ Pind. <i>Ol.</i> 11.4 Pind. <i>Nem.</i> 3.4 Pind. <i>Isthm.</i> 2.3 Pind. <i>Pae.</i> 5.47 Pind. <i>Pae.</i> 11.14 Pind. <i>Pyth.</i> 3.64 ²⁰⁶ Pind. <i>Pyth.</i> 8.70 Pind. <i>Nem.</i> 2.25
<i>melleus</i>	delightful as honey, honey-sweet	v,t	<i>modulator</i> birds		Apul. <i>Flor.</i> 4 Apul. <i>Met.</i> 6.6
<i>mellifluus</i> ²⁰⁷	flowing with honey		sounds <i>cantilena</i> (S) s		Arn. <i>Commentarii in Psalms</i> 150 Chalcid. 95 ²⁰⁸ August. <i>Mus.</i> 3.3
<i>mellitus</i>	delightful as honey, honey-sweet	t,v,x	s	rest, <i>mollio</i>	Apul. <i>Met.</i> 5.15. 9–10 ²⁰⁹
μελικομπος	sweet sounding		s v ²¹⁰		Pind. <i>Isthm.</i> 2.32 Pind. fr. 152
μελίρροθος	sweet sounding				Pind. fr. 246

204. From γηρύω “to sing.”

205. The point here is that Pan’s music is not beaten by a bird’s μελίγηρυνάοιδόν—“honey-sounding” song.

206. Able to put a charm (φίλτρον) into the θυμός.

207. Not in the OLD but in LSJ; in Boethius *De arte metrica* 5.2.2 this attribute is given to Homer’s mouth; Cassiod. *Var.* 1.31.4: singing and instrumental music even impress the beasts “*mellifluis clamoribus*/with honey-flowing outbursts.”

208. Referring to the Sirens producing the harmony of the Spheres.

209. Notice the nice assonance: “*nec (...) nequitia vel illa mellita cantus dulcedine mollita conquivit.*”

210. Sweeter than bee-built honeycombs.

Greek/Latin	English	Senses	Attributed to	Effect	Sample Ref.
μελισσότοκος	honeeyed		h (Moirā)		<i>Anth. Pal.</i> 7.12
μελίστακτος	of dropped honey		M ²¹¹		<i>Anth. Pal.</i> 4.1.33
μελιτρεπής	honey sweet		s (Anacreon)		Simon. 184.9 (= <i>Anth. Pal.</i> 7.25)
μελιπτέρωτος	honey-winged		s (Muses)		<i>Ath.</i> 14.633a
μελίφρων ²¹²	sweet to the mind	x	s		Pind. <i>Pae.</i> 8.78; Pind. fr. 122.14
γλυκύς	sweet, pleasant, delightful	t,s ²¹³	a p expresses sweetest considerations s singing p s h a v s a (sound) melody (a) a-player h s (Anacreon) h (Calliope)	hunt	Pind. <i>Ol.</i> 10.94 Pind. <i>Ol.</i> 1.18–19 Pind. <i>Ol.</i> 10.4 Pind. <i>Nem.</i> 3.32 Pind. <i>Nem.</i> 4.44 Pind. <i>Nem.</i> 5.2 Pind. <i>Nem.</i> 9.3 Pind. <i>Pae.</i> 7.11 Pind. <i>Pae.</i> 8.75 Pind. <i>Isthm.</i> 2.7 Bacchyl. 2.12 Ael. <u>NA 12.46</u> <i>Ath.</i> 4.176c <i>Ath.</i> <u>14.633a</u> <i>Anth. Pal.</i> 4.1.35 <i>Anth. Pal.</i> 9.189
γλύκειος	sweet		a v a s (Phrynichus)		Bacchyl. 2.12 Pind. <i>Pyth.</i> 10.56 Eur. <i>Aj.</i> 1202 Ar. <i>Av.</i> 750

211. The whole context is the imagery of a poetic στέφανος (wreath); even though the attributes for flowers would indirectly apply to song, they are not included here because the primary description is the flowers themselves.

212. See also in Pind. *Nem.* 7.13: a “honey-minded cause” thrown into the streams of the Muses.

213. Despite these frequent examples in Pindar, LSJ 352 does not mention this word’s usage for sound.

Greek/Latin	English	Senses	Attributed to	Effect	Sample Ref.
γλυκερός	sweet		v v M/Apollo s		Hom. <i>Od.</i> 22.145 HH 7.59 HH 25.5 Sappho 71
γλυκυηχής	sweet-voiced		v (Myrtis)		<i>Anth. Pal.</i> 9.26
γλυκύφθογγος	sweet-toned				Schol. Pind. <i>Ol.</i> 6.162
καταγλυκαίνω	to sweeten	t,x	strings		Ath. 14.638e
ἥσυχος ²¹⁴	quiet	c,x	h		Pind. <i>Nem.</i> 7.82
<i>quietus</i>	quiet	x,c	s (Tritones)		Stat. <i>Achil.</i> 1.55
ἥμερος ²¹⁵	gentle	t,x	v		Pind. <i>Nem.</i> 7.83
μαλθακός	soft	t,f,x	v s		Pind. <i>Pyth.</i> 8.31 Pind. <i>Nem.</i> 9.49
μαλθακόφωνος	soft-voiced		s		Pind. <i>Isthm.</i> 2.8
προσηνής	soft, gentle	t,b,x,c	organ		Ath. 174d
<i>mollis</i> ²¹⁶	agreeably soft, mild	a,f,x,c	v/s <i>modi/k</i> s (Orpheus) <i>tympana</i> s s a chorus chorus k s (soldiers) <i>sonus</i> (trumpet)		Cic. <i>De or.</i> 3.25.98 Hor. <i>Carm.</i> 2.12.3–4 Ov. <i>Met.</i> 11.15 ²¹⁷ Prop. 3.17.3 Sen. <i>Ep.</i> 90.19 ²¹⁸ Sen. <i>Ag.</i> 361 Apul. <i>Met.</i> 10.32 <i>Il. Latina</i> 881 Claud. <i>Carm.</i> 9.10 Ven. Fort. <i>Carm.</i> 9.7.11 Amm. Marc. 22.4.6 ²¹⁹ Dracontius, <i>Romulea</i> 8.645

214. A large word field is connected with the same basic meaning; see as well ἥσυχαστικός “soothing” for music in AQ 1.19 40.15. In our context it is the “famous sound” of hymns.

215. Literally “tame”, also “cultivated, smooth.”

216. Primarily for touch. For the senses rather positive, for character rather negative (“effeminate, weak, cowardly”). This shows that the value of the sensual impression does not necessarily carry over to the moral level.

217. “*cunctaque tela forent mollita cantu*/rendered harmless by the chant.”

218. Here certainly in a negative sense, seen as an example for the *luxuria* that has spread in society.

219. In this case negative, seen as not fitting for soldiers; in the comparative.

Greek/Latin	English	Senses	Attributed to	Effect	Sample Ref.
<i>levis</i>	smooth	x, b	s a <i>plectrum/ modi</i>		Lucr. 5.1380 Verg. <i>Ecl.</i> 5.2 Hor. <i>Carm.</i> 2.1.40
<i>delicatus</i>	luxurious, elegant	x,c,t	v/s		Cic. <i>De or.</i> 3.25.98
καταστατικός	fitted for calming	x	melodies/ rhythms	soften ²²⁶	Plut. <i>Lyc.</i> 4.2
λεπτός ²²⁷	fine, delicate	v,s	harmony v (birds)		Eur. fr. 773.23 Ar. <i>Av.</i> 235
λεπταλέος	fine, delicate		v/s (boy)		Hom <i>Il.</i> 18.571
μελλιχόφωνος	soft-voiced		s (?)		Sappho fr. 71
χλιδών ²²⁸	delicate	v,x	d/s (μολπά)		Pind. <i>Ol.</i> 10.84
ἀγαυός	noble	x	s		Pind. <i>Pae.</i> 9.36
<i>decens</i>	becoming, graceful	x,v	Sappho/s		Ven. Fort. <i>Carm.</i> 9.7.6
δεδαώς ²²⁹	well- learned		k		HH 4.510

226. About the melodies and rhythms of Thaletas, which are instilling obedience (εὐπειθεία) and harmony (ὁμόνοια), quieting his listeners, uniting them in their strife for good things (τῶν καλῶν), overcoming κακοθυμία (bad mood/spirit), thus preparing the Spartans for Lyncurgus.

227. Literally “peeled, husked”, then “thin, fine”, etc. in multiple meanings (e.g. “refined”); in music also technical in contrast to πυκνός (dense, in tetrachord); see Barker 2002b, 31; 33.

228. From χλιδᾶω “to be soft/delicate”; the word field shifts between delicate and luxurious/ornamented, including χλιδή meaning also “effeminacy.”

229. From *δάω “learn, teach.”

Greek/Latin	English	Senses	Attributed to	Effect	Sample Ref.
<i>doctus</i> ²³⁰	learned	x,c	a l chorus musician s Catullus S s (M) M l (Apollo) <i>modulamina</i> k/l <i>modulatio</i> (M)		Prop. 2.30.16 Prop. 2.34.79, 2.3.20 Hor. <i>Carm. saec.</i> 75 Hor. <i>Carm.</i> 3.9.10 Tib. 2.3.20 Tib. 3.6.41 Ov. <i>Met.</i> 5.555 Ov. <i>Met.</i> 5.662 ²³¹ Sen. <i>Agamemnon</i> 336 Apul. <i>Flor.</i> <u>3.15</u> ²³² Avienus <i>Aratus</i> <i>Phaen. Progn.</i> 624 Sid. Apoll. <i>Carm.</i> 1.8 Mart. Cap. 2.117
<i>peritus</i>	expert		<i>modifier</i>		Apul. <i>Flor.</i> 4
<i>docilis</i>	ready to learn, skillful, apt	x	Amphion chorus (Nereids)		Hor. <i>Carm.</i> 3.11.1 ²³³ Mart. <i>Spect.</i> 26.1
ἁρμονικός	skilled in music				Pl. <i>Phdr.</i> 268d
δεξιῶς	skillfully	x,c	singing		Lucian <i>Ind.</i> 10
εὐκρεκτος	well-struck		p (with s)		Ap. Rhod. 4.1194
εὐλυρας/-ος	skilled in the lyre		l (Apollo) l (Apollo) l (Apollo) M		Eur. <i>Alc.</i> 570 Eur. fr. 477 Ar. <i>Thesm.</i> 969 Ar. <i>Ran.</i> 229

230. See also Ps 47 (46).8: “*psallite sapienter* (συνετῶς)/make psalms (or: play the psalterium) sensibly.”

231. These two quotes occur in the musical contest between Marsyas and Apollo where being *doctus* becomes a point.

232. The context is the contrast between the unkempt and uneducated Marsyas who with his *aulos* dares to challenge the learned and splendid Apollo and his lyre. Cf., for this story, Herod. 7.26; Ov. *Met.* 6.382–400; *Fast.* 6.703–710; Fulg. *Myth.* 3.9; Hyg. *Fab.* 165. Another mention of the word is *ibid.* 15.55.

233. Being docile to his teacher Mercury, Amphion is able to move rocks with his lyre.

Greek/Latin	English	Senses	Attributed to	Effect	Sample Ref.
εὐχειρία	skill: <i>aulos</i> playing		a		Poll. 4.72
εὐρυθμος ²³⁴	rhythmical		d d harmony (singer)		Ar. <i>Thesm.</i> 985 Ar. <i>Plut.</i> 759 Nonn. 19.111
ὀρθός	straight, correct	x	music (Apollo)		Pind. fr. 32 ²³⁵
εὐάρμοστος ²³⁶	well-joined	c	Pan on reed s		Eur. <i>El.</i> 702 Pl. <i>Leg.</i> 655a
εὐκοσμῶς	orderly	v,c,x	s/v		Thgn. 241
κατά κόσμον	according to order	x	l/s	delight	HH 4.479
κόσμιος	well-ordered	x,c	melody/ rhythm	soften	Plut. <i>Lyc.</i> 4.2 ²³⁷
<i>moderatus</i>	temperate, restrained	x,c	a (<i>spiramen</i>)		Stat. <i>Theb.</i> 8.222
<i>imbellis</i>	not involving war	x	l (M)		Hor. <i>Carm.</i> 1.6.10
εὐθήμων ²³⁸	harmonious		s (with l)		Ap. Rhod. 1.569
παναρμόνιος	complex, harmonious		d	excite, teach	Lucian, <i>Salt.</i> 72
πάμφωνος	with all tones		s (a)		Pind. <i>Pyth.</i> 12.19

234. See also: εὐρυθμία: “rhythmical order or movement, harmony between the orator and his hearers, gracefulness of persons, graceful movement, delicacy of touch” (LSJ 730). Plato uses this and similar terms in *Resp.* 400c–401a. Cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1341b26 and elsewhere for “orderly, graceful, well-proportioned.” Quintilian translates the term in *Inst.* 1.10.26 with “*aptus et decens motus.*”

235. Quoted in Aristid. *Or.* 3.620 and Plut. *De Pyth. or.* 6.397a.

236. See also the references in LSJ for character (well-tempered, accommodating, harmonious) with the same adjective, e.g. Isoc. *Panath.* 32; Hippoc. *Epid.* 2.6.1.

237. See also under καταστατικός.

238. From τίθημι; literally “set in good order.”

Greek/Latin	English	Senses	Attributed to	Effect	Sample Ref.
ποικιλόμοσος	yielding rich music		Orpheus		Timoth. <i>Pers.</i> 221
σύντονος ²³⁹	in har- mony with, severe, in- tense	x,c	d (Bacchic) harmonies [harmony] s (Thales) Dorian		Eur. <i>Bacch.</i> 126 Arist. <i>Pol.</i> 1342b21 Arist. <i>Pol.</i> 1290a27 ²⁴⁰ <u>Strabo 10.4.16</u> Ath. 624f (Pratin.)
κοσμιότης	propriety, decorum	c,x	music		Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D90.2
<i>congruens</i>	combining harmoni- ously	x	tones d with s/a		Cic. <i>Rep.</i> 2.69 ²⁴¹ Liv. 7.2.5 ²⁴²
<i>concors</i>	harmoni- ous	x	tones sound (s)		Cic. <i>Rep.</i> 2.69 Ov. <i>Met.</i> 5.664
<i>consonus</i>	sounding together, harmoni- ous	x	strings of l music		Ov. <i>Am.</i> 1.8.60 Apul. <i>De mundo</i> 20
<i>elegans</i> ²⁴³	tastefully attractive, graceful	x			Sall. <i>Cat.</i> 25.2
<i>nobilis</i> ²⁴⁴	renowned, noble	x,c	s (M) s	mulceo	Stat. <i>Theb.</i> 6.335 Ennodius <i>Carm.</i> 1.2.4

239. Also used for high pitch and not always positive (see next note).

240. Comparison between music and State constitution (σύντονος is attributed here directly to the despotic constitution while harmony should be “well mixed”—κεκραμένη); also rather negative in the Ath. passage.

241. The “*concentus ex dissimillarum vocum*/concord out of dissimilar voices/sounds” in music is compared with the State; see also to *concors*.

242. Cf. August. *Serm.* 311.6: “*Quid est saltare, nisi motu membrorum cantico consonare?*”/What is dancing if not the sounding together in song with the movement of the members (of the body)?”

243. Originally “careful in choosing, fastidious,” it can have either negative (“addicted to luxurious habits” or positive value (“as above, also: “apt, skillful, fine,” etc.) while the adverb “*elegantius*” seems to appear in positive contexts throughout. The quoted Sallust passage points out an exaggeration: “*elegantius quam necesse est probae*” along with “*instrumenta luxuriae*.”

244. Also: “familiar, remarkable, important, of imposing grandeur, superior.”

Greek/Latin	English	Senses	Attributed to	Effect	Sample Ref.
<i>herous</i>	belonging to a hero	x	l		Hor. <i>Carm.</i> 1.12.1
ἄμβρόσιος	divinely excellent	t,s,x	v (M,Graces) v (Graces) s (Phrynichus)		HH 27.18 Hes. <i>Theog.</i> 69 Ar. <i>Av.</i> 750
θεῖος	divine	x	v (of singer) singer d (χορός) music v (citharist)		Hom. <i>Od.</i> 1.371 Hom. <i>Od.</i> 4.17; 8.43, 87, 539; 23.133, 143 Hom. <i>Od.</i> 8.264 Soph. <i>Trach.</i> 643 Philostr. <i>VA</i> 4.39
<i>divinus</i>	divine		s (Fates) poet/singer		Cat. 64.321 Verg. <i>Ecl.</i> 5.45
<i>entheus</i>	frenzied, inspired	x	l		Stat. <i>Silv.</i> 1.5.1
εὐάς ²⁴⁵	Bacchic		v (singer)		Nonn. 19.110
θεσπέσιος ²⁴⁶	divinely sounding	s,x	s S v s Hom. verses grasshopper music	longing	Hom. <i>Il.</i> 2.600 Hom. <i>Od.</i> 12.158 HH 4.422 Pind. <i>Nem.</i> 9.7 Pind. <i>Isthm.</i> 4.39 Ar. <i>Av.</i> 1095 Lucian <i>Ind.</i> 12
<i>caelestis</i>	godlike, heavenly	x	v (Nero)		Suet. <i>Ner.</i> 21.1
θεόγλωσσος	with the tongue of a god		v/s (women)		<i>Anth. Pal.</i> 9.26
θέσπις	inspired	x	s s singer singer s s l	delight	Hom. <i>Il.</i> 2.599–600 Hom. <i>Od.</i> 1.328 Hom. <i>Od.</i> 8.498 Hom. <i>Od.</i> 17.385 Hes. <i>Theog.</i> 31–32 HH 4.442 Eur. <i>Med.</i> 425

245. Literally: “one who cries”; see similar εὔασμα/εὔασμός, εὔασμός/-ής/-ικός

246. LSJ 795 proposes an etymology from θεός & ἔσπον (ἐνέπω “tell”).

Greek/Latin	English	Senses	Attributed to	Effect	Sample Ref.
ἱερός	filled with divine power	x	s s s/cry s s a	hearten	HH 1.19 Pind. fr. 194.1 Aesch. <i>Sept.</i> 268 Eur. <i>Bacch.</i> 161 Ar. <i>Av.</i> 1719 ²⁴⁷ Ath. 14.617b
θεοσεβής	fearing God	x	s		Ar. <i>Av.</i> 899
<i>pius</i>	devout	x,c	s		Prudent. <i>Cathemerina</i> 2.50
ἄγνος	pure, chaste, holy	x	s v (Iphigenia)		Sappho 44.26 Aesch. <i>Ag.</i> 245
σεμνός	revered, august, holy		s	fear/ courage	Aesch. <i>Pers.</i> 393 ²⁴⁸
ἀγαθός ²⁴⁹	good, capable	x,c	a (ἀλλητῆς) a (ἀλλητῆς)		Pl. <i>Symp.</i> 215c Pl. <i>Prt.</i> 327b–c
<i>sollemnis</i>	solemn	x	a a		Ov. <i>Am.</i> 3.13.11 Sen. <i>Agamemnon</i> 359
<i>cultus</i>	elegant, polished	x	l/s (Horace)		Ov. <i>Trist.</i> 4.10.50
ἀγλαός ²⁵⁰	splendid, shining	v	s		HH 4.451

247. If the attribute is taken with ἔυφημον and not στόμα.

248. This is a song-like cry, which arouses fear in the Persians and courage in the Greeks.

249. Basic meanings are “well-born, gentle, brave,” including moral goodness, and for things that they are serviceable, beneficial; in the *Symposium* the opposition between a low-level ἀλλητρίς and a high-level ἀλλητῆς is expressed, probably in terms of capability, both of which regardless excite their audience. See also below “φαῦλος.”

250. Also “beautiful, noble, glorious, famous,” applied to people and things.

Greek/Latin	English	Senses	Attributed to	Effect	Sample Ref.
χρῦσεος	golden	v	M singer		Pind. <i>Isthm.</i> 8.5ab Pind. in Paus. 10.5.12
<i>praeclarus</i>	splendid, magnifi- cent	v,x,c	s/l		Cic. <i>Tusc.</i> 1.2.4
<i>egregius</i>	out- standing, excellent	x	v		Vitr. 8.3.24–25 ²⁵¹
θαυμάσιος ²⁵²	wonderful, marvelous	v,x	s/l	varia ²⁵³	HH 4.443
<i>mirus</i>	extraor- dinary, remarkable	x	v (<i>modus</i>)		<i>Anth. Lat.</i> 658.12
<i>stupendus</i>	stunning	x,f,v	l (<i>barbiton</i>)		Sid. Apoll. <i>Epist.</i> 8.9.5.16
<i>inauditus</i>	unheard of	x	<i>symphonia</i>	<i>delecto</i>	Hyg. <i>Poet. astr.</i> 2.17
ἀθέσφατος	unutterable		h		Hes. <i>Op.</i> 662
κλυτός	renowned, glorious	x	v s p		Pind. <i>Pyth.</i> 10.6 Pind. <i>Nem.</i> 7.16 Pind. <i>Isthm.</i> 2.2

251. Such a voice (three times repeated) is supposedly the result of drinking from a special fountain; cf. about the same Plin. *NH* 31.2.15.

252. Cf. also Hom *Il.* 18.496 where women marvel (θαυμάζω) over a bridal procession with instruments, chant, and dance, and in *Od.* 8.265 where Odysseus marvels in spirit (θυμῶ) over a “diviner dance.”

253. Several effects are assumed (id. 447–449): cure against sufferings of the helpless (μοῦσαάμηχανέων), and especially three: mirth (εὐφροσύνη), love (ἔρωτα), and sweet sleep (ἥδυμος ὕπνος).

Greek/Latin	English	Senses	Attributed to	Effect	Sample Ref.
νέος ²⁵⁴	new	x	s <i>tropos</i> h s s h music h	praise	Hom <i>Od.</i> 1.352 ²⁵⁵ Pind. <i>Ol.</i> 3.4 ²⁵⁶ Pind. <i>Isthm.</i> 5.63 ²⁵⁷ Pind. fr. 70b.5 ²⁵⁸ Eur. <i>Heracl.</i> 767 ²⁵⁹ Timoth. <i>Pers.</i> 204–205 ²⁶⁰ Xen. <i>Cyr.</i> 1.6.38 ²⁶¹ Strabo 13.2.4 ²⁶²
<i>novus</i>	new	x	strings <i>tropaea</i> Sappho		Hor. <i>Carm.</i> 1.26.10 Hor. <i>Carm.</i> 2.9.18 Ven. Fort. <i>Carm.</i> 9.7.5

254. Kaimio 1977, 242 contributes references with similar terms: “Alcman speaks of a new song (μέλος νεοχμόν) in 14 a, possibly also in 4, frg. 1, 4, 6; Bacchylides refers to a chorus with νεοκέλαδος (frg. 61, 2, dubious), and Pindar promotes this aspect in O. 3, 4; 9, 48f. 1. 5, 63. Apparently some new aspect of the style of music was meant.” She further gathers references for variety (see ποικίλος), pointing out that “new” will in the later fifth century “acquire negative connotations: (...) characteristics of the modern virtuoso style” (so e.g. in Pl. *Resp.* 399d; *Leg.* 812d–3).
255. Telemachus probably means new stories rather than tunes or musical features, as Plato points out upon quoting the passage (in *Resp.* 423b).
256. In the compound “νεοσίγαλος,” according to LSJ “new and sparkling” from “νέος” (“new”) & “σιγαλόεις” (“glossy, glittering”); referring to a *tropos* as the voice is “harmonized” to a Dorian rhythm (πέδιλον, originally “shoe”).
257. Together with πετερόεις “winged”.
258. This is already entering into a certain criticism, opposing old-style dithyramb (“drawn out like a rope”) with “new gates standing open wide for the holy chorus-rings” (tr. West 1992, 343–344).
259. According to an emendation by Wilamowitz (see GMW 1.81 n. 127); here the new song is not the cause but the result of an external change (in this case, for the better).
260. The whole passage from 202–240 is about the newness of his music with strong polemic against the old; he uses further νεοτευχής (“newly wrought”), referring to the Muse.
261. The strife of musicians to create something new is driven by the fact that what is new and in fresh bloom (ἀνθηρός) is highly esteemed (εὐδοκιμεῖ); this is here compared with warfare for which Cyrus is encouraged by his father to develop new strategies along with the old.
262. Quoting Terpander, who announces his “new hymns” on a seven-stringed *phorminx* in contrast to the four-stringed ones.

Greek/Latin	English	Senses	Attributed to	Effect	Sample Ref.
ποικίλος ²⁶³	changeful	v	h h h		Pind. <i>Ol.</i> 6.87 Pind. <i>Nem.</i> 4.14 Pind. <i>Nem.</i> 5,42
λιγύς ²⁶⁴	clear, shrill		p p p p p v (Circe) M M M s (swan) k (Hermes) s (M) M v/s a s (dirge) lotus (pipe) M S	delight tears melts θυμός	Hom. <i>Il.</i> 9.186 Hom. <i>Il.</i> 18.569 Hom. <i>Od.</i> 8.67, 105, 254, 261, 537 Hom. <i>Od.</i> 22.332 Hom. <i>Od.</i> 23.133 Hom. <i>Od.</i> 10.254 Hom. <i>Od.</i> 24.62 Hes. <i>Sc.</i> 206 HH 17.1; 20.1 HH 21.1 HH 4.425 Sappho 103.10 Alcm. 14a, 28 Thgn. 241 Bacchyl. 23 Aesch. <i>Supp.</i> 113 ²⁶⁵ Eur. <i>Herac.</i> 893 Pl. <i>Phdr.</i> 237a Apoll. Rhod. 4.892, 914

263. Literally: “many-colored, spotted”; metaphorically: “diversified, manifold, complex”. See West 1992, 345–346, with more references in n. 78; also Kaimio 1977, 149, and recently the interesting study on this term by LeVen 2013 who claims that the meaning of the term shifted from a multisensual experience of beauty to a more metaphorical (and ideological) term. See also ποικιλοφόρμιγγος (tone-changing/multi-toned *phorminx*, with “song”) in Pind. *Ol.* 4.2.

264. This and the following term are closely related (see also the verb λιγυρίζω and the noun λιγυρότης) and cover the range from “sweet” to “shrill wailings”, and both are used for joyful and sad context. Kaimio 1977, 231–233, distills the meanings “clear, distinct” and adds the connotation of “whistling sound” like that of wind or a whip.

See Barker 2002b, 25, with some comments on the background of these terms.

265. See below n. 379 (to βαρύς).

Greek/Latin	English	Senses	Attributed to	Effect	Sample Ref.
λιγυρός	clear, shrill		S s/M(teaches) y l M S v ²⁶⁶ whetstone/v M a M s s M swan/nightin gale S s	θυμός melts	H. <i>Od.</i> 12.44, 183 Hes. <i>Op.</i> 659 Hes. <i>Sc.</i> 278 Sappho 58 LP 12 ²⁶⁷ Alcm. 1 Alcm. 7 Thgn. 939 Pind. <i>Ol.</i> 6.82 Pind. <i>Pae.</i> 14.31 Eur. <i>Heracl.</i> 892 Pl. <i>Phdr.</i> 237a ps-Theoc. <i>Id.</i> 8.70 Theoc. <i>Id.</i> 15.135 Anacreonta 50.4 Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 974a ²⁶⁸ Apoll. Rhod. 4.914 <i>Anth.</i> Pal. 9.364
λιγυρήης	clear- sounding		k		<i>Anth.</i> Pal. 9.308
λιγυκλαγγής ²⁶⁹	shrill		chorus		Bacchyl. 14.14 ²⁷⁰
λιγύμολπος	clear- singing		v (Nymphs)		HH 19.19
λιγυσφάραγος	shrill- sounding		p		Pind. fr. 140a.60f
λιγύφθογγος	clear- voiced		a birds bee nightingale s (in contest)		Thgn. 241 Bacchyl. 5.23 Bacchyl. 10.10 Ar. <i>Av.</i> 1380 Oppian <i>Halieutica</i> 5.620

266. Negation: the person cannot sing with the clear voice of the nightingale.

267. Five more references in Sappho are presented in Kaimio 1977, 129, but the point of reference is doubtful because of text corruption. She seems to refer aesthetically to women's voices and the nightingale.

268. The clear voice of swan and nightingale was imitated by humans to learn; the idea is quoted from Democritus (DK 68 B154).

269. In Bacchyl. 5.73, we find this word applied to the string of a bow (for an arrow)—an example for the close relation between the musical and military bow.

270. The context is that such a chorus and lyre are not fitting in a sorrowful context—each at its *καίρος*.

Greek/Latin	English	Senses	Attributed to	Effect	Sample Ref.
λιγύφωνος	clear-voiced		l/s	delight	HH 4.478
<i>acutus</i> ²⁷¹	high-pitched, piercing	x, b, v, s, t, c	v (<i>ululatus</i>) cymbals M (Calliope) <i>aes</i> (Rhodope) cymbal		Cat. 63.24 ²⁷² Hor. <i>Carm.</i> 1,16.7 Hor. <i>Carm.</i> 3.4.3 Ov. <i>Met.</i> 6.589 Ov. <i>Fast.</i> 4.189–190
καναχή ²⁷³	sharp sound ²⁷⁴		p (plectrum) a a a	rouse	HH 3.185 Pind. <i>Pyth.</i> 10.39 Bacchyl. 2.12 ²⁷⁵ Soph. <i>Trach.</i> 642 ²⁷⁶
<i>tinnulus</i> ²⁷⁷	emitting a ringing sound		v cymbals l <i>fistula</i>		Cat. 61.13 Ov. <i>Met.</i> 4.393 Sen. <i>Troades</i> 833 Calp. <i>Ecl.</i> 4.74
τορός	piercing, thrilling	v, c, x	h (Melanippides)		<i>Anth. Pal.</i> 4.1.7
διαπρύσιος ²⁷⁸	piercing		k (Anchises)		HH 5.80
βρόμος ²⁷⁹	sounding		p	rousing <i>aulos</i>	Pind. <i>Nem.</i> 9.8

271. Similar to the Greek ὀξύς (below in the “negative” section), this word first describes a pointed, sharp surface; for sound it is also used for metal (e.g. a sword: Ov. *Met.* 5.204), chicken, and frequently for the voice of the orator.

272. In the context, describing a maddening Phrygian revel in honor of Cybele, right before various instruments are mentioned, so that the Maenads may actually be singing. See also *gravis*.

273. This word is included even though it is a noun, but the corresponding adjectives such as καναχός and καναχίς do not seem to be used for music; however, the noun characterizes the instruments and, due to the whole related word field, evokes interesting associations such as the gnashing of teeth, splashing of water, ringing of metal, etc.

274. This noun possesses a metallic sound connotation from the verb ἤχέω (“sound, ring, peal”), but beyond that indicates a variety of sounds: ring, clash, sharp sound, clanging of metal, gnashing of teeth; cognates further include sounds like noisy frogs (Nic. *Ther.* 620), the splashing of water (see also κανάσσω: “pour with a gurgling sound”) or the feet of horses.

275. Along with “γλυκύς.”

276. There is a negative value in this quote, emphasized by the adjective ἀνάρσιος (hostile), referring to sorrow.

277. Frequent are the cognates *tinnio*, *tinnitus*, etc., referring to a metallic ringing, jangling sound, referring to bells, cymbals, trumpets, but also the human voice and even for the music of the spheres (Plin. *NH* 2.6).

278. Also for shouts and noise; in other contexts for local movement and intensity.

279. Notice that this word is also used as a proper name for Dionysius/Bacchus, referring to him as “the noisy, boisterous one.”

Greek/Latin	English	Senses	Attributed to	Effect	Sample Ref.
ἀγάθεγκτος ²⁸⁰	loud-sounding		s		Pind. <i>Ol.</i> 6.91 ²⁸¹
κεχλαδῶς ²⁸²	exulting loudly		h		Pind. <i>Ol.</i> 9.2
τεθηλῶς ²⁸³	thriving		d/s		HH 4.452
βαρύβρομος	deep-thundering		tympanum <i>aulos</i> Aeolian		Eur. <i>Bacch.</i> 156 ²⁸⁴ Eur. <i>Hel.</i> 1351 Ath. 14.624f
ἀριζήλος ²⁸⁵	conspicuous	v	salpinx		Hom. <i>Il.</i> 18.219
<i>sonabilis</i>	resounding, sonorous		<i>sistrum</i>		Ov. <i>Met.</i> 9.784
<i>sonax</i>	resounding, loud, noisy		shell (<i>bucinat</i>)		Apul. <i>Met.</i> 4.31
<i>sonorus</i>	full of sound, loud, sonorous		k l	gaudeo	Tib. 3.4.69 ²⁸⁶ Stat. <i>Silv.</i> 1.5.4 ²⁸⁷
<i>argutus</i> ²⁸⁸	ringing, clear-voiced, melodious	s,v,c,x	l (Apollo) cicada psalter s a <i>aera</i>		Hor. <i>Carm.</i> 4.6.25 <i>App. Verg. Cul.</i> 153 <i>App. Verg. Ciris</i> 178 Prop. 1.16.16 ²⁸⁹ Sil. 13.346 Sil. 17.18

280. From φθέγγομαι “to utter a sound”, which can be human or from an animal with lungs; characteristics: usually just loud/clear; from animals for neighing, whinnying, croaking; also things: creaking, also instruments: trumpet (Xen. *An.* 4.2.7; 5.2.14), *aulos* (id. *Symp.* 6.3; Thgn. 532), *phorminx* (Thgn. 761).

281. This passage compares the thus-characterized songs to a “sweet” (“γλυκύς”) mixing-bowl.

282. LSJ links this to *χλάδω “exult loudly,” occurring also in Pind. *Pyth.* 4.179.

283. Literally “sprout, grow, bloom”, also “swell.”

284. The context is arousing fear, but this does not come from the sound which is mentioned in direct speech.

285. For sound rather “penetrating, clear;” the word is also used for persons, tales, etc.

286. Negated; cithara and song are rejected in favor of the *avena* (reed), soft passion for a strong one.

287. Literally “*muta ferae... sonorae terga premes/force* mute the shells of the sounding beast,” i.e. “keep the lyre quiet.”

288. Also for birds, cicadas, baying hounds, the rustling of trees, grass, streams; ringing; creaking, rattling, snapping; for people: talkative, tattling, expressive, eloquent (gestures), shrewd, adroit. For the voice of persons (not clear whether referring to singing) in Hor. *Carm.* 3.14.2 (Neaera); Mart. 6.34.8 (Catullus), 8.73.7 (Tibullus).

289. Here negative, forming an oxymoron with *blanditia*; see also under *blandus*.

Greek/Latin	English	Senses	Attributed to	Effect	Sample Ref.
<i>clarus</i> ²⁹⁰	loud, sonorous	v,x	trumpet v		Verg. <i>Aen.</i> 5.139 Ov. <i>Met.</i> 3.703
<i>clarisonus</i>	loud, clear- sounding		v (Fates)		Cat. 64.320 ²⁹¹
<i>canorus</i> ²⁹²	resonant, sonorous		v (matron) l (<i>fides</i> , Orpheus) swan trumpet l (<i>fides</i> , Orpheus) versus trumpets v (S) Apollo (l) S v <i>modulatus</i> (Amphion) v (S) v chorus v (M) v Orpheus <i>modulation</i> v (M)	tempt fear charm lure <i>mulceo</i> shift stones <i>mulceo</i> charms <i>mollio</i>	Plaut. <i>Poen.</i> 33 Verg. <i>Aen.</i> 6.120 Verg. <i>Aen.</i> 7.700 Verg. <i>Aen.</i> 9.503 Hor. <i>Carm.</i> 1.12.11 Hor. <i>Epist.</i> 2.2.76 ²⁹³ Ov. <i>Fast.</i> 3.841 Ov. <i>Ars am.</i> 3.111 ²⁹⁴ Ov. <i>Ars am.</i> 3.142 Ov. <i>Met.</i> 5.561 Petron. 68 Sen. <i>Hercules</i> 263 Sen. <i>Med.</i> 357 Plin. <i>NH</i> 31.2.15 Juv. 11.162 Apul. <i>Met.</i> 6.24 Macrobian. <i>Sat.</i> 2.1.5 ²⁹⁵ Sid. Apoll. <i>Epist.</i> 8.11.3.21 Mart. <i>Cap.</i> 1.11 Mart. <i>Cap.</i> 2.117
<i>resonans</i>	echoing		s (birds)		<i>App. Verg. Cul.</i> 147

290. Often of the human voice when speaking, also other sounds. Notice that the meaning “clear” seems to apply only to sight, not sound.

291. The attribute is used in the same poem in v. 125 for a mad shriek. See also Cic. *Arati Phaenomena* 526 (280).

292. Also of birds, swan, a crowd of people (Ov. *Fast.* 6.671), dog, water.

293. The context is musical.

294. Here the negative effect of the Sirens, similar in Claud. *De raptu Proserpinae* 3.256–258 (there the Sirens are using lyres: “*accensaeque malo iam non impune canoras in pestem vertere lyras: vox blanda carinas alligat; audito frenantur carmine remi*/and kindled by evil they turn the melodious lyres into destruction not with impunity: the pleasant voice detains the vessels; the oars are restrained when the song has been heard”).

295. See above under *dulcedo*.

Greek/Latin	English	Senses	Attributed to	Effect	Sample Ref.
<i>liquidus</i> ²⁹⁶	clear-toned melodious	x,v,c,f	s		Calp. <i>Ecl.</i> 4.150
ἡδόμενος ²⁹⁷	glad, delighted	x	v (birds)		Ar. <i>Av.</i> 236
εὐφρων	cheerful, merry	f	s/d (μολπή) (Apollo)	rejoice, delight	Eur. <i>Alc.</i> 587 Sappho 96.5
εὐτυχής	fortunate	x	s/d	s	Ath. 619c
<i>iocosus</i>	full of fun	c,x	l		Hor. <i>Carm.</i> 3.3.69
<i>ioculariter</i>	in fun, jestingly	x	s		Suet. <i>Iul.</i> 49.4
<i>laetus</i>	expressive of joy	c,f,x	l s/l s (for Bacchus) s (paean) v s (Germans) a (<i>tibia</i>)		Ov. <i>Fast.</i> 5.667 Ov. <i>Pont.</i> 3.4.46 Verg. <i>G.</i> 388 Verg. <i>Aen.</i> 10.738 Sil. 8.420 Tac. <i>Ann.</i> 1.65.1 <i>Anth. Lat.</i> 726.19
<i>felix</i> ²⁹⁸	happy, felicitous	x	s (Apollo) chorus (Nereids) s		Tib. 3.4.40 Prop. 1.17.26 Ov. <i>Am.</i> 2.17.27
φίλιος ²⁹⁹	friendly	x	h		Pind. <i>Pyth.</i> 1.60
λαοσσόος	rousing the nations	x	s		Pind <i>Pyth.</i> 12.24
παραστατικός ³⁰⁰	able to rouse	x,v,c	music/s		Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 238a
<i>furius</i>	mad, wild, uncon- trolled	x,c	a		Ov. <i>Fast.</i> 4.341

296. Originally “liquid, fluid, melted” (of water), then also “smooth, clear, pure, serene.”

297. From ἡδομαι (“to enjoy oneself, take one’s pleasure in”).

298. Literally “fruitful, productive, rich, fertile,” then also “bringing good luck, blessed, fortunate, wealthy.” In music it might express the joyful character of the piece or the good quality of the tune.

299. Cf. also φίλος in Anacr. fr. 373 (for the lyre).

300. From παραστατέω; literally “fit for standing by,” then “displaying” and “desperately courageous,” “furious;” see this word also in Phld. D41.19.20, 121.26; Sext. Emp. *Math.* 1.307.

Greek/Latin	English	Senses	Attributed to	Effect	Sample Ref.
<i>eliciens</i>	coaxing, enticing	x	k (Orpheus)		Sil. 11.471
σμερδαλέος	terrible to hear ³⁰¹	v	l (Hermes) l/s (Apollo)	laugh/joy	HH 4.420 HH. 4.502
μαλερός	fiery, glowing	x	s		Pind. <i>Ol.</i> 9.22 ³⁰²
λειριόεις ³⁰³	like a lily		v/cicadas v (M) S		Hom <i>Il.</i> 3.152 Hes. <i>Theog.</i> 41 Apoll. Rhod. 4.903
κύκηνειος	of a swan	x	v (Moirai)		<i>Anth. Pal.</i> 7.12
βαθύς	deep, high	x, v, c	music		Ath. 14.623e
καμπύλος	bent, curved	v, x	meter (s) music		Simon. 29 Ath. 14.623e
εὐκαμπής	well-bent, flexible	v, x	melody/ modulation	en chant	Lucian, <i>Imagines</i> 14
<i>consolabilis</i>	consolable	x	s		Gell. 16.19.12

Good and Beautiful

One might at first wonder why the most basic word for our distinction, “good,” does not often appear in Greek nor in Latin in the context of music. The word καλός appears almost exclusively in Homer and Hesiod, where it covers a great variety of objects; being here a rather formulaic expression, it still conveys a general positive notion. Later authors apparently prefer more specific terms. But all references point at the meaning “beautiful” with no apparent moral judgment.³⁰⁴ Likewise, the Latin *bonus* or *bellus*, on those rare occasions that they are employed, refer

301. The first meaning in LSJ is “terrible to look on.” Despite the negative sounding definition, the context renders the meaning positive (Evelyn-White 1936, 395 translates with “awesomely” since it makes Apollo laugh for joy).

302. LSJ 1077; Homer uses this epithet always for fire; it is here used positively as an image of giving light to a city, at the same time quicker (θάσσων) than a “manly horse or a winged whip.” Cf. also Kaimio 1977, 235–236.

303. Used for cicadas (for this see Anacreontea 34 along with λιγυρός) and in that combination in Homer for the sound of men talking; see Stanford 1969 who suggests a (complex and intriguing) synesthetic image, which is quite convincing given the many loans from other senses in the Greek musical vocabulary. See also Murray 2003, vol. 1, 141 n. 2, with reference to Kirk’s commentary.

304. This is different in the use of this term by the music theorists; see n. 22 in the Introduction.

principally to the quality of a performance or the ability of a musician. Apparently, ancient literary texts did not intend to call music itself directly “good;”³⁰⁵ in consequence, clearly moral terms such as ἀγαθός, χρηστός, or *virtuosus* are scarcely used in musical context. Apart from the aesthetical category, the evaluation of music happens rather via other ethical characterizations.

The table continues with a list of adjectives, which, all compounds of the prefix εὖ- plus a musical term, describe a well or beautifully sounding melody, song, voice, or instrument. The same applies to compounds with καλ-, but this base also has derivate uses outside of music. The poetic value of these words, and of many others listed later, can be seen in associations from other usages where they are attributed to water, insects (especially cicadas), birds, or other sounds. The sound is simply “good,” corresponding to the expectation of those who listen. Quotes from all different styles and periods show how universally accepted these characteristics are, even though the exact meaning may shift from one author to another. Latin authors, deprived of such an assortment of compounds, simply abstain from such characterizations—*benesonans* is very rare and occurs as one word only very late on.

Graceful and Lovely

With χαρίεις we transition into words, especially from the roots χαρι- (related to “grace”) and ἐρ- (related to “love, desire”), that refer to a style which exerts a certain attraction and emotional response. Loveliness (χάρις) in song is considered a divine gift (Pind. fr. 141), and hearing the voice of Orpheus leads to joy (χαρά) (Aesch. *Ag.* 1630).³⁰⁶ ἡμέροεις stands out as used almost exclusively by Homer and Hesiod. Latin features a few passages including *gratus* and words for “beloved,” but for other terms such as *pulcher*³⁰⁷ or *amoenus*³⁰⁸ do not seem to be applicable in

305. In the moral sense; strictly speaking, music cannot be moral anyway but only human attitudes or behavior, for only human beings possess a moral conscience.

306. On the purpose of splendor/beauty/joy (ἀγλαία): HH 4.476; Hes. *Sc.* 285 is in a general joyful context of instrument-playing and dance (270–284).

307. “Aesthetically pleasing, beautiful”: mostly used for physical appearance and moral value, but also for speech and writings. A quote from Augustine (*Serm.* 243.4.4) the difference between the visual *pulchritudo* and the musical *suavitas* becomes patent: “*diversi soni ratione coniuncti, pariunt, non videntibus pulchritudinem, sed audientibus suavitatem*/different sounds, conjoined by reason, bring forth not beauty for those who see, but pleasantness for those who hear.”

308. This term (meaning “pleasant, agreeable, enjoyable”) occurs mostly for things to see; the only application to the realm of sound is to that of speech (e.g. Gell. 2.26.21.4 *verba... Ennii amoenissima* or 10.3.15.2: “*si quis est tam agresti aure ac tam hispida, quem lux ista et amoenitas orationis verborumque modificatio parum delectat*/if anyone is so savage or also

relation to music. Occasionally *iucundus* is used. Most of these attributes can apply to human character as well.

Pleasant and Sweet

The word *λαρός* initiates a vast section comprising aesthetically rich concepts by explicitly emphasizing the aspect of pleasantness and enjoyment. Aristotle states that all people hold that music is one of the most pleasant things,³⁰⁹ and according to Musaeus, to sing is for man “most pleasant” because of its “exhilarating power.”³¹⁰ The key word here is *ἡδύς*; its basic meaning is “pleasant,” but in musical context it is often translated with “sweet.” *γλυκύς* underwent the opposite development, meaning primarily “sweet” (in the literal sense of taste) and then being used metaphorically for “pleasant, delightful.” This is not surprising if we consider that also in English the word “sweet” very often takes the meaning of “pleasing in general; yielding pleasure or enjoyment; agreeable, delightful, charming,” as evidenced by the OED.³¹¹ The same happens in Latin with *dulcis/suavis* and similar terms in other languages. Even though etymology links *ἡδύς* to *suavis* rather than *dulcis* (which, for its part, according to the OLD, is related to *γλυκύς*), the latter word corresponds to *ἡδύς* and its cognates as the predominant Latin term.³¹² The list reveals copious Greek compounds with different shadings of “sweet” or “pleasant” experiences. Pindar develops the greatest variety, but his favorite is *γλυκύς*.³¹³ Latin again leaves us with a minimum of basic terms.

rough with the ear, whom this light or enjoyment of speech and measure of words pleases little;” or 16.3.1.4: “*sermonibus usquequaque amoenissimis demulcebat*/he charmed in every instance with most enjoyable words.”)

309. *Pol.* 8.5.2 1339b20–21: “τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν πάντες εἶναι φαμεν τῶν *ἡδίστων*.” This and the following quotes are not referenced in the table for belonging to the theoretical discussion treated later; however, they appear here in the discussion because they introduce us well into the aspect considered.

310. *Ibid.* 1339b22–24: “εἶναι βροτοῖς *ἡδίστον* αἰδεῖν;” “ὥς δυναμένην εὐφραίνειν.” Cf. *Pind. Pyth.* 3.88–90: The uppermost happiness (*ἡδύφωνος ὄλβος ὑπέρτατος*) for men is to listen to the golden-crowned Muses singing and dancing (*μέλπειν*).

311. Category 5 at <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/195665?rskey=jHt5nx&result=2&isAdvanced=false#eid>, accessed August 18, 2012.

312. Virgil, for instance, hardly ever uses the word *suavis* (and then mostly for scent), but he employs *dulcis* with certain frequency, even though in his canonical writings only twice related to music. Apuleius makes ample use of both terms. Carruthers 2006 offers an analysis of the world field of “sweetness” in Medieval Latin with its aesthetic, moral, and metaphorical ambivalence.

313. In Pindar, a wide range lot of things are sweet: message (*Ol.* 4.5), reward (*Ol.* 5.1), Aphrodite (*Ol.* 6.36), mixing-bowl of songs (*Ol.* 6.91), arrow (*Ol.* 9.11–1); longing (*Pyth.* 4.184),

It is only logical, given the nature and origin of sweetness, that “honey” becomes a primary element and then forms compounds on its own (with μελί-). An important word here, again especially in Pindar, is μελίγηρυς (or Dorian μελίγαρυς). Apart from Apuleius it seems that only a few later Latin authors used the honey-association for music.³¹⁴ English translators find great difficulty to reproduce the rich Greek imagery implied by these words. According to Pindar (*Nem.* 3.76–80), song is like a frothing drink composed of milk and honey—or, as Philodemus has it (*Mus.* 4.12 D126), like a sweet dessert after dinner.³¹⁵ Isidore (*Etym.* 3.20.4) even suggests an etymological connection between *melos* (or μέλος) and *mellus/mel* (μέλι): “*Euphonia est suavitas vocis. Haec et melos a suavitatem et melle dicta/Good sound is charm/sweetness of the voice. This and ‘melody’ are named according to sweetness and honey.*”

The effect of musical sweetness is at times made explicit by verbs such as τέρω (“to delight, gladden, cheer, give pleasure”)³¹⁶ or θέλω (“charm”)³¹⁷, or in

marriage (*Pyth.* 4.222–223), garden (*Pyth.* 5.24), laughter (*Pyth.* 8.85), offspring (*Pyth.* 11.57), rest (*Nem.* 7.52), return home (*Nem.* 9.22–23), etc.

314. At times we find words like *melleus* or *mellitus* applied to speech; referring to a woman’s singing voice: “*murmure namque tuo dulcia mella fluunt/for from your whisper sweet honeys are flowing*” (*Anth. Lat.* 658.22); Boethius (*Consolatio Philosophiae* 2.3.2) speaks of rhetoric and music by means of a honey-image: “*oblita...rhetoricae ac musicae melle dulcedinis; tum tantum, cum audiuntur, oblectant/spread with the sweet honey of rhetoric and music; they delight as long as they are listened to.*” The effect is marred by its fleetingness: “*cum haec auribus insonare desierint, insitus animum maeror praegravat/when these cease to resound in the ears, inner grief weighs down the spirit.*”

315. Poets have compared themselves to bees pouring nectar, cf. Pind. *Ol.* 7.7–8; *Nem.* 7.77–78; Pl. *Ion* 534b. For more detailed information on the combination poet-bee-honey, see Roscalla 1998, 66–68.

316. The following notes provide some references in addition to those in the table (since they are not necessarily related to sweetness, but to music); for τέρω e.g. see Hom. *Il.* 1.474 (Apollo); 9.186/189 (Achilles, with regard to his φρένα (heart, as seat of passions) and θυμός respectively); *Od.* 1.347; 8.45, 91, 368 (in the midriff/heart (φρήν); 12.188 (supposedly from the Sirens’ song); 17.385; HH 4.506 (Zeus, because of Apollo singing with lyre); Hes: *Theog.* 37; 917 (τέρψις, song of Muses); Pind. *Ol.* 6.105: hymns are sprouting like a charming (εὐτερπής) flower; Eur. *Hel.* 1352 (Cypris/Aphrodite, because of the *aulos*).

317. Pind. *Pyth.* 1.5–14, bringing peace and sleep to the minds, with Apollo’s “shaft” (κῆλον), which carries a double-meaning here, alluding to both an instrument of war and music; cf. Lippman 1964, 19: Apollo is the god of war and harmony, hence also of healing; see also Pind. *Nem.* 4.1–5 (songs of the Muses); song or music “charms/soothes” (*Od.* 1.338), evokes silence (*Od.* 1.325, 339), or joy (*Od.* 8.367).

Latin especially by *mulceo* (“to touch, move gently, quiet, give ease”)³¹⁸ or similar *mollio*,³¹⁹ *lenio*,³²⁰ *flecto*,³²¹ or simply *moveo*.³²²

318. The whole range of meaning from the OLD is interesting; I give here a summary of meanings: “1. to touch lightly, stroke, caress, move gently along; 2. to soothe the passions, pacify, quiet, appease, or sim.; 3. to give ease from physical pain, relieve, to alleviate, to make easier or more tolerable, to make sweeter or more fragrant; 4. to affect in an agreeable or relaxing manner, soothe, charm, beguile.” This applies also to animals (for examples see Wille 1967, 590). Some examples: Verg. G. 4.510 (Eurydice, wailing, charming tigers); *Aen.* 7.754f: “*spargere qui somnos cantuque manuque solebat mulcebatque iras et morsus arte levabat*/[Umbro] used to put to sleep [snakes] with song and touch and appeased [their] furies and relieved the bites with skill;” Ov. *Met.* 5.561: “*canor mulcendas natus ad aures*/song arose to charm the ears” (about the human voice of the Sirens); 14.339 (*mulcere feras et flumina longa morari*/to charm the beasts and to hold back long rivers)—about Canens; Ov. *Trist.* 4.1.12: “*harundineo carmine mulcet oves*/[the shepherd] charms the sheep with a melody from the reed;” Manilius 5.333; Petr. 127 (like the *concordia* of the Sirens); Quint. 9.2.5: “*tum disponenda atque varianda sunt, ut auditorem, quod in fidibus fieri videmus, omni sono mulceant*/then [these qualities of oratory] are to be placed and varied, so that they charm the listener with any sound, which we see happen with string instruments” (variation creates delight); Pliny *NH* 8.50.114: “*mulcentur fistula pastorali et cantu*/[deer] are charmed by the pastoral pipe and song;” Sil. 14.472; Apul. *Met.* 10.32: “*tibiae multiforabiles cantus Lydios dulciter consonant. quibus spectatorum pectora suave mulcentibus*/the many-holed pipes resound sweetly Lydian songs; with these charming the hearts of the onlookers;” id. 8.30 (in the Phrygian *modulum*); Ambrosius *Hexameron* 5.24.85 (tunes at night calm people down); Arn. *Adv. nat.* 7.32: “*tibiarum stridore mulcentur*/they are charmed by the whistling of the pipes;” Mart. Cap. 9.913; Sid. Apoll. *Epist.* 1.2.9 (lyre well played *mulcet* as much as bombastic orchestras); Isid. *Etym.* 3.17.2 (*musica animum mulcet*/music charms the mind); Ven. Fort. *Carm.* 2.9.59; 10.11.4; Boethius *Consolatio Philosophiae* 3.1.1: “*auribus carminis mulcedo defixerat*/the charm of song enchanted/sank into the eyes;” *permulceo* in Columella *Rust.* 12.4 (effect of an orderly performance); Sil. 11.290 (the war trumpet); Apul. *Met.* 2.25: “*ad vigilias animum meum permulcebam cantationibus*/for the night watch I beguiled my mind with songs;” Serv. *Aen.* 1.66.4; Cassiod. *Psalm.* 145 *Praef.*: “*musica ista salutaris non solum mortalium permulcet auditum, sed etiam intellectum delectat angelicum*/this beneficial music not only beguiles the hearing of mortals but also pleases the intellect of angels;” Mart. Cap. 9.913; Isid. *Etym.* 3.17.2 (*musica animum mulcet*).

319. E.g. Sid. Apoll. *Epist.* 8.11.3.21: “*qui cotidiana saxa et robora corneasque fibras mollit dulciloqua canorus arte*/[Lampridius/Orpheus] who, sonorous, charms ordinary stones and oaks and cornel-tree leaves with sweet-sounding art.”

320. E.g. Luc. 9.643: “*Cerberos Orpheo leniovit sibila cantu*/Cerberus eased the hissing at the chant of Orpheus.”

321. E.g. Prop. 3.2.6: “*ad tua rorantis carmina flexit equos*/[Galatea] turned the dripping horses to your songs, [Polyphemus].”

322. According to the OLD 1139a *moveo* entry 15: “to move to tender feelings, soften, touch.” Examples: Ov. *Ars am.* 3.321: “*saxa ferasque lyra movit Rhodopeius Orpheus*/the Tracian

Behind this lies a richer variety of evaluative levels than one perhaps would expect. Certainly, most contexts remain on the level of beauty and simple appreciation. Birdsong is very often so described.³²³ The singing poet can be sweet, as can the words, the melody, the sound of an instrument or of a chorus or a single voice.³²⁴ Early Roman dramatic performances show this characteristic.³²⁵ Sweetness is the determining factor in the singing competition between Pan and Apollo.³²⁶ But sweet sound is also at times attributed to weeping and thus seen as feminine.³²⁷ Ambrose thinks the opposite and interestingly defines that “*dulcis igitur est cantilena quae non corpus effeminat, sed mentem animumque confirmat*” sweet, therefore, is a song that does not weaken the body but strengthens mind and soul” (*In psalmum XIV sermo* 118.7.26). Macrobius suspects that *dulcedo musicae* has its origin in heaven where souls return after death (*In Somn.* 2.3.6). On the other hand, sweet music can also be judged as negative or corruptive.³²⁸ Christian authors take diverse and at times ambivalent positions regarding the legitimacy and function of aesthetic beauty in (liturgical) music; it is mostly accepted when

Orpheus moves rocks and beasts with the lyre”: here and in similar places probably not only physical movement, but also “psychological” movement is meant—with all its implied anthropomorphism.

323. The ancients thought that the swan sings his own funeral song (*dulcia carmina*): Mart. 13.77.1–2, cf. Ov. *Met.* 14.428–430.
324. For the Greeks almost always the lyre or cithara; for the Romans, somewhat surprisingly, mostly the *aulos* or flute. “Sweet” is used very often for the human voice in general; for just one example (including the concept of honey) see Hom. *Il.* 1.248–249.
325. *Anth. Lat.* 111.3–6: “*cum grata chorus diffundit cantica dulcis... motibus ipse [saltator] probat*” when the sweet choir spreads out pleasing songs, he [the dancer] shows with movements;” Lucian *Salt.* 72.
326. Ov. *Met.* 11.170; similar in Theoc. *Id.* 1.1, 2, 7 (ἡδύς); ps-Theoc. *Id.* 8.82–83, including a honey image.
327. Boet. *Mus.* 1.1: “*ut cum cantico quodam dulcior fiat causa deflendi. Id vero etiam fuit antiquis in more, ut cantus tibiae luctibus praeiret*”/that with some song a sweeter reason of mourning is given. For that was also the custom with the elders, that song of pipes preceded lamentations.” Here sweetness is more the effect but yet directly linked to the music, something, which Boethius calls “*maxime muliebre* (feminine to the highest degree).” We shall discuss the distinction of musical character according to gender in the context of Aristides Quintilianus.
328. E.g. Cic. *Leg.* 2.15.38–39; we shall revisit the negative aspects in the next section. A striking example from outside the realm of music offers Sen. *Ep.* 90.20.1: “*Incredibilest, mi Lucili, quam facile etiam magnos viros dulcedo orationis abducatur vero*./It is unbelievable, my Lucilius, how easily the sweetness of speech truly seduces even great men.”

pious texts are used and the “function” of beauty is to praise and please God, to increase piety, or to effect conversion.³²⁹

Soft, Fine, Delicate

Another series of adjectives (beginning with ἥσυχος), again particularly prominent in Pindar, develops music’s quietness and gentleness—thus loaning a concept related to the sense of touch and to feeling. Latin quotes employ mostly the words *mollis* and *blandus*, and these arouse effects varying from fascination to somnolence; in some Latin texts “soft” or “fine” are characteristics of a good musical performance, especially of string instruments.

Learned and Skilfull

In this section, mostly the musician and his (or her) talent or performance matter, even though the qualities are sometimes, as a metaphor or hypallage, attributed to an instrument or song. Again, the Greek language is capable of specifying what exactly the “skill” is referring to by using composite word-forms. Whether one plays the lyre well or not results in very different outcomes (cf. HH 4.482–488): skillful performance provides delight for the mind, whereas false notes provoke thoughtless things (“μάψ (...) μετήπορ”). Seneca (*Ep.* 87.12) justly points out that good instruments do not yet make a good musician.³³⁰ Occasionally, authors lay out the concrete qualities that are expected in a proficient musician or poet. For

329. See Wille 1967, 384–397; Jerome has a negative view (quotes in Wille 1967, 380); different Cassiod. *Historia ecclesiastica* 8.6; Augustine is torn between both sides (see in the corresponding section in ch. 3). For the effect of conversion through sweet liturgical music see Isid. *De ecclesiasticis officiis* 2.12.2: “*ut oblectamento dulcedinis animos incitet auditorium... compunctionem magis audientibus faciat*/that the delight of sweetness arouse the spirits of the listeners... [the voice maybe of a kind that it] rather cause compunction in those who listen.” Also August. *Conf.* 9.6.14: “*quantum fleui in hymnis et canticis tuis, suave sonantis ecclesiae tuae vocibus commotus acriter! voces illae influebant auribus meis, et eliquabatur veritas in cor meum, et exaestuabat inde affectus pietatis, et currebant lacrimae, et bene mihi erat cum eis.*/How much did I weep at your hymns and songs, intensely moved by the sweetly sounding voices of your church! These voices flowed into my ears, and truth was poured into my heart, and hence the passion of piety blazed up, and the tears flowed, and I was well with them.”

330. Lucian (*Ind.* 12) reports some painful stories to illustrate this: one (*Ind.* 9) is about Evangelus who presumptuously thought his golden-adorned cithara would give him a victory in musical contest but instead got flogged for his awful performance; the other tells of Neanthus, son of the tyrant Pittacus at Lesbos, who hoped to inherit Orpheus’ genius by simply playing the master’s lyre; he ended up torn into pieces, like Orpheus, but tragically met this fate through dogs who had gathered for the sound (ἥχος).

example, in Ar. *Thesm.* 162, a musician is assumed to spice up or “season” the harmony (χυμίζω).³³¹ In Lucian as well we find a long list of characteristics for a good singer.³³² According to West, Phrynichus issues the first recorded (positive) critical judgment about a tragedian, informing us that his style was “highly melodious and pleasing to the ear” in addition to being embellished with creative choreography.³³³ Aristophanes knows little restraint when it comes to pointing out qualities or deficiencies in poets or musicians. Distinctness (διαστολή) is expected of the tones produced on an instrument (1 Cor 14.7). One word, εὔμουσία, with the adjective εὔμουσος, links the idea of “good music”³³⁴ to that of beauty and art (e.g. Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 49), to skill in music (e.g. Diog. Laert. 2.17), and to sweetness of song.

Orderly, Harmonious, Noble

The previous concept has already led into the listing of certain qualities considered *proper* to music as such, but quite a number of these are rather abstract: for example, Pindar, quoted by Aristides Quintilianus, speaks of Apollo’s music as being ὀρθός—“correct”. As a result, not many of these find their way into poetry. However, it is quite evident that the ideas of harmony and proper order are named as essential characteristics of music positively appraised across literary genres and periods. Already in the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes* 4.478–482, we find that the clear sound of the lyre (λιγύφωνος) together with its “good order” (“εὖ κατὰ κόσμον ἐπιστάμενος ἀγορεύειν”) enriches a feast, dance, and a joyful atmosphere, teaching through sound all that gives delight (χαρίεντα) to the mind (ibid. 484).³³⁵ Harmony, the meaningful combination and integration of disparate elements, seems

331. LSJ 2013 suggests translating here: “soften rough music”—I do not quite see where the roughness should come from.

Interestingly, fourth century comedy describes cooking often in musical terms, such as Machon fr. 2, Alexis fr. 193, Hegesippus fr. 1, and Damoxenus fr. 2 (Kassel/Austin). I am grateful to Andrew Barker who brought this fact to my attention.

332. Lucian, *Imagines* 14, see already above under καλός: Penthea supposedly is so perfect in observing the proper rhythm, measure, synchrony with the cithara, softness in touch (τὸ εὐαφής), flexibility of the melodies/modulations (τὸ εὐκαμπής τῶν μελῶν)—beyond the skill of even Orpheus or Antiphon; her singing stuns her audience and petrifies them, much as Gorgon had done, and one remains enchanted (κεκλημένος) as one would by the Sirens, with the one difference that wax will not protect one against it.

333. 1992, 352, with references to Ar. *Vesp.* 220 and scholia, 269, 1490, 1524 and others.

334. For this, LSJ 722 quotes from ps.-Plut. *De placitis philosophorum* 4.20: “κινεῖ ἡμᾶς ἡ εὔμουσία, ἐνοχλεῖ ἡ ἀμουσία/good music moves us, bad music annoys us.” See LSJ 722 also for references for the other concepts; see also εὐνομία μουσική in Longus 2.35.

335. Something similar is said about melody in Anacreontea 60a.6.

to be the heart of the classical understanding of “good” music. At times, harmony and severity are brought into relation, as is the case with the usage of the word σύντονος.³³⁶ One finds approving mention of the correspondence between the content of what is expressed with the form, the quality of the voice.³³⁷ Other concepts related to that of harmony include temperate/moderate,³³⁸ tasteful, and noble.

Divine and Devout

From noble to divine is only a small step, and both music and musicians are often said to be inspired from heaven,³³⁹ unless they themselves already belong to the higher realm (e.g. the Muses, Graces, Fates, or Harmonia³⁴⁰ in person). Outstanding musicians are often said to be of divine descent³⁴¹ or at least to have been instructed by the gods or other superior creatures.³⁴² Often melodies and

336. E.g. Strabo 10.4.16: The Cretan State stipulates that boys learn war-dance and other songs according to Cretan rhythms (συντονωτάτοι) in the context of military education. For a similar idea see Plut. *Instituta Laconica* 14 = *Mor.* 238a. In his complaint about decadent contemporary music, Cicero (*Leg.* 2.15.39) praises the *iucunda severitas* in the music of the ancient dramatists Livianus and Naevius.

337. E.g. in Eur. *Hel.* 1346: Cypris/Aphrodite takes on a voice “of earth/copper” (χάλκεος), appropriate to appease Demeter, the goddess of the earth who for her part engages the “deep-sounding” (βαρύβοημα) *aulos*. This point will become very important in our discussion of Plato in ch. 3.

338. Also in Cic. *Leg.* 2.15.38 (regarding instrumental music in theater).

339. See above pp. 39 and 60 and the following examples: Hes. *Op.* 658–662; *Theog.* 22–35 (Hesiod’s “vocation”), 94–95, 103 (singers and cithara players exist through the Muses and Apollo); HH 3.518–519; Pind. *Pyth.* 12 (Athena invents song for men after the victory over the Medusa); *Ol.* 3.7, 10; *Pae.* 9.34; fr. 141 (loveliness—χάρις—given by god); fr. 151 (from Eustathios *Il.* 9.40; here the Muse incites, which is different from Homer (*ad loc.*) who incites the Muse!).

340. E.g. HH 3.195; Hes. *Th.* 933–7; Eur. *Phoen.* 822, and the ninth book in Mart. Cap. *De nuptiis*.

341. Orpheus, for example, is called the “son of Apollo” (e.g. Ov. *Met.* 10.167)—even though “biologically” he was rather the son of Oiairos (Pind. fr. 126.9; Apollod. 1.3.1; Mart. Cap. 1.3), so Apollo is rather his “father in art;” regardless, the authors coincide in that his mother was the Muse Calliope. For Amphion, Zeus is claimed to be his father and Antiope his mother (e.g. Hom. *Od.* 11.260–262). Vergil *Ecl.* 4.56–56 mentions Linus as son of Calliope and Apollo.

342. For evidence about Olympus as a disciple of the satyr Marsyas (*aulos*) see Wille 1967, 535 n. 480 and Barker 1984, 92 n. 197. Achilles learned to play the *phorminx* from his mentor, the centaur Chiron (cf. Hom. *Il.* 11.830–832), who, according to Phot. *Bibl.* 190, had been instructed by Dionysius himself.

instruments which people approve highly of are said to be of divine origin.³⁴³ In one case, that of the Dionysian rites, does music of divine provenance incur negative descriptions; other than that, the divine element in music is eminently positive. Because of the godly source of music it is often seen as having a special power that goes beyond the natural.³⁴⁴ The gods always prevail over the humans who presume to challenge them in musical pursuits (e.g. the daughters of Pierus against the Muses in *Ov. Met.* 5.269ff). Sometimes gods themselves and their power are thought to be made present through music.³⁴⁵ Speculation on the nature of the cosmos culminates in the idea that all of nature and the universe itself are structured according to musical parameters and thus possesses a harmonic sound (cf. *Mart. Cap.* 1.11–28, with Apollo at its origin). Human music, then, is owed to divine origin and looks up to the divinities as its patrons.³⁴⁶ The idea of music as a gift from God, still present in Roman thought (e.g. *Sen. Ben.* 4.6.5), continues to be present in the Christian tradition.³⁴⁷

The vocabulary includes here also some terms not directly connected to religion but still breathing the spirit of the sublime (ἄγνος, σεμνός, *sollemnis*, *cultus*).

343. Hermes, for instance, found or invented the cithara (*HH* 4.24ff), being the father of Pan (*Cic. Nat. D.* 3.22.56; *Ov. Met.* 1.711–712) who, for his part, invented the *syrix* (*Verg. Ecl.* 2.31–33; *Ov. Met.* 1.689–710). The *aulos* is purported to have been invented by Athena/Minerva; however, the strange face she had to make playing it led her to reject it with contempt (e.g. In *Arist. Pol.* 1342b 2–7; *Ath.* 14.616e–617a; *Hyg. Fab.* 165; *Fulg. Myth.* 3.9; *Ov. Fast.* 6.695–702). This, of course, cannot be the reason for the *ethical* quality that is attributed to its sound.

344. See above and Wille 1967, 443, collecting the reports on Apollo, the Muses, Orpheus, Linus, Arion, and Amphion; also Lippman 1964, 45–51.

345. So the Pythagoreans, see *Iambl. Myst.* 3.9 (quoted in Mathiesen 1990, 43–44), due to the attraction of like to like given the “alliance in these sounds and melodies to the proper orders and powers of the several gods.”

346. E.g. *Ar. Thesm.* 111–113: “Rejoice in most beautiful songs, Phoebus, bringing forward sacred reward in musical contests.”

347. E.g. *August. Mus.* 6.17.57; *Ep.* 166.13: “*musica...dei largitate concessa est.*” See also Wille 1967, 622, and in the corresponding section below. It may be important to notice that the idea of a divine (origin of) music did not enter Christian thought as a foreign import from Neoplatonic sources via Augustin and others, but counted on a basis in the Judeo-Christian faith that God has created the world according to mathematical principles (cf. *Ws* 11.20: “But you have disposed all things by measure and number and weight”), and music is an important feature used to describe heaven (e.g. *Apoc* 5.9–13; 14.2–3; 15.3–4).

Splendid, Marvelous, and New

Not necessarily linked to superior forces but to highlight supreme quality, authors rely on terms taken mostly from the sense of sight. Both Latin and Greek offer a number of descriptions; the table contains only a few. “Shining splendor” metaphorically links to wonder and surprise, and whatever is new has always exerted particular appeal. Already in Homer we find the observation that people “always give more applause to that song, which is the latest to circulate among the listeners” (*Od.* 1.351–352; cf. Pindar *Ol.* 9.48–49 and quoted in Pl. *Resp.* 424b)—an early precursor to modern hit lists. Music reveals always something new for those who can recognize it (Ath. 14.623e, and in f: “music is like Libya, which brings to birth a new animal every year”). More points about “new” will follow in the next chapter since this attribute is sometimes also criticized; it is included here for passages with positive meaning.³⁴⁸ Newness can also be prompted by different experiences: “changes of tears, changes of fortune, have bred new songs” (Eur. *HF* 767, with a text correction by Barker in GMW 1.81 n. 127).

Clear, Shrill, Resounding, and Loud

In a way, the characterizations collected here are in opposition to the ones above about sweetness and softness. It might surprise that *λιγύς* is Homer’s preferred term for the *phorminx*, and it is used as well for the Muses, Circe, the Sirens (more frequently *λιγυρός*), the *aulos*, and the swan. It must be rather the clarity than a particular timbre that motivates the choice of these words in these cases. In contrast, other words aim more at a piercing sound (e.g. *καυαχή* and *tinnulus*) and can have a negative connotation. Also the associative range of *λιγύς* and its twin *λιγυρός* includes negative elements, especially wailing and a general shrillness of sounds.³⁴⁹

348. See also Kaimio 1977, 242, and D’Angour 2011 on newness in Greek culture. In addition, we may mention the whole biblical tradition of the “new song” (שִׁיר/שִׁיר הַחַדָּשׁ/*canticum novum*) with its eschatological dimension of deliverance and redemption; cf. Jdt 16.1 (psalmus), 13 (hymnus); Pss 32 (33).3; 39 (40).4; 95 (96).1; 97 (98).1; 143 (144).9; 149.1; Is 42.10; Apoc 5.9; 14.3; cf. August. *Serm.* 34.1.1: “*Ad unum enim regnum pertinent Omnia, homo novus, canticum novum, Testamentum novum*/For to the one kingdom belongs everything: a new man, a new song, a new testament;” 336.1.1: “*Quid enim habet canticum novum, nisi amorem novum? Cantare amantis est. Vox huius cantoris, fervor est sancti amoris*/For what does the new song contain if not a new love? Singing belongs to the lover. The voice of this singer is the fervor of holy love.”

349. LSJ attributes also “sweetness” (with reference to the Sirens in Hom. *Od.* 12.44, 183), but the vantage point of a clearer semantic distinction of musical vocabulary makes one reluctant to stretch a term to the opposite of its most frequently attested meaning. Homer

The following words (βρόμιος and onward) emphasize volume and resonance (while *argutus* combines volume and a particular mix of timbre). The preferred term employed in Latin is *canorus*, which semantically overlaps in part with λιγύς/λιγυρός (and thus fills the same slot of an epithetic stereotype) but seems to neither reach into the concept of shrillness nor allow for a use in a negative context.

Most terms in this section are actually proper to the sense of hearing; some are loaned from sight (e.g. *clarus*) or even touch (e.g. *acutus*); ὀξύς and *acutus* can apply to all senses. λιγύς/λιγυρός are limited to sounds, but not to music.³⁵⁰ The lyric poets have a preference for this sort of sound.³⁵¹

Happy and Joyful

From the loud music there is an easy transition to the joyful, even though direct characterizations of this kind do not abound.³⁵² Strictly speaking, we are dealing again with examples of hypallage, since the authors attribute to the song or instrument its effect on the musician or listener.

Rousing and Wild

The first two words here indicate an important musical effect usually expressed by verbs (and hence not found in our list).³⁵³ The corresponding quotation from Plutarch³⁵⁴ is particularly rich. It describes the Spartan music in the times

knows of other ways to describe sweetness of the Sirens' song; see in the same context v. 187: μελίσσηρος. Notice also that Latin authors hardly ever use words such as *dulcis* or *suavis* for the Sirens but prefer *canorus*. For more about the Sirens see p. 131.

350. The earliest references for λιγυρός (from the *Iliad*) actually show its origin from natural sounds: 5.526 and 23.215 (wind); 11.532 (whip); 14.290 (bird); cf. Hes. *Op.* 583 (locusts). It is further used for shouting (Hes. *Sc.* 233) and wailing (Eur. *Med.* 205), especially in the tragedies.

351. Anderson 1994, 70, attests in Alcman an “unusual interest in the quality of the singing voice” (as high-pitched, clear, and sweet) and collects in n. 28 references for the usage of λιγύς in Alcman and other lyric poets; he later (73–75) comments on Alcaeus, Sappho, and Stesichorus. They all understandably preferred this sort of musical tone since they are dealing mostly with women's voices or those of boys (e.g. Anacreontea 43.11). A certain ambiguity of shrillness is also reflected in verb such as λάσκω (“to ring/shriek/scream”), which features positive in Eur. *Alc.* 346 and negative in Alcman 1.86.

352. I have listed almost exclusively Latin terms, but most probably there are also Greek examples that I have not been able to identify.

353. Just one example from Hom. *Od.* 23.143–145 where the cithara arouses (ὀρνυμι) to dance and song (cf. for the same verb Hes. *Sc.* 274 where the bridal hymn itself rises or swells up).

354. *Instituta Laconica* 14. See also n. 71.

of Lycurgus containing a stimulus (κέντρον: “sharp point”), which is a stirring (ἐγερτικόν) of the emotion (θυμός) and a rousing (παραστατικόν) of an ecstatic (ἐνθουσιώδης) and effective (πρακτικός) impulse (ὁρμή: “rapid motion, onset, assault”)³⁵⁵—this all in the service of education to warfare. Another frequent context of ecstatical music is the frenzies of Bacchic ὁργή,³⁵⁶ which tend to be considered rather harmful and are therefore placed in the “negative” section below. A few similar terms are included in this section.

Varia

The table ends with some attributes that do not fit well into any of the previous categories and highlight metaphorically some particular characteristics which, except for the last one (*consolabilis*), we cannot fully appreciate.³⁵⁷

Music Images

In addition to what has been collected in the table, I would like to mention another way of characterizing music, even though not directly evaluative. It allows us to admire still further how the ancients perceived music in a spontaneous and poetic manner. Just as the language oftentimes needs to take recourse to other senses to describe a particular acoustic effect, we find a wealth of imagery and analogy in order to convey more complex ideas about how musical experience. A few examples may illustrate the point.³⁵⁸

Musical tunes appear like a woven texture³⁵⁹, a shot arrow (Pind. *Ol.* 9.5–14) hitting the mark (Pind. *Nem.* 6.28–9; 9.55), a slumber (ps-Theoc. *Id.* 9.33), or a

355. κέντρον δ' εἶχε ταῦτα ἐγερτικόν θυμοῦ καὶ φρονήματος καὶ παραστατικόν ὁρμῆς ἐνθουσιώδους καὶ πρακτικῆς.

356. E.g. in Pind. *Dithyramb* 2.19–23, preceded by the 1–14 loud-thundering groans (ἐρίγδουποι στοναχαὶ μανίαι τ' ἄλαλαί τ' ὀρίνεται) of the Naiads.

357. See the corresponding n. 303 for λειριόεις; swans appear elsewhere with quite distinct associations, and what Athenaeus quotes from the comic poet Eupolis (“ἡ μουσικὴ πράγμα ἔστι βαθύ καὶ καμπύλον/music is a deep and curved/varied thing”) remains also somewhat mysterious.

358. Kaimio 1977, 242, gathers a few more (especially for the genre of choral lyrics): “the boat or other vehicle carrying songs, or the song as a path or wreath of flowers.”

359. E.g. Pind. *Pyth.* 12.8 διαπλέκω; *Nem.* 4.44–45; possibly also the sound of weaving in Eur. *IT* 222–223; Ar. *Ran.* 1315–1317; see also GMW 1.71 n. 61. Indirectly but nicely in Pind. *Pyth.* 8.68 (cf. Anderson 1994, 100).

drink from a fountain in the heat of summer (Verg. *Ecl.* 5.46–47). Song is more delightful than the murmuring of wind or mountain rivers and their banks (Verg. *Ecl.* 5.81–84).

Most comparisons are drawn from birds. We already commented on the nightingale earlier;³⁶⁰ the swan represents another prominent “singer.” Alcman is called a swan-singer of wedding-songs (*Anth. Pal.* 7.19); swan-like songs appear in Alcman 1.101 and Lact. *Phoen.* 45–49; the swan is even compared with the lyre in Lucr. 2.505–506 and Sid. *Epist.* 8.9.4; Phrygian rhythm flows swan-like along with the wind (Anacreontea 60a.5–10); Mart. Cap. 9.918 mentions his *teneri cantus*. Sometimes the similarity might be motivated more by the swan’s appearance.³⁶¹

Birds in general count as the first inventors of music and its teachers.³⁶² Some comparisons are quite creative, so a girl’s singing with an owl³⁶³ or a crotala player with a stork (Petr. 55). Birds’ song sometimes becomes negative, especially as a bad omen.³⁶⁴

An animal particularly famous for its alleged musicality is the dolphin, which is said to love the *aulos*³⁶⁵ and the cithara in Stat. *Silv.* 2.2.118–20; also in Sext. Emp. *Mus.* 24). This might stem from or explain the story that a dolphin miraculously rescued the singer Arion who, condemned to death, was

360. See above n. 268.

361. Paeans from a “grey-bearded mouth” in Eur. *HF* 691–694; the “motley-plumed” melody in Ath. 14.617d; Cyncus gets transformed into a swan while lamenting (Verg. *Aen.* 10.189–92; another swan song appearance is in 7.699–701: “*cycni...canoros dant... modos*”).

362. E.g. Democritus in Plut. *De soll. an.* 20 = *Mor.* 974a = DK 68 B154 (humans learned song by imitation of swans and nightingales; cf. id. 19 = *Mor.* 973a); Varro *Rust.* 3.16.7; Lucr. 5.1379–1381. Similarly about the wind: id. 5.1382–1383 (cf. Wille 1967, 424–425). Wille 1967, 155, reports that the Romans paid more for a nightingale than for slaves and charioteers, and how they were directly included into instrumental music and imitated by sophisticated mechanisms (cf. Pliny *NH* 10.29.84). For a special praise of the nightingale’s musical power, see *Anth. Lat.* 658.1–28 and the idyllic beauty of nature’s sound in Tiberianus 1.15–20.

363. Alcman. 1.85–88; for more about this comparison in Alcman, see Anderson 1994, 68–69.

364. E.g. the owl in Verg. *Aen.* 4.460–463, Ov. *Epist.* 2.118 (*avis*), *Met.* 10.452–453, *Ibis* 223–224.

365. Cf. Pind. fr. 125: “moved by the lovely melody of *auloi*” (in GMW 1.61, in n. 29 also referring to Eur. *Hel.* 1451–1455: a Phoenician ship as a “χοραγὲ τῶν καλλιχόρων δελφίνων/ choir-leader of the fair-dancing dolphins”); “*aulos*-loving dolphin” in Ar. *Ran.* 1317 quoting Eur. *El.* 435 (GMW 1.116). Apollo takes up the shape of a dolphin in HH 3.399–519, concluding the episode playing the *phorminx*.

thrown into the ocean.³⁶⁶ According to Pliny *NH* 9.24, dolphins even like the organ.³⁶⁷ Bacchic music supposedly transformed a group of Tyrrhenians into dolphins: Hyg. *Astr.* 2.17 (in Wille 1967, 562 n. 23).

Conclusion

The testimony of poets and other literary authors of classical antiquity shows an overwhelming agreement that good music is beautiful, pleasing, gracious, tasteful, and resounding. More than proving the obvious, however, behind these general features a much more detailed spectrum opens up which shows significant preferences. The Greeks—here especially the early poetry from Homer to Pindar (and still Aristophanes)—reveal a particular taste for two characteristics. The first is sweetness (γλυκύς and its compounds), often directly associated with honey (compounds with μέλι) and which seems to be almost synonymous with pleasantness (ἡδύς and its compounds), beauty (compounds of εὖ), and goodness (compounds of καλός), along with notions of softness and delicacy. The second is clarity and high pitch (λίγυς/λίγυρός). The two do not seem to be in opposition to each other in the Greek mind, since often times the same authors characterize the same or similar subjects (e.g. divinities such as the Muses) using both descriptions, and that in a positive sense. In general “sweetness” is principally applied to voice and is seldom applied to instruments (and then principally to the lyre). “Clearness” or “shrillness” are applied to both human and animal sounds—and also to the *phorminx*/cithara, probably because of its metallic timbre). Tragic authors use positive imagery mostly to mark the very absence of (joyful) music (e.g. Eur. *Med.* 421–429 and p. 151). Actual song in the tragedies, as would be expected, has the qualities of mourning and weeping.

The Romans generally employ a much less diversified vocabulary, and in their works we find the emphasis on sweetness (*dulcis*) and pleasantness (*suavis*). They generally apply a greater variety of words for softness (*mollis*, *lenis*, *levis*, etc.) as well as for sonorous resonance (*canorus*, *clarus*, etc.).

In both language traditions there is a strong belief in the divine origin and inspiration of music, which gives it its dignity and splendor. Evaluation and criticism of composers and performers and their skill is present from the early

366. Hdt. 1.23–24 and Gell. 16.19, further in Pliny *NH* 9.8.28 and presented by August. *De civ. D.* 1.14 as an argument to belief in the biblical account about the prophet Jona rescued by a whale. About Arion in general and his “rescue” see Wille 1967, 553–555.

367. Although Pliny might have gotten something mixed up here, since it had been the *Delphians* who apparently appreciated the organ very much as reported from the Pythian Games in 90 BC (see West 1992, 380).

beginnings as evident from both descriptive terms as well as the institution of musical contests. Lastly, the quality of music is measured by a certain order or harmonious combination of the different musical elements. This will be a key point for the later theoretical discussion.

Characteristics of Negative Value

Now follow the characteristics that show music in a negative light.

Table 2–3. Terms of musical characterization—predominantly negative.

Greek/Latin	English	Senses	Attributed to	Effect	Sample Ref.
κακός/κακῶς	bad	v,c,x	Aeschylus s (Nero) a playing		Ar. <i>Ran.</i> 1249 ³⁶⁸ Philostr. <i>VA</i> 4.39 Ath. 624b
<i>malus</i> ³⁶⁹	unpleasant distressing, evil	x,a,c,f	s singing		Hor. <i>Sat.</i> 2.1.82, 153 ³⁷⁰ Plin. <i>Ep.</i> 3.18.9
κακότεχνος	being of bad art	x	s		Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 706d
κακόζηλος	having a bad style	x	s		Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 706d
<i>obscenus</i>	indecent	x,c	s v		Quint. 1.2.8 Juv. 11.174
<i>lascivus</i>	given to levity or frivolity	x,c	s s (Nero)		Ov. <i>Trist.</i> 5.1.15 Suet. <i>Ner.</i> 42.2 ³⁷¹
<i>procax</i>	undisci- plined, licentious	x	M chorus		Hor. <i>Carm.</i> 2.1.37 Tac. <i>Ann.</i> 11.31.2

368. Contrasting with what the chorus says right after: “ἀνδρὶ... κάλλιστα μέλη ποιήσαντι/the man who made the best melody” (1255).

369. The OLD has under “unpleasant for the senses” no example for sound (except under 5.c: for “insulting or abusive words”). A recitation of *mala carmina* is mentioned in Mart. 12.40.1, and even though singing is mentioned right after, what is bad is probably the text only.

370. Probably rather the content than the music itself.

371. “*carmina lasciveque modulata*/wantonly played songs.”

Greek/Latin	English	Senses	Attributed to	Effect	Sample Ref.
<i>luxurians</i>	reveling immoder- ately	x	<i>s/moduli</i>		Sid. Apoll. <i>Epist.</i> 9.13.2.18
<i>immoderatus</i>	immoder- ate	x,c	v		Cic. <i>Nat. D.</i> 2.49.149
αἰανής ³⁷²	wearisome	x	s s		Aesch. <i>Pers.</i> 636 637 Aesch. <i>Pers.</i> 941
ἀφόρμικτος, ἄλυρος, etc.	without the lyre		s (dirge) h (Erinyes)		Aesch. <i>Ag.</i> 990 Aesch. <i>Eum.</i> 332– 333, 345–346 ³⁷³ Eur. <i>IT</i> 145–146 Eur. <i>Phoen.</i> 1028 Eur. <i>Alc.</i> 447 Eur. <i>Hel.</i> 185
μέλεος	unhappy, miserable	x	s (cry, shriek) s		Aesch. <i>Supp.</i> 112 Ath. 14.643e
<i>miserabilis/</i> <i>miser</i>	pitiable, pathetic	x	sambuca s s s s s		Lucil. <u>27.733</u> ³⁷⁴ Ov. <i>Met.</i> 5.118 Verg. <i>Ecl.</i> 3.27 Hor. <i>Carm.</i> 1.33.2 Isid. <i>Etym.</i> 1.39.14 <i>Carm. Priapea</i> 68.15
<i>infelix</i> ³⁷⁵	unhappy, wretched	x	sambuca		Lucil. 27.733
<i>tristis</i>	depressed, gloomy, unhappy	x,v,c,t,s	a s		Prop. 2.7.12 Luc. 8.734
<i>maestus</i>	expressing grief, sad	x,c,v	<i>tubae</i>		Prop. 4.11.9

372. Originally: “eternal, everlasting, perpetual.”

373. It is not quite clear why LJS 192 speaks of this context in terms of “melancholy music”—frenzy and madness are quite different from melancholy.

374. “*Ardum, miserrimum atque infelix lignum*/dry, most wretched and unhappy wood.”

375. Literally “yielding nothing useful, unproductive,” then also “unlucky, ill-fated, unfortunate.”

Greek/Latin	English	Senses	Attributed to	Effect	Sample Ref.
μινυρός ³⁷⁶	whining		Lamprus		Ath. 2.44d
λυγρός	baneful, mournful	x,c	s (Phemius)	harrow heart	Hom. <i>Od.</i> 1.341 ³⁷⁷
ιάλεμος ³⁷⁸	lamenting	x,c	s (dirge)		Eur. <i>HF</i> 109
γοερός	mournful	x	s <i>aulos</i>		Eur. <i>Hec.</i> 84 Ath. 4.174f
πάνδυρτος	all-plaintive		s s (dirge) nightingale		Aesch. <i>Pers.</i> 941,944 Eur. <i>Hec.</i> 212 Soph. <i>El.</i> 1077
<i>flebilis</i>	plaintive, doleful	x	s (<i>modi</i>) <i>modi</i> c (<i>amans</i> <i>exclusus</i>) l/v trumpet s (<i>modi</i>) <i>modi</i>	sadness	Cic. <i>Tusc.</i> 1.44.106 Hor. <i>Carm.</i> 2.9.9 Ov. <i>Rem. am.</i> 36 Ov. <i>Met.</i> 11.52–53 Ov. <i>Her.</i> 12.140 Sen. <i>Hercules</i> <i>Oetaeus</i> 1091 Boethius <i>Cons.</i> 3.12c.7
βαρύς ³⁷⁹	heavy, deep	s,x,c	s (dirge)		Aesch. <i>Suppl.</i> 113 ³⁸⁰

376. Also applied to the chirping of young birds. The word here intends to insult the musician in a whole paragraph of invective. See for more on this passage in the comments below.

377. Although this is certainly more because of the content rather than to the song itself, and Telemachus makes an apology for the singer; cf. similar *Od.* 8.83–95 where the same songs elicit pleasure in the nobles of the Phaeacians (τέρποντ’ ἐπέεσσιν) while Odysseus weeps and groans, likewise 521–541 (538: “οὐ γάρ πως πάντεσσι χαρίζομενος τάδ’ αἶδει/” since it cannot be that he pleases all alike with his song,” tr. Lattimore).

378. Usually a noun (“dirge”) or else meaning “tedious, dull, stupid;” see also in Aesch. *Suppl.* 115; *Choeph.* 424 (the Cissian wailing woman/ιαλεμιστρια).

379. Most connotations with this term are negative, just to enumerate some definitions from LSJ 308: heavy to bear, burdensome, oppressive, causing disgust, unwholesome, with disgust, violent, severe, troublesome, overbearing, etc. It expresses “stong, offensive” smell (Hdt. 6.119). In music, it is a technical term for low pitch and in prosody for the grave accent, but I have not found any non-technical use in music; for speech it is often related to groaning (στεναχέω/στενάχω), e.g. Hom. *Il.* 18.323 (Achilles); *Od.* 8.95, 534 (Odysseus). Kaimio 1977, 228–230, describes the meaning with “low pitch, and, at the same time, the loudness of the sound, and, in addition, its terrifying, awe-inspiring or menacing character” and, applied (in compounds) to the *aulos*, less the pitch but “loudness and impressiveness.”

380. Here in contrast to “high” (λιγέα μέλεα). Both terms are certainly referring to pitch but, in the context of sobbing, also to the general character of the melody.

Greek/Latin	English	Senses	Attributed to	Effect	Sample Ref.
<i>gravis</i> ³⁸¹	low in pitch deep	x,c,s	a noise (trumpet) s (<i>bucina</i>)		Cat. 63.22 ³⁸² Sid. <i>Carm.</i> 5.408 Ennodius <i>Dictiones</i> 7.2
οὔλιος	baleful, deadly	x	s (dirge)		Pind. <i>Pyth.</i> 12.8 ³⁸³
δαίος	hostile, destructive	x,c	d/s/a	death	Eur. <i>HF</i> 889–897 ³⁸⁴
<i>letal</i>	deadly, fatal	x	s (priest)		Sen. <i>Thyestes</i> 692 ³⁸⁵
<i>letifer</i>	bringing death	x	s/ <i>bucina</i>		Corippus <i>Iohannidos</i> 2.250
<i>mortifer(us)</i>	bringing death	x	s (S)		Hier. <i>In Esaiam</i> 6.14 ³⁸⁶
<i>diabolicus</i> ³⁸⁷	devilish, diabolical	x	s		Caesarius Arelaten- sis, <i>Sermo</i> 303.3
ἐχθρός	hated, hateful	x,c	s (Hades)		Aesch. <i>Sept.</i> 870
στυγνός	hated, abhorred	x,c	s (paean)		Eur. <i>Trö.</i> 126 ³⁸⁸

381. The basic meaning is “heavy, weighty, ponderous”, also “causing heaviness, overwhelmed, rank, oppressive, relentless, grave, serious, venerable,” etc. As sound it also occurs in descriptions of dogs, water, and as technical term for the grave accent.

382. See more about this passage under *acutus*.

383. Athena weaves Gorgon’s θρήνος into something (better): a musical στέφανος. The image is continued in 12.19–21 where Athena imitates (μιμῶμαι) with “many-voiced song” (πάμφωνος μέλος) for pipes Euryale’s (one of the three sisters of Gorgon) “ἐρικλάγκταν γόον/loud-sounding wail, weep.”

384. This frenetic dance and *aulos* song, here without drums, accompanies slaughter and not the pressing of grapes—the destructive side of Dionysius.

385. “*Ipse est sacerdos, ipse funesta prece letale carmen ore violento canit*/He is the priest, he himself sings the deadly song with violent mouth in fatal prayer.”

386. Jerome draws the analogy between the Sirens and desire for pleasure “*quae dulci et mortifero carmine animas pertrahunt*/who with sweet and death-bringing song lure the souls.”

387. Not in the OLD but in LSJ.

388. At times the dramatists choose deliberate oxymora (with paean/hymn), cf. Barker GMW 1.85 n. 152.

Greek/Latin	English	Senses	Attributed to	Effect	Sample Ref.
στυγερός	hated, abominated	x	s d/s (M)		Hom <i>Od.</i> 24.200 ³⁸⁹ Aesch. <i>Eum.</i> 309 ³⁹⁰
δυσκέλαδος	ill-sounding		h (Erinyes) s		Aesch. <i>Sept.</i> 867 Eur. <i>Ion</i> 1098
<i>horrendus</i>	terrible	x,c	sound a		Liv. 5.37.8 Ov. <i>Fast.</i> 4.190
<i>horridus</i>	rough, dreadful	a,x,c	trumpet a (<i>buxus</i>)/s <i>bucina</i>		Stat. <i>Theb.</i> 4.342 Claud. <i>De raptu Proserpinae</i> 2.264 Corippus <i>Iohannidos</i> 2.250, 6.545
<i>horribilis</i>	inspiring fear/horror	x	s (barbarian a)		Cat. 64.264
<i>horrisonus</i>	making a dreadful noise		a (<i>buxus</i>)		Valerius Flaccus 2.583
<i>abhorrens</i>	repugnant	x,c	s (captives)		Curt. 6.2.5
<i>turpis</i>	repulsive, ugly	a,c,x	d singing s	ridicule	<i>Rhet. Her.</i> 4.60 August. <i>De vera religione</i> 47.90 Donat. <i>Interpretationes Ver- gilianae Aen.</i> 9.775 ³⁹¹
<i>taeter</i>	foul, horrible	x,a,c	v		Petron. <u>70</u>
<i>terribilis</i>	inspiring terror	x	trumpet trumpet trumpets trumpets		Enn. <i>Ann.</i> 140 Verg. <i>Aen.</i> 9.503 Ov. <i>Met.</i> 15.784 Claud. <i>Carm.</i> 17.181
<i>terrificus</i>	terrifying	x	prophets (s) trumpet		Verg. <i>Aen.</i> 5.524 Sil. 14.371

389. The song about Clytemnestra, because she caused her husband Agamemnon's death—also here what is hateful is the content rather than the melody, but the latter might possibly reflect that content.

390. This dance and song will be dreadful to the victim of the god.

391. The point is that musical science should not lead to ugly song but to brave deeds of men.

Greek/Latin	English	Senses	Attributed to	Effect	Sample Ref.
<i>terrisonus</i> ³⁹²	sounding terribly		trumpet		Sid. <i>Carm.</i> 5.408
<i>ferus</i> ³⁹³	aggressive fierce, ferocious	x,c	trumpet		Ov. <i>Fast.</i> 1.716 Corippus <i>Iohannidos</i> 1.512 ³⁹⁴
<i>saevus</i>	harsh, savage, ferocious	x,c,v,f	trumpet s		Sil. 14.371 Luc. 4.186
<i>trux</i>	savage, fierce	c,f,x	s (Gauls: war) s sound (Germans)		Liv. 5.37.8 Tac. <i>Hist.</i> 2.22 Tac. <i>Ann.</i> 1.65.1 ³⁹⁵
<i>minax</i>	menacing	x	Apollo Alcaeus	<i>terreo</i>	Hor. <i>Carm.</i> 1.10.10 Hor. <i>Carm.</i> 4.9.7 ³⁹⁶
φρενοδαλῆς ³⁹⁷	ruining the mind		h (Erinyes)	spell on soul	Aesch. <i>Eum.</i> 330, 343
ἀγλευκῆς	not sweet	t,c,x	v (citharist)		Philostr. <i>VA</i> 4.39
ἀνάρσιος	incongru- ous, hostile	x	s (καναχή)		Soph. <i>Trach.</i> 641
δυσκέλαδος	ill-sounding, shrieking	x	h (Erinyes) h s (Muse)		Aesch. <i>Sept.</i> 867 Eur. <i>Ion</i> 1090 Eur. <i>Ion</i> 1098 ³⁹⁸

392. Not in the OLD but in LSJ with one reference to Claudianus.

393. Originally for wild animals or uncivilized, rude people.

394. In contrast to the “sweet dreams” that the trumpet drives out of the hearts.

395. This is not necessarily musical sound even though the expression is preceded by “*laeto cantu.*”

396. According to Porphyrius this is more because of being *amarus* and *austeritate carminis*, in Campbell 1982 vol. 2, 229.

397. From δηλέομαι: “hurt, damage.”

398. This and the previous reference deal with songs telling of the evil deeds of women (usually) and now, reversed, of men—so the negativity is mostly in reference to the text.

Greek/Latin	English	Senses	Attributed to	Effect	Sample Ref.
<i>raucisonus</i>	hoarse-sounding		<i>bombus</i> (horns) s (horns)	<i>mino</i>	Cat. 64.263 Lucr. 2.619
ὄξύς ⁴⁰⁶	shrill, piercing	f,a	s s (Curses) <i>aulos</i>		Anacreontea 55.3 Aesch. <i>Sept.</i> 952 ⁴⁰⁷ Ath. 4.174f
ὄξύδουπος	sharp-sounding		cymbal		Anth. Pal. 6.94
ὄξύμολπος	clear-singing		dirge		Aesch. <i>Sept.</i> 1028 ⁴⁰⁸
ὄξύτονος ⁴⁰⁹	sharp-sounding, piercing			s s	Soph. <i>El.</i> 243 ⁴¹⁰ Soph. <i>Aj.</i> 630 ⁴¹¹
ὄξύφωνος	shrillvoiced		nightingale l, h (Lydian)		Soph. <i>Trach.</i> 963 Ath. 14.626a

406. The sound image associates animals (horses, pigs, birds of prey, nightingale, grasshopper) and metal. It is very frequently used in the technical literature in contrast to βαρύς to indicate high pitch; see also Kaimio 1977, 38–40, 227–228, and Barker 2002b, 27–31. Cf. further compounds such as ὄξυβόας/-βόης, ὄξύγοος, ὄξυηχής/-ός, ὄξυκώκυτος, ὄξυμελής, ὄξυπαραύδητος, ὄξύτης, ὄξύτόμος, ὄξύφωνος (and cognates); not all with a negative connotation. Kaimio (id. 227) observes that the contexts are negative, not aesthetically but “almost exclusively associated with the terrifying, painful or sad aspects of life: battle, menace, bad tidings, mental pain;” not necessarily of high pitch but “a piercing sound uttered in the grips of a vehement emotion of a negative character” (id. 228).

407. Here in a sense positive for the victorious evil; clearly negative in Aesch. *Pers.* 1058 (cries of wailing).

408. Even though the context is mourning, the lamentation appears somewhat positively because the point is the absence of a proper honorable funeral.

409. Also in the technical sense in reference to a high note and for the acute accent. Soph. *Phil.* 1093 uses it for a πνεῦμα.

410. “Wings of wailing,” not necessarily song.

411. Referring to a dirge; a further comparison is made to the lament of the nightingale.

Greek/Latin	English	Senses	Attributed to	Effect	Sample Ref.
ὄρθιος ⁴¹²	high-pitched, shrill	x	h melody	joy terror	Sappho 44.32 Aesch. <i>Ag.</i> 1153 ⁴¹³
πυκαεῖς/ πενκῆεις ⁴¹⁴	sharp, piercing	x	cry	threat	Aesch. <i>Cho.</i> 386–387
<i>acer</i> ⁴¹⁵	strident, shrill, harsh	a,c,x	s a <i>tubae</i>		Lucil. 30.1005 Hor. <i>Carm.</i> 1.12.2 Stat. <i>Silv.</i> 5.3.193
<i>acerbus</i>	harsh, strident, discordant	t,c,f,x	v v (rower)		<i>Rhet. Her.</i> 4.60 ⁴¹⁶ Sen. <i>Ep.</i> 56.5 ⁴¹⁷
<i>acidus</i> ⁴¹⁸	harsh-sounding, shrill	t,s,x	v		Petron. 31.6 Petron. 68.5
<i>stridulus</i>	sounding high pitched		<i>cornu</i> <i>s/cornu</i>		Verg. <i>Aen.</i> 12.267 Sen. <i>Oedipus</i> 734
<i>stridor</i> ⁴¹⁹	sequeak, creak		a/s a	pain	Verg. <i>Ecl.</i> 3.27 Calp. <i>Ecl.</i> 3.60
<i>tremulus</i> ⁴²⁰	tremulous, quavering	x,v	s/v v <i>s/bucina</i>		Hor. <i>Carm.</i> 4.13.5 Petron. 70 Corippus <i>Iohannidos</i> 2.250

412. This word usually means “straight up, steep, uphill, upright.” Kaimio 1977, 230–231, identifies the common use in the context of music as “loud;” the majority of contexts, also for speech and cries, is negative—the Sappho passage is rather an exception.

413. Chorus about Cassandra: “πόθεν...τὰ δ’ ἐπίφοβα δυσφάτω κλαγγᾷ μελοτυπεῖς ὁμοῦ τ’ ὄρθιοις ἐν νόμοις;/Whence do you strike up the terrible things with unutterable sharp sound together in piercing melodies?”

414. The association here is a pine (πενκή), possibly the sharp needle.

415. Literally “harp, pointed” similar to *acutus*, also “bright, bitter, strong; keen, shrewd, energetic,” etc. The sound characteristic is also used for wind, fire, cicadas. It is not always negative (cf. the Horace reference).

416. The whole passage is a contrast between the splendid appearance of a citharede and his terrible performance.

417. In the context of giving the *modos* (musical pattern) for the rowers on a ship.

418. Originally “tasting sour, bitter, tart, acid,” then also “unpleasant, disagreeable”

419. Among others, also for elephants, gnashing of teeth, cicadas, wind, door.

420. This term is also associated with “effeminate”: Quint. 11.3.91; the negative association emerges also in Quint. 11.3.55.

Greek/Latin	English	Senses	Attributed to	Effect	Sample Ref.
δύσφατος	unutterable		scream	terror	Aesch. <i>Ag.</i> 1152
δυσθρήνητος	loud-wailing		s (dirge)		Eur. <i>IT</i> 144 ⁴²¹
ἐρικλάγκτης ⁴²²	loud-sounding		s (weeping, Euryale)		Pind. <i>Pyth.</i> 12.21
άδινός ⁴²³	vehement, loud	x	lamentation (Achilles) groaning (id.) S		Hom. <i>Il.</i> 18.316 Hom <i>Il.</i> 23.225 ⁴²⁴ Hom <i>Od.</i> 23.326
ἀνάρμοστος	out of tune	v,c,x	melody (k)		Lucian <i>Ind.</i> 9
ἄσύντακτος	disorganized	x	melody (k)		Lucian <i>Ind.</i> 9
ἀπόμουσος	away from the Muses		v young man	laughter	Lucian <i>Ind.</i> 9 Lucian <i>Ind.</i> 12
φαῦλος ⁴²⁵	mean, bad	x,c	a (αὐλητρίς) a (αὐλητής) d		Pl. <i>Symp.</i> 215c Pl. <i>Prt.</i> 327b–c Ath. 631d
λεπτός ⁴²⁶	thin, weak	x,v,s	v	laughter	Lucian <i>Ind.</i> 9

421. “δυσθρηνήτοις ὡς θρήνοις/loud-wailing like dirges.”

422. ἐρι- (prefix to strengthen the sense, LSJ 687) & κλάζω (used for birds, dogs, arrows, wind, wheels, sea, cithara, *aulos*, men’s shouting).

423. Literally “close, thick” and “crowded, thronging,” applied to bees, flies, sheep; later also “deep;” for a further discussion of the term see Stanford 1969. It usually stands for a sound with shrill timbre (clearly seen from Hom. *Od.* 16.216–219, together with λιγυρός, in comparison with sea eagles or vultures deprived of their chicks, so the Murray’s literal rendering “thick and fast” misses the point here).

424. Murray translates with “unceasingly”, equally for *Od.* 223.326.

425. Most of the meanings given in LSJ 1919–1920 can be synthesized under “of inferior value,” with no direct applications to perception; the opposite in both *Symposium* and *Protagoas* is ἀγαθός (see above n. 249).

426. Also positive, e.g. Ar. *Av.* 235 (bird twitter).

Greek/Latin	English	Senses	Attributed to	Effect	Sample Ref.
<i>indoctus</i>	unlearned, ignorant		s s s		Verg. <i>Ecl.</i> 3.26–27 Prop. 2.34.84 Hor. <i>Epist.</i> 2.2.9
<i>barbarus</i>	ignorant, uncivilized	x,c	<i>plectra</i>	<i>con- fringo</i>	Ennodius <i>Carm.</i> 1.8.38 ⁴²⁷
<i>inconditus</i>	rough, crude	x,c,v	s (captives)		Curt. 6.2.5
<i>absurdus</i>	out of tune, discordant	x,c	<i>musicus</i>		Amm. 21.1.13 ⁴²⁸
<i>discors</i>	discordant	x	<i>symphonia</i>		Hor. <i>Ars P.</i> 374
<i>dissonus</i> ⁴²⁹	combining different sounds	x	s (Gauls: war) s (chorus) s (M)		Liv. 5.39.5 Columella 12.2.4 Mart.Cap. 2.209
θηλυδριώδης ⁴³⁰	effeminate	c	s (Agathon)		Ar. <i>Thesm.</i> 131
<i>infractus</i>	broken, effeminate	c,x	S		Sen. <i>Ep.</i> 90.19 (cf. 114.1)
μεταμανθάνω	learn differently		S		Aesch. <i>Ag.</i> 712 ⁴³¹

Bad, Immoral, and Immoderate

A direct negative moral judgment on music is, like a positive one, rarely expressed,⁴³² and even if it is, it is not usually clear whether what is referred to is the music itself,

427. The passage describes a contrast: “*confringunt dulces barbara plectra modos*/the barbarian plectra ruined the sweet tunes.”

428. The context is the looming death of Constantine, preceded by omens where all the experts fail: “*Grammaticus locutus est barbare... ignoravit remedium medicus*/the grammarian has spoken in a barbaric way... the doctor did not know remedy.”

429. This term does not necessarily possess the negative impression that arises in the Livy passage, but at times simply signifies different sounds, which, actually, may be combined into a harmonious whole, cf. Sen. *Ep.* 84.10 or Apul. *De mundo* 20; it is positive also in Mart. Cap.

430. From “θηλυς” = “female.”

431. Meant is a song changed from a joyful bridal tune to one full of lamentation (πολύθρηγος).

432. For the same reason as explained above for “good/beautiful,” attributes such as πονηρός, χαλεπός, κακοῦργος, φαῦλος, etc., do not seem to have music as their subject.

the text, or the general circumstance in which a performance occurs. However, it does seem that some musical patterns in themselves are apparently perceived as “indecent” or “frivolous” (e.g. Suet. *Ner.* 42.2 as quoted). As the references show, comments on musical decadence in literature (and not only by the theorists) intensify during Roman times and comes to a certain climax during the reign of Nero. Immoderation and excess belong to this category.

Sad, Mournful, and Miserable

Miserable music may be caused by the pitiful state of mind of the musician or by deplorable talent. As for the former—the latter will be discussed below at the end of “destructive and terrible”—, the most frequent “negative” use of music occurs in the context of sorrow or grief. But we should first note that such situations often times indicate precisely the *absence* of music (or at least of instrumental accompaniment), which in itself functions as a manifestation *e silentio* for the dreadfulness of the state of affairs.⁴³³ Even though some say that the Muse should not deal with sad business,⁴³⁴ we still find many examples throughout antiquity where dirges are solemnly performed and instruments express sad sound. What exactly gives music a plaintive character in the ancients’ ears we cannot tell—but we might perhaps get some idea if we listen to the melody of the nightingale, which served as a favored comparison for songs of mourning.⁴³⁵

433. As an example for unaccompanied song see Eur. *Alc.* 430–431; death is the culmination of the absence of music (Soph. *OC* 1220–1223: no wedding song, lyre, dance, cf. Soph. *Ant.* 810–816; in war (Ares): Aesch. *Supp.* 635, 678–683, Eur. *Phoen.* 784–791); the desire of being never Muse-less: Eur. *HF* 676; deprivation from musical delights also in Soph. *Aj.* 1199–1204. Cicero: no music at the funeral of his enemy Clodius (*Mil.* 32.86; cf. Luc. 8.734 about Pompey’s funeral: “[non] ut resonant tristi cantu fora); instruments fall silent as war is imminent: Dracontius *Romulea* 8.641–645. See also the OT: wailing should not have music: Si. 22:6 “μουσικά ἐν πένθει ἄκαιρος διήγησις/Musica in luctu importuna narratio/Song in mourning is (like) untimely talk;” NT: Apoc 18.22 (the devastation of Babylon; “the voice of kitharists and musicians and *aulētai* and salpinx players are not heard in her”—the first of a whole series of privations); cf. also Mt 11.17/Lk 7.32 (no dancing to *aulos* playing).

434. Ov. *Fast.* 4.83–84: “*Subprime, Musa, querelas! non tibi sunt maesta sacra canenda lyra!*”/Check the grievances, Muse! It is not yours to sing sad things with the sacred lyre!” (the translation by Frazer in LOEB 1931, instead of *maesta* making *sacra* the direct object, misses the point: “tis not for thee to warble sacred themes on mournful strings.”)

435. E.g. Aesch. *Supp.* 57–72; *Ag.* 1140–1148; Soph. *El.* 147–149; *Aj.* 624–631 (its “pitiable (οἰκτρὸς) lament” contrasted with human cry (αἰλινός) and “shrill-toned songs (ὄξυτοναι φῳδαί)”; Eur. *Hel.* 1107–1016; *Rhes.* 546–550. That the nightingale is not always associated with sorrow can be seen from the following references: Ar. *Av.* 1380; in Latin: Plaut. *Bacch.*

As mentioned above (p. 93), the distinction between officially mourning in a musical way and non-musical groans or cries is not always clear. Cries of lamentation appear synonymously with “song” as can be seen e.g. from Eur. *Phoen.* 1036–1042 (here also like thunder) and *Tro.* 148; terrors can be wrought into unutterable clamour and high-pitched melodies (Aesch. *Ag.* 1152–1153). Aeschylus in general employs the high-pitched soundpair λιγύς/λιγυρός for sad sounds (LSJ 1084), but the other extreme, deepness, can also carry some connotation to a sorrowful groaning, in both the Greek βαρύς and the Latin *gravis*.⁴³⁶ Both pitches are combined in Aesch. *Supp.* 112–113: “τοιαῦτα πάθεα μέλεα θρεομένα λέγω λιγέα βαρέα δακρυοπετῇ/I utter such pitiful shrieked melodies, shrill, deep, making tears fall.”

Destructive and Terrible

The most obviously negative effect music can have is when it is put to the service of direct damage and destruction, even death. The ecstatic and frenetic musical rituals connected to Dionysius/Bacchus or Cybele (especially by the Corybantes), the latter of Phrygian origin, can lead to devastating madness.⁴³⁷ Drums, *aulos*, and high-pitched hoarse yells to particular rhythms and dance movements encite a spectacle that transmits horror and fear. In addition to the attributions listed in the table, we find that the tragedians⁴³⁸ make frequent use of such devices, e.g. when in Aesch. *Eum.* 329–333 the Erinyes erupt into a madness, “without *phorminx*,” that makes mortals “wither,” or when a maddening death-dance precedes a catastrophe (Eur. *HF* 871–899).⁴³⁹ Ill-sounding music expresses anger against the other sex (Eur. *Ion*

38 (comparison with a songstress), Petron. 68 (to be imitated by slave), Pliny *NH.* 10.29.81, Lactant. *De opificio dei* 10.15. Barker 2004 explores the history of changing nightingale descriptions and how Aristophanes seems to use it for a musical parody of the “New Music.”

436. E.g. Hor. *Carm.* 4.9.8 (with reference to Stesichorus); low is connected with sadness: Stat. *Theb.* 6.120–122: “*cum signum luctus cornu grave mugit adunco tibia, cui teneros suetum producere manes lege Phrygum maesta*”—supposedly softening up the spirits of the dead (*manes*).

437. Eur. *Bacch.* contains numerous descriptions of Dionysian music but without corresponding epithets. For a detailed description based on mostly Latin sources see Wille 1967, 53–56 (Bacchus) and 56–62 (Cybele)—of course, the worshippers themselves would not have classified their rites as negative, but most of the authors describing them did (especially in Plautus, Tibullus, Ovid—for references see Wille 1967, 59–60). About the relationship between music and trance in Greek music and rites see Rouget 1985, 187–226. I disagree with some of his conclusions but this cannot be discussed here.

438. We have to exclude Sophocles for the most part who is generally sparse in music descriptions.

439. *Aulos* and dance elicit fear. (“χορεύσω καὶ καταυλήσω φόβω”) and frenzy. Notice the contrasting silence after the terrible deed: *ibid.* 926–930.

1090–1098; *Med.* 419–427), but can also be related to the topic of mourning (as in Aesch. *Pers.* 633–639; *Sept.* 854–874). “Not well-sounding song” (“οὐκ εὐφωνος”—“οὐ γὰρ εὖ λέγει”) stands at the origin of crime and doom where the hymn is the first sin (πρώταρχος ἄτη) (Cassandra about the Erinyes in Aesch. *Ag.* 1186–1192).⁴⁴⁰ A fearful heart prompts Orestes to sing and dance in grudge/rancor/ill-will (“κότος”) (Aesch. *Cho.* 1024–1025). Dionysian rage is it which causes the death of Orpheus, torn into pieces by Maenads (so in Apollod. *Bibl.* 1.3.2) or, according to Vergil (*Georg.* 4.520–527) and Ovid (*Met.* 11.1–53; cf. Lucian *Ind.* 11; Paus. 9.30.5), by Thracian women who with their orgies overpower Orpheus’ musical defenses.⁴⁴¹ In other contexts, tunes are perceived negative for being the forebearer of some looming evil (e.g. in war, here mostly the trumpet, battle songs, or Aiakides’ war-cry in Hom. *Il.* 217–224) or the consequence of it (see e.g. n. 389 above). Occasionally, the terror inflicted by musical sound can also have a positive outcome: Triton saves himself from the giants by blowing into a snail-shell (Hyg. *Poet. astr.* 2.23).

Obviously, “horrible” can also be the characteristic of bad musical style or performance: both Greek and Latin authors assemble quite an arsenal for musical invective (some of these terms appear in other sections of our table).⁴⁴² A recurrent Latin term, mostly for wind instruments, is *raucus*, implying a mostly (but not in all contexts) negative tone. Music in early (Roman) times is described as rather rough and crude (cf. Ov. *Ars am.* 1.111–114; AQ 2.6 61.26ff).

It is significant for our later discussion that many of the adjectives in this section apply also to human character or behavior, the quality of which is transferred onto music. Frequently they can also describe negative perception from the other senses.

Piercing, Harsh, and Shrill

These attributes specify “bad” sound in terms of acuteness, but even though the pitch level could be similar to what “λίγυς” etc. indicates, the terms here appear in clearly negative context, again either in tragedy or as examples of a horrifying or simply repulsive effect. “ὄξύς” and related words aim at a piercing sound (metallic, like a cymbal) with clearly unpleasant connotations.

440. See GMW 1.72 n. 64 on the difference between “σύμφθογγος” and “οὐκ εὐφωνος” in this passage.

441. More on the different versions about the death of Orpheus see n. 5 *ad loc.* by Frazer in his translation (1921). Wille 1967, 551, comments: “Thus, Orpheus has perished as representative of the Apollonian music.”

442. Timotheus, for instance, rants against the “shrieks of shrill and loud-voiced criers” of the “ancient-music-wreckers” (μουσοπαλαιολύμας, Timoth. *Pers.* 216–217, tr. GMW 1.96); for Latin examples: Verg. *Ecl.* 3.26–27; Calp. *Ecl.* 3.55–60; 6.22; Horace ridicules bad performance in *Carm.* 3.15.13–14; 4.13.4–8.

Loud

Even though this section is very small, I separated these few words from the others because they single out volume as the disturbing element, and almost always connected to lamentation.

Ignorant and Discordant

The table concludes with a series of terms that are somewhat related to the roughness mentioned above under “terrible,” but in this case the point is not the timbre directly but the “barbaric” or “unlearned” quality of song or instrumental play. Except for the Lucian passage, there are mostly Latin words, and much concerns criticism of the musicians. Under “miserable,” for instance, we already quoted Phrynichus Comicus 69 (in Ath. 2.44d) who slanders the musician Lamprus as “μινυρὸς ὑπερσοφιστής” (“a whining arch-Sophist”), “Μουσῶν σκελετός” (“a dried body of the Muses”), “ἁηδόνων ἡπίαλος” (“an agree for songstresses/nightingales”) and, worst of all, a “ὕμνος Ἄιδου” “hymn of Hades”—and all this just because he was a “water-drinker.” Aristophanes has Aeschylus and Euripides mock each other extensively in the *Frogs*⁴⁴³ and takes on Agathon as well (in *Thesm.* 100–212, for being womanish). Horace elaborates on technical mistakes of musicians⁴⁴⁴ who, according to Martial, could then be thrown out of the theater, despite the magic power, which the cithara would normally have.⁴⁴⁵

Dangerous

This last section, in a way, takes up again what was said above under “destructive,” but with a particular twist. There is music that is apparently good, being attractive,

443. Against Aeschylus especially in Ar. *Ran.* 907–933; 1249–1250 (for repetitiveness); against Euripides 1296–1369 (for mixing genres, rhythms, etc.); see also West 1992, 352–354 and nn. 118, 122, 123, 130).

444. Ars P. 347–350: “*Sunt delicta tamen quibus ignovisse velimus; nam neque chorda sonum reddit quem volt manus et mens, poscentique gravem persaepe remittit acutum, nec semper feriet quodcumque minabitur arcus.*”/However, there are faults that we should want to pardon; for neither does the string produce the sound which hand and mind intend, and quite often it gives a high note to the one seeking a low, nor will the bow always strike what is indicated.” At 374, Horace mentions the offense of *symphonia discors* when something better is expected *gratas inter mensas*; also Venantius Fortunatus in *Carm.* 2.9.3–6: “*en stupidis digitis stimulat is tangere cordas...*”/behold, to touch strings with senseless stimulated fingers ...”

445. Mart. 14.166: “*De Pompeiano saepe est eiecta theatro quae duxit silvas detinuitque feras*”/From the theater in Pompeii often has been expelled that which has lead woods and detained wild beasts.”

and yet proves harmful. The Sirens,⁴⁴⁶ female bird-monsters with human heads and enticingly beautiful voices, lure with seductive “sounds”⁴⁴⁷ humans to their island and then have them perish there. Their song is characterized as “sweet,” “honey-voiced,” or also “clear/high-pitched”⁴⁴⁸—at any rate, the quality of the song is undisputed. Homer’s account is fascinating in that “resourceful Odysseus” finds a way to enjoy the beauty and avoid the harm, while others were even able to surpass them (see above n. 90; also Alcman 1.98: “more melodious than Sirens”) or make them fall silent, as Daphnis does in Sil. 14.471–473. Hence, the danger here comes not from the music as such but from a particular situation in which music is employed as bait in a trap. Nevertheless, throughout antiquity and Christianity, the Sirens’ song is emblematic for the pernicious effect of deceitful attraction.⁴⁴⁹ Sound charming and seductive⁴⁵⁰ is related to deceitful speech or superficiality.⁴⁵¹ Christian writers sometimes suspected that a sweet voice or a high pitch could actually damage the soul (e.g. Hieron. *Ep.* 107, 4–9; 128.4.3). In general, the idea of musical enchantment, be it seen in a positive or negative light, is widespread.⁴⁵²

446. Meaning here those mentioned in Hom. *Od.* 12.39–54, 183–198 (cf. also Ov. *Ars Am.* 3.311–314; Sil. 12.33–6), not the celestial ones who, according to Pl. *Resp.* 617b, produce the harmony of the spheres; both cannot be identical.

447. Barker in GMW 1.31 n. 37 points out that the word used in Homer (φθόγγος) does not specify the exact nature of the music, although it is usually assumed that the Sirens are producing vocal song. According to Claud. *De raptu Proserpinae* 3.257 they used lyres (“*in pestem vertere lyras*”), on some depictions even *auloi* (cf. Wille 1967, 541). Cicero suggests that rather curiosity and content of the Sirens’ songs attracted sailors, not the music (*Fin.* 5.18.49). Wille (ibid.) points out that Cicero is alone with this hardly convincing view. Others rather emphasize the magic behind the song (e.g. Pliny *NH* 30.2.5–6).

448. See all the references in the table marked with an “S” in the column “attributed to” and n. 349 above.

449. “Allegorized (...) as representing the lusts of the flesh, the insatiable desire for knowledge, the dangers of flattery” (OCD 1413; cf. Wille 1967, 542).

450. This concept is also frequent in other contexts, e.g. Aesch. *PV* 173: “μελιγλώσσοις πειθοῦς ἐπαιδαῖσιν/with honey-tongued incantations of persuasion.”

451. Cf. Quint. 5.8.1; Petr. 127; Maxim. *Eleg.* 5.19f. The Romans used to depict a battle between Muses and Sirens in which the Sirens represented corrupting music (so then referred to in Hieronymus *In Esaiam* 6.14) and the Muses purifying harmony (see Wille 1967, 542, along with symbolic use of the Sirens’ song in other contexts and a positive transformation of this paradigm to explain the yearning for eternal life).

452. See GMW 1.90 n. 185 with references for ἐπαιίδω (erroneously transliterated “epaidein”), ἐπαιοιδή/ἐπωδή (spell) and ἐφυνμένω. Also the verb κηλέω would have to be considered (especially in Lucian, *Imagines* 14 (see above n. 332); Eur. *Alc.* 359 (to charm like Orpheus); Pl. *Lysis* 206b (here is implied words and songs should actually rather be used to “charm” than to “make savage” (ἐξαγριαίνω)—the contrary of which would amount to “πολλή

Conclusion

“Negative” music is usually not characterized as negative in that it is evil in itself or leads directly to evil consequences but rather due to some association with a negative circumstance (anything that could be the reason for wailing: death, defeat, any sort of catastrophe, menacing armies announced by the sound of the trumpet, etc.). Sometimes it is not easy to determine whether the passage is referring to music at all, and not simply to sounds such as shrieking, sighing, or groaning. Greeks and Romans show a general preference for mellow-“sweet” sound with a certain tendency to appreciate higher pitch rather than lower, but they find extreme shrillness and harsh timbre disturbing.

The absence of (enjoyable) music usually indicates an adverse situation or a lessened joy. Thus Pindar writes that the joy over the toil of good deeds is short-lived if one goes to Hades without a song (Pind. *Ol.* 10.91–93).⁴⁵³ The presence of music, on the other hand, is generally a sign of goodness and even more than this seems to be incompatible with moral evil. Pindar begins his first Pythian Ode contrasting the charm of the Muses with the terror which their music inflicts upon those who are evil, “for whom Zeus has no love”.⁴⁵⁴

There are only three significant instances (which will remain prevalent throughout antiquity) in which music takes up a negative value: the context of sorrowful wailing (in both the epic and the tragic genre), the destructive frenzy of Bacchic dance-song, and the ambivalence of the Sirens’ chant, which, though itself extremely beautiful, represents a deadly danger due to its deceitful attraction. At times a negative judgment is cast on musicians who display a lack of moderation or talent in their composition or performance or whose style does not meet the standards of tradition.

At the end of the *Odyssey*, Penelope receives much praise as Odysseus’ prudent and loyal wife through the mouth of the deceased king Agamemnon. Her honor will be made perennial by a “gracious” song composed by the immortal gods. The king’s thoughts then turn to his own wife and murderer, Clytemnestra, for which

ἀμουσία”); *Prt.* 315a–b (Protagoras, enchanting with his voice like Orpheus), cf. Lucian *Ind.* 12 (Neanthus trying to enchant [in addition, the verb καταθέλω is used] like Orpheus on his very lyre; see more at n. 330); “κηλεῖται αἰοδαῖς” Archilochus at Phld. *Mus.* 1.32 D49.38.

453. This reference, however, seems to aim more at the fame perpetuated through sung poetry than at the joy music itself can provide, but it is possible that both aspects are meant.

454. Pind. *Pyth.* 1.1ff, taken up again in 97–98 where virtuous Croesus is opposed to the cruel tyrant Phalaris for whom there are no lyres and boys’ voices. Cf. about this also GMW 1.55. See also in the OT: Am 5.23 and Ez 26.13 (God does not want to hear songs or the harp because of moral evil committed by the people); Is 24.8–9.

he prophecies the fate of a “hateful” song because of her evil deeds (κακά ἔργα).⁴⁵⁵ The character of a song ought to correspond to the good or evil deeds of which it tells. Morality and aesthetics are harmonized in the divine Muse.

In order to appreciate the ancients’ approach to the value of music, we first reviewed the functions music exerts within antiquity and then collected positive or negative descriptions for music and its effects by means of characteristics (epithets) given to various musical parameters, including direct literary accounts of the impact that music has on those who either perform or listen to it. We have been able to identify Greek and Roman preferences in aesthetical categories, their keenness in artistic criticism, and manifold examples for profitable or detrimental musical features. We were also able to perceive various causes which the authors indicate for the positive or negative effects: divine origin, knowledge or skill, and moderation produce “good” song; evil forces, ignorance, frenzy, deceit, discord, and the lack of moderation lead to “bad” song. With this empirical material in place, we now move on to study the theoretical discussions of the value of music in the ancient authors.

455. Hom. *Od.* 24.197–201: “τεύξουσιν δ’ ἐπιχθονίοισιν ᾠοιδὴν ἀθάνατοι χαρίεσσιν ἐχέφρονι Πηνελοπείῃ, οὐχ ὥς Τυνδαρέου κόρη κακά μῆσατο ἔργα, κουρίδιον κτείνασα πόσιν, στυγερὴν δέ τ’ ᾠοιδὴν ἔσσειτ’ ἐπ’ ἀνθρώπους/But the immortals will make for the people of earth a thing of grace in the song for prudent Penelope. Not so did the daughter of Tyn-dareos fashion her evil deeds, when she killed her wedded lord, and a song of loathing will be hers among men...” (tr. Lattimore). Pindar develops a similar idea according to which a good hymn is fitting recompense for a virtuous king (*Pyth.* 2.14) in contrast to a not virtuous one: *Pyth.* 1.95–98: Croesus vs. Phalaris).

The Impact and Value of Music According to Ancient Theorists

Introduction

Prefatory Remarks

In the first Pythian Ode Pindar evokes the lyre of Apollo, reminding us that music is god-given, and hated by the beings to whom the love of Zeus does not extend. Music soothes, cheers and pacifies; it threatens the power of the monsters, who live by violence and lawlessness. Those lonely, antinomian beings are astounded by music, which speaks of another order of being—the order, which “the footstep hears, as the dance begins”. It is this very order that is threatened by the monsters of popular culture.¹

What Roger Scruton says here about ancient Greece, he means for our time. But indeed, the Greeks fought their own battle about “good” and “bad” music. Tastes and artistic preferences differ, and change is natural and necessary for any development of culture. But aesthetics cannot always remain neutral. A piece of music, like any piece of art or literature, happens within the cultural context of politics, philosophy, and religion, and any such piece may either promote or obstruct certain ideas, values, and objectives. As the ancients become increasingly conscious of

1. Scruton 1997, 504.

the capacity of music to move the human heart, due to its deep emotional impact, they begin to reflect on the moral value of the effect that these psychic motions, with their influence on the intellect, could or should have, since the emotional state is an important factor in human dispositions and actions. Thus the aesthetic judgment is complemented by an ethical perspective: the stimulation, preservation, and transmission of values as expressed in attitudes (virtues) and behavior. Both dimensions are interdependent; hence, a change on the aesthetic level will make those concerned with the well-being of their socio-political-cultural reality alert, since this could have ethical implications for other areas of society. Plato, for instance, would argue that a city-state would find it difficult to defend itself against aggressors if young men's characters become feeble and slack because they are exposed to tunes that render them melancholic and "soft." He would also argue that discipline and hard work or even an environment of dignity and respect could be undermined by a musical culture that invites to licentiousness and sensuality, accustoming the young people to violate time-honored laws.

However, the underlying assumption that certain music may actually dispose and lead people "to either constructive or destructive actions or reactions in the interior or exterior of the person" (see above p. 45) begs justification and proof. Behind it lurks the still deeper question of how to explain this nexus between musical stimuli and ethos. Is it possible, and if so, on what grounds, to identify a particular ethos, such as "vigor" or manliness, in a particular musical phenomenon such as rhythm or pitch? And why do these resonate with or create a definite ethos in the human soul and its emotions? Ancient authors attempted to offer various, at times stunning, solutions to resolve this mystery, with a varying degree of penetration and success.

In the current chapter, I shall present provide an overview of the extant material, along with some bibliographical information concerning primary and secondary texts, which relates to how the various ancient authors illustrated, explained or discussed the effect and value of music. The scope of this work does not allow a full review of the scholarly work about each of these authors and their texts; I am limiting myself to consider for the most part commentaries and analyses offered by specialists in the area of ancient music. The sources belong to very different genres—comedy, dialogue, letters, historiography, treatise, and even biblical commentary. Some write in an anecdotal context, others offer extensive theoretical reflection. They belong to a period extending over nearly a thousand years, but within their "schools," they show in general a noteworthy continuity. The further down we go in history, the more complex and mixed the material tends to be from which the writers draw.

Given the great range of possible applications of ethos in society, it is not surprising that the various authors argue with political, social, aesthetical, moral,

religious, even metaphysical reasons, each author weighing them according to his own perspective and world-view. At the same time, many of these views are inter-related, build on each other, and have common points of departure. By choosing to review the authors one by one, I am aware that there will be some repetitions of ideas. I hope, however, that such repetitions will serve to aid a nuanced grasping of the most common arguments.

I have grouped the various authors, forty-three in total, according to certain common principles or overarching themes. Within each section, the authors will usually be presented in chronological order. I deliberately decided against a fully continuous chronological treatment because the interconnectedness of authors and the evolution of thought in a similar string of tradition across the centuries can better be associated and compared in a systematic arrangement. In any case, a table at the end of this introduction allows a chronological overview of all the authors, and the general historical development is already laid out, at least in summarized form, in Abert, Anderson, and in the works quoted in the section above on “Musical Ethos.”

Before we begin the extensive journey through the ancient history and theory of musical ethos, I shall first offer a summary vision of the whole and thereby explain the rationale behind the groups into which the writers have been divided up.

Preliminary Survey of Authors and Currents

It seems that the question about the effect of music coincides with a rather radical transformation of musical style in Greece during the late fifth century BC. While some earlier innovations had been met with benevolent acceptance, **Aristophanes** is the first one who takes to task what he and others now see as a degeneration. In his eyes, the promoters of the “New Music” betray the beauty, simplicity and dignity of the older compositions for the sake of showy effects and novelty. It is mostly through later authors such as **pseudo-Plutarch** and **Athenaeus** that we hear about the conflicts arising at the time in Sparta, Athens, and elsewhere between adherents to the tradition and the innovators who are accused, among other things, of relaxed and feeble musical features, the muddling of styles, and the break with other conventions. All this is seen as undermining the classical ideals of education (*paideia*); indirectly we sense, therefore, that the ethos-creating function of music is already taken for granted. The deviations are identified in the critiques as “feminizing,” soft, vulgar, licentious, irrational, and lawless, whereas the traditional music, characterized as “good”, is claimed to uphold the “proper measure,” moderation, manliness or severity, and even to have beneficial therapeutic effects. In Roman times, **Cicero** and **Quintilian** are the most outspoken critics of changes in musical styles, comparing them with similar trends in oratory and

associating both with cultural ethical decay at large. Others decry musical eccentricism and dilentantism, especially under the emperor Nero.

At the origin of a systematic philosophical discussion of music stand the cosmic observations and speculations attributed to the **Pythagoreans**. Their purported interest in mathematics and astronomy leads them to draw parallels between the order in the cosmos, in music, and that found within the human soul. Music is seen as harmonizing opposites and as capable of establishing “proper order” through consonance. Hence, it also provides a means for them to improve therapeutically the state of mind and body—if the anecdotic accounts of later authors correctly report such practices. The Neo-Pythagorean Iamblicus states, perhaps under Platonic influence, that music may also lead the soul into an ecstatic experience of divine presence within the cosmic harmonies. **Damon**, a musician and possibly an educator of Pericles, develops for the first time a complete system of musical patterns (*harmoniai*) and rhythms, recognizes positive or negative ethical value in them, and envisions their political and educational relevance, apparently without a cosmological backdrop. **Plato** quotes Damon directly on this point as he endeavors to censure literary texts and musical parameters (*harmoniai*, rhythms, and instruments) according to the education most suitable for the guardians and citizens of his ideal State. This education proceeds by means of the proper “tuning” of the various parts of the soul; according to Plato, the three areas of (literary) content, (musical) expression, and the soul all need to reflect the same ethos as appropriate to the context (age, gender, profession, etc.). Plato attributes to music high pedagogical value. It has a powerful influence upon the soul, and thus frequent exposure to good (appropriate) music can help to form the proper ethos. More importantly still, studying harmonical theory serves as a *praecambulum* for philosophy that allows one to “tune” into cosmic harmony and thus acquire wisdom, that true appreciation of what is good and beautiful, as well as a proper criterion of judgment related to the value of various forms of soniferous music. The structural parallelism of proportions between the elements of the cosmos, of the soul, and of music accounts for their mutual convertibility, and this is what allows music to induce ethos through *mimēsis*. With these ideas, we have in Plato the first comprehensive view of musical ethos, which, even if not yet fully systematic or complete, has had a lasting impact on all later theories.

Plutarch’s sporadic reflections on musical ethos build on Plato’s views with slight alterations. Music is able to create positive states of mind which, according to Plutarch, the Spartans under Lycurgus have applied practically. Reason and restraint are to be sought, whereas excesses ought to be avoided for their corrupting effect. In addition, there should always be text sung with the instruments. While Plato rejects the *aulos* completely, here it is admitted within certain limits. Good music contributes to the virtues of “manliness” and austerity. “Bad” music,

on the other hand, leads to crudeness and moral decline and is considered to be aesthetically deplorable as well, with the one exception of an artistically well-crafted representation of evil content, but only insofar as it remains clearly labeled as such. **Strabo** briefly exposes similar ideas, emphasizing the connection between divine and good human music (harmony), which is transmitted through education but also can get corrupted. **Nicomachus** develops an astronomic-mathematical theory in which music is a quasi-living being; the harmonic principle gives matter (e.g. a string) a divine value. As in Plato, the cosmos, music, and the soul function according to similar mechanisms. **Ptolemy** manages to combine the Pythagorean mathematics of cosmically derived rational harmonic proportions with the empirical reality of actual music, assuring the highest degree of perfection and beauty. Harmony as due proportion and rational movement mediates between matter and form, God and nature. Ptolemy does not hesitate to assign precise equivalences and apparently even causality between elements such as proportions, musical intervals, and virtues with their practical applications—for the latter he draws explicitly from the alledged Pythagorean therapeutical practices. Harmony (good tuning) finds a direct correspondence in virtue, and disharmony (bad tuning) in vice. He (or a later author) adds some astrological speculations about the relationship between the ethical value of music and the planets, along with male or female attributions that are taken up later by other authors. An answer to the exact reason why music should evoke specific emotions and *ethē* remains elusive. The Neoplatonic philosopher **Plotinus** describes the universe as harmonious but as such composed of divergent elements where even “bad/evil” things or sounds, in their way, are “good” for the whole, since both good (consonance) and evil (dissonance) are needed in their own way. As in earlier authors, these cosmic principles account for music’s influence on the (irrational) soul. We find no pedagogical system derived from this here; at best, music is again a stepping stone for the higher lore of philosophy, leading towards the Good/Beautiful through “good” music which follows cosmic harmony.

With Plotinus, we have reached the end of the line of authors more closely related to the Pythagorean-Platonic tradition, even though the now following authors certainly also owe it much despite that, in general, they take a different approach. This other line begins with Plato’s disciple **Aristotle**. Even though he remains committed to the general objective of *paideia* in his *Politics* and distinguishes proper from improper musical features for this purpose, he widens the horizon by paying more attention to other applications of music, especially the homoeopathic or cathartic transformation of an inordinate emotional state in adults. More clearly than in Plato, musical ethos is linked to specific contexts or groups of human beings (e.g. age or social state) within which some *ēthē* are good or proper, others bad or improper. That music elicits enjoyment is acknowledged

more positively, whereas the proper value judgment remains relegated to understanding and experience. His highest ideal is the contemplative-relaxed or even aesthetical appreciation of music in the state of an enlightened *otium*. Overall, Aristotle is less deductive than inductive in his method, by rejecting cosmological speculations and focusing more on the observation of the real life of people. At the same time, apart from the continued use of the concept of *mimēsis*, he does not engage in explaining the deeper workings of musical ethos. Some illustration of how *mimēsis* is thought to function can be drawn from the (post-)Aristotelian writings *De audibilibus* and the *Problemata*. According to the latter, music communicates ethos through the movement of sound in sequential pitch change and rhythm which resembles extra-musical behavior. Elsewhere, the *Problemata* identify a nature-given (but not cosmologically induced) preference for order and balance or consonance within mixed realities and movements, especially after a previous dissonance, as a reason for musical enjoyment. Appropriateness, and hence enjoyment, emerges further from the balance between voice and accompaniment and between melodic ethos and the characters of a tragic play. The emphasis on enjoyment, an aesthetical category, is striking as an overarching pattern within a series of individual observations in this context.

Two of Aristotle's disciples continue in different directions. **Theophrastus** seems to reject the idea of musical ethos shaping human character while accepting its power to relate to emotion and to bring about healing, however not in a quantitative way (as the Pythagoreans saw it) but according to tone qualities. **Aristoxenus**, on the other hand, despite being reluctant in identifying ethos in individual musical parameters, draws for the first time attention to the ethos of the musical piece as a whole. For this ethos to be appropriate and beautiful, both composition and performance need to reflect the emotional thrust (*pathos*) intended by the composer. Judging ethos is based more on perception than theoretical knowledge—as fitting to the empirical tradition—, but the final goal is still, as in Plato, philosophy.

Polybius, even though not a philosopher, belongs to the “empirical” approach because he contributes a historical example to illustrate the benefit of musical education for a whole population, changing their character against adverse natural dispositions into truly civilized human beings. A complete failure of music providing positive character motivates **Dio Chrysostom's** discourse to the Alexandrians, accusing them for their excessive reactions and use of music which, at the same time, displays a degenerate taste and reflects the vulgar character present in all areas of city life. Back in the field of theory, from **Cleonides** we learn three melodic styles that represent particular *ēthē*, and **Dionysius of Halicarnassus** indicates, parallel to literary style, necessary ingredients for enjoyment, which are good melody and rhythm, variety, and appropriateness, for all of which people

have a natural “feel.” He also identifies letters, syllables, and words which carry a particular ethos to express certain content—the same concept will be applied later by others to music—but he also establishes the priority of melody over speech (not content). Negative ethos seems to be proper to express negative content, but in general positive, noble, and balanced expressions are preferred as enjoyable and beautiful. His principle of variety—which had encountered Plato’s utmost suspicion—is further confirmed by a text from the corpus ascribed to **Hippocrates**: the greatest variety produces the best harmony and with it the greatest delight. The last author in this section, **Philostratus**, briefly takes up a point made by Aristoxenus, that the powerful harmonizing effect of an instrument stems from the combination of all the various musical parameters, to which the skill of the musician is added.

Most of the advantages and influences ascribed to music by the authors mentioned so far are being put into question or outrightly denied by some writers of the Epicurean (or Skeptic) philosophical tradition. While Theophrastus and Aristoxenus already moved away from the educational ambitions of musical ethos, the following authors dismiss any “utility” or ethical force of music apart from the area of aesthetics or enjoyment. The anonymous **Hibeh Papyrus** ridicules incompetent music theorists and intends to disprove, exactly opposite to Polybius, the shaping of a people’s ethos by a counterexample. **Philodemus** presents a much more detailed critique, mostly directed against the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon but indirectly against many other authors, of all sorts of advantages that may single out music over other disciplines and make it “useful.” According to him, the alleged effects of music truly belong to the text or other factors, and he sees no interdependence between cosmos, music, and the soul, not even on the level of *mimēsis*. Consequently, music is irrelevant for education and even more for the benefit of the State. **Sextus Empiricus** repeats a good number of points brought forth by Philodemus. Valuable is his doubt about the subjectivity or universal objectivity of musical ethos and effect. In rejecting music’s capacity to change states of mind, he seems less strict as Philodemus by allowing for a negative impact. Music is rather the consequence than the cause of emotional imbalance and not necessary for a harmonized soul and, thus, happiness, or even philosophy. He presents a long (and rather eccentric) list of corresponding human and musical *ēthē* just to say that he does not agree with any such correspondence. The argumentative value of these three contributions is limited, but the still unresolved questions of how music can have ethos and move the human soul or how the cosmos and music are related are justly raised and may have triggered later authors to resolve them.

Before getting to the last stage of theoretical development, the contribution of classical Latin authors should be considered, beyond what they had to say in the context of the debate on the “New Music.” **Cicero** is familiar with the Epicurean

contempt towards music, but his own opinion aligns rather with Plato's, especially in his concern for the moral impact of music on the State, even though he entertains the possibility of a converse causality in that, rather than bad music corrupting society, a corrupt society may attract bad musical ethos. He also owes Plato (or the Pythagoreans) the idea of the harmony of the spheres which he explores to re-establish the connection between cosmic and human music and as a metaphor for unity in art, society, or the soul. The image of a unified choir is also used by the **Younger Seneca** to illustrate the union of knowledge and builds upon the Pythagorean musical soul therapy. **Quintilian** shows, as a rhetorician, a great appreciation for the effect of music which he sees similar, at times even parallel, to oratory; for this reason, he wishes the students to be formed in it to learn an emotionally supported delivery of ideas. He also incorporates the Pythagorean cosmology and conception of harmony as a concord of dissimilar things.

A few minor authors appear towards the end of antiquity, most of whom depend on the Pythagorean tradition: **Censorinus**, unimpressed or unaware of the skeptics of musical ethos, re-introduces the whole range of practical musical achievements and ties them all back to the harmonious cosmic ratios, in terms of Cicero's harmony of the spheres, which influence human life and, what he is particularly interested in, human birth. **Aphthonius** emphasizes the natural character of music and considers the emotions, like Theophrastus, to be at the origin of music, together with divine inspiration. His thoughts are more aesthetically motivated and detached from ethical or cosmological considerations. **Calcidius**, for this part, goes back to Plato's *Timaeus* and sees in music the natural remedy for the human soul to recover its state of order; this happens through order and reason along with strength (or passion) which music brings about to elicit the proper balance between the various virtues. **Favonius** and **Macrobius** both comment on Cicero's harmony of the spheres. The former also draws much from Calcidius and thinks that music purifies the souls by mirroring heavenly music where apparent discordance becomes concord. Macrobius distinguishes cosmic numbers by gender (male/female) and identifies music on the level of the World Soul as fully harmonious, while human music, with all its various effects, is ambiguous in value. Music is almost universally present in everything, emerging from the life-giving World Soul, but in its metaphysical origin it can only be perceived in the astronomical order.

The conclusion of the series of classical authors strictly speaking consists of three works that present an overarching synthesis of much of what the previous theorists have developed. **Aristides Quintilianus** designs a brilliant (even if in many ways certainly questionable) system of musical theory and ethos, conflating Pythagorean-old gender-assignments with the harmony of the spheres, the Aristoxenian approach of a holistic view of musical ethos in all parameters with

the Platonic ideal of pursuing virtue and happiness through musical education, and a developed theory of the structure of the human soul with Theophrastus' ideas of musical healing, the atomistic ethos-attribution of Dionysius of Halicarnassus with Ptolemy's mathematical interval-virtue-correspondence, just to mention a few. His most significant original achievement is the attempt to establish ontologically a harmonic-ethical dualism as the foundation of all reality which, at least within the ancient conception of the world, finally closes the translation gap between music, cosmos, the soul, and ethos, because for him everything possesses essentially ethos, and music is the underlying principle ruling all levels of being according to the same harmonic-ethical parameters. **Martianus Capella** and **Boethius** offer the last ancient summaries of music theory, Martianus within a mythological-allegorical narrative and Boethius in an abstract philosophical treatise. Both authors reuse many traces from earlier texts down to Aristides Quintilianus, including multiple examples for the positive effect of music (only Boethius tells of negative effects as well). Martianus is most interested in what is proper and creates harmonic union and aesthetic enjoyment (after all, personified Harmony is speaking and the context is a wedding feast), with references to musical therapy but not to education; Boethius, returning to Plato's ideals, focuses much more on music theory as a vehicle towards philosophy but also to judge real music—for which he accepts, like Ptolemy, both sense and reason as instruments. The universality of music is described in similar terms as Aristides Quintilianus but without the male-female ontology. He shares Plato's concerns about music's influence on the well-being of the State and accordingly endorses music education and therapy in the traditional fashion, pursuing in everything the ideal of harmony or *concordantia/consonantia*. Both authors refer as ultimate point of reference for this ideal to the harmony of the spheres.

The survey concludes with a series of explicitly Christian authors, in particular three Greek and three Latin witnesses, to show the transition of classical musical ethos into the framework of the new faith. **Clement of Alexandria** still draws fully from the previous traditions, such as stories about the power of music and the conception of harmony as proper balance of contrary elements, but now shifts them to a new ideal and even devises a new explanation for its origin. Instead of cosmical music being the ideal for human music and ethos, he finds in the divine-human person of Jesus Christ the prototype for harmonious perfection, the "New Song," from which even the order of the universe stems. He also develops criteria for the educational and therapeutic employment of music very similar to the Pythagoreans and Plato, but now inspired by what is befitting to the new life in Christ. **Basil of Caesarea** builds especially upon the traditional lists of musical healing, now attributing this effect to the singing of psalms, which, in addition to bringing peace to the soul, also foster union between people and bring about other

advantages, even virtues. That music is enjoyable reinforces its pedagogical effectiveness. **John Chrysostom** proceeds in a similar vein but contrasts the psalms with “bad” songs of demonic origin which weaken the soul. Aesthetical beauty is not so much sought as that the faithful themselves become a cithara, creating a harmony of mind and body and leading the soul closer to heaven through *ψυχαγωγία*, a concept that was also common in pagan theories and newly applied by several Fathers.

Augustine follows Platonic thought in considering music a path leading the soul to higher realities, in his case, God, both in the theoretical (numerical) reflection and in the musical practice of worship. The numeric proportions, especially of rhythm, allow musical science to explore the principle of evenness or *aequalitas* which underlies all of creation. Augustine’s method includes, like in Aristoxenus, empirical verification, but the test of “enjoyment” needs to be grounded on the principles of reason in order to be objective. He rejects, like Plato, the base “theatrical” music, but now because it is opposed to the true expression of joy which is directed towards heaven. Augustine vacillates between his deep aesthetical appreciation for harmonious music, which strongly touches his affectivity and deepens the prayerful experience, and the danger of neglecting God (or at least the text sung) over the beauty of the hymns, but he admits how music manages to express what words cannot say. Music also serves often as an allegorical expression and as a symbol for unity. For **Cassiodorus**, music seems to be intrinsically good and harmonious—all else is simply not music. He points out musical ethos in rhythms and instruments and subscribes to the rational-harmonic arrangement of both cosmos and music as well, in a fashion that has traits in common with Aristides Quintilianus (harmony ordering everything). Education and healing based on musical ethos are illustrated with pagan and biblical examples. **Isidore of Seville** considers music to be the perfection of every discipline because of its harmonizing influence on everything. Different from Cassiodorus is that he does distinguish harmonious and dissonant musical sounds and that he goes into some detail in associating musical ethos with concrete human realities. For the rest, he conjoins fragments from ancient musical tradition with Christian symbolism.

Overall, the great majority of Christian authors evaluates music positively as long as it is not associated with immorality or directed to pagan divinities. It serves to elevate the soul to God, the creator of a harmonious universe, especially in the context of the liturgy, but also to move hearts to conversion or to create positive ethos in them. Aesthetic expectations for such music is at times clearly formulated and widely coincides with the classical preferences for good music. Many other (non-religious) benefits of music continue to be considered and promoted, whereby the psalms, being the sung word of God, receive the pride of place. Some authors (such as Jerome) tend to prefer music only in a spiritual (non-sensitive)

way, whereas others emphasize the need to real musical expression (such as Niceta). While all agree in the ethos-creating power of music, there is no renewed effort to create a theory on musical ethos beyond generic observations or attributions.

Table 3–1. Ancient Greek and Latin authors and texts on the effect and value of music.²

Author	Life Dates or <i>floruit</i>	Work(s)	Main Points
<u>Pythagoras</u> of Samos and his followers	ca. 570– ca. 490 BC	esp. in Arist. <i>Met.</i> 985b–986a, <i>Cael.</i> 290b12–291a29; Strabo 10.3.9; ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1147a; Nicomachus, <i>Manuale harmonices</i> 3; Theon 12, <i>passim</i> , Ptolemy <i>Harm.</i> ; Iamblichus, <i>VP</i> 15, 25–26, 31, 34	m. and cosmic harmony; healing and purification
<u>Damon</u>	before 444 BC	esp. in Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 400c, 424b–c; Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D22; ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1136e; Ath. 628c–d	ethos in m.
<u>Aristophanes</u>	ca. 460–386 BC	Νεφέλαι/ <i>Nubes</i> (423, revised 418–416)	old and new m. education
		Θεσμοφοριάζουσαι/ <i>Thesmophoriazousae</i> (411)	ethos in m.
		Βάτραχου/ <i>Ranae</i> (405 BC)	Aeschylus (old) vs. Euripides (new)
Alcidamas (?)	4 th c. BC	<u><i>Hibeh Papyrus</i></u> 1.13 (ca. 390 BC)	criticism of ethos in m.
<u>Hippocrates</u> of Cos (?)	5 th c. BC	Περὶ διαίτης/ <i>De victu</i> 1.18 (ca. 400 BC)	variety in m.
<u>Plato</u>	ca. 429–347 BC	Πολιτεία/ <i>Respublica</i> (ca. 380 BC)	m. ethos and education

2. This table gives all titles in their original form and language plus the common Latin titles for the Greek works. For authors whose works are only fragmentarily quoted in other authors, those other works are listed; important compilers of works or quotes from different authors are also included separately. The life and work dates are compiled mainly from the OCD and the EB and only meant as a point of reference, without any intent to take sides for disputed dates. The column “main point” indicates the central aspect for our discussion, not necessarily the central aspect of the particular work or chapter. Underlining highlights the part of the author’s name as used in this study. The abbreviation “m.” stands for both the noun “music” and the adjective “musical.”

Author	Life Dates or <i>floruit</i>	Work(s)	Main Points
		Τίμαιος/ <i>Timaeus</i> (ca. 360 BC)	m. and cosmic harmony
		Νόμου/ <i>Leges</i> (ca. 357–347 BC)	m. ethos in the State
<u>Aristotle</u>	384–322 BC	Πολιτικά/ <i>Politica</i> , 8.2–7 (ca. 335–322)	m. and education
Pseudo-Aristotle	-	Φύσικα προβλήματα/ <i>Problemata physica</i> 19 (3 rd c. BC–6 th c. AD)	m. and enjoyment
<u>Theophrastus</u> of Eresus	ca. 371–287 BC	Frs. 552, 555, 716, 719, 720, 724, 726	m. expressing and healing emotion
<u>Aristoxenus</u> of Tarentum	(ca. 370–after 322 BC)	Ἀρμονικῶν τὰ σωζόμενα/ <i>Elementa harmonica</i> (after 322)	pathos and ethos in the whole of m.
Polybius	ca. 200– ca. 118 BC	Ἱστορίαι/ <i>Historiae</i> 4.20–21	m education forming character
<u>Philodemus</u> of Gadara	ca. 110–40/35 BC	Περὶ μουσικῆς/ <i>De musica</i> (frs.)	criticism of ethos in m.; m is useless except for pleasure
Cleonides	ca. 1 st c. BC (or 2 nd –4 th c. AD)	Εἰσαγωγή ἀρμονικῆ/ <i>Harmonica introductio</i> 13	ethos in m.
Marcus Tullius <u>Cicero</u>	106–43 BC	<i>De oratore</i> 3.51.197 (55 BC)	m. and ethos, pleasure
		<i>De re publica</i> 2.47.69; 6.18.18–19 (51 BC)	harmony; harmony of the spheres
		<i>Tusculanae disputationes</i> 1.2.4; 3.18.41–43, 3.19.46, 5.4.116 (45 BC)	m. and ethos; only for pleasure
		<i>De legibus</i> 2.15.38–39; 3.14.32 (ca. 44 BC)	effect of m. in education, State, morals
<u>Strabo</u>	ca. 64 BC–ca. 21 AD	Γεογραφικά/ <i>Geographica</i> 10.3.9–10	religious and moral function
<u>Dionysius of Halicarnassus</u>	ca. 20 BC	Περὶ συνθέσεως ὀνομάτων/ <i>De compositione verborum</i> 11	qualities of enjoyable and beautiful m. and style

Author	Life Dates or <i>floruit</i>	Work(s)	Main Points
Lucius Annaeus <u>Seneca</u> (the Younger)	ca. 4 BC–65 AD	<i>Epistula</i> 84 (64 AD)	harmony
		<i>Epistula</i> 87 (64 AD)	good musician
		<i>Dialogus de ira</i> 3.2.4, 3.9.2 (41 AD)	ethos in m.
Marcus Fabius Quintilianus (<u>Quintilian</u>)	ca. 35–ca. 96 AD	<i>De institutione oratoria</i> 1.10.2–33; 9.4.9–12	m. in education and rhetoric
<u>Dio</u> Cocceianus/ <u>Chrysostom</u> /of Prusa	ca. 40/50–after 110 AD	Πρὸς Ἀλεξανδρεῖς (Oratio 32, possibly between 98–117 AD)	good and bad effect and use of m.
Lucius Mestrius <u>Plutarchus</u>	ca. 50–ca. 120 AD	Τὰ παλαιὰ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπιτηδεύματα/ <i>Instituta Laconica</i> 14–16	education, State and m.
		Συμποσιακά/ <i>Quaestiones convivales</i> 7.5, 7.8.4	immoral m.
<u>Pseudo-Plutarch</u>	close to Plutarch	Περὶ μουσικῆς/ <i>De musica</i> (1 st /2 nd c. AD)	ethos in m.; ancient vs. new style
<u>Nicomachus</u> of Gerasa	1 st /2 nd c. AD	Ἀρμονικῆς ἐγχειρίδιον/ <i>Manuale harmonices</i> (ca. 100 AD)	harmony of the spheres
		Ἀρμονικὸν ἐγχειρίδιον/ <i>Manuale harmonicum</i> (after previous)	harmony of the spheres
<u>Theon</u> of Smyrna ³	70–135/140 AD	Περὶ μουσικῆς (τῶν κατὰ τὸ μαθηματικὸν χρησίμων εἰς τὴν Πλάτωνος ἀνάγνωσιν)/(<i>De musica (Expositio rerum mathematicarum ad legendum Platonem utilium)</i>)	m. and cosmos

3. He is not discussed individually but included in the chapter on the Pythagoreans.

Author	Life Dates or <i>floruit</i>	Work(s)	Main Points
Claudius Ptolemaeus (Ptolemy)	ca. 100–ca. 170 AD	Ἀρμονικά/ <i>Harmonica</i>	m. and cosmos
Sextus Empiricus	late 2 nd c. AD	Πρὸς μουσικούς/ <i>Adversus musicos</i>	criticism of ethos in m.
Titus Flavius Clemens (Clement of Alexandria)	ca. 150–ca. 211/6 AD	Προτρέπτικος πρὸς Ἑλλήνας/ <i>Protrepticus</i> 1.1–8 (ca. 190 AD)	m. and harmony; Christ as the New Song
		Παιδαγωγός/ <i>Paedagogus</i> 2.6 (ca. 190–192)	proper Christian m.
Lucius Flavius Philostratus	170–245 AD	Τὰ ἐς τὸν Τυανέα Ἀπολλόνιον/ <i>Vita Apollonii</i> 5.21 (ca. 210–230 AD)	power of the <i>aulos</i>
Iamblichus of Chalcis	ca. 245–ca. 325 AD	Περὶ τοῦ Πυθαγορείου βίου/ <i>De vita Pythagorica</i> 15, 25–26, 31, 34	m. and cosmic harmony; healing and purification
		Πρὸς τὴν Πορφυρίου πρὸς Ἀμεβῶ ἐπιστολὴν ἀποκρίσις, καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ ἀπορημάτων λύσεις/ <i>De mysteriis</i> 3.9	effect of m. and divine inspiration
Athenaeus of Naucratis	ca. 200 AD	Δειπνοσοφισταί/ <i>Deipnosophistae</i> 14.623e–639b	ethos and effect of m.
Plotinus	205–270 AD	Ἐννεάδες/ <i>Enneades</i> 3.2.16–17; 4.4.40	cosmic harmony; m. and magic
Censorinus	3 rd c. AD	<i>De die natali</i> 10–13 (238 AD)	effect of m.; m. and cosmos
Basil of Caesarea	ca. 330–379 AD	Ὁμιλία εἰς τὸν πρῶτον Ψάλμον/ <i>Homilia in Psalmum primum</i> 1–2	power of m. in the psalms
Aristides Quintilianus	late 3 rd /early 4 th c. AD	Περὶ μουσικῆς/ <i>De musica</i>	ethos in m., cosmic theory
Aelius Festus Aphthonius	1 st half of 4 th c. AD	<i>De metris</i> , in: Gaius Marius Victorinus, <i>Ars grammatica</i> 6.158–160 (4 th c. AD)	natural origin and affect in m.
Calcidius	4 th c. AD	<i>Platonis Timaeus interprete Calcidio</i> (esp. 40, 50, 73, 95, 267)	harmonic structure of cosmos/soul; m. restores virtue of soul
John Chrysostom	ca. 354–407 AD	Εἰς τὸν ΜΑ΄ Ψάλμον/ <i>Expositio in Psalmos</i> 41.1–3 (387 AD)	usefulness of psalm m.

Author	Life Dates or <i>floruit</i>	Work(s)	Main Points
Aurelius Augustinus (Augustine)	354–430 AD	<i>De musica</i> 1, 6 (386–389 AD)	m. as science, to discover evenness, as a path to God
		<i>Confessiones</i> 10.33.49–50 (ca. 397–400 AD)	attraction of m. pleasure
Favonius Eulogius	late 4 th /early 5 th c. AD	<i>Disputatio de somnio Scipionis</i> (380–420 AD)	cosmic harmony and earthly m.
Ambroisus Theodosius Macrobius	5 th c. AD	<i>Commentarius in Ciceronis somnium Scipionis</i> (after 430 AD)	divine origin of m. in the harmonic soul of the universe
		<i>Saturnalia</i> (after 430 AD)	decadence in m. practice
Martianus Minneus Felix Capella	last quarter of 5 th c. AD	<i>De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii</i> 9 (ca. 430)	ethos in m., harmony rules everything
Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius	ca. 480–ca. 524 AD	<i>De institutione musica</i> (ca. 500)	ethos in m., power of m.
Flavius Magnus Aurelius Cassiodorus	ca. 490–ca. 585 AD	<i>De musica</i> (in: <i>Institutiones divinarum et saecularium litterarum</i>) (543–555 AD)	m. harmony and power of m.
		<i>Variarum liber</i> 2.40 (506)	power of m.
Isidorus Hispalensis (Isidore of Seville)	ca. 560–636 AD	<i>Etymologiae sive origines</i> 3.15–23	power of m.

The Debate About Musical Decadence

As a first approach, we shall now review how a wide representation of authors view the relationship between music and the dimension of ethos, concretely, the perceived lowering of musical standards and a simultaneous—and corresponding, at least in the view of many, decline in morals.

One clarification to start: in this and the following sections, when using terms that include a value judgment such as “decadence,” they represent the evaluation made by the original authors, not necessarily mine.

The Emergence of “New Music”

Only isolated testimony exists about musical ethos before the end of the fifth century BC⁴ when the first (preserved) theoretical considerations about musical ethos are written and, perhaps not coincidentally, Greek music undergoes something that Barker calls a “musical revolution” towards a “New Music.”⁵ In his words, it is

characterized by a rapidly developing growth of complexity and variety in all aspects of musical composition—in melody, in rhythm and metre, in poetic diction—coupled with an abandonment both of repetitive formal structures and of rigid divisions between musical styles.⁶

Along with a new “emphasis on emotional expression and decorative elaboration” come, on the technical level, an increase of strings for the cithara and a greater popularity of the technically enhanced *aulos* which makes possible virtuoso modulations between the then established *harmoniai*. We could perhaps compare this process with the harmonic “revolution” brought about by the well-tempered tuning during the eighteenth century, first explored by Bach in his *Well-Tempered Clavier* and then stretched to its limits by the exuberance of Romantic harmonic texture until its dissolution in the atonality of Arnold Schönberg.⁷ The modern development might seem much more drastic since it involves the whole system of “harmony” in our sense, which the Greeks did not explore (they remained mostly on the level of melody and mode), but from the heat of the debate we can gather that the Greeks experienced the changes in their own musical tradition with similar intensity. In a world with fewer sensual stimuli and a finer perception of detail, smaller changes already provoke a profound impact.

This is not the place to give a full account of all the changes and the protagonists involved.⁸ Here we shall focus on those points that are applicable to the

4. Cf. Anderson 1955, 89 n. 5.

5. As briefly mentioned already earlier, cf. p. 65.

6. GMW 1.98; the following quotation is from p. 97.

7. West 1992, 371, quotes from Slonimsky’s *Lexicon of Musical Invective* 1953, 42–52, harsh criticism against Beethoven’s style, which resemble strikingly what is being said about the Greek “New Music,” for which he thinks “it is not altogether inappropriate to compare the transition from eighteenth-century Classicism to nineteenth-century Romanticism.” The case could also be made for a comparison with the transition from a public taste shifting from Wagner to jazz and beyond at the beginning of the twentieth century because the moral implications are in this case more pronounced (as described e.g. in Jones 1994, 91–98).

8. For a more extensive treatment see e.g. Anderson 1966, 34–63; id. 1994, 113–144; GMW 1.93–98; Comotti 1989, 29–42; West 1992, 356–372. Csapo 2004 adds much detail to the

evaluation of music, especially if connected to ethos. After a summary glance over some relevant characteristics, we shall see in Aristophanes an early treatment of the dispute; a brief sketch of the ulterior evolvement during the Hellenistic period follows, further illustrated by the accounts of pseudo-Plutarch and Athenaeus; lastly, we shall review the Roman, mostly Latin, contribution to the debate. Recent scholarship has been unearthing the intimate connection between socio-political power struggles and these modern musical trends, especially in the fifth and fourth century.⁹ We need to limit ourselves to the musical side of the dispute, while keeping in mind that political quarrels bring about distortions and exaggerations of the arguments employed by the contending fractions.

Along these lines, a word must be said about the accuracy of the descriptions of "degeneration" given by the ancient critics of the new musical culture, applicable similarly to the ideal drawn of previous times. Robert W. Wallace has undertaken a sensible study about the presumed changes from the fifth to the fourth century BC in the theater audiences' behavior and the artists' attitude. He confirms a general trend "in favor of personal drama and theatrical spectacle (...), the staging of more purely popular entertainment" and, at least in the case of the Theater of Dionysius, with a central purpose "to stir the public's emotions," the development of a star cult, "an evolving attitude in some artists to produce works of immediate popular appeal" and to create something new, for which "some artists deliberately played to the emotional side of the theater audience." He identifies as one cause for this phenomenon the "rise of individualism" and the appearance of individuals "who sought success regardless of principles or policies."¹⁰ This does not account

description of the new trends. The most complete recent study on this period is LeVen 2014, placing the "New Music" into its literary and socio-political context. She calls our attention to be careful in not judging these musical trends only by the words of its critics and not to oversee elements of continuity. Here we are mostly concerned with the actual judgments of a specific type of style, be it only perceived, rhetorically distorted, or, at least in parts, real.

9. For instance, Csapo 2004 observes a political polarization of the "New Music" by its critics since "elite superiority, at least, was threatened by the rise of professionalism in many branches of the arts, and especially the music of the theatre" (p. 236; further 240–241); see also Csapo 2011. Wilson 2003 shows by the example of Kritias how the *aulos* became a reflection and even a means of political power-struggle; Wilson 2004 illustrates something similar for string instruments.
10. Wallace 1997, 107–109. He compares the reduction of "elitist or high-brow elements (or from another perspective, lowering standards) in drama to achieve a broader appeal" with "the history of television and, more generally, the history of capitalism of which the media are a part." He does not support the pejorative view of these developments as voiced at their time, mostly because the treatment of and education in serious matter has been delegated

for all charges raised against the new musical style but shows the change of the general tone within society. Rossi (1988) suggests the symposium as the place in which new musical styles are freely tried and, perhaps, singled out by Damon who observes the ethos manifested by the performers of these styles. Günther Wille's work provides historical evidence for the development in Roman times. At any rate, in our task to gather information on the ancients' position on "good and bad music," we shall try to present the different views as best as the sources allow us, without the intent to assess how widely accepted and representative they were in their time. It remains remarkable, however, that our sources almost exclusively consist of defenders of the more traditional side, and rarely the cause in favor of innovations is made, especially on the level of ethos. It might be that writings of "progressive" theorists have not been preserved; but more probable is that the "progressives" were no theorists but just the "consumers" and the musicians themselves who did not bother to theorize and draft apologies for their tastes and attitudes apart from indirect (but perhaps not less powerful) "messages" encapsulated in their own artistic output.

As we begin our survey of what these musical changes consist of, a first surprise lies in the fact that innovation by itself is not necessarily declared a bad thing. Pseudo-Plutarch,¹¹ along with other authors, gives a detailed account of the development of Greek music teeming with inventiveness.¹² However, once something beautiful or noble had been established, the next generations, according to the same author, should rather not stray from it.¹³ Here, a problem is set off by a

to less public forums such as philosophical schools and artists "who worked purely for their craft" (110).

11. This author will be presented with more detail in a subsequent section; he is introduced here because he informs about the chief traits of the new musical style. For his report and the one of Athenaeus and others some caution is needed because the positions they attribute to earlier authors may or may not be historically accurate—but often times we possess no other sources to check these quotations against.
12. An explicitly positive characteristic is given (ps. Plut. *Mus.* 11.1134f–1135a) when Olympus is said to have discovered the enharmonic genus by accidentally omitting a tone from the diatonic genus, and "he was struck by the beauty of the character of this procedure" ("καταμαθεῖν τὸ κάλλος τοῦ ἡθους", tr. Barker) and "admired" (θαυμάζω) that new *systema*, later also called "the beginning of the beautiful (καλός) Hellenic music" (11.1135b); cf. similarly the "beautiful" style (τῶπος) introduced by Terpander. (12.1135c). Already in the Homeric Hymn to Hermes (HH 4.443), new lyre song is praised "wonderful, marvellous" (θαυμάσιος).
13. Ps.-Plutarch (*Mus.* 12.1135c) praises those who did not deviate (ἐκβαίνω) from the "καλὸς τύπος." This principle is strongly emphasized in Plato, cf. below p. 209. Dionysius of Halicarnassus offers some very sensible reflections on the principle of variation (in *Comp.* 19)

group of musicians around Timotheus of Miletus (ca. 450–360 BC). Even though Timotheus at first does not want to appear right away as transgressing the norms (παρανομιῶν)¹⁴ of usual music, in the eyes of the city rulers his modernization eventually goes too far; his plight at Sparta for adding extra strings is only an exterior manifestation:¹⁵ they are employed for modulations and a musical style that now expresses what the critics perceive as a negative ethos, characterized as more vulgar (φορτικώτερος), loving novelty for its own sake (φιλόκαινος), seeking popular appeal (φιλάνθρωπος), and calculated for effect (θεματικός), at the same time making the earlier simplicity (ἀπλότης) and dignity (σεμνότης) in music appear “archaic.” In terms that do not lack self-confidence, Timotheus declares himself honoring the “new Muse” with “new” songs, not against the old—this caveat seems politically induced—, but to “bring new life.”¹⁶ While in earlier times the focus has been on ethos (37.144f), now ostentatious artistry and the pride of the musicians stand in the foreground who, “far from contesting the critics’ charges about the ethos of music,” consciously indulge in their new ways, perhaps even to the point of exacerbating the traditionalists.¹⁷

where he also mentions the “new” school but without any reproach; all he says is that they continuously assumed “license” (“ἄδεια”)—which here is meant in a merely technical, not moral sense.

14. “παρανομία” will become a key term in Plato, indicating the “lawlessness” of innovated Music that will lead to licentiousness, e.g. *Resp.* 424d (in this context falls also the word “to corrupt” (“διαφθείρω”); *Leg.* 700d. The current reference is from ps.-Plut. *Mus.* 4.1132e.
15. Plut. *Instituta Laconica* 17 = *Mor.* 238c describes the context and attributes a similar situation already to Terpander (early seventh c. BC)—in his case he had added just one string. Such a thing was considered an attempt to corrupt (“παραφθείροι”) the ancient music (Ath. 636e); see above ch. 2 n. 78 and also Plut. *An seni* 23 = *Mor.* 795d: Timotheus gets hissed at for his innovation (καινοτομία) and transgressing (παρανομέω)—but at the same time prophetically encouraged by Euripides that the theaters would shortly submit to him. The actual decree of his condemnation is allegedly conserved in Boethius *Mus.* 1.1 182.7–183.10 (text, tr., and comm. in Bower 1989, 185–188), giving the following reasons: dishonoring the ancient music, corrupting the ears of the youth (through variety), effeminate/complex ethos instead of simple/uniform, performing at an improper occasion and without due reverence; Timotheus is charged to reduce his cithara strings from eleven to seven. The authenticity of this transcription is hard to assess.
16. “ἐξανατέλλω”—“cause to spring up from”; the context of the quote is *Pers.* 202–240. According to Ath. 122c–d, however, he was not squeamish in opposing the old: “οὐκ αἰδῶ τὰ παλαιά: καὶνὰ γὰρ μάλα κρείσσω, νέος ὁ Ζεὺς βασιλεύει: τὸ πάλαι δ’ ἦν Κρόνος ἄρχων, ἀπίτω μούσα παλαιά.” About the contradictory evidence regarding his position see Anderson 1966, 50 & 228 n. 40 with references.
17. See Csapo 2004, 247.

The speakers in pseudo-Plutarch's *De Musica* deplore musical decadence as a problem of their own time,¹⁸ even though such a phenomenon was already addressed by Plato and Aristoxenus, as we shall see. The music of dignity (ἀξία), which the elders respected, was—at least in the probably idealizing recountal of the critics—august (σεμνός), manly (ἀνδρώδης), divine sounding (θεσπέσιος), and beloved by the gods (θεοῖς φίλος), while the new theater music has become effeminate (κατεαγώς) and light (κωτίλος) as expressed in multiplicity of strings/notes (πολυχορδία), variety (ποικιλία),¹⁹ the chromatic genus,²⁰ modulations between the *harmoniai*, etc. The rise of theater itself appears somewhat degenerative, for in “good old times” Greeks had dedicated all their musical skill to divine worship and education (27.1140d–e); this criticism echoes Plato's complaint about “theatrocracy” (*Leg.* 701a), meaning the dictation of style by the taste of the populace, and reflects in a similar vein the remarks transmitted from Aristoxenus (see below). Even modern *aulos* music for athletic competitions is now described as weak (ἀσθενής) and uncultivated (οὐ κεκρυμένος).

It is noticed that some musical styles produce proper ethos in the accompaniment but not in the melody, something that recent trends have been muddling (19.1337b–d). Furthermore, the subordination of the instrument (*aulos* in particular) to the accompanied text is lost. Pratinas of Phlius (early 5th c. BC, in *Ath.* 14.617b–f) curses the *aulos* as “killing tune and rhythm” (“παραμελορυθμοβάταν”) because it now outmatches the chorus instead of accompanying it,²¹ converting Dionysian cult into a hubbub (θόρυβος) and tumultuous outrage (ὕβρις πολύπαταξ);²² instead, Pratinas exalts his own Dorian composition.

Traditional and progressive schools stand in sweeping opposition against each other, and after Timotheus things keep moving further in the same direction, so much so that even he appears at the time of the account already somewhat outdated.²³ In a famous passage quoted from the comic poet Pherecrates (ca. 430 BC),

18. The point comes up in various sections: 12.1135c–d; 15.1136b–c; 18.1337a–b; 21.1137f–1138c; 26.1140b–27.1140f; 30.1141c–31.1142c.

19. Barker (GMW 1.223) translates with “complexification” (reappears in 30.1141c) and notes (n. 123) how this characteristic was rejected Plato. Terpander and Olympus serve as authorities to strengthen Plato's position.

20. “Genus” in ancient Greek music refers to a specific arrangement of intervals within the tetrachord (which is the basis for the Greek scale system). The three traditional genera are diatonic, chromatic, and enharmonic (see e.g. West 1992, 162).

21. See about this point Anderson 1994, 86–88.

22. Hypallage—the adjective belongs syntactically to “altar” (“θυμέλη”).

23. Cf. Polyb. 4.20.9 and Barker's comment (GMW 1.285 n. 122): “The daring and iconoclastic innovators of the fifth century have thus become the children's classics of the second,

the Muse herself laments her abuse by various modernizers (Melanippides, Philoxenus, Cinesias, Phrynis, and, as a climax, Timotheus) through loosened multiple strings, discordant (ἐξαρμόνιος) and confused twisting and turning (κάμπω,²⁴ στρέφω) melodies (i.e. modulations between different *harmoniai*) like crooked ant-tracks²⁵ (30.1141d–1142a)—all in all a chaotic absurdity (ἀτοπία). Hardly more flattering does Antiphanes (ca. 380 BC) word it, another comic poet who does praise Philoxenus (ca. 435–380 BC) but dismisses all other contemporaries as composing ivy-twined (ἀνθρασιπτότατος) flower-fountain-songs with idle (μέλεος) words, plaiting strange tunes (ἀλλότρια μέλη) (Ath. 643d). The figure of Telesias of Thebes (dates unknown) illustrates how someone, originally educated in the best of traditional music (“ἐν τῇ καλλίστῃ μουσικῇ”), is drawn into the complex theater music including its most new-fashioned crazes (καινοτομία) (ps.-Plut. *Mus.* 31.1142b–c).²⁶ Music education, therefore, should not be based on

even in the most conservative of Greek societies;” however, criticism against certain musical features stemming from this time continues into the Roman period and not just as an anti-quarian memory; see Plutarch and the Latin authors cited below.

24. This verb occurs elsewhere in musical invective: in Ar. *Nub.* 969 with a *figura etymologica* (“κάμψειν τινα καμπήν” followed by “δυσκολόκαμπτος”) to ridicule the contemporary citharede Phrynis; Philostr. *VA* 4.39: a drunk run-down street musician “twists” some of Nero’s badly bent and turned odes (“ψδὰς ἔκαμπτεν, ὅποσας Νέρων ἐλύγιθῃ τε καὶ κακῶς ἔστρεφεν”). Plutarch, in *De seipsum citra invidiam laudandum* 1 (= *Mor.* 539c), chides Timotheus for his “unmusical and unlawful” (“ἀμούσως καὶ παρανόμως”) self-praise on occasion of his victory over (the Ionian) Phrynis whom he calls “ἰωνοκάμπταν” (“Ionian bender,” or, depending on the textual reading, “φωνοκάμπταν” “voice bender”)—Timotheus apparently lashes out the way he receives.
25. 30.1142a: μυρμηκίαι ἐκτράπελαι—cf. similar Ar. *Thesm.* 100 (μύρμηκος ἀτραποί) about Agathon; GMW 237 n. 203. Ael. *NA* 6.43 describes the tortuosity of ant tracks using the term “ποικίλος.”
26. The author remarks with some implicit satisfaction that Telesias was unsuccessful in composing according to the new ways of Philoxenus because his excellent training in Pindar and others—with the conclusion that music can only be pursued well/beautifully and judiciously (“καλῶς καὶ κεκριμένως”) following the old way, along with liberal education and philosophy as the judge for what is proper and useful in music: “αὕτη [ἡ φιλοσοφία] γὰρ ἱκανὴ κρίναι τὸ μουσικῇ πρέπον μέτρον καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον” (about this passage see Barker 2007, 247–249). But Philoxenus himself was unable to innovate by composing a Phrygian dithyramb (Arist. *Pol.* 1342b9–12). That Philoxenus was supposedly better than other innovators emerges from Ath. 644d–e. For a more detailed description about him see GMW 1.94–95 and Anderson 1966, 160–161 & 280 n. 28 who believes that he began traditionally and only later became a “song-twister,” in order to reconcile the somewhat contradictory witnesses, including Phld. 1.18 D31 (where he is seen “identical in *tropos*” with Pindar).

what happens to please the student or teacher but on the *tropoi*²⁷ that befit best the establishing or correcting of ethos (ἡθῶν ἐπανόρθωσις).²⁸

As we can already see from this section, the sources provide many fewer quotations defending the new style than rejecting it, a tendency which we shall observe also further on. It is difficult to get a clear idea of these changes, first because we have very few actual examples handed down to us (Anderson and West discuss these in their collections), and then because derogative criticism provides only distorted information about the reality in question. In lack of better evidence, we continue this first round with an author who does not even pretend to be objective but still sheds some revealing light on the issue.

Aristophanes²⁹

Even though Aristophanes is by no means a music theorist or philosopher, this protagonist of Old Comedy is the first one to take sides within the developing antagonism between two musical—and also poetical—styles. Hence his contribution comes not in form of theoretical deliberation but through biting ridicule and parody, embodying the opposing schools in the distortion of caricatured poets that would drive his point home in a less nuanced but all the more pronounced way.

In the *Clouds* (*Nubes*), the modern educational approach taken by the Sophists is under heavy attack for corrupting the traditional social values of dignity and respect. For one part, the (possibly Damonian) attempt to teach ethical classifications of rhythms and other elements is presented as nonsensical.³⁰ Later, the “Better Argument” presents “old schooling” and discipline through a music lesson where students learned songs, maintaining faithfully the traditional *harmoniai* and being punished for doing away with the Muse if anyone “messed around and bent something bent like those of today who make all those hard bendings like

27. Barker GMW 1.239 n. 213 proposes to understand this term here as “technically specific melodic genre.”

28. As an example of how real goodness/beauty are sacrificed for the sake of acoustic convenience, the author brings up the example of the enharmonic genus, τὸ μὲν κάλλιστον τῶν γενῶν, which was abandoned because people thought they could not hear the small *diesis*-interval any longer (38.1145a; for further references about the loss of this genus see GMW 1.245 n. 242). Furthermore, the innovators are upsetting the rationality of the tetra-chord system (39.1145c–d).

29. Text and tr.: Henderson 1998–2002; tr. (excerpts): GMW 1.99–116.

30. About Damon being a sophist and the possible allusion to his theory at 635–694 see GMW 1.99–101, esp. n. 10, but also below in the section dedicated to him.

Phrynus.”³¹ Such crooked, affected way of modern melodic style is taken on again with Agathon in the *Thesmophoriazousae* and associated with a feminizing character,³² in the *Birds* (*Aves*) with Cinesias, an often abused modern poet,³³ and again generally in *Nub.* 333 with the term “twisters of choir songs” (ἄσματοκάμπτης). Another tendency of the modern poets and musicians, that of their attentiveness to public acclaim and monetary gain, finds satirical treatment in *Av.* 917–953.³⁴

But even before the generation around Timotheus aroused the spirits, with Euripides a notable change of style had occurred in classical tragedy, in contrast to Aeschylus,³⁵ which determines the story in the *Frogs* (*Ranae*):³⁶ Dionysius stages a contest between the two dramatists in Hades, which naturally revolves mainly around matters of plot, literary style, and dramaturgy, but touches upon some aspects about music. From a firestorm of invective and exaggeration the following can be gathered (1249–1364): Euripides accuses Aeschylus of composing in an unexciting lengthy and monotonous (cithara) pattern, while the latter in turn mocks the former for committing a promiscuous mixture of song genres and instruments, “the complexity and irregularity of the metres, the affected elaboration of imagery and diction, and—in one case—the distortion of words

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31. 970–971: “εἰ δέ τις αὐτῶν βωμολοχεύσαιτ’ ἢ κάμψειεν τινα καμπήν, οἷας οἱ νῦν τὰς κατὰ Φρύνιν ταύτας τὰς δυσκολοκάμπτους...;” my attempt of rendering the pun in English; about Phrynus and the imagery see above n. 24.
 32. Agathon appears dressed like a woman and is all concerned about beauty; his bent and ant-like verses are mentioned at 68–69 (“χειμῶνος οὖν ὄντος κατακάμπτειν τὰς τροφὰς οὐ ῥάδιον, ἦν μὴ προῖη θύρασι πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον”), 100 (“μῦρμηκος ἀτραπούς, ἢ τί διαμινύρεται”), 137–139 (ridiculing the mixture of styles: “ὥς οὐ ξύμφορα—how unsuitable!”). His appearance as a woman, in accordance with his song (146–156; Henderson, n. 8 to line 100: “its rhythms, mainly Ionic, suggest Asiatic luxury and effeminacy”) and in his desire to acquire manhood through imitation (154–156) corresponds to the idea developed in Plato (cf. *Resp.* 395c–e) that *mimēsis* leads to the assimilation and habituation of what is imitated; see below in the section on Plato and GMW 1.110 n. 44). About Aristophanes’ ambiguous treatment of Phrynichus who is mentioned in *Thesm.* 164, probably considered as having “conceded too much to the versatility and ornamentation of the new *aulos* music, forsaking the noble simplicity of traditional melodic lines,” see GMW 1.111 n. 49.
 33. For a long list of his achievements and artistic “crimes,” see GMW 1.106–107. The main passage bantering his style is *Av.* 1373–1409; cf. *Eccl.* 330.
 34. Barker (GMW 1.105 n. 24) suggests that the poet’s association with Simonides’ avarice might be aimed at when the poet is compared with Simonides at 919; cf. on the point *Pax* 697–699.
 35. The third of the great three, Sophocles, as we could already observe from the analysis of characterizing terms, stayed rather low profile with regard to music (cf. also *Ar. Ran.* 76–82; 786–790), although also he brought about some innovations, cf. Comotti 1989, 33–34.
 36. The play’s center passage with the contest is in 950–1471.

to suit melodic ornamentation,”³⁷ and the incongruence between “commonplace incidents in highly coloured and emotional language.”³⁸ That Euripides was fashionable among the new generation is also reflected in *Nub.* 1353–1378 where Philpides, the prototype of a youth corrupted by Sophistic education, declares singing to the cithara archaic and Aeschylus’ style “full of noise,” and instead gets passionate about the “wisest” Euripides. Comotti summarizes the tragedian’s new style in these terms:

In his work music gradually loses its traditional function as the support for the poetic text and becomes instead a means of expressing dramatic moments, the emotions and the states of mind represented in the tragedy (...). In his polemic, Aristophanes berated Euripides for filling his plays with popular, heart-rending, and exotic songs, which were aimed only to appeal to the emotions of the audience and, which defiled the solemn and austere character of the ancient harmonies.³⁹

Aristophanes, at least for the genre in which he writes, shows no interest in the ballast of theoretical reflection that he sees the Sophists and Plato develop, but he does hold that musical style and traditional values (and thus proper ethos) are maintained or perish together. He ridicules the new tortuous complexity which only aspires an emotional rush and leads to an exaltation of banality in content. It seems, however, that even Aristophanes, the merciless critic of the “New Music,” eventually himself succumbs to at least some of the new features,⁴⁰ while the stream of musical development resists halting its course in defiance to all contrary efforts.

Hellenism

During the Hellenistic period, generally conceived as beginning with the death of Alexander the Great, the rise of professionalism in the theatrical and musical arts intensifies the development towards virtuoso performance on all fronts: instrumental, vocal, melodic, rhythmic, and textual complexity. As West puts it:

37. Barker 1989, 116 n. 66. Part of this is the one-syllable-one-note rule, which Euripides violated. This is ridiculed in *Ran.* 1314, 1348; cf. Csapo 2004, 223, and Anderson 1966, 58–59 who also refers to Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 11: Euripides is accused for ignoring the patterns of tonic word accent when composing his melodies.

38. GMW 1.115 n. 66 and 1.116. The mixing of styles is attacked by Plato in *Leg.* 812d–e.

39. 1989, 34.

40. E.g. by increasing lyric songs to the expense of choral parts; cf. Comotti 1989, 39. Anderson 1994, 123–127, gives a more comprehensive account of Aristophanes’ position.

This was an age in which, in music as in the theatre, public enthusiasm was increasingly focused on the virtuoso skills, personality, and showmanship of the individual performer.⁴¹

Guilds of musicians and actors organize performances around the whole Levant while artistic competitions and musical festivals continue to flourish. “Timotheus remained a classic for centuries”⁴²—the style of the New Music carries on and is developed further through augmentation (everything becomes greater: numbers of performers, artistry, sophistication, etc.) and increased complexity (e.g. chromaticism, modulations).⁴³ In the early Empire, on the level of melody, a tendency of simplification can be observed (e.g. the diatonic genus, less modulation), but ornate affectation seems to have been present until the end of antiquity.

Platonic and Peripatetic philosophers alike, each group from its own ground, rise to combat the “corruption” (παραθορά) of music.⁴⁴ Particular arguments will be examined from the treatment of individual authors later on.⁴⁵ In general, Aristoxenus⁴⁶ is reported to lament the transfer of music from worship in the temples and from character formation in schools to the theaters,⁴⁷ bringing about a complete barbarization: “this vulgar music has advanced into great destruction.”⁴⁸ In the ancient style, songs possessed and maintained a specific character according to *nomoi*, i.e. well defined melodic structures, rhythmic form, and tonal range, designated to a particular occasion with their names of origin.⁴⁹ In such a setting,

41. West 1992, 366.

42. West 1992, 381; see following pages for the next points.

43. Also new instruments are invented. The interest in impressing others and seeking applause with exotic musical furniture can, for instance, be seen in Ath. 4.175a–b (a new *aulos*-like invention), but the author also remarks that for those who love Euripides everything else is a great evil (“κακὸν μέγα”).

44. Ps.-Plut. *Mus.* 3.1131f. Some textual witnesses write “παραφορά” instead, which could mean here “derangement, distraction, frenzy.”

45. For the direct criticism of “theatrocracy” and the related decay of cultural and musical standards see Pl. *Leg.* 659b–c; 700a–701b; *Grg.* 501–502b; Arist. *Pol.* 1341b9–20; Wallace 1997, 97–101 quotes further witnesses.

46. From this Peripatetic philosopher and prominent Music theorist (ca. 370– ca. 300 BC) we possess important sections about more technical aspects of music, but only few comments about ethical issues survive. See later the section dedicated to him.

47. So in fr. 124 and ps.-Plut. *Mus.* 27.140d–f from a section that is not directly quoting Aristoxenus but represents his thought; cf. Mathiesen 1999, 364–365; West 1992, 370.

48. Ath. 632b: “εἰς μεγάλην διαθορὰν προελήλυθεν ἡ πάνδημος αὕτη μουσική.” Gulick (n. c *ad loc.*) calls to mind that “πάνδημος” alludes to the “vulgar Aphrodite” in Pl. *Symp.* 180e–181a (cf. below n. 176).

49. Cf. ps.-Plut. *Mus.* 6.1133b–c and Comotti 1989, 15–16.

music was “elevating, instructive, and useful” and could therefore form “an essential part of Greek paideia.”⁵⁰ Violating the traditional musical patterns is now judged as a commencing disintegration of education and culture at large. Also Aristotle noticed that, instead of education, music was being pursued mostly for the sake of enjoyment.⁵¹ Now, even the practitioners of musical art themselves fall into disrepute due to their wanton style of both performance and life—and the connection between these two, for the critics, is more than obvious.⁵²

Pseudo-Plutarch⁵³

At this time, an unknown author—virtually all scholars agree that it is not Plutarch—discusses questions of music in a symposian setting, mostly assembling quotations from earlier personalities. The work, despite being inferior to the original Plutarch in terms of literary value, presents a goldmine of otherwise lost information about ancient music. As can be seen from its introductory paragraph, multiple remarks throughout,⁵⁴ and the final sections, this work aims to illustrate the educational value of music insofar as it can form the character in pursuing what is appropriate: “It is most important, and most characteristic of music, to give everything its proper measure (τὸ προσήκον μέτρον)” (44.1147a). In part to illustrate this thesis, and for the other part to provide some sort of compendium on music in general, the author recounts the historical stages of music development in its parameters such as instrumentation, *nomoi*, *tonoi*, genera, rhythm, and intervals, based in much on other authors such as Plato, Aristotle, Aristoxenus, and Heraclides.⁵⁵

50. Mathiesen 1999 364–365, commenting on ps.-Plut. *Mus.* 31.1142c–d.

51. *Pol.* 1337b28–29: “νῦν μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἡδονῆς χάριν οἱ πλείστοι μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς: οἱ δ’ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔταξαν ἐν παιδείᾳ.”

52. Cf. West 1992, 378, who offers, among others, the following descriptions: “Simos, dated to the second half of the fourth century BC, ‘corrupted’ the melodic style of older composers, and dealt in poetic obscenity. (...) The magode is described as being equipped with drums and cymbals and dressed in feminine garments, but also as playing a variety of unseemly roles both male and female, an adulteress, a procuress, a drunk serenading his mistress, and so on.”

53. Text and tr.: Einarson/Lacy 1967; tr. and comm.: GMW 1.205–249; summary and discussion: Mathiesen 1999, 355–366 (although mostly on the technical sections). I am referencing by the chapter numbers followed by the standard codex numeration.

54. E.g. 26:1140bc; 27:1140e; 31–32:1142b–d.

55. See GMW 1.205 and his commentary throughout.

His position is rather conservative, quoting criticism against the decadence of music in the theaters in contrast to the ancient ideal of character formation through music (15.1136b; 27.1140de). He defends Plato and musicians who follow similar principles against attacks from adherents of the “new style” by assuring that the formers’ approval or use of only few *harmoniai*, narrowness of range, or fewness of notes does not stem from ignorance but better judgment (17.1136e–22.1138c).⁵⁶ Traditional music used to be more complex in rhythm, the current one is more complex in melody,⁵⁷ and the elders omitted certain features that now count as modern because they had no utility (χρεία) for very specific purposes—in Plato’s case, for his State (21.1137f–1138c).

After explaining the historical development of the different musical elements and, embedded into this account, confronting the old and new style, the author presents the mathematical underpinnings of interval theory for which he sets out from Platonic-Aristotelian considerations and moves on to mere (neo-)Pythagorean ones, not without relishing their logical consistency and concordance, which is embedded in a cosmic-divine harmony to which humans have access through sight and hearing (then considered the noblest of senses) (22.1138c–24.1140b). All of this had motivated the ancient Greeks to include music as an essential element in education in order to

mould and structure the souls of the young through music towards gracefulness and decorum, evidently on the grounds that music is of value in dealing with all circumstances and for every action that is seriously undertaken, and especially in facing the dangers of wars.⁵⁸

After a longer treatment of technical details to explain the elements that compose musical ethos—supposedly following closely Aristoxenus—the author concludes with a portrayal of the general usefulness of music by appraising the ethos acquired through education in it and drawing from the stock of legends about Achilles (Hom. *Il.* 9.186–189), Terpander, Thaletas,⁵⁹ and the Achaeans appeasing Apollo (Hom. *Il.* 1.472–474). The two foremost functions of music are grateful

56. See for the same idea AQ 2.7 65.12–18 who adds that some aspects of music (“τὰ ἀπορρητότερα”) were purposefully kept secret; cf. GMW 2.469 n. 64.

57. Cf. Ath. 14.622c about a “new, virginal, undefiled” Bacchic procession song: “pouring simple rhythm with varied melody (“ἀπλοῦν ῥυθμὸν χέοντες αἰόλω μέλει”).

58. 26.1140b–c: “τῶν γὰρ νέων τὰς ψυχὰς ᾤοντο δεῖν διὰ μουσικῆς πλαττεῖν τε καὶ ῥυθμίζειν ἐπὶ τὸ εὖσχημον, χρησίμης δηλονότι τῆς μουσικῆς ὑπαρχούσης πρὸς πάντα καιρὸν καὶ πᾶσαν ἐσπουδασμένην πράξιν, προηγουμένως δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολεμικοὺς κινδύνους” (tr. Barker GMW 1.232).

59. For details on these stories, see ch. 2, n. 79.

recompense to the gods and creating harmony in the soul (42.1146c); next comes its sobering and calming function at symposia as a result of music's order (τάξις) and due proportion (συμμετρία). The greatest and most serious matter, however, the celestial motion based on musical harmony, is postponed “for another occasion”—and thus remains to be taken up by other authors (e.g. Nicomachus, Theon, Ptolemy, and Aristides Quintilianus). The new trends, no longer mentioned here, have no chance to comply with these sublime tasks that are entrusted to music.

Athenaeus

Within the *Deipnosophistae*,⁶⁰ that monumental assembly of excerpts from authors throughout antiquity until ca. 200 AD—again within the setting of a dinner party—, there is one section dedicated in particular to themes that refer to the value of music, apart from a few isolated comments that I refer to elsewhere. The general fertility and usefulness of music as a “treasure” for education is acknowledged (623f) as well as its ability to calm down temper and heal diseases (623f–624a). Athenaeus has the origin and ethos⁶¹ of the various *harmoniai* discussed, which, according to Heraclides of Pontus (fourth c. BC, in 624c), are reduced to three (Dorian, Aeolian, Ionian/Iastian).⁶² A direct correspondence between the different ethnic temperaments and their music as reflected in the *harmoniai* is drawn; it is noticeable that none receives unqualified praise: Pratinas declares the Aeolian to be preferred as the intermediate, not Dorian—usually the unchallenged favorite, which he calls “severe” (σύντονος).⁶³ Also the other *harmoniai* receive not very unified characterizations, depending on the author, and some, like the Ionian, have also changed over time (624c–626a).

Music is useful in war for several reasons, not only to instill bravery in the soldiers but also to soften the hearts of opponents during negotiations (626e–627e). It plays a beneficial (and sobering) role at feasts and in tempering character in

60. Text and tr. of the here pertinent section: Gulick 1937; Olson 2011; tr. and comm. (excerpts): GMW 1.258–304.

61. He emphasizes that a *harmonia* must have ethos or pathos (passion/emotion) (625e: “δεῖ δὲ τὴν ἁρμονίαν εἶδος ἔχειν ἥθους ἢ πάθους”).

62. I shall not list all the characteristics here; they are given in the synoptic table in the appendix. There is a different triad in 635d and 637d: Dorian, Phrygian, and Lydian (according to Anacreon and Pythagoras respectively).

63. This term has sometimes positive connotation (e.g. Strabo 10.4.16), but negative in Arist. *Pol.* 1290a27 where it is associated to despotism. Solomon 1981, 98 n. 33, attempts to parallel these *harmoniai* with the *ēthē* in Cleonides; see below about this author's exposition. For a discussion of the modes as presented here see also Winnington-Ingram 1936, 18–21.

general, even for the gods (627e–f). Worship of the gods proceeds in a more dignified way if music and prayer are joined, and so music does not appear in the feasts of Dionysius for pleasure only. Interestingly, the Spartans are praised for having rescued music three times from destruction (627f–628b).⁶⁴ Music can exercise and sharpen the mind and can influence the soul, according to the kind of songs, in a positive or negative way. Reference is made to Damon's theory of the correspondence between aesthetics and morality (see below); ethos and musical (or dance) expression need to be in agreement, dance, which is indecent or beyond the proper measure (ἄμέτρως)⁶⁵ reveals a soul of the same kind; also text (content) and dance should correspond—and if they don't, the person is considered reprobate (ἰσώκομος) (628c–d)—we see another clear reflection of Plato's "ethical triangle" here (see p. 223). Dance is also acclaimed for its ability to train for military matters (628e). A nice rule slightly critical to contemporary flamboyancy stems from the *aulos* teacher Caphisias: "Not in the big lies the good, but in the good the big."⁶⁶ What follows is a long list of different dance types, which we shall not analyze since dances do not fall directly into our investigation (a few of them, those which in ethos are characterized in similar terms as music, are marked in the table in the appendix). Noteworthy is the claim that wars ceased after a particular war dance (πυρρίχη) was discontinued; it is tempting to think that the author has some causality in mind, as if the dance had indeed created a proclivity to wars (631a–b).⁶⁷

Every now and again, a sigh of nostalgia for the beauty and nobility in the "old times" is voiced when all elements had their proper order and beauty according to the art:⁶⁸ *auloi* were "in harmony" with the *harmoniai* that they would play, whereas at present time music is made at random (εἰκῇ) and irrationally (ἁλόγως). Catering

64. "μουσικήν (...) φασιν τρις ἥδη σεωκέναι διαφθειρομένην." Various commentators suggest these to be the instances of Terpander (Ath. 635f; ps.-Plut. *Mus.* 9.1134b–c), Timotheus (Ath. 636e), and Phrynis (Ath. 638c; Plut. *Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus* 13 = *Mor.* 84a). He uses the same word "διαφθείρω" as ps.-Plut. *Mus.* 1140e; cf. also Pl. *Resp.* 424d. About the use of Spartan discipline against musical excesses, see also Csapo 2004, 243–245, with a vase illustration of Phrynis' fate.

65. Gulick in n. e *ad loc.* points out that this term may also mean "immodestly." Barker (GMW 1.287 n. 135) phrases the whole idea this way: "The music that a soul learns to enjoy determines its character, and its character determines what music it will create and enjoy." Cf. AQ 2.14 80.25–29: this is one of the passages Rossi 1988, 242, cites as evidence for symposia as sources for Damon's ethos theory.

66. "οὐκ ἐν τῷ μεγάλῳ τὸ εὖ κείμενον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἐν τῷ εὖ τὸ μέγα" (629b).

67. He says that only the Spartans continued the dance, but also that the dance became more moderate and had a most beautiful melody (κάλλιστα μέλη) attached to it.

68. Ath. 631e: "τὸ δὲ παλαιὸν ἐτηρεῖτο περὶ τὴν μουσικήν τὸ καλὸν καὶ πάντ' εἶχε κατὰ τὴν τέχνην τὸν οἰκεῖον αὐτοῖς κόσμον/In the old days a noble beauty was carefully preserved in

to the applause of the crowds was previously a sign of bad art (κακοτεχνία) but now has become the musicians' objective.⁶⁹ His key witness is no one less than the distinguished musician Aristoxenus whose complaint about the loss of musical character training in favor of mere theater spectacles we have already quoted above. As a remedy, Athenaeus suggests philosophy along the lines of Pythagoras, relating music with wisdom (σοφία)⁷⁰ and thus giving music its proper weight since the whole universe is composed through it (632b–c).⁷¹ This theme returns a bit later when exemplified by the intrusion of lawlessness and change of ethos: making good music (τὸ χρηστομουσεῖν) supposes not violating the ancient musical laws; rather, whenever adherence to the laws dissolved, the style became mean (φαῦλος), exchanging gentleness (πραότης) with softness (μαλακία) and moderation (σωφροσύνη) with licentiousness (ἀκολασία) and relaxation (ἄνεσις) (633b–c). No direct causality between moral and musical decline is stated, but it seems music appears, as we shall see it in Cicero, a manifestation of the general situation. At the end of a lengthy discussion of various instruments, especially the *magadis*, the discourse on music ends with some further words on musical decadence, mentioning songs of a wretched (μοχθηρός) *nomos*⁷² that stand in no comparison to Terpander or Phrynis (638c).

In summary, Athenaeus treats the advantages that music brings for education and healing, both physically and psychologically, but also for war, feasting, and worship. Given the close relationship between beauty and goodness (or ugliness and evil), a decay in musical style is seen to go along with deteriorating morals. Much of what he says here we shall also find, phrased differently, in Plato. On the other hand, it is astonishing that Athenaeus recounts all the advantages and uses of music as if no doubt about them had ever existed; not a single time (in his whole *opus magnum* with hundreds of authors quoted) does he mention the skeptics of musical ethos, Philodemus or Sextus Empiricus—either he simply does not know them or, what may be more probable, tacitly ignores them.

music, and every aspect kept to the orderliness proper to it, in conformity with the principles of the art" (tr. Barker GMW 1.291).

69. Ath. 631f: "τέλος ποιοῦνται τῆς τέχνης τὴν παρὰ τοῖς θεάτροις εὐημερίαν."

70. With Barker (GMW 1.292 n. 162) we should note that Athenaeus does not mean here "sophists" in the sense of a philosophical school but "expert," "practitioner of a skill."

71. Ath. 632c: "τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οὐσίαν διὰ μουσικῆς ἀποφαίνει συγκεκλιμένην."

72. This term refers to "any traditionally established melodic pattern" (Anderson 1966, 55).

Development in Roman Times

The debate about musical taste and decadence finds its way into Roman culture,⁷³ especially once Greek artists start flooding Rome after 146 BC. This influx prompts a boost in musical activity but also polarizes people between enthusiastic adorers of exuberant Hellenistic fashion and those who disapprove the loss of the *severitas iucunda* in the melodies of Livius Andronicus and Naevius.⁷⁴ Also here, artistic and moral license are going hand in hand. Thus it is not surprising that, like in Sparta, even legal action is taken to impose “restrictions on the performances of the Greek virtuosi and on the use of instruments other than the tibia” by means of an edict in 115 BC.⁷⁵ However, these measures do not prove capable of stemming the avalanche of attractive novelty.

Latin authors largely echo the criticism voiced during early Hellenism (especially by Aristophanes, Plato, and Aristoxenus). On the aesthetic level they speak against decorative exuberance and sweetness in style, the excessive virtuosity and showmanship to please the mushy taste of the masses and to earn the greatest applause in the theaters; the Romans (and the Greeks among them) continue the Hellenistic trend to ever more spectacular, massive, and sophisticated performances, at the same time coarsening the aesthetic quality.⁷⁶ Within the historical context, the official promotion of ecstatic musical inebriation during public spectacles can be interpreted as an easy and effective means of the ruling classes to entertain, appease, or, if needed, electrify the masses otherwise hard to control.⁷⁷

73. A more detailed account of these developments can be found in Comotti 1989, 51–54 and Wille 1967, 326–357 (with particular attention to the musical dilettantism at Nero’s court) from whom I have drawn some elements.

74. Roman poets, both late third c. BC. See e.g. Cicero in *Leg.* 2.15.39; the passage will be discussed with more detail on p. 300.

75. Comotti 1989, 51 with n. 5.

76. For a more detailed description of these phenomena, see Wille 1967, 327–329.

77. Cf. Carl Johann Perl, quoted in Wille 1967, 328 n. 295: *“Ihnen galt die Musik bloß noch als eines der bequemsten Hilfsmittel, um die immer schwerer beherrschbare Menge bei Laune zu halten, abzulenken, einzulullen, zu entnerven und gegebenenfalls aufzuputschen. Gerade die Sinnfälligkeit der Musik war es, die das beste Werkzeug abgab, um die erstrebten Wirkungen zu erzielen. Musik als reine Magie, als Förderin vitaler Affekte, als Reizmotor der Extatik, der Erotik, der kollektiven Verdemütigung unter eine irdische Gewalt, mit einem Wort, Musik als Bindeglied zwischen Menschheit und irdischer Fesselung: so tritt uns die weltliche Musik jener Zeit entgegen.”* For them, music counted no longer as more than one of the most comfortable means to entertain, distract, appease, enervate, and, as needed, inflame crowds that were ever more difficult to dominate. It was precisely the sensuality of music that provided the best tool to achieve the desired effects. Music as pure magic, as promoter of vital affects,

On the ethical level, the authors continue to be concerned for one part about the decline of a positive pedagogical use to form young souls in simplicity, virility, and respect for law and tradition, for the other part about an increase of sensuality and licentiousness provoked by soft emotivity, at times paired with indecent dance practices.⁷⁸ A few testimonies from different periods follow to illustrate these points.

Regarding aesthetics and style, Cicero contrasts the florid, soft-adorned mode of singing with a more sober one—, which apparently even the multitude seems to prefer; an observation that seems to contradict many others witnesses. Regardless, as in oratory, extreme sensations do not last long.⁷⁹ To avoid tediousness, along with decoration one has to know how to pause, cut back, and offer variety.⁸⁰ Quintilian, who advocates strongly the inclusion of musical training for orators, rejects with equal vehemence the “effeminate” and shameless contemporary “disjointed” style, which has razed what was left of manly vigor; neither does he want to hear of the psalterium and *spadix*,⁸¹ to be refused even by modest girls. For his purpose serves only the music sung of and by strong men—the music that manages to

as a stimulating motor of ecstasy, of eroticism, of a collective submission under an earthly power, in one word, music as link between humanity and mundane captivation: in this way the secular music of that time presents itself to us” (from Perl’s introduction to the first German edition of Augustine’s *De musica* from 1937).

78. See for this e.g. Plut. *De esu carnum* 2.2 (= *Mor.* 997b–c) as discussed below (at n. 265), and the passage in Macrobius referred to in n. 91.
79. *De or.* 3.25.98: “*Quanto molliores sunt et delicatiores in cantu flexiones et falsae voculae quam certae et severae! quibus tamen non modo austeri sed si saepius fiunt multitudo ipsa reclamant.*” How much softer and more refined the bends and artificial utterances are in song than the firm and severe (melodies)! However, if they are used more frequently, not only austere people but also the crowd protests at them.” Quintilian observes the same regarding the other senses and oratory and shows how intense sensations lose their power after a first extreme impact, even up to creating disgust.
80. *De or.* 3.25.100: “*Possumus iudicare [orationem] concinnam, distinctam, ornatam, festivoam, sine intermissione, sine reprehensione, sine varietate (...) non posse in delectatione esse diuturna.*” We can judge that a speech that is orderly, distinct, decorate, jovial, but without pause, without restraint, without variety (...) cannot be of lasting enjoyment.” About the point of variety see below under Dionysius and Hippocrates. Cicero’s point of view on music and ethos will be discussed in the section dedicated to him.
81. According to the OLD, the word “*spadix*” occurs only here as an instrument (perhaps because of its “chestnut” color) and hence we cannot tell what sort of (assumably stringed) instrument this was and why it was so reproachable. What *melodia fracta*, mentioned by various authors, exactly was is not completely clear either; we might think of the repercussion-effect that Aristophanes already ridiculized in Euripides.

move or calm the emotions.⁸² He gives reasons for this position in a later part of the *Institutio* where he reiterates the preference of harshness over weakness because the sweeter the rhythm is, the more monotonous and less emotionally effective it becomes.⁸³ This reasoning is more motivated for the orator by the objective to impress a judge properly, but nevertheless it reflects in a concrete context the role attributed to the ethos of sound. Quintilian frequently criticizes the current speaking style in court, which shows characteristics similar to those of the New Music.⁸⁴

Several authors parody musicians for their eccentricity, so Varro in his satire "Ὀνος λύρας (*Asinus ad lyram*),⁸⁵ or Horace when mocking the capricious singer (and rival) Tigellius as an example for extremism both in his singing style and in his private life,⁸⁶ or Petronius in several instances during his account of Trimalchio's dinner party.⁸⁷ Ovid dissuades a heartbroken lover from visiting the theaters

82. 1.10.31: "*non hanc [musicam] a me praecipi, quae nunc in scenis effeminata et impudicis modis fracta non ex parte minima, si quid in nobis virilis roboris manebat, excidit, sed qua laudes fortium canebantur, quaque ipsi fortes canebant; nec psalteria et spadicas, etiam virginibus prolis recusanda, sed cognitionem rationis, quae ad movendos leniendosque adfectus plurimum valet.*" The music taught by me is not the one which is now on the stages—effeminate and structured by shameless modes, has destroyed to no little measure what of manly strength remained in us, if any—, but the one which was sung as praise of strong men and which the strong men themselves sang; not psalters and strings, to be shunned even by young women of low birth, but the recognition of the measure that has the ability to move and appease the passions of many."

83. 9.4.142–143: "*duram potius atque asperam compositionem malim esse quam effeminatam et enervem, qualis apud multos et cotidie magis lascivissimis syntonorum modis saltat (...); quoque est dulcius, magis perdit amittitque et fidem et adfectus motusque omnes.*" I would prefer a hard and harsh composition rather than an effeminate and weak one, which jumps to many and today more in most impudent rhythms of castanets (...); and the softer it is, the more it ruins and loses confidence and all emotions and dynamics."

84. Take, for instance, 11.3.58: "*Quid vero movendis adfectibus contrarium magis quam, cum dolendum irascendum indignandum commiserandum sit, non solum ab his adfectibus in quos inducendus est iudex, recedere, sed ipsam fori sanctitatem ludiorum talariorum licentia solvere? (...) nos etiam cantandi severiorem paulo modum excessimus.*" What is certainly more contrary to move the emotions than when not only the judge, who is to feel sorry or get angry or indignant or compassionate, withdraws from these emotions to which he is to be induced, but also the licence of such entertainments dissolves the very dignity of the court?"

85. One of his Menippean satires, very fragmentary; for the text see e.g. Riese 1865; Astbury 1985.

86. Hor. *Sat.* 1.2.1–6; 1.3.1–19.

87. E.g. 28–33, 64, 69.

for their enervating performances of cithara, pipe, lyre, and singing.⁸⁸ Pliny the Younger, a few generations later, offers a rare testimony of that the taste of the audience has changed to the better: whereas in the past the theater induced the musicians to apply a bad style, the improved preference for *severitas* has him hope that this will rub off on the musicians as well.⁸⁹ Apparently, this positive trend did not last long. Ammianus Marcellinus (ca. 330–395) tells of the closing of libraries and study houses for the sake of amusement and the construction of instruments like lyres as big as chariots (14.6.18)—a testimony of cultural decline while simultaneously engrossing through musical extravagances.

With regards to the ethical impact, Macrobius (*Sat.* 3.14.4–14) reports complaints, reaching back to the times of Scipio Africanus the Younger,⁹⁰ that at his time even upper class boys and girls would learn how to act, dance to the cro-tala, play the sambuca and psalterium and learn to sing, and that together with “cinaedi.”⁹¹ Another problem was the type of dances which they learned, “*quam saltationem impudicus servulus honeste saltare non posset*/a dance which a shameless little slave could not honorably perform” (id. 7). That some of these artists were important public figures or gained respect and support, in the eyes of the author

88. Ov. *Rem. am.* 751–754: “*At tanti tibi sit non indulgere theatri, dum bene de vacuo pectore cedat amor. Enervant animos citharae lotosque lyraeque et vox et numeris brachia mota suis*/But you should not indulge so much in theaters, while love retreats well from an empty heart. Citharas and lutes and lyres and the voice and arms moved to their rhythms weaken the spirits.” Admittedly, this case is not universally applicable, but the ideas behind it are similar to what other authors say.

89. *Ep.* 3.18.9: “*hac severitate aurium laetor, ac sicut olim theatra male musicos canere docuerunt, ita nunc in spem adducor posse fieri, ut eadem theatra bene canere musicos doceant. Omnes enim, qui placendi causa scribunt, qualia placere viderint scribent.*”/I am happy about this severity of ears [i.e. the severe taste of those who listen], and, such as once the theaters taught the musicians to sing badly, so now I am induced to hope that it become possible that the same theaters may teach the musicians to sing well.” This is quite the opposite of how Plato believes things should work: the musician should responsibly influence the audience, not the other way round.

90. Dated at 133 BC, see Kaster 2011, 99.

91. “(...) *quae maiores nostri ingenuis probro ducier voluerunt*/what our ancestors wished to consider a disgrace for free-borns” (id. 7). On the sociological level, the problem was that free-born were engaged with things that were considered below their dignity, i.e. being trained like professional musicians or entertainers (see id. 5: “*reprehendit non quod saltare, sed quod optime scierit*”/[Sallust] rebukes not that [Sempronia] danced, but that she knew it perfectly”), and that these youngsters learned it amidst *cinaedi* (sodomites; about the link between the *cinaedi* and “corrupted” poetry see Strabo 14.1.41; Varro *Sat. Men.* 353).

only adds to prove the increasing corruption of the time.⁹² Idleness and immorality of young people's life find the Elder Seneca's disapproval towards the end of the Republic, a life marked by the general tendency of effeminacy, which is reflected in their musical practices.⁹³ The Younger Seneca blows into the same horn when he lectures on how man has fallen into luxury and made the soul a slave to the body's lust; one manifestation are the soft movements of the body (dancing) and soft and weakened songs.⁹⁴

Tacitus describes how under Emperor Nero (54–68 AD), theater music and moral decline coincide, especially among youth, and refers concern that weak sound and sweet voices will not enable them to enact justice and occupy noble offices.⁹⁵

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92. Wille 1967, 326 thinks that Macrobius here and in 2.1.5 (*"ut puella ex industria supra naturam mollior canora dulcedine et saltationis lubrico exerceret inlecebris philosophantes"*) that a girl, through her skill smoother than out of nature, would stimulate through inticements those who were philosophizing with sonorous sweetness and the glide of dance") actually approved such practices, but this goes counter the repeated remarks of the participants of the *Saturnalia* that they are living in a time morally superior to the previous when these things took place (e.g. 3.14.3: *"de alia lascivia qua nunc caremus admoneo"*/I remind you of other vices of which we now abstain").
93. *Controv.* 1 pref. 8: *"Torpent ecce ingenia desidiosae iuventutis nec in unius honestae rei labore vigilatur: somnus languorque ac somno et languore turpior malarum rerum industria invasisit animos, cantandi saltandique obscena studia effeminatos tenent, et capillum frangere et ad muliebres blanditias extenuare vocem, molliitia corporis certare cum feminis et immundissimis se expolire munditiis nostrorum adolescentium specimen est"*/Behold, the talents of a slothful youth languish, nor is there attentiveness to the performance of one honest thing: sleep and apathy and the pursuit of things more disgraceful than sleep and apathy invades the minds; the indecent devotion to singing and dancing keeps them effeminate, and the ideal of our young people is to break up the hair and to sing with thin voice womanish charms, to compete with women over the softness of the body and to refine oneself with most impure manners."
94. Sen. *Ep.* 90.19: *"hinc molliitia molles corporis motus docentium mollesque cantus et infractos"* hence the softness of those teaching soft body movements and the soft and disjointed/effeminate songs;" cf. *Ep.* 114.1. Eccentricity and dilettantism produced at times such absurd phenomena as Nero's own musical escapades (see Wille 1967, 332–338).
95. *Ann.* 14.20–21: *"ceterum abolitos paulatim patrios mores funditus everti per accitam lasciviam, ut quod usquam corrumpi et corrumpere queat in urbe visatur, degeneretque studiis externis iuventus, gymnasia et otia et turpis amores exercendo, principe et senatu auctoribus, qui non modo licentiam vitiis permiserint, sed vim adhibeant ut proceres Romani specie orationum et carminum scaena polluantur. (...) an iustitiam auctum iri et decurias equitum egregium iudicandi munus expleturos, si fractos sonos et dulcedinem vocum perite audissent?"*/Moreover, the ancestral customs, gradually rescinded, were utterly subverted by an introduced wantonness, so that whatever was able to be corrupted or corrupt was seen everywhere in the city [of Rome],

Plutarch deplores that *κακομουσία* in dancing has tyrannically subjugated almost all music to her capricious and mindless theater performances—“it thus has lost honor with men who have intelligence and are divine.”⁹⁶ In Quintilian we have a harsh critic of an overindulged education practice at private homes, which is aggravated further by the licentious and obscene music performances in dinner parties—thus the new generation cannot avoid adopting a pampered lifestyle.⁹⁷

Overall, we can find widespread unanimity among the Roman authors in that manly, severe, even harsh ethos is to be pursued over a weak, “effeminate,” relaxed style.

Conclusion

Ingemar Düring⁹⁸ observes that the criterion for the distinction between good and bad music “is remarkably unchanging. Contemporary music is nearly always regarded as a depravation. It is usually characterized as dissolute and effeminate and as having a destructive effect on the human soul.” While it is true that modern styles, in all areas of culture, tend to provoke resistance from conservative

and the youth degenerated through foreign pursuits, by dedicating themselves to sports and leisure and shameful loves, with the support of the emperor and the senate who not only granted licence for vices but used force that the Roman nobles would dishonor themselves on the stage with the show of speeches and songs. (...) Would justice spread and would they fulfill the eminent duty of judging as the cavalry division if they listened skillfully to disjointed sounds and the sweetness of the voices?”

96. *Quaest. conv.* 9.15.2 = *Mor.* 748d: “καὶ γὰρ αὕτη καὶ πάνδημόν τινα ποιητικὴν προσεταιρισμένη τῆς δ’ οὐρανίας ἐκπεσοῦς ἐκείνης τῶν μὲν ἐμπλήκτων καὶ ἀνοήτων κρατεῖ θεάτρων, ὥσπερ τύραννος ὑπήκοον ἑαυτῇ πεποιημένη μουσικὴν ὀλίγου τὴν ἅπασαν, τὴν δὲ παρὰ τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσι καὶ θείοις ἀνδράσιν ὡς ἀληθῶς τιμὴν ἀπολώλεκε/and after [dancing] associated itself with some vulgar poetry and fell away from the heavenly kind, on the one hand it rules over senses and mindless spectacles, having made, like a tyrant, almost all music subject to itself, and on the other hand really has lost honor among those who have a mind and who are godly men.” Sandbach 1961 in n. b *ad loc.* explains that Plutarch may have in mind the *pantomimi*: “the dancer was here the star performer (and often popular idol), supported by musicians and a choir whose songs were explanatory of the dance, whereas in the ideal *hyporchema* of the moralist dance and song were on an equal footing, and dancer and singer the same person.” For more on Plutarch’s comments on music see below in the section dedicated to him.

97. 1.2.6–8: “*Mollis illa educatio, quam indulgentiam vocamus, nervos omnes mentis et corporis frangit.* (...) *omne convivium obscenis canticis strepit, pudenda dictum spectantur*/Feeble is that education which we call leniency, it breaks all vigor of mind and body. (...) Any banquet resounds of indecent songs, things are watched that are shameful to mention.”

98. 1958, 175.

defenders of tradition (among the ancients at the forefront are to be mentioned Aristophanes and Plato),⁹⁹ the argument of musical ethos seems to lead beyond banal conservatism (“the old is better”), but offer reasons why specific modernizing trends could indeed be problematic. The observation that problematic trends are often new ones could be accounted for by the fact that novelties have a greater impact than things people are familiar with, but if they pose a problem, it must lie less in their newness as such but in their ethos.

Therefore, after having outlined some general traits of the controversy between the two main contrasting tendencies in the practice of ancient music, often referred to simply as the “old” and the “new,” it is now necessary to examine more closely the reasons for the relentless criticism of the “new” musical trends and styles. For this, we shall now engage in the systematic discussion of the various traditions of ancient musical thought about the question of musical ethos and its foundations and applications.

Music and Cosmos—Musical Ethos in Education and Therapy

“The whole life of man requires good rhythm and harmony.”¹⁰⁰ This phrase could be a motto to sum up a good deal of what the Pythagorean-Platonic view of music is about. In the current section we shall study the probably oldest and most influential tradition, which begins by linking music to natural and cosmic laws. These are often expressed in mathematical terms to allow a better understanding and determining of the interior workings of music (especially tuning, intervals, scales, rhythms, and the construction of instruments), but also to systematically put music at the service of specific preconceived political, social, moral, religious, and even therapeutic objectives.

99. Anderson 1966, 56 speaks of a “healthy transition from one predominant style to another (...). It is a debated question whether Plato and Aristophanes were simply reactionaries, resisting the natural course of development, or whether they justly diagnosed pathological symptoms. Musicologists tend to take the former view and philologists the latter, as might have been predicted.” This comment is made in the context of the particular problem of mixing instrumental and vocal melodic patterns (*nomoi*) in “new music,” which led to a more ornate singing style.

100. Pl. *Prt.* 326b: “πᾶς γὰρ ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εὐρυθμίας τε καὶ εὐαρμοστίας δεῖται.” Cf. Phld. *Mus.* 1.32 D49; 1.13 D22.

The Pythagoreans

Pythagoras and his school,¹⁰¹ highly influential on Greek science and thought, can be credited with the first traceable theoretical reflections of music's power and value,¹⁰² according to which, if the biographers can be trusted here, they also lived. Furthermore, their tenets on the power of music are integrated into an organic view of the whole cosmos, expressed in mathematical terms, and thus they are setting the stage for one of the two main traditions of music theory in antiquity.¹⁰³ Much of this will be taken up and further developed by Plato and his followers.

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101. Strictly speaking, there is not a unified Pythagorean school, but rather a group of thinkers who branch out from similar roots in different directions; for our purpose, however, it is sufficient to refer simply to the "Pythagoreans" in the sense of what has been ascribed to this tradition, always with the caveat that not all participants may have agreed on every aspect. Furthermore, the inclusion of Neo-Platonists as witnesses in this discussion is justified in matters of our topic because the Platonic school draws heavily from the Pythagoreans, and Theon (12) states that Plato himself followed them in many ways. A balanced overview of the Pythagorean tradition based on the results of modern scholarship can be found in Kahn 2001 who also summarizes and discusses well sources, ideas, and the historical development.
 102. Neubecker 1994, 128: *Es war "anscheinend die Schule des Pythagoras, die als erste die Beziehung Musik-Seele in den Dienst der Erziehung und Seelenformung gestellt hat/It was apparently the school of Pythagoras, which first put the relationship between music and the soul at the service of education and the forming of the soul."* At the same time, she points out that the origins for a differentiated view of the effect of music are probably older, and shares with Abert 1899 and Anderson 1966 the hypothesis that it was prompted by the influx of oriental music or even directly imported from the East.
 103. "The whole being of the universe is held together by music" (quoted in Ath. 632c). Philolaus in DK 44 B 6 sees in harmony the principle that allows order in the universe, so as to unite what is unequal. Kahn 2001, 3–4 records the "notion of a network of connections between music, mathematics, and celestial phenomena, which is summed up in the notion of the music of the spheres" as one of two "clusters of ideas" that are most peculiarly Pythagorean, the other being the conception of the soul as immortal along with the cycle of reincarnation. Kahn, after pondering the sources, also argues in favor of attributing mathematical and philosophical reflections to the historical Pythagoras and that it is not a "fabrication of Plato's school", within the Milesian cosmology and natural philosophy (2001, 14–17).

Boccardo 2002 presents a perspicacious study to show how changing philosophical principles are responsible for the historical development of musical ethos down to Aristides Quintilianus—a work, which has found surprisingly little attention. He accounts how the attribution of ethos emerges from early conceptions about natural forces analogous to medicine and dedicates much space to the Presocratics and the Pythagorean view. In his interpretation, the latter attributed ethos to the single notes and their combination rather than

Of Pythagoras himself there remains no written word, and from his immediate followers only sparse fragments of text survive; however, multiple authors quote his theories directly or indirectly, either to agree or disagree with him. From the Middle Platonist Theon of Smyrna¹⁰⁴ we learn about Pythagorean mathematics, astronomy, and musical cosmology. One of the most prominent collectors of information on his life and doctrine, although quite late, is Iamblichus, a Syrian Neo-Platonic philosopher (ca. 245–325 AD) who discusses this matter especially in his work *De vita pythagorica*.¹⁰⁵ It is neither possible nor necessary to discuss here what testimonies and positions are properly attributed to this school and what is historical or rather legendary. Walter Burkert did not give much credit to Pythagoras in terms of philosophical or scientific achievement, whereas Charles Kahn and others give some credibility to later reports about the existence of, as well as certain practices and believes of, an early “brotherhood.”¹⁰⁶ Kahn does not discuss in particular how reliable the descriptions of Pythagorean practices of “music therapy” and ethos-shaping are, but there is no reason for considering other practices more historical than these, besides they are mentioned in a good number of authors. It is hard to imagine that “Pythagorean musicology” or “mystical mathematics” “never had anything to do with character observation and induction,” as Anderson claims,¹⁰⁷ rather, as we shall see, a connection between these two realities, even though not explicitly stated by the later biographers, is quite likely.

to structural elements as in the later philosophers who entertained different ideas about the relationship between matter and form, body and soul, and the theory of perception.

Barker in GMW 2.3–8 contrasts Pythagorean with Aristoxenian writers; see id. 28–29 on the significance of the school for music in general. See also Neubecker 1994, 128–130; Mathiesen 199, 412–426 (on Theon).

104. Quoted with page and line number from Eduard Hiller’s Teubner text from 1878; Lawlor 1979 provides a not always very literal or reliable English translation. See also Mathiesen 1990, 44–48; id. 1999, 412–429, and some excerpts in Joscelyn 1993, 16–20.

105. Text for *VP*: Deubner/Klein 1975; tr. Taylor 1818; for *De mysteriis (Myst)*: tr. Taylor 1821; Wilder 1911; Clarke *et al.* 2003. About Iamblichus see also Kahn 2001, 133–137; Neubecker 1994, 129–130 n. 7.

106. Burkert 1962/1972; Kahn 2001, viii–ix and 8–13. Whoever might have brought up first these ideas, in our context we shall treat them as Pythagorean for lack of evidence in favor of some other concrete source. Most contemporary scholars on music theory still work under the supposition that the early Pythagoreans (even if it was not Pythagoras himself) were the first to develop some sort of harmonic system; cf. most recently Barker 2014 and Bond 2014.

107. Anderson 1966, 130. Waerden 1943, 164–178, argues that also the Pythagoreans first departed from general experience, then formed their theories, and later, when challenged, submitted them to experiment.

For the ethical consideration of music, the Pythagoreans have laid important groundwork by distinguishing more precisely the nature of concordant and discordant intervals, based on mathematical proportions;¹⁰⁸ these proportions, for their part, correspond to similar ones in other areas of nature so that almost everything can be described by numbers, culminating in the assumption of a cosmic harmony, which keeps everything together and in order.¹⁰⁹ Music, then, appears as “a physical manifestation of cosmic harmony,”¹¹⁰ wherefore the study of musical proportions raises the philosopher to the realm of the universe—philosophy itself is described in musical terms or even called the “greatest music.”¹¹¹ The human soul is embedded in this universal harmony, and it seems that Philolaus taught that also the human soul itself is a harmony (by harmonizing opposites of the body) or has a harmony (harmonized parts of the soul).¹¹²

108. Theon 8.13–17 offers an eloquent eulogy about the value of numbers, commenting on the (pseudo-Platonic) *Epinomis* (977d), which states that number is the human way to understand the world: “number, as the source of all that is good, could not be the cause of any ‘evil.’ On the contrary, that, which is devoid of number lacks any sort of reason; it is without order, without beauty, without grace and ultimately deprived of all perfections” (tr. Lawlor 1979, 5).

109. References in GMW 2.30–38; see in particular Arist. *Met.* 985b–986a; 1090a20–30 and, about the harmony of spheres, Arist. *Cael.* 290b12–291a29. Aristotle disagrees and finds these theories forced; as we shall see, Philodemus goes in his criticism even further. See also [Pl.] *Epin.* 991e. Heller-Roazen 2011 has recently popularized a legend of Pythagoras’ “omission” of discord and the thesis that reality cannot be comprehended without discordance.

110. Mathiesen 1990, 42. He also mentions a number of other ancient authors who elaborated on the connection between music and cosmos, as known through Porphyry’s commentary on Ptolemy’s *Harmonics*. According to Theon 12.11–12, the Pythagoreans define music as ἐναντίων συναρμογή (combination of opposites, such as unity-multiplicity; separately mindedness and agreement [Lawlor 1979, 7, translates: “accord with discord”]).

111. “ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὐσης μεγίστης μουσικῆς” in Pl. *Phd.* 61a, attributed to Pythagoras (without “μέγιστος”) in Strabo 10.3.10 in the context of the idea of cosmic harmony. Plato relates philosophy to the “true Muse” in *Resp.* 548b, which is neglected by those who prefer gymnastics over music. About the relationship between music and philosophy in Plato see Moutsopoulos 2002, 25–31.

112. GMW 2.39; cf. Kahn 2001, 23–30, 68–69. Plato refutes the idea of the soul being a harmony in *Phd.* 85e–86d & 91d–95a (see below n. 185 and Barker 2005, 73–74; Arist. *De an.* 407b28–408a34; Lucr. 3.131–135: musicians should keep the term harmony for themselves). The proposal that the soul *has* harmony is mentioned in Arist. *Pol.* 1340b18; see also GMW 2.39 n. 41. In Pl. *Ti.* 36e–37a the soul “participates” in reason and harmony (“λογισμοῦ δὲ μετέχουσα καὶ ἁρμονίας”). Aristoxenus (frs. 120a–d) has renewed the idea of the soul being the harmony for the body like for song or strings, cf. Cic. *Tusc.* 1.10.19–20,

Theon introduces music as the unifying factor for opposites,¹¹³ through which concord of things and the rule of the universe takes place—a truly divine matter.¹¹⁴ He highlights the importance of such consonance (συμφωνία), which is derived from mathematical principles,¹¹⁵ for it “has the greatest power, being truth in reason, felicity in life, and harmony in nature.”¹¹⁶ Hence, concordant sounds—referring to those, which show affinity (οικειότης) with, or sympathy (συμπάθεια) for, others—bear positive value because as a simultaneous chord they create the sensation of sweetness (ἡδεῖα) and soft tone (προσηνῆς φωνή) (51.2–4)—referring to the intervals of fourth, fifth, and octave. These considerations give a first idea of how these authors draw the connection between the cosmic, mathematical, and ethical realm. Another important example that points towards ethos can be found in Plutarch, who reports that the Pythagoreans introduced the distinction between

1.11.24, and 1.18.41 (where Aristoxenus is reprimanded for meddling with his love for songs in philosophy since “*membrorum vero situs et figura corporis vacans animo quam possit harmoniam efficere non video*/I do not see how the position of members and the form of a body without soul could produce harmony”); cf. Lactant. *De opificio Dei* 16.14–17: “*si quid in nobis esset harmoniae simile, ictu moveretur externo sicut nervi manibus*/If there were in us anything similar to harmony, it would be moved by an external stroke like the strings by hands” (in Wille 1967, 508 n. 170).

113. “τέλος γὰρ αὐτῆς τὸ ἐνοῦν τε καὶ συναρμόζειν” (12.14–15). This idea, even in musical terms, is also developed in Heraclitus, e.g. DK 22 B 8 (“Ἡ τὸ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον καὶ ἐκ τῶν διαφερόντων καλλίστην ἁρμονίαν/What is opposite [is] combined, and from the differing ones [arises] the best/most beautiful harmony”); B 51 (“παλίντροπος ἁρμονίη ὅκωσπερ τόξου καὶ λύρης/the contrary harmony/combining like bow and lyre”); B54 (“ἁρμονίη ἀφανὴς φανερῆς κρείττων/invisible harmony/combining is stronger than the visible”); cf. B 10 in [Arist.] *Mund.* 5.396b7–397a8 where, together with more examples from nature and the arts, the combination of high and low, long and short tones in diverse voices to one harmony is mentioned and the beauty (κόσμος) stemming from such order; cf. about this also Kahn 2001, 37, and Boccadoro 2002, 60–61.
114. Mathiesen 1999, 414, paraphrasing Theon 12.15–17: “The final purpose of music is to unite and harmonize, just as god is the harmonizer of dissonance through music and medicine.” Further: “ἐν μουσικῇ ἡ ὁμόνοια τῶν πραγμάτων, ἔτι καὶ ἀριστοκρατία τοῦ παντός/in music [lies] the accord of things, moreover even the best rule of everything” (12.18–19). That the Pythagoreans believed that the universe is created according to harmony is reported also in ps.-Plut. *Mus.* 44.1147a.
115. Theon (47.6–8) distinguishes “intelligible” and “perceptible” harmonies; the first are numbers, the second sound.
116. “ἐν λόγῳ μὲν οὐσα ἀλήθεια, ἐν βίῳ δὲ εὐδαιμονία, ἐν δὲ τῇ φύσει ἁρμονία” (47.1–3; tr. Lawlor 1979, 32).

odd numbers as male and even numbers as female.¹¹⁷ This distinction will become important especially in Aristides Quintilianus. Be it the rationality of proportions or the union of contraries (Philolaus), the *proper order* is the object of these reflections resulting in practical applications that pursue such order.¹¹⁸

Since, according to the Pythagoreans, music is responsible for creating consonance and harmony, it is understandable that Iamblichus (*VP* 15) attributes to Pythagoras the discovery of the healing power of beautiful rhythms and melodies as a remedy for problematic manners and passions.¹¹⁹ He and his followers supposedly applied melodies in specific genera (diatonic, chromatic, or enharmonic)¹²⁰ to temper the passions and lead them into the opposite direction; concrete examples are given how he used to calm down and purify his disciples in the evening and arouse them again in the morning through specific songs and modulations performed by the lyre or the voice. All these examples suggest an allopathic

117. *Quaest. Rom.* 102 = *Mor.* 288d. The reason he gives is this: “For the odd number is generative, and, when it is added to the even number, it prevails over it. And also, when they are divided into units, the even number, like the female, yields a vacant space between, while of the odd number an integral part always remains. Wherefore they think that the odd is suitable for the male, and the even for the female.” (tr. Babbitt 1936).

118. Cf. Ritoók 2001, 60.

119. This was certainly not a new idea—there are earlier literary references to musical healing, especially in the Orphic tradition (c.f. Moutsopoulos 2002, 32), but it is possible that the Pythagoreans were the first to make systematic use of it, based on speculative principles. Provenza 2012 analyzes the Aristoxenian fr. 26 Wehrli which mentions musical purification (“catharsis”) of the soul as practiced by the Pythagoreans, the historically earliest association between both (also attested later in Dio Chrys. *Or.* 32.57 and Plut. *De Is. et Os.* 80 = *Mor.* 384a); if Provenza’s interpretation of a *ritual* understanding of “catharsis” is correct, this allows us to assume that the testimony about “music therapy” among the early Pythagoreans is independent from Plato and Aristotle who had a different concept of it. The most recent analysis of Iamblichus’ account of musical ethos is Provenza 2015, contrasting it with the view of Porphyrius who excludes the concepts of catharsis and *paideia*. Wallace 2015, 195–200, rejects early Pythagorean ethos theory and credits Damon with having been the first.

120. It may be mentioned already here that the primary ethical force at the time around Plato and Aristotle (and probably earlier) seems to have been attributed to the *harmoniai*, melodic patterns (or “modes”) underlying melodies. This shifted shortly after, around the time when the Hibeh Papyrus was redacted, to the genus (a specific way of dividing up the basic unit of the tetrachord within a specific *harmonia*). Iamblichus as a late author assumes the genus as specifying the ethos, while we may presume that the Pythagoreans, if they worked with musical ethos, most probably rather focused on the *harmoniai*, just as Damon did.

approach.¹²¹ Pythagoras, for his part, is said to have enjoyed directly the “sublime symphonies of the world” and the harmony of the spheres in their “dissimilar and variously differing sounds, celerities, magnitudes and intervals,” based on ratios and “producing a most gentle (εὐμενεστάτης), and at the same time a variously beautiful (περικαλλεστάτης) motion and convolution.”¹²² This experience trained his mind so as to acquire an exceptional capacity for perception and wisdom. He tried to imitate (ἐκμιμέομαι) representations (“εἰκόνες”) of these sounds for his disciples by means of instruments and the voice so as to become conformed to them by a divine power. Out of all this wisdom his disciples were able only to grasp “images and examples” (ibid.).

The practical benefit of music is taken up again in ch. 25 and partially repeated and illustrated with more examples, especially for creating the proper ethos through communal musical activity, which, if properly done (“κατὰ τοὺς προσήκοντας τρόπους”: 25.110) would make the participants “delighted, harmonious, and orderly.” Pythagoras would compose particular melodies for purification of souls affected by depression, anger, and any perturbation, while he devised another type of melody against “desires” (“ἐπιθυμία,” probably meaning “lust”).¹²³ In addition to melody, dancing and the lyre are employed, while the *aulos*—because of its insolent and ostentatious character, not having the freeman’s sound—is not

121. Several other authors refer to the Pythagoreans about the idea of avoiding insomnia: Quint. 9.4.12 (lyra playing before going to sleep: “*lenire mentes, ut, si quid fuisset turbidiorum cogitationum, componerent;*” Cens. 12.4; Boeth. *Mus.* 1.1 185.26: “*ut Pythagorici quibusdam cantilenas uterentur ut eis lenis et quietus sompor increperet.*”

Ptol. *Harm.* 100.7–12 refers to this practice but in a slightly different way: according to him, Pythagoras had them in the morning be exposed to some rather calming musical setting so as to turn their confused souls into a settled and well-ordered condition before undertaking the activities of the day; cf. also Dio Chrys. *Or.* 32.57. About the allopathic method see e.g. Busse 1928, 50; Wille 1962, 45–46.

122. *VP* 15.65–66; tr. Taylor 1818, 33. This idea is confirmed as Pythagorean also in Sext. *Emp. Mus.* 30 and in Theon 138.9–147.6 (Lawlor 1979, 91–96). This “hearing” of the celestial harmonies is to be understood as perceived by the mind, not the senses; cf. also Theon 16.16–17.8 and in Mathiesen 1990, 45. Barker 2005, 117 affirms that the mathematical proportions in music came first and instigated the search for parallels in other areas (astronomy, human nature, etc.). Aristotle (cf. n. 109), criticizes this practice explicitly for trying to make things fit a preconceived system.

123. As an example for the cultivation or recovery of continence might serve the case mentioned in Iamb. *VP* 31.195 (Taylor 1818, 102) where, by means of music, “Pythagoras restored a man to temperance, who had become furious through love.” Ath. 624a tells the case of the Pythagorean Cleinias who, himself of outstanding character, would calm himself down with the lyre to avoid anger.

used.¹²⁴ Here fits in the story about the sobering effect of the Dorian mode¹²⁵ (or, as called here, “spondaic”) in contrast to the Phrygian, which elsewhere is attributed to Damon.¹²⁶ In a similar vein, Empedocles is credited with having prevented a murder by singing a Homeric verse (*VP* 25.113). On the one hand this seems to be rather an example for the previously mentioned employment of “select verses of Homer and Hesiod” with the “purpose of correcting the soul,” with the text having the greater import; on the other hand, Iamblichus stresses the change of harmony in the music (μεθαρμόζω) along with the text. The Pythagorean school, so says Iamblichus, develops a whole set of songs fitting to “change,” “combination,” and “treatment.” They even rely on musical spells (ἐπωδαί) to fully cure passions and diseases. It is significant that Iamblichus emphasizes that these are “without a melody of words” (“ἄνευ λέξεως μελισμάτων”, *VP* 25.114), so the magic is done by music only.

Iamblichus himself summarizes: “In this way, then, Pythagoras established through music in many ways the most useful improvement of human *ēthē* and lives.” The positive value of music is seen, therefore, in its power of purifying or

124. Taylor 1818, 60 n. 1, adds a comment by Proclus that explains in Platonic terms the prohibition of the *aulos* and instruments imitating it due to its “variety”). According to Iambl. *Myst.* 3.9.4–5, the *aulos* is both producing and healing the “conditions of aberration” (“τὸ τῶν αὐλῶν ἐμποιεῖν ἢ ἱατρεῦειν τὰ πάθη τῆς παρατροπῆς” tr. Wilder 1911, 121; Taylor 1821, 130, translates more accurately “inordinate passions of the soul” in agreement with the Latin rendering from 1678 by Thomas Gale “*animis nostris perturbations inferre et auferre*” (in the Teubner edition 1857, 118). Even though Iamblichus is responding to arguments brought forth in a letter by Porphyry, the thrust of the whole passage is not to refute the effects of music mentioned in the letter, but to argue the role of the gods (and our pre-knowledge of and about them) within the greater context of divination.

125. The explicit preference for Dorian is made later (*VP* 34.241–242, tr. Taylor 1818, 124): “Epicharmus, and prior to him Pythagoras, conceived that the best dialect, as well as the best harmony of music, is the Doric; that the Ionic and the Aeolic participate of the chromatic harmony; but that the Attic dialect is replete with this in a still greater degree. They were also of opinion, that the Doric dialect, which consists of vocal letters, is enharmonic.”

126. See below n.150. Iamblichus’ version has some additional elements: first it is said that the person was enraged because he saw his mistress coming from the house of his rival, and then that he was inflamed and excited by a Phrygian song; one would think that jealousy would not need Phrygian *aulos* music to lead to violence; but the point is that the calmer music brings about order and moderation in general, for it changed the whole attitude and behavior of the affected person who previously acted without restraint and stupidly. Sextus Empiricus ridicules this story in *Mus.* 17 after recounting it in 7.

healing the soul by means of music that corresponds to the desired effect (by both strengthening the good and leading away from a bad disposition).¹²⁷

Ch. 26 gives an account of how Pythagoras discovered the musical proportions and concludes: “And having reduced it to a system, he delivered it to his disciples as subservient to every thing that is most good/beautiful (τὰ κάλλιστα).”¹²⁸ Since, as we have seen, the term “καλός” vacillates between an aesthetic and moral meaning, both areas resound in this expression. A more explicit connection between the harmonic speculations and the ethical impact of music is not established at this point.

In another of his works (*Myst.* 3.9), Iamblichus talks about the relationship between music and the gods. He refers to the observation that music can be moving (κινητοκός) and passionate (παθητικός); causing or healing inordinate passions; changing the body’s conditions (κρᾶσις) or dispositions (διάθεσις); either instigating or finishing a Bacchic frenzy or other ecstasy, and he declares that all these effects are physical and works of human art. The ultimate reason for a truly “enthusiastic,” e.g. divinely inspired effect, however, lies, according to Iamblichus, in a kinship (συγγένεια) between the chorus songs, different divinities in their orders and powers, and the cosmic movements and sounds produced by them. This relationship or connection (οἰκειότης) brings about without mediation the presence (παρουσία) of the gods; the participation, possession, and inspiration by the gods and their power are concomitant to the divine harmony. The other functions of music (healing, purifying) are explicitly declared as not of divine origin. Divine harmony does not proceed from the soul as if it belonged to her essence but as reminiscence of her perception of it before her union to the body, prompted by the similarity of particular songs. However, the text does not seem fully consistent, because if music properly belonged to the gods, how could it then, on the “physical” level, have the described effects without any relation, at least remote, to the divinities? But regardless, the point is to separate properly the natural and the

127. See also in 29.164 (Taylor 1818, 88): “Pythagoras, however, thought that music greatly contributed to health, if it was used in a proper manner.” Bodily health does not seem to be aimed at directly but rather by means of the healthy soul’s profitable influence on the body. Music is for the soul what medicine is for the body (see in 25.110: “χρησθαι (...) τῇ μουσικῇ ἐν ἰατρείας τάξει”). About this point in Pythagoras similar Plut. *De virtute morali* 441e; AQ 2.3 54.27–55.23. Provenza 2014, 112, points out that the therapeutical use of music is here pursued “not through eradication of an unfavourable psychic state, but through reorganisation of it: (...) a state is not eliminated to replace it with another one, but is worked on to transform it, according to a process of ‘harmonization’—through tightening and loosening—in which the most suitable music for restoring equilibrium must be sought.”

128. 26.121 (tr. Taylor 1818, 65).

supernatural spheres and not claim direct divine intervention for every phenomenon. This passage, even though it deals only with the specific case of divine possession within the context of ritual music, shows how firmly the link between music and cosmic-divine forces is thought of as being able to resonate in the soul—however not due to any special interior harmonic structure of the soul but to a simple act of “recalling” (ἀναμνήσκω). Gods become directly present in music through its similarity (ὁμοιότης) to them, represented in the harmony of the spheres.¹²⁹

Again, to what degree these theories were really held by the early Pythagorean school is hard to decide; retro-alimentation from Plato and later speculations are quite possibly present. At any rate, the correlation between divinities, cosmos, soul, human behavior, and music seems to be a constant in both earlier and later witnesses. The Pythagoreans do not seem to consider any music “bad” as such, but if it is to connect us with the cosmos and open up to wisdom, one would assume that the music used by humans should be of a kind that blends in with those universal principles: creating harmony, consonance, and concord, brilliant like the logical consistency of mathematical equations. If the Pythagoreans discovered that specific musical parameters are fitting to provoke or change certain states of mind or even body, it does not seem so impossible that they had an intuition of musical ethos. And if there is any truth in the claim that Pythagoras pretended to “imitate” celestial music in acoustical form and teach from there what is most good or beautiful, his followers can hardly have missed the bond between the aesthetical and the ethical, since both stem from the same root, the harmony of the cosmos.¹³⁰

129. It does not seem immediately obvious that the theory of divine likeness “has considerable aesthetic significance,” as Mathiesen suggests (1990, 44), beyond the terms of “order” and “harmony.” The state of divine inspiration frees music from other functions and may include at times some sort of aimless contemplation of (divine) beauty, which we could call aesthetic; still, frenetic Bacchic dances might not quite match what we would call an aesthetic experience. It is another thing to say that music as such, especially in its mathematical underpinnings, “is the paradigm for the order of the universe. (...) This is its aesthetics” (id. 48).

130. It is a common view in scholarship that ancient harmonic science was for the most part divorced from actual musical practice (e.g. for the case of the Pythagoreans O’Meara 2005, 136: “Such numerical ratios may find expression in audible sounds and in instruments. Such sounds may remind us of a musical knowledge innate in us, but they are not the objects of Pythagorean music. This music is, as Proclus says in the similar case of geometry, a way for us of looking at ourselves, a form of self-knowledge, and approach to the structure of our soul.” But if it so happens that specific audible music “structures” our soul in harmony in one way and music in another, music must have been for the Pythagoreans more than a playground of mathematics, and conversely their insight into what arithmetically can be established as consonant and dissonant, etc., must have played a role in *melopoia*, in

Whether a direct divine intervention (“enthusiasm”), or the work of a soul, drawing, on its own, from the “anamnesis” of a previous stage—divine powers swing within the musical sound and become present through it, making music, in this conception, so special and powerful.

Damon¹³¹

The somewhat mysterious figure of Damon (or Damonides of Oea, as Aristotle calls him in *Ath. Pol.* 27.4),¹³² appears on the horizon about half a century after Pythagoras. He is often considered an important source for Plato’s ideas about music and seems, perhaps for the first time, to have established a link between musical ethos and its influence on society and politics. No direct writings of his are preserved.¹³³ From mention in ancient authors we learn that he was a renowned sophist and musician, teacher¹³⁴ and adviser (Pl. *Alc. I* 118c) of Pericles to whom he taught the songs “with which he [Pericles] harmonized the city.”¹³⁵ According to Plutarch, Damon was so astute that the citizens decided to ostracize him (Plut. *Nic.* 6.1) for being a “sharp sophist” under the musician’s disguise.¹³⁶ He is said to have delivered

their music production, in order to distinguish music that is good, fitting, convenient from music that is not (cf. Else 1958, 87, who holds “the existence of a fifth-century doctrine, which affirmed a likeness or kinship between music and the soul”). This statement does not intend to deny the fact that the ultimate goal of education (and philosophy) for them is not reached through the auditive but through the study of abstract harmony as a rational ordering of the soul (cf. Calcidius, *In Tim.* 267, 273.2–3; O’Meara 2005, 139). Rocconi 2012a, 68, expresses with some caution a similar view. Ritoók 2001, 60–61, sees the Pythagorean’s achievement in having moved away from the mythological or magical understanding in both the mathematical and therapeutical treatment of music.

131. See for general information and discussion: Wiliamowitz-Moellendorff 1921, 61–66; Richter 1961, 22–24; 33–34; Anderson 1955; id. 1966, 38–42; GMW 1.168–169; Comotti 1989, 30–32; Wallace 1991; West 1992, 246–247; Neubecker 1994, 130–131; Hagel Forthcoming, 1–8; most recently Wallace 2015 (I have not yet been able to review this volume).

132. Wallace 1991, 50, holds that the phrase “Damon, son of” was omitted due to a transmission error. Plut. *Per.* 9 quotes Aristotle already with that “faulty” reading.

133. Most references to his life and doctrine are collected in DK 37.

134. According to Isoc. 15.235, he was the most prudent (φρονιμώτατος) among the citizens. Plut. *Per.* 4 says Damon or Pythocleides was Pericles’ “liberal arts” teacher (“τῶν μουσικῶν”).

135. Olympiodorus, *In Alcibiade* 137.20–138.11, quoted from Wallace 1991, 50.

136. Plut. *Per.* 4: “ἄκρος σοφιστής.” This testimony seems to stand against the possibility that “Damon may have had no political aims of his own” (Barker 2005, 66). Plutarch gives as reasons for Damon’s expulsion that he was greatly involved in (political) issues (μεγαλοπράγμων) and supported tyranny (φιλοτύραννος). Plut. *Arist.* 1.7 spins it slightly

a speech before the Areopagus about the importance of music in education (Phld. 4.34 D148.1–5).¹³⁷ Plato makes cursory references to Damon in *Laches*,¹³⁸ and in the *Republic* Socrates invokes him as an authority in two instances.¹³⁹ According to one source, Damon was even Socrates' teacher (Diog. Laert. 2.5.19).

Scholars disagree about the exact content of Damon's musical theory. How much credit we can give him for ideas attributed to him by other authors, and how much of Plato's exposition on musical theory is really Damonian are subjects of critical debate.¹⁴⁰ Damon certainly recognized the ethical implications of musical parameters (which he may well have inherited from the Pythagoreans), but if it is true that he invented a form of the Lydian mode (the "slacked" or "lower-pitched": "ἐπανεμμένης") and taught all of the other *harmoniai*,¹⁴¹ then it is questionable that

differently by saying he was too much of a thinker ("φρονεῖν εἶναι περιττός"), which probably means that he was dangerously smart and as such too well connected to political realities. Aristotle (*Ath. Pol.* 27.4, referred to also in Plut. *Per.* 9) supports the political indictment. Comotti 1989, 30, dates his exile at 444–443 BC and surmises as a reason that he induced Pericles to spend much money on building the Odeum. Wallace 2004 argues that part of the reason for Damon's ostracism lies in his musical innovation, parallel to other cases of reported sanctions against musicians, especially in Sparta (see above).

137. The debate about this speech and its value is summarized in Richter 1961, 23; see more recently Wallace 1991, 33–42, who argues against the historical possibility of a real speech in Damon's time.
138. 180d: for being both the most accomplished musician and a worthy companion for young men), 197d: Socrates calls him a "good companion" and a very capable sophist; and 200a–b: an ironical reference from the mouth of Laches.
139. Pl. *Resp.* 400c: about a detailed ethical analysis of rhythmical patterns; and *Resp.* 424b–c: about the negative political impact of changing musical style.
140. As Wallace 1991, 32, points out, it is almost impossible to distinguish what Damon himself taught from what was developed by his school. For our purpose, this distinction is negligible. Most of the more recent studies strive to distinguish carefully between Damonian and Platonian elements (e.g. Pagliara 2000, 206–210, and others quoted in our footnotes). Comotti makes no distinction between Damon's and Plato's views.
141. Ps.-Plut. *Mus.* 16.1136e; cf. Procl. *In R.* 1.61.19; Wallace 1991, 48. The exegetical problem of attributing the invention of the Lydian mode to Damon is discussed in Pagliara 2000, 173–175 (with n. 43). Barker 2005, 67, based on AQ 1.9/19.2–3, argues in favor of attributing to Damon also the ethical theory of the *harmoniai*, even though his name is not mentioned in that context in the *Republic* (so also Neubecker 1994, 130). Hagel Forthcoming, 7–8, objects that Damon may not have possessed any actual theory about this and that Plato seems to discredit Damon somewhat by means of irony; he concludes: "the text of the *Republic* does not support the notion of a full-fledged Damonian ethos theory; the contrary is true." Hagel also questions seriously the identification of Aristides' *harmoniai* with those of Plato's time (id. 3–5). Rossi 1988 had already argued that Damon derived the

Damon censured the *harmoniai* on the grounds of their ethical distinction in the way Socrates does in Plato's *Republic*; neither does there seem to be any evidence that Damon developed a theory of *mimēsis* or of an analysis of the soul.¹⁴² According to Anderson, he differs from Plato by his openness to innovation as opposed to static perfection, by his greater tolerance of pleasure, and by adding that music trains not only in manliness but also in justice.¹⁴³ Both Plato and Damon share the conviction that musical elements may possess ethical value and that changes in music may have a political impact. A deeper connection of Damon to the Pythagoreans seems improbable.¹⁴⁴

Damon's views regarding musical ethos can be gathered in three points:¹⁴⁵

- Music is the product of a special kind of movement in the soul and reflects this movement.¹⁴⁶

different *harmoniai* with their *ēthē* from the symposia as the most convenient (or possible) place where these were being tried out. Damon may have gathered these from observation; to what detail he entered into theoretical description we cannot know.

142. Cf. Barker 2005, 70–71; Anderson 1955, 89, 100, includes the idea of *mimēsis* because he accepts a reference from Aristides Quintilianus, see n. 147 below.

143. Anderson 1966, 75–81; 241 n. 22; 161–162 (with reference to Phld. *Mus.* 1.13 D22); cf. further Phld. *Mus.* 3.77 (as in DK 37 B4 and Wiliamowitz-Moellendorff 1921, 63–64) D22.12–15/100.37–45. Anderson (id. 79 and again 162) paraphrases Philodemus: “Had Plato claimed that music conduces to justness we should ask for proof”—I believe *Leg.* 664b does imply some of this; see also below (n. 494 in the section on Phld.). I would, therefore, not go as far as Anderson in declaring this “the most direct single clash” between Damon and Plato (already in Anderson 1955, 97), for the ethos of *harmonia* can hardly be reduced to one virtue only. Ptolemy found another solution for incorporating justice (see p. 244).

144. This assessment hinges in part on the extent to which Aristides Quintilianus reflects Damonian thought (Schäfer 1937, for example, sees a strong relation while most recent scholars rather disbelieve it). See Richter 1961, 23–24; Anderson 1966, 242 n. 26; Wallace 1991, 51–53, who shows how (neo) Platonic thinkers later incorporated Damon's theory, which then led to the misconception that Damon himself had been part of the Pythagorean tradition. Rossi 1988, 240, stresses the “experimental” approach that Damon most probably took —, which would link him more to Aristotle than with Pythagoras (even though, as we have seen, Pythagoras may have reached some conclusions from observation as well). Cf. also Pelosi 2010, 30 n. 36.

145. Cf. GMW 1.69 and 2.383 n. 143.

146. This applies if Ath. 628c–d and AQ 2.14/80.23–81.3 are representing Damon's theory correctly, which Barker 2005 affirms and Wallace 1991 and Hagel Forthcoming reject because both texts speak only of “those around Damon” (“οἱ περὶ Δάμωνα”, which Gulick (for Ath.), Lord 1982, 206, and Ritoók 201, 63, misleadingly translate with “Damon and

- Rhythms and *harmoniai* can be classified according to an ethos that they express.¹⁴⁷ An analysis of the *harmoniai* and rhythms reveals the elements on which their affinities with different character types depend.
- Musical forms (τρόποι) are never changed without [changes in] the greatest political laws (Pl. *Resp.* 424c). Accordingly, music presents an important influential or educational tool that can be used to achieve definite political objectives.

Damon, or at the very least his followers, hold that songs with positive characteristics (e.g. ἔλευθέριος, καλός) form souls with precisely those qualities, while negative ones produce the opposite. Something similar applies to dance movements (Ath. 628c–d)¹⁴⁸—a clear testimony for a correspondence between aesthetics and ethos—as is underscored by the story, immediately following in Athenaeus, about someone who proved himself unfit for marriage through an improper dance. Ritoók shows well how Damon brings the Pythagorean idea of cosmic order “down to earth” and makes it a tool of creating an individual and communal order as ethos, and how this confers social, even political importance on music education.¹⁴⁹ A fragment from Philodemus (*Mus.* 1.13 D22) has Damon teaching that song and cithara playing exercises boys in manliness, moderation, and justice. This would

his school”). But the ideas exposed in these references at least correspond to the tenets expressed in Plato’s *Republic*, whatever that may mean in relation to Damon.

147. Barker (in GMW 1.69) assumes that Damon identified harmonic ethos not by means of qualitative mathematical rationales (such as interval proportions) according to Pythagorean tradition, but along the lines of a qualitative ethical (particularly: male-female) classification of notes, just as Aristides Quintilianus does it (*Mus.* 2.14/79). Hagel Forthcoming, 5–6, is very skeptical about attributing Aristides’ gender-classification to Damon—but the absence of other authors’ mentioning of such an attribution is an *argumentum e silentio* while Plato does show traces of such a theory (e.g. Pl. *Leg.* 802d–e; see also GMW 2.470 n. 71 and Pelosi 2010, 47–48).
148. “ἐν ὀρχήσει καὶ πορείᾳ καλὸν μὲν εὐσχημοσύνη καὶ κόσμος, αἰσχρὸν δὲ ἀταξία καὶ τὸ φορτικόν/in dance and walk, beautiful [is] gracefulness and good order, ugly however [is] disorder and what is vulgar.” Ritoók 2001, 63–64, compares two possible interpretations of this passage: music is either both product of the soul and influencing it (thus creating an ethical harmony between souls engaged in the same music), or only the reflection of the soul’s ethos. In either case, the origin of music is now explained psychologically, no longer mythically (the Muse). Despite the title of his essay, referring to Damon’s place in aesthetic thinking, I disagree with Ritoók when he claims that Damon did not speak of beauty (“*von Schönheit spricht auch Damon nicht*,” p. 65); we need to remember that for a Greek the terms “καλός” and “κόσμος” cannot be conceived without an aesthetic association.
149. Ritoók 2001, 64–65.

again imply a positive (morally and socially relevant) effect of music in general, even though this passage does not consider any differentiation in types of music. The story that Damon brought youngsters, drunken and mad from Phrygian *aulos* music, to their senses by changing the mode to Dorian, elsewhere attributed to Pythagoras,¹⁵⁰ may be considered apocryphal, but it shows a clear link between the ethical and therapeutic functions of music. Still, whatever use of music Damon considered positive and to be officially promoted, he might not have found universal agreement, if his expulsion from the city had anything to do with his political employment of music.

Barker summarizes Damon's achievement as follows:¹⁵¹

Damon's work was important and original because it provided, for the first time so far as we know, precise technical descriptions of the structures on which the music of that period was based, and because in correlating each structure with specific ethical and aesthetic characteristics it reduced the vague descriptions and haphazard associations found in the poetic tradition to systematic and intelligible order. If Plato exploited it in the cause of a moral crusade, that is no reason for supposing that Damon did so too.

Even if there is no evidence that Damon clearly declared specific musical elements "good" or "bad," his role is historically crucial because he developed a framework, which enabled Plato and later authors to describe and explain the ethical impact of music in a systematic way and to formulate concrete educational objectives and procedures based on this framework.

150. It is told in Gal. *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* 5.453, see DK 37 A 8, and slightly different in Mart. Cap. 9.926 ("ebrios iuvenes...modulorum gravitate perdomuit; quippe tibicini spondeum canere iubens temulentae dementiae perturbationis infregit/he fully domesticated drunk adolescents by the depth of tunes; he naturally brook the madness of drunk commotion as he commanded a piper to perform a spondee"). See about the scholarly discussion Neubecker 1994, 19, with n. 57; also Wallace 1991, 48. Attribution to Pythagoras in Iambl. *VP* 25.112; Quint. 1.10.32; Sext. Emp. *Mus.* 8, 23; see also above n. 126. The confusion of the protagonist here does throw a hint at some perceived closeness between Damon and Pythagoras; however, the authors attributing the story to Damon are late.

151. 2005, 71.

Plato¹⁵²

Plato's position on music in general and musical ethos in particular is outlined for the most part in the *Republic* and the *Laws*.¹⁵³ Although his ideas on music are not very systematically developed in his dialogue-narrative that as a whole has a different general scope, its distinct and controversial statements and implications have challenged philosophers and musicians ever since. His theory has frequently been summarized and commented on.¹⁵⁴ I hope to present a coherent picture of Plato's position regarding musical ethos that reviews some of the more recent scholarship and serves for future discussion. Despite Hagel's justified admonition not to identify indiscriminately Plato with Socrates or other speakers featured in his dialogues, I still believe that Plato agrees, at least for the most part, with what he has Socrates and the "Athenian" expound in the *Republic* and in the *Laws*.¹⁵⁵ Much of what differs in the *Laws* from the *Republic* in terms of legislation on music—apart from its being a reaction to possible criticism against his restrictive attitude in the *Republic*—can be explained by the different pedagogical objectives. The works need to be read together as mutually complementary.¹⁵⁶

152. The two main text referenced in this section are the *Republic*: text: OCT (Slings) 2003; text and tr.: Shorey 1935/1937; Emlyn-Jones/Predy 2013; tr. (excerpts) and comm.: GMW 1.127–140; and the *Laws*: text: OCT (Burnett) 1922; text and tr.: Bury 1926; tr. (excerpts) and comm.: GMW 1.141–163.

153. It is perhaps the most prominent, at times the only one mentioned in today's handbooks on music theory, psychology, or therapy, e.g. Wigram/Pedersen/Bonde 2002, 17–18, and Bloom's analysis in his work of 1987, which is triggered by Plato's considerations.

154. E.g. Moutsopoulos 1959/2002 (esp. 224–407); Anderson 1966, 64–110; Zoltai 1970, 30–35; GMW 1.124–163; Neubecker 1994, 132–133; Pelosi 2010. The great amount of secondary literature about Plato and music does not allow for an adequate appreciation of all existing interpretations here. I am discussing some issues of greater relevance in the footnotes but had to refrain from more in order not to supercharge the text with side tracks.

155. Hagel Forthcoming, 9–10; see about my point Beardsley 1975, 31.

156. Barker 2005 discusses in depth similarities and differences between references to musical ethos in earlier dialogues (in the mouth of interlocutors other than Socrates) and his two main works. One has to take into consideration the nature of the earlier dialogues and their different aims, which explains what is lacking in them in comparison to the later works. It seems to me, however, that the assumptions about a different viewpoint of Plato in earlier times are almost all based on *argumenta e silentio*. I think it is remarkable enough that dialogues concerned with quite different problems refer to musical ethos at all, with ideas rather similar to what later will become a more systematic theory in the *Republic*. When Barker (on p. 60) contrasts Laches (in *La*. 188c–d) who "seems to find it just as natural as Protagoras does to apply musical descriptions to people and their lives" with

The “Ethical Triangle” in Plato’s Educational System

Plato treats music with a very specific objective: to define its role in the integral formation to be provided for the guardians of his ideal State (*Republic*) and for its citizens in general (*Laws*). The educational value of music, as the softening correlative to the hardening effect of gymnastics (*Resp.* 410c–412a, 441e–442a), stems from the ability of the human soul to be shaped and impressed according to what it perceives,¹⁵⁷ and this susceptibility is held to be the greater the younger a person is—thus one comes to prefer what one grows up with (*Leg.* 802c–d). Plato establishes his general pedagogical procedure in *Resp.* 376e–377c and develops the rule that bad examples are to be avoided first for the “text” (λόγος) part of μουσική.¹⁵⁸ From 398c onward, he applies this to melody/mode (“τὸ περὶ ᾠδῆς τρόπου καὶ μελῶν λοιπόν”) or ἁρμονία,¹⁵⁹ in 399c–e to instruments, and in 399e–401a to rhythm, all of which are supposed to “follow” the text (lyrics), i.e. to depend on and support the text by showing corresponding characteristics (398d). This line of dependence is then extended to the correspondence between text (λέξις and λόγος)¹⁶⁰ and the

their “complete absence from most of Plato’s early writings,” there are still the very dialogues written by Plato in which he attribute musical metaphors to speeches by Laches and Protagoras.

157. For the correlation between music and the soul the reason is given in *Ti.* 47c: harmony is akin to the movements of the soul (“συγγενεῖς ἔχουσα φορὰς ταῖς ἐν ἡμῖν τῆς ψυχῆς περιόδοις”); cf. also 90c–d and our discussion of the topic further below.

158. The reader is reminded of the wider meaning of this term as explained in ch. 1.

159. The use of this term in Plato is not fully clear; see GMW 1.130 n. 18, 163–168. Barker understands it in the context as an “organization of pitches” or, in 2005, 23–24, a *modello di accordatura* [pattern of attunement], which “gives a melody the ethically relevant features.” He emphasizes (also on p. 29) that in Plato the ethos of a particular melody stems from the structures underlying it, just as the morality of a person’s actions depends on the disposition of his or her soul, in other words, on “virtue”. See also Barker 2007, 308–327.

160. “λέξις” signifying more the exterior presentation (diction, style, etc.) of the speech/language, while “λόγος” in this context refers to the text regarding its content. For a more detailed distinction see Barker 2005, 32, n. 11. The equivocity of “λόγος” is discussed e.g. in Theon 72.24–73.15 (Lawlor 1979, 47–48).

ethos of the soul;¹⁶¹ actually, all the arts¹⁶² are μιμήματα (expressions) “σώφρονός τε καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἦθους/of a sound mind and of good ethos” (401a).¹⁶³ All of these are good or bad in direct connection to the soul’s ἦθος;¹⁶⁴ therefore, anything that is bad in any art needs to be kept from adolescents. Conversely, they ought to be exposed to everything good/beautiful and graceful (καλός; εὐσχήμων) so that they acquire similarity, friendship, and consonance (ὁμοιότης; φιλία; συμφωνία) with the good/beautiful λόγος (400d; cf. *Prt.* 326a–c)—for the goal of music is the love of what is good/beautiful: “δεῖ δέ που τελευτᾶν τὰ μουσικὰ εἰς τὰ τοῦ καλοῦ ἐρωτικά” (403c).

Plato presents a concrete canon of virtues or habits of the soul that he wants music to foster, among which manliness,¹⁶⁵ self-control (or moderation),

161. What is meant by “ethos of the soul” becomes clear in 400e: εὐήθεια (the LSJ definition “goodness of heart” is not felicitous for this context), but properly understood: everything should follow “τὴν ὡς ἀληθῶς εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς τὸ ἦθος κατεσκευασμένην διάνοιαν” (“thought”—the intermediate between reason and perception, see Horn/Rapp 2002, 105–106; in contrast to “ἄνοια” right before), so the tr. is: “thought that has provided itself truly well and beautifully with ἦθος.” Even though ἦθος may be unconscious, as Plato points out later (402a–c; cf. *Leg.* 653b), in itself, due to its ethical “content,” it is based on a “thought” or rational principle that at least the educators should understand (see *Leg.* 654c–e), in line with the λόγος,—the principle of the proper order.

162. Plato uses here “δημιουργία,” literally “craftsmanship,” and includes everything from poetry to architecture, even weaving.

163. Cf. also 654e–655b; *Leg.* 668a (“μουσικὴν γε πᾶσαν φαμεν εἰκαστικὴν τε εἶναι καὶ μιμητικὴν/all music, we say, is representative and mimetic”); 668b; 798d (“τὰ περὶ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς καὶ πᾶσαν μουσικὴν ἐστὶν τρόπων μιμήματα βελτιόνων καὶ χειρόνων ἀνθρώπων/what concerns rhythms and all music are expressions of the manners of the best and the worst men”). About “mimetic,” see the corresponding section below.

164. Plato consistently adds the prefixes ἀ- (or κακο-) and εὖ- to the terms in question.

165. In the *Laws*, Plato pursues a different path by distinguishing the *ēthē* according to sex and social status (free or slave) (669c–d), probably because he now talks about the education of all people, not just of the (male) guardians in the city. “Female” (or “soft,” “ordered,” “moderate”) features are fully rejected in the *Republic* and in the *Laws* obviously allowed for women, but it seems that music reflecting ethos linked to “lamentation” remains excluded or at least very restricted (800d–e)—the reasons for this are further explained in *Resp.* 603c–605c. Anderson 1966, 80 with 90–91, calls for caution against relating the sexual classification of music to the system that we find in Aristides Quintilianus (who attributes it to Damon), but see a similar concept reported in Ath. 14.628d (in a “Damonian” context).

gracefulness, and a free and noble mind stand out. In order to achieve these, certain select *harmoniai* (Dorian and Phrygian),¹⁶⁶ various rhythms (not specified), and

166. There is a long debate about why Plato accepted Phrygian, a traditionally ecstatic and frenetic mode (associated with Dionysius whom Plato even chooses as patron of the elders' musical "council" in *Leg.* 666b), to which he here attributes quite different qualities. Anderson, after reviewing some of the discussion, points at a changed practice in Athens in which "ecstasy had disappeared" (1966, 108, quoting Winnington-Ingram, and 129). Hagel Forthcoming, 9–11, argues that the inclusion of Phrygian by "Socrates" might have been a deliberate simplification introduced in an ironic way by Plato who would later, in the *Laws*, favor the idea of an assessment of music by experienced aged citizens. But since this "adequate musical judgment" would be acquired by "proper education," Hagel rightly senses that this would make "the whole point regrettably circular" (id. 13); and that makes one wonder whether Plato was really devoid of any clear idea on what reality such judgments should be based upon. Pagliara 2000, 210, might aim at the right direction by bringing up the specific objective of the *Republic*, the formation of the guardians, which requires different criteria than the wider educational goal in the *Laws*. Gostoli 2007, 28–34, suggests, based on *Phdr.* 244d–e, that Plato tries to preserve the option of a "cathartic" Dionysian rite; her otherwise ingenious theory seems to falter for not explaining why this very "*scrupulo religioso*" (34) should not have induced Plato to maintain also the *aulos*, which was equally essential to these rites as she herself relates (33, based on *Cri.* 54d where the *aulos* is mentioned explicitly, but not the Phrygian mode, cf. Tartaglini 2001, 298). For further theories see e.g. Busse 1928, 40 n. 1 (Plato wants to educate warriors who need resilience in the battle—Aristotle does not have this in mind when he rejects the Phrygian); Koller 1954, 22; Lord 1978, 203–219 (who thinks that Dorian is pacific and Phrygian warlike), and, in response, Tartaglini 2001 who offers the most complex explanation by establishing a link between the cathartic effect of the Phrygian *harmonia* with the need of the guardians to be free-willed (ἐκούσιος, 399c). But serious problems remain. For instance, Plato describes the ethos of the Phrygian *harmonia* not as the *result* of a cathartic experience (through some sort of divine madness) induced by this *harmonia*, but as the ethos of the *harmonia* itself, which consists in imitating the sounds of a person in the state of the desired ethos, just as he does with the Dorian. If Plato takes a positive stand towards some sort of catharsis elsewhere, this does not prove that he envisions it as part of the guardians' education for which we would expect him to be more explicit. Apparently, not even his disciples understood him in this way). Besides, other authors have stated Plato's suspicion of praeter-rational realities (e.g. Anderson, see below n. 229; Halliwell 2002, 73).

Some deeper anthropological reflection would also be required: Tartaglini speaks of the will as "*virtù acquisibile attraverso la paideia*" (2001, 305); if the underlined word means "virtue," we must remember that the will is a spiritual faculty (along with the intellect), not a virtue; if it means "power," it still remains unclear what sort of maniacal purification should form "willpower" as a stable condition of rational self-control to endure hardships (such an effect does not seem to be mentioned in *Phdr.* 244d, which Tartaglini calls at witness; the context of augury and purification from illnesses is something quite different)—especially

few instruments (lyre and cithara)¹⁶⁷ that naturally convey them are required, with the resulting simplicity and stability within both the musical and the poetical repertoire. Plato conversely rejects *harmoniai* and rhythms of different ethos (threnodic and convivial or “soft”), innovations, variations, and mixtures that confuse or corrupt the ethical import of story and music.¹⁶⁸

It is important to notice that, in Plato’s conception, the above-mentioned value levels one and three are fused together, but without losing the sense for their distinctness:¹⁶⁹ for him, the ethos of a person’s soul depends on the value of both

if it is a simple tune in Phrygian played on a cithara without *aulos*. It does not help trying to reintroduce the once excluded *aulos* through the back door with the simple term “καταυλέω” in *Resp.* 411a (Plato here makes a hypothetical consideration to explain psychological processes) or *Leg* 790d–791b (which is not the context of guardian education, see also below n. 179).

For the discussion of what music Plato deemed good or bad, the question of what to do with the label “Phrygian” here is less relevant than the ethos he seeks to promote; on the other hand, if the Phrygian *harmonia* in its “enthusiastic” form were considered beneficial for the purpose of *paideia*, this would have important consequences and would separate him further from Aristotle who explicitly did not suggest such things for the education of children (cf. below n. 352). For these and other reasons, I am not prepared to decide conclusively in favor of any of these attempts of interpreting Plato’s inclusion of the Phrygian *harmonia*.

167. Apollo (standing for the lyre/cithara) is preferred over Marsyas (*aulos*; *Resp.* 399e). Barker 2005, 29, notes that Plato rejects the *aulos* and other instruments not because of their tone-qualities, as we might expect, but because of their ability to play different *harmoniai*. We should specify that the point is that they can apparently be played *at once*, within the same piece and without need of re-tuning as a string instrument would require—all in line with the criticism of “variety” and undue “mixing” of modal patterns as voiced also in other authors (see the previous section on the New Music).

About dance, related to rhythm and postures, not much is said in the *Republic*; it receives more attention in the *Laws*.

168. E.g. the “crossbreeding” of genres, cf. *Leg.* 700a–b; Comotti 1989, 7–8; 31–32. Barker (GMW 1.124, 128 n. 13) observes here an implicit criticism of the “modernistic” trends as initiated by Timotheus, even though they had been around for quite some time when the *Republic* was written; such criticism is more explicit in *Leg.* 660a–e; 669b–670a. This “new music,” so Plato, “stimulates emotions and passions upsetting to a man’s rational equilibrium” (in the words of Comotti 1989, 38).

169. See, for instance, expressions such as “εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς” in 400e or “καλός τε καὶ αἰσχροῦς” in 402a; translating in these paragraphs “καλός” simply with “beautiful” and “αἰσχροῦς” with “ugly” obscures therefore the wider range of these concepts across the three value levels. In *Leg.* 653b–c, Plato uses “ἀρετή” for the positive, which education stirs up in a child’s soul. Barker develops a similar point about the meaning of “εὐάρμοστος” and its opposite in GMW 1.134–135 n. 40: there are no morally neutral musical laws.

the aesthetic and the moral influences that flow from the arts, but especially from music, because “rhythm and melody sink most deeply into the inner part of the soul and most strongly take hold of it,”¹⁷⁰ and because education in music provides the capacity to discern good and bad, both aesthetically and morally: the person educated in musical taste has acquired an interior familiarity (οἰκειότης) with the λόγος (meaning here something like “reason for good and bad;” cf. *Leg.* 653a–c), even prior to conscious understanding. The point is particularly clear in *Leg.* 654b–d: someone well educated (ὁ καλῶς πεπαιδευμένος) not only sings and dances well (καλῶς—in the aesthetic sense) but also good [songs and dances] (καλά) (in the moral sense). Hereby we notice that ethos prevails over aesthetics: to administer properly (ικανῶς ὑπηρετεῖν) voice and body, without delight in good and hatred for the bad, counts as less educated than to keep up correctly (κατορθοῦν) delight and hatred even though one cannot keep up voice and body perfectly correct.

What exactly is expressed by the musical parameters remains somewhat obscure. It is hard for us to imagine what sorts of utterings, produced by someone hit by bad fortune, the Dorian *harmonia* should be imitating, and how such music should then form the soul to instinctively recognize what is good and beautiful.¹⁷¹ Socrates/Plato exonerates himself of further explanation by referring to Damon for details when it comes to discussing the correspondence between rhythm and ethos. But whatever Plato has in mind, we can grasp his principle: the nature of musical sound agrees with the “content” it expresses (or as it is conveyed by the accompanying text), and this agrees with the ethos of the soul. These three ends of the “ethical triangle,” as we could call it, will always have the same value, good or bad,¹⁷² which can be initiated from any angle: bad content will find its expression (εἰκών) in bad music and shape a bad state of the soul, and the reverse for the good, and the state of the soul, good or bad, will accept only content and music

170. “μάλιστα καταδύεται εἰς τὸ ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς ὃ τε ῥυθμὸς καὶ ἁρμονία, καὶ ἐρρωμενέστατα ἄπτεται αὐτῆς” (*Resp.* 401d); cf. “...ἵνα τὴν τῶν μελῶν μίμησιν τὴν εὖ καὶ τὴν κακῶς μεμνημένην, ἐν τοῖς παθήμασιν ὅταν ψυχὴ γίγνηται (...) / so that the *mimēsis* of the songs, having represented in a good way and in a bad, whenever the soul undergoes passions in/ through them (...)” (*Leg.* 812c).

171. Barker 2005, 22, illustrates the general idea with the music of a military march, which would not “follow” the words of a lullaby. Further examples are given in *Leg.* 669c–670a, but it remains to be seen how it comes about that musical elements can convey these *ēthē*.

172. An illustration of harmful imitation is given for pitch and rhythm of speech in 397b–398b, despite its attractiveness for boys, teachers, and the crowd.

fitting to it.¹⁷³ Plato does not directly discuss the case of attempting to combine good music with bad content or vice-versa—this he would have considered simply an absurdity and not appropriate (ἀπρεπής/ἄμετρος);¹⁷⁴ it would break the synchrony of the triangle with certainly no profit for the state of the soul. Since Plato's approach is guided by an educational ideal, he begins the triangle from the angle of the soul by choosing content (virtues) considered beneficial for it¹⁷⁵ and requires musicians to design their *harmoniai*, rhythms, and instruments in ways that express the content's ethos (*Resp.* 401b–d; *Leg.* 660a; 661c). As a consequence, an affinity, even love (ἔρος), towards all things and persons that are καλοὶ grows in the soul of the young people formed this way.¹⁷⁶

173. This order is taken up again in *Leg.* 658e–660a and 802a–e: the wise elders decide according to their properly formed taste and pleasure what music is to be considered good.

174. The debate in Aristophanes about adequate music seems to reflect this problem: modern dramatists are criticized for an improper musical rendering of text. Examples for improper or senseless (ἄλογος) combinations are given in *Leg.* 669c–d (which has a historical background, cf. 700a–701b); “bad” is here not the musical elements in themselves but the unfitting context in which they are used.

175. For that purpose, Plato undertakes his strict censorship of the poetic tradition in 377b–398b. Similar *Leg.* 660a.

176. Plato describes this “right/true love” (ὀρθὸς ἔρως) in *Resp.* 402d–403b as being directed, in a self-controlled (σωφρόνως) and “musical” (μουσικῶς) way, towards what is well-ordered (κόσμιος) and good/beautiful (καλός), in contrast to excessive pleasure (ἡδονή υπερβάλλουσα), lust (ῥβρις) madness (μανία) and licentiousness (ἀκολασία) like the love related to Aphrodite (cf. the “vulgar” [πάνδημος] Aphrodite in *Xen. Symp.* 8.9–10). Consequently, signs of improper love carry the blame of ἀμουσία (lack of music/taste) and ἀπειροκαλία (ignorance of the good/beautiful). To love that which ought to be loved is also a topic of *Leg.* 653a–654a and considered the content of education as given by Apollo and the Muses. Problems can arise because the most just life does not always seem to be the most pleasant, so that people, especially children, need to be induced to the truth by poetry and music (*Leg.* 661e–664c). The nature and significance of “acquired taste” due to habit and enjoyment is developed further in *Leg.* 655a–656b.




Figure 3–1. The ethical triangle.

The Proper Measure

One principle at work behind all of this is that of the “proper measure,” also called the “golden mean.” Plato, rather than speaking in absolute terms, seeks to balance out different forces in order to achieve an integrated equilibrium—not only here, but in many other parts of his work.¹⁷⁷ This is pertinent to our discussion in two ways: first, through the decadence caused by excessive food (403e–404e) and too much “soft” music (411a–c) or gymnastics (411c–e)—moderation in each field is required—, and, second, through the above-mentioned correlation between music and gymnastics, which, eliciting opposite effects on both body and soul, together will forge a harmoniously fine-tuned personality.¹⁷⁸ Each exercise, left alone and

177. Aristotle uses this principle more systematically, above all (but not exclusively) in his ethical theory. For a systematic treatment of the principle of the “mean” in Plato and Aristotle and its philosophical significance, see Kramarz 2000.

178. Both Anderson 1966, 94–95, and Barker 2005, 50, note that Plato at one place links music’s influence to the soul and gymnastic’s to the body (*Resp.* 376e; *Leg.* 795d–e) while elsewhere he emphasizes either practice’s importance for the soul (*Resp.* 410c). In this there need not be seen a contradiction. Naturally, gymnastics is the exercise of the body, and music is foremost spiritual (while dance is the area where both overlap). Just previous to the latter

pursued to an extreme,¹⁷⁹ would result either in cowardice, a choleric temperament, rudeness, discontent, and weak spirit,¹⁸⁰ or in harshness, violence, ignorance, and gracelessness.¹⁸¹ Therefore, even the previously discarded wailing-tunes

passage, Plato discusses the interdependence between soul and body and how the soul guarantees the well-being of the body (*Resp.* 403d–409e). Hence, it is logical that he now addresses the effect of gymnastics on the soul, without which a proper understanding of either discipline's function in view of the final objective, the harmonious personality, cannot be reached, since the soul, calibrated by both disciplines, ultimately guarantees the proper treatment and state of health of the body.

In *Leg.* 631e–632c and 634a–635d, Plato uses the principle of fine-tuning to balance out pain and pleasure (and other extremes); cf. also *Ti.* 88b–c (balance between body and soul, study and exercise, as a condition for being rightly called καλός and ἀγαθός). There is even a “best” music for a herd of sheep, which the herdsman will sing and play (*Plt.* 268b).

179. Notice that Plato is aware of a magical lure within the softening effect of certain tunes; see the verb “κηλέω” (“charm, bewitch”) in *Resp.* 411b, describing how someone can be drawn in too much. Interestingly, Plato suggests elsewhere (*Leg.* 659e; 664b–c) a positive use of musical enchantment (ἐπιφθῆ) in order to provide συμφωνία and acceptance of the truth (that happiness lies in justice) in children's souls. A similar case is *Leg.* 790d–791b where a lullaby is described in terms of a μελωδία “casting down a charm like a flute” (καταυλέω), combined with a rocking movement, on frightened and sleepless infants, with an effect, which is compared to calming down those affected by Corybantic or Bacchic frenzy. But what has the soothing effect here? This passage is sometimes used to prove a homoeopathic approach in Plato and that Corybantic frenzy was also used for *healing* madness (cf. Ustinova 1998, 509 and Gostoli/Tartaglini as quoted in n. 166), but the text does not support this interpretation, which would also contradict all that Plato says elsewhere about the effects of music on the soul. Plato speaks of a “remedy” against what is caused by Corybantism (αἱ περὶ τὰ τῶν Κορυβάντων ἰάματα τελοῦσαι) and emphasizes clearly the exterior movement (ἐξωθεν κίνησις), which rules over (κρατέω) the interior one of fear and frenzy and overcomes the madness of those who dance and play *aulos*. Frenzy is not defeated by more frenzy but by tranquilizing movement; and the *aulos*, which elsewhere is seen as precisely the cause for frenzy (*Cri.* 54d; cf. Anderson 1966, 64 & 235 n.1), does not seem to play a role in the remedy (despite the term “καταυλέω” used in the context of the mother's voice, which here could also be understood simply as “casting a spell through musical sound” without need to force the etymology of the word). I venture to disagree with Anderson's reading of the text (1966, 65, but see 237 n. 4 on a reference to Plutarch about tranquilizing by a change of mode).

180. This corresponds to the cliché of the “effeminate” musician (cf. in *Symp* 179d–e the contrast Orpheus–Achilles) and some general scorn for music (see GMW 1.24 with references to *Hom. Il.* 3.54; 24.261).

181. Plato, relying more on common observation, does not offer a psychological explanation for these effects, less so because only later are the parts of the soul introduced systematically

could prompt a healthy result on the “θυμός”¹⁸² by means of the best-measured (μετρίωτατος) and most proper (προσήκοντος)¹⁸³ blend (κράσις) of tightening and loosening (tension and relaxation) in both disciplines (411a–412a).¹⁸⁴ This applies also to the soul itself which, according to Plato, has three areas, the “passionate” (θυμοειδής, or θυμός), the “philosophical” (φιλόσοφον, or λόγος), and the desires (ἐπιθυμίαι). The proper interior order entails, on the level of the individual and of the soul, the rule of reason over passion and that of both over the desires. The constructive cooperation of θυμός with λόγος is guaranteed through its proper measuring, or “attuning,” by means of physical and musical education respectively, evening out the extremes¹⁸⁵ (*Resp.* 439d–442b).

This then, according to Plato, is the “absolutely most musical and well-harmonized” person, much more so than a good string-tuner¹⁸⁶—a comment that proves

and even then without the level of precision and acumen of Aristotle’s *De Anima* and *Nicomachean Ethics*.

182. See further below about the anthropological context of this term. Concerning the difficulty arising from this apparent contradiction see below n. 352.

183. This concept is also important for Plato’s view of what is beautiful, see 420d: “τὰ προσήκοντα ἐκάστοις ἀποδιδόντες τὸ ὅλον καλὸν ποιούμεν/as we give to each what is proper, we render the whole beautiful” (see further *Phdr.* 264c about the proper proportion of the parts to each other and to the whole).

184. The proper ethos requires, therefore, the ideal measure (or, in the case of music, also quality) within each discipline and the ideal proportion between both disciplines. Plato does not contemplate the cases of someone who would exercise neither music nor gymnastics, or too much of both, but it is not difficult to imagine how a person could accumulate the defects of the lack from both. But an excess in both is rather improbable, given that for their complementarity a strong natural inclination towards one would generally exclude the other. Examples for an incorrect mixture between music and gymnastics follow in the discussion of the different forms of government in book 8 (e.g. 546d; 548c).

185. Cf. GMW 1.138 n. 50 and Barker 2005, 36–38; 50–53. As a maybe somewhat trivial example of how a musician—as the first one could be expected to give witness of the positive effect of music—should show a more moderate behavior may be referred to *Phdr.* 268d–e: instead of a rude response, ἀγρίως, a musician would speak more gently, πραότερον.

In *Phd.* 85e–86d with 91d–95a, Plato answers the question whether the soul is harmony composed by the body negatively because the souls rule over the body and can differ in virtue.

186. “τοῦτον ὀρθότατ’ ἂν φαίμεν εἶναι τελέως μουσικώτατον καὶ εὐαρμοστότατον, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸν τὰς χορδὰς ἀλλήλαις συνιστάντα” (412a). The interior order is described in musical terms again in 443d–e. In *La.* 188d, the true musical man is the “ἁρμονίαν καλλίστην ἡρμολογούμενος,” whose life is harmonious in that his words and actions match, according to the ethos of the Dorian *harmonia* (which Socrates is then said to possess); cf. further *La.* 193d–e. A similar idea is expressed in *Ath.* 14.628e about dance and words.

that “good music” for the philosopher ultimately consists in good ethos to which actual music is only a vehicle. A bit later in the text, the “good guardian” (φύλαξ ἀγαθός) of himself and of the “music” (meaning here the entire poetic-musical curriculum) he has learned is described as “εὐρυθμόν τε καὶ εὐάρμοστον ἑαυτὸν ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις παρέχων/showing himself well in rhythm and well in harmony in all these things” (413e), rendering him χρησιμώτατος (most useful) to himself and to the State (cf. similar *Prt.* 362a–b). The syntactical structure sets parallel “music” and “State,” hinting at the relevance of not only assimilating but also preserving the musical patrimony for the well-being of the political community.¹⁸⁷ “Good rhythm and harmony” stand metaphorically for the well-balanced personality.¹⁸⁸

Music on its own is already placing order into children’s naturally disordered movements and sounds (*Leg.* 653d–654a; 672c–d),¹⁸⁹ and it has the power to bring together opposing forces.¹⁹⁰ This applies no longer to the specialized guardians

187. Similar parallels were already used in the earlier debate on “New Music” to contrast musical simplicity (such as few strings), aligned with oligarchy, on the one hand and complexity (such as many strings, chords, modes, etc.), aligned with democracy (seen as heterogeneous or even chaotic), on the other; see Wilson 2004, 304.

188. The use of musical vocabulary (which is not exclusive to Plato) to express the soul’s character in the ethical triangle shows an intuition into the collective consciousness of the people who shaped language. That this corresponds to the concept of being “moderate” (μέτριος) results from 423e. For Plato’s connection between psychology and morality (healthy soul for proper morals) and the role art plays within it see ch. 2 in Halliwell 2002.

Ultimately, for Plato music plays an ancillary function as *praeambulum* for philosophy; this is emphasized again later in 522a; only the mathematical science of harmony leads up to the highest science of dialectics (cf. 530d–531e). This might be the ἐπιστήμη mentioned in *Symp.* 187c, which is beyond the ambiguous actual music-making and is then a “δαιμόνιον πρᾶγμα” and useful (χρήσιμον) if it pursues the beautiful and the good (τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ζήτησις; *Resp.* 531c).

189. This anticipates an idea further developed in *Ti.* 47c–e.

190. A reflection on this idea can be found in *Symp.* 187b–e, pointing out that the opposites cannot be (any longer) at variance (διαφέρομαι), rather harmony is consonance (συμφωνία) or agreement out of things varying (ὁμολογία ἐκ διαφερομένων), in other words: music integrates or brings “love” to originally opposite elements (such as fast or slow rhythm) (“ἔστιν αὖ μουσικὴ περὶ ἁρμονίαν καὶ ῥυθμόν ἐρωτικῶν ἐπιστήμη;” *Ti.* 80a–b might offer an explanation of how this is to be understood); cf. on this passage Barker 2005, 75–95 and 2007, 325–326. Harmonic systems are distinguishable easily on the level of “science” (dissecting intervals, proportions, etc.), but in composing or performing actual music and in its relationship towards human beings (“πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους” [Lamb’s translation “to social life” obscures the point]), there is the danger of immoderation (ἀκολασία) because of the pleasure factor (ἡδονή). Like in medicine, the proper balance between the opposites is

only but to the public at large:¹⁹¹ people, but especially children should listen to what is even *better* than their ἦθος so as to improve their enjoyment, and with it their ethos.¹⁹² The proper music is to be decreed by law (*Leg.* 657a–b; 660a) and sung especially to children to form their ethos well.¹⁹³

Plato crowns the apex of his *Republic* (619a) by proclaiming explicitly the principle that extremes (τὰ ὑπερβάλλοντα) are to be avoided and the mean (τὸ μέσον) to be sought: this, so as to become the most blessed human being (εὐδαιμονέστατος) in the current life and in the next, within the eternal harmony of necessity, which in itself is song uttered by the Sirens and the Fates (617c).

Conservatism to Foster Order in Soul and State

“To dissolve what is beautifully harmonized and is well habituated is the will of an evil (one).”¹⁹⁴ Such danger, expressed in the *Timaeus* in metaphysical terms, exists for Plato similarly on the level of individual and State. It is only natural, then, that once the proper mean or balance is found, pains must be taken to maintain it—hence Plato’s energetic stand against innovations (νεωτερίζειν) in both music and gymnastics, which he describes as a gradual process of corruption from children’s games¹⁹⁵ to the ἦθος and ways of life (ἐπιτηδεύματα), then to

required, which can only be assessed properly by the one who is at home in the science of unambiguous harmony.

191. Cf. Anderson 1994, 165.

192. “δέον γὰρ αὐτοὺς αἰεὶ βελτίω τῶν αὐτῶν ἡθῶν ἀκούοντας βελτίω τὴν ἡδονὴν ἴσχειν” (659c). Notice that Plato does not reject pleasure as an effect but rather uses it to improve ethos.

193. Again “ἐπαεῖδω” is used, with the connotation of enchantment or charm (664b). Plato then develops the idea that the whole city is supposed to enchant itself by song in choirs organized by age groups dedicated to the Muses, Apollo, and Dionysius—the latter so as to motivate the elderly singers through wine (see Plut. *Instituta Laconica* 15 = *Mor.* 238a–b). On the debate about the notion of “charm” and “enchantment” in Plato see Anderson 1966, 70 & 239 n. 14. I do not see evidence in Plato for a belief in strictly magic charms, at least as far as music is concerned.

Apparently there are still degrees even within the acceptable music, for the third choir is supposed to present the best songs (τὰ κάλλιστα) to achieve the greatest good (“μέγιστ’ (...) ἀγαθά”)—unless one sees passages like *Leg.* 670a–671a as a proof for a more lenient approach in the *Laws*, as Anderson does (1966, 73); but maybe Plato is just more realistic here in how to reach the ideal but does not change the general normative.

194. *Ti.* 41a–b: “τό γε μὴν καλῶς ἀρμολογεῖν καὶ ἔχον εὖ λύειν ἐθέλειν κακοῦ.”

195. Cf. later p. 336 n. 15. It sounds as if Plato were citing the excuse used by the innovators to appease those concerned: “It’s just for fun, won’t do anyone harm”—and they might even

transactions (συμβόλαια), to the norms,¹⁹⁶ and finally the government (or constitution) (424b–425a). It is to be noticed, however, that Plato does not reject only particular innovations but innovation as such,¹⁹⁷ for he does not want children to grow up getting used to transgressing established norms and thus becoming transgressors or lawless themselves (παράνομοι). What sounds like rigorous conservatism is based on the conviction that, once the best way of government and living in a State is achieved—through the constant changing only of what is bad (*Leg.* 797d–e) with respect to the unchangeable truth (cf. *Leg.* 668a) and divine disposition (cf. *Leg.* 653c–654a; 797a–b)—any further change can only be for the worse.¹⁹⁸ Plato

believe it themselves, being unaware of Plato's ethical triangle (cf. 700e). A similar reference to criticism—choral dances being something outdated (ἀρχαιότης)—occurs in *Leg.* 657b.

Plato specifies the difference between “ᾠσμα” (an individual song—of these, of course, there may be plenty of new ones, see *Leg.* 665c) and “τρόπος ᾠδῆς” (which means “way, mode, style”) or “εἶδος” (“form, kind, style”)—the restriction falls on the last two. Cf. Rocconi 2012b, 129–130.

196. I am translating “νόμος” here with “norm” rather than “law” because Plato does not speak here about civil laws only but means and also rules of custom and convention, as the following passage shows (425a–b) (cf. about this also Wallace 1991, 47). About the shifting meaning of the term as political or musical and the attempts of interpretation, see Anderson 1966, 99–100; 252–254, and Bartles, 2012, 135–136.

197. Cf. *Leg.* 659d and with more detail 797a–798d. Similarly, as Barker points out (2005, 29), Plato does not reject particular instruments for elements such as timbre or loudness but because they are “panharmonic”—and this makes them prone to violate the established norms. This sort of reasoning would make the Spartans' concern over Timotheus' extra string for his cithara understandable (cf. Plut, *Instituta Laconica* 17 = *Mor.* 238c), and likewise that he was acquitted because a statue of Apollo had the same amount of strings as his *lyra* (in Ath. 636e–f)—for the recourse to authority is compatible with the idea of preserving an established order. Given that this incident, if historical, occurred during Plato's lifetime, the assumption of a mentality within the Spartan leadership similar to Plato's is not anachronistic (see for this also *Leg.* 660b–e). Another reference to penalties for musical law violations in Argos is ps.-Plut. 37.1144f.

The great prototype for millennium-long fidelity to tradition is Egypt (*Leg.* 656d–657b). Anderson 1966, 243 n. 30, points out: “In actual fact the music of Egypt by Plato's time had already gone through at least as sweeping a change, under foreign influence, as was then taking place in Greece.” Sachs 1940, 98 and 1943, 62–63, attributes these changes to the fifteenth century BC (about a thousand years before Plato), mostly based on the import of many new instruments. It is difficult to imagine the tunes should not have changed along with the instruments, but Plato claims their constancy for his time as much as the visual arts have remained constant, due to corresponding legislation and ritual use. Sachs 1943, 71–73, confirms the notion of unchanged features.

198. This derives from a rather static conception of the world and man within it, which underestimates the human capacity to develop culture from good to *better*.

is very serious about this and does not speak in theory only but has a concrete historical example in mind, which he describes in *Leg.* 700a–701c: the degeneration of morals and social stability and order in democratic Athens is said to have begun with an audience-driven, pleasure-pursuing break of musical conventions.¹⁹⁹ This is supposed to have led to a “theatrocracy,” in which the common people deem themselves competent judges in everything, challenging shamelessly those who do in fact know better. All this is then projected to culminate in the rejection of submission and respect to rulers, parents, elders, and ultimately in ignoring the law, oaths, and the gods—thus the line of decadence would end in a repeat of the fate of the Titans who are now suffering eternally.²⁰⁰ With that in mind, Plato now teaches that conversely the observance of the norm (εὐνομία) practiced in music prevents general lawlessness and restores order,²⁰¹ as much in the individual as in society.²⁰² The ultimate goal for Plato is a State in which there is perfect order

199. That poets and musicians primarily cater to the audience’s desire for pleasure is stated also in *Grg.* 501b–503d. About this phenomenon see also Wallace 1997 who assesses the historicity of this description.

200. The Athenian speaker has talked himself into such a raging tirade that he needs to remind himself of what they had been talking about—a moment of self-irony and comic relief, which might also reveal an intuition that he has gone a bit too far; but it also shows that a neuralgic point has been hit.

201. *Resp.* 425a. Barker 2005, 95 (cf. 126), thinks that Plato is not interested at all in restoring deformed character, but the idea is clearly here (“ἐπανορθόω”); cf. also *Ti.* 47d–e. The healing process of society should then lead into a “virtuous cycle” as described by Plato earlier (424a): good education produces good natures (characters) and these provide, in turn, good education—a sort of self-purifying evolutionary process driven by proper educational principles. The corresponding vicious cycle is described in *Leg.* 659a–c. At another place, one of the dialogue characters quote Socrates lamenting the lack of proper education (“ἀμέτρως καὶ ἀναρμόστως/unmeasured and unorganized”) as a cause for conflicts and other sufferings (*Cleitophon* 407c–d).

Regarding order, see the definitions of musical terms given in *Leg.* 664e–665b, using the word “τάξις” “arrangement, order” (originally of an army): rhythm as the τάξις of motion, *harmonia* as the τάξις of voice (high and low blended), and choral dance as the combination of both. Already in its interior structure does music represent order and organization, a microcosmic image perhaps of the perfect State.

202. Plato assumes a sort of “praestabilized harmony” between soul and State, both having the same interior structure and following the same ethical principles (*Resp.* 427e–445e; esp. 441c); hence the status of interior integrity within the individual has repercussions on the State and vice-versa. As the means to achieve musical stability, like in Egypt, it is proposed to dedicate all dances and songs to religious festivals (*Leg.* 799a–b) since consecrated music seems to resist change better (stated in *Leg.* 657b). Concrete stipulations for this sort of music are given in *Leg.* 800e–802e: the content should have these characteristics:

among the citizens,²⁰³ everyone dedicated to his own affairs (cf. *Resp.* 423c–d); the State is thus just the middle ground between the perfectly adjusted interior of each individual and the harmony of the cosmos.²⁰⁴ Plato does not consider explicitly the unifying aspect of making music *together*, perhaps because it is obvious for him. The choral performances he envisions are important because they are public and involve a common exercise of the ethos to be promoted. Later authors (e.g. Cicero and Christian writers) pay more attention to this point.

Good Music and How to Achieve It; Bad Music

Good music, then, is characterized by simple *harmoniai* and rhythm,²⁰⁵ expressing in some way ethically positive content (manliness and moderation), faithful to traditional genres, norms, and patterns and without distracting variations, submitting to text and content. Its positive effect still depends on the proper balance with physical activity (gymnastics), which, if achieved, will render an emotionally well-rounded personality in which reason rules with the help of affection for what is good in any field, loyal to the laws, and, hence, contributing to the stability and cultural integrity of society. In this sense it is less important that a performance be aesthetically perfect than that music transmits what is objectively good,²⁰⁶ as established, judged, and promoted by those who understand, after the proper training, music's ethical underpinnings.²⁰⁷ For while music, as a gift of the gods,

auspiciousness (εὐφημία), prayer (εὐχή) to the gods, and care not to pray for anything that is not really good; the corresponding songs (ancient and new) are to be selected by competent elders and musical advisers to fulfill the requirements of the ethical triangle. Bartels 2012, 141 highlights the social significance of ethos in the *Laws* and hence the significance of proper musical education.

203. Anderson 1966, 90 and 246 n. 44, underscores the goal of “uniformity” as “purpose of this *paideia*” (with reference to *Leg.* 664a). We should add “uniformity in the good” in order to avoid the idea of totalitarian streamlining, especially because the State is not an end in itself but oriented toward the benefit of its citizens.

204. *Resp.* 441c–e; 530d–531d; cf. Anderson 1994, 66–67; 163–164.

205. *Leg.* 812d–e. This includes homophony (unison singing); cf. Anderson 1966, 96–97 with 251–252.

206. *Leg.* 654b–d, somewhat preparing the ground for the chorus of the elders (with its less-end technical brilliance due to age) as instituted in *Leg.* 665d–666c; nevertheless, musical training forms a necessary condition for a citizen to count as “well-educated” (“καλῶς πεπαιδευμένος”, in 654b); about this same point see above p. 33 n. 4.

207. This specialized education comprises both good perception and understanding of rhythms and *harmoniai* and their correctness and adequate employment in view of ethos (*Leg.* 670b–e; 812b–c), something which ordinary people, or even composers, often neither know nor need to know, as long as they are lead by those who do know how to enjoy the “correct”

has the capacity to provide pleasure, this is not the first criterion for its value or correctness (ὀρθότης).²⁰⁸ Rather, it is that the ones who experience the pleasure²⁰⁹ are the best in virtue and education,²¹⁰ and particularly that they (come to) *understand* (γινώσκω) the three essentials for any *mimēsis* (such as painting or music): what it is (i.e., what is expressed), how correctly and how (technically) well it is

music that leads to virtue. This concept of music education leading to proper judgment is taken up in ps.-Plut. *Mus.* 41.1146a–b. See on this point the lucid study by Bartels 2012 who suggests that the oldest group of citizens (in her interpretation not identical with the third chorus but still older), through life experience and maturity, is the most qualified to identify the best νόμοι in music and, at the same time, as true μυθόλογοι, the best νόμοι of living.

208. Cf. *Leg.* 653d–654a; 655c–d: to say the opposite would be neither tolerable nor pious; not even the poets or composers themselves are deemed competent to judge according to what they “like” (τέρπω) (656c; cf. 801a–c). The pleasure criterion is reduced *ad absurdum* first in 658a–d because of its subjectivity and again in 667b–668d because it is irrelevant to discover and understand the truth. Later follows a historic-political refutation of the pleasure principle for music in 700d–701b by showing its disastrous consequences. On the other hand, virtue itself is happiness, and this the poets ought to convey (660e–661c). *Grg.* 501c–502c discusses further the faulty pleasure-seeking in the arts.
209. We may suppose that Plato has not in mind the normal pleasure that ordinary people feel but what in *Ti.* 80b he calls “εὐφροσύνη,” translated by Bury fittingly as “intellectual delight,” since those who have advanced knowledge discover in “mortal motions” the imitation of divine harmony (“διὰ τὴν τῆς θείας ἀρμονίας μίμησιν ἐν θνηταῖς γενομένην φοραῖς παρέσχον”). About the danger in ordinary pleasure-seeking through music see Pl. *Symp.* 187c–e. Plato’s distinct use of ἡδονή and χάρις in this context has been pointed out by Bartels 2012 and Halliwell 2002, 66 (even though he does not discuss the difference but the general problem of pleasure as an unstable factor within the mimetic experience).
210. “ἐκείνην εἶναι Μοῦσαν καλλίστην ἥτις τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ ἰκανῶς πεπαιδευμένους τέρπει, μάλιστα δὲ ἥτις ἓνα τὸν ἀρετῇ τε καὶ παιδείᾳ διαφέροντα/that Muse [= music] [should be] the most valuable which pleases the best men and those who are properly educated, foremost [if it pleases] one who excels in virtue and education” (*Leg.* 658e–659a). Plato points to another vicious cycle of continued deterioration if the spectators determine by their pleasure what is best and thus corrupt also the composers and judges, as historically illustrated in 700c–e (Anderson 1966, 245 n. 41, contributes further references to this point from other authors). See also 802a–d: for the described screening process done by the elders, Plato does allow the counsel of composers and musicians, even trusting their pleasures and desires in some cases (“ταῖς δὲ ἡδοναῖς καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις μὴ ἐπιτρέποντας ἀλλ’ ἢ τισιν ὀλίγοις”)—a remarkable flexibility. Anderson 1966, 98, and 1994, 165, attests the *Laos* a greater reasonableness in general; but this could, of course, if ever applied, lead again to subjectivism, because on what grounds would the judges decide to trust the pleasures or desires of musicians rather than their own?

crafted.²¹¹ In the end, pleasure arises from what one has become used to since childhood, and so one should rather get used to what makes one better (“βελτίους (...) παρέχεται”), regardless of whether there are sweet ingredients in music or not (*Leg.* 802c–d).²¹²

An additional notion comes into play when Plato speaks of “fitting” (πρέπων) songs (in harmony, rhythm, melody, meter) according to gender, based on the natural differences between male and female—magnificence (τὸ μεγαλοπρεπές) and what tends to manliness (“τὸ πρὸς τὴν ἀνδρίαν) for the former, and what tends to order/decor and temperance (τὸ πρὸς τὸ κόσμιον καὶ σῶφρον) for the latter (*Leg.* 802d–e). In *Leg.* 669c, this conception is extended to the difference between prisoners or slaves and free men. Good music, then, can also be relative to the person to whom its ethos would rightly belong. Such a distinction, of course, did not have any relevance in the *Republic* when only the formation of the guardians was discussed.

At least in earlier works, Plato does not seem to consider it problematic when the musician (and poet) himself enters into some sort of frenzy, inspired by the gods (ἔνθεος; κατεχόμενος) like the Corybantes; and it seems that it is the very music that draws him into that state without which he would not be able to compose at all.²¹³ The great quality of their works is due to the god speaking through them (*Ion* 533e–535a).²¹⁴ But, this is a special case; for the rest of the citizens,

211. “ὁ τέ ἐστι πρῶτον γινώσκειν, ἔπειτα ὡς ὀρθῶς, ἔπειθ' ὡς εὖ, τὸ τρίτον, εἵργασται” (669a–b). These points are drawn from, and therefore also apply to, the judgment of whether something is good/beautiful (καλός) (668d–669a). For the deeper problems of reconciling mimetic representation, correctness, and ethos see Halliwell 2002, 65–69. It might be interesting to notice that Thomas Aquinas (*Summa Theologiae* 1.39.8) lists three quite similar constituents for *pulchritudo*: “*integritas sive perfectio (...). Et debita proportio sive consonantia. Et iterum claritas.*”

212. “παραιθεμένης τῆς γλυκείας μουσῆς” (802c).

213. See *Ion* 534a: “Whenever they get engaged in *harmonia* and in rhythm, they enter into Bacchic frenzy (βακχεύουσιν).” The patronage of Dionysius for the chorus of the elders and the musical “encantation” of the younger show that Plato has not dismissed this dimension in the *Laws*.

214. This is the reason why poets and composers are not proper judges on good and bad music, as said above: they do not have knowledge about their own field, which, for them, is not an art. That the poets can still produce bad works supposes that not all that they write or perform stems from divine inspiration, and this applies even to greats such as Homer and Tyrtæus (e.g. *Leg.* 801a–c; 858e). Anderson 1966, 84–85 with 244 nn. 36 & 37, points at the tension between the idea of inspiration on the one hand and the poets’ limitations on the other. Inspiration seems to be demanded for the objectively *good* compositions or performances. At the same time, not the claim of inspiration but the objectively certified judgment by the competent jury vouches for the goodness of a composition.

reason and understanding should reign, lest the dictatorship of passion and desire for pleasure obscure what is objectively good and true.

Plato also allows room for the healing properties of music (e.g. *Leg.* 790d–e). In *Chrm.* 156e–157b, the treatment of the soul, from which all the well-being of the body stems, is achieved by “charms” (ἐπωδή). These may be understood to be either sung magic formulas or tunes that create moderation (σωφροσύνη) in the soul and thus are cures for the head (the context is a headache) and the body. It is possible, however, that this passage refers rather to text since the term “λόγος” is also used. In *Lysis* 206b, the proposition is offered as obvious that speaking and singing should be used to “charm” (κηλέω),²¹⁵ instead of “making savage” (ἐξαργυαίνω)—the opposite of which would amount to “πολλή ἀμουσία.”²¹⁶

Music is bad, according to what we have seen, in the following cases: (1) when it expresses bad ethos; (2) when it mixes musical elements associated with different *ēthē*, or when music with a particular ethos is performed by someone to whom it does not correspond (and hence is confused, unintelligible, and ridiculous); (3) when it introduces changes to the traditional musical rules;²¹⁷ (4) when it is complicated and complex; (5) when it is poorly made or performed.²¹⁸

Plato observes with some psychological insight (*Leg.* 654b–656c) that those who enjoy objectively “bad” music—due to “nature, disposition, or habit” (“παρὰ φύσιν ἢ τρόπον ἢ συνήθειαν”)—still feel some uneasiness or “shame” at displaying their preference publicly, as they sense the incongruity. Bad music produces its damage regardless of the pleasure felt (656a), and so, the only solution to preventing such a conflict is seen in the proper habituation through education imposed by legislation.

Is there anything *intrinsically* good or bad in music, on the ethical level? Barker argues that Plato does not assume this in the *Symposium* (187c–e), where the value of music depends on the aesthetical categories of composition, performance, and

215. The context, getting hold of someone, suggests this particular word.

216. See above p. 131 n. 452. For further examples on overcoming fear, madness, or sleeplessness see also above in this section n. 179.

217. Strictly speaking, point 2 is a subpoint to 3, but it is important enough to form an argument on its own.

218. *Leg.* 669b. This stands here last and least because it is of little importance for Plato’s main concern; cf. Anderson 1966, 86–87 with 244–245 nn. 38 & 39. We might subsume here also the cases when musical quality suffers because of showiness in order to gain public applause (*Leg.* 700d–e; *Grg.* 501b–503d). Be it noted here also that performing and listening for Plato seem to have the same value; see Anderson 1966, 100. Aristotle addresses this distinction more directly and demands active music practice for early education. About *mimēsis* and ethos in Plato see also Beardsley 1975, 31–39; 46–51.

individual disposition, but that he does assume it in the *Republic*.²¹⁹ This is true insofar as Plato discards certain musical features (e.g. specific *harmoniai*) from the State, without denying their artistic value (397d–398b). However, also in the *Republic* (and later in the *Laws*) there are two other factors in play. One is the proper measure: music in itself is already “softening” in comparison to gymnastics (the problem arises when this effect becomes too prevalent). The other point is the proper correspondence between the ethos of a musical parameter or piece to a specific content, which is exemplified later in the *Laws* insofar as tunes and rhythms may fit one genre or even context while not fitting another.²²⁰ It seems that in the *Laws*, the value of music depends more on the context, converting the ethical triangle into a pyramid with (extramusical) “context” as the fourth end. Only insofar as bad (e.g. effeminate, lascivious) content could in some way be represented legitimately (e.g. in a literary work), then the music, which would have to match this content, would at least be fitting and “appropriate.”




Figure 3–2. The ethical pyramid.

219. Barker 2005, 79–80.

220. Here it would matter little whether Plato is talking about the “underlying structures, rhythmic forms and patterns of attunement” (Barker 2005, 80) or actual compositions; because either would not cause a problem in themselves but as soon as they are concretely employed upon human beings, “πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους” (*Symp.* 187c). The *Republic* is more restrictive because most its stipulations are directed towards the education of the State’s guardians.

Mimēsis

If we want to understand more deeply why and how, according to Plato, music is able to possess ethical force, we need to consider two concepts, the first of which is “*mimēsis*.”²²¹ It deserves particular attention because the ethical value of music hinges on the presumed capacity of musical features to be identified with something that lies outside the mere aesthetic coordination of tones. The role of *mimēsis* in ancient authors, including the later development, has already been the subject of a profound study by Stephen Halliwell. He stresses that “μίμησις” is not properly translated by the word “imitation” as we understand it today but means—with multiple shadings throughout the history of aesthetics—a sort of combination of representation and expression.²²² Roger Scruton has argued that music as we understand it, strictly speaking, does not represent but express.²²³ Halliwell, in turn, when discussing Aristotle, convincingly contends that the ability to experience (or express) ethos (or emotion) in music supposes that there is something

221. Cf. Lippman 1963, 196: “It is the power of music to imitate virtue that explains its capacity to influence and mold character. Thus the conception of imitation acts as an intermediary between the concrete nature of music and its ethical effects, and undertakes to explain how the one can bring about the other.”

222. 2002, 37–14; on “imitation” see 6–14, esp. n. 31; on expression and representation in Aristotle see 151–164 (the quote later in the text is from 161) and 247. Directly about Plato’s attitude towards these terms see 132 n. 39 with some criticism on Scruton’s remark of Plato’s “insensitivity” to the distinction between representation and expression. I would side with Scruton in that Plato does not reflect on the fact that *mimēsis* does not work the same way in music as it does in the visual arts. But another problem might be that Scruton’s definition of “representation” is drawn too narrow.

I shall use “*mimēsis*” in order to avoid the misleading term “imitation;” for the verb “μιμέομαι” in musical context I shall use “express” (for being slightly less contested than “represent,” but without the intention to exclude the latter) except when exact “imitation” (in the sense of copying) is meant, although I am aware that in many instances the precise meaning (“representing” or “expressing”) may not have been considered by the authors I am discussing. Unfortunately, scholars often use indiscriminate terminology, e.g. Pelosi 2010, 52: “the representative possibilities of music are such that in real sense one can speak of them as a figure and a melody representing the coward and the courageous person;” or Lord 1982, 98 n. 49: “the representation of character in the visual arts is slighter than in music”—, which is additionally problematic since it is much harder to trace “representation” in music than in visual arts.

An older work on the topic, but in parts outdated, is Koller 1954, which already received some important correction in Else 1958.

223. 1997, 118–170. Still, even “expression” is a metaphorical term if applied to music (id., 155–157).

in music that makes this communication possible; there is a causal connection between “the perceived affective content of the musical work and the corresponding pattern of the listener’s experience.” *Mimēsis*, then, necessarily contains both the dimensions of representation and expression as two sides of a coin. It seems to me that the same could or even should already be said for Plato as well. We shall need to leave the discussion of the possible expressivity of music for ch. 4; for now it is enough to look at the way Plato envisions that *mimēsis*, as expression of ethos, works in the case of music.

Certainly, Plato is convinced of the strong psychological impact of artistic representation, especially in drama (comprising text, gesture, and music), for both the actor and, to a lesser degree, for the spectator, and he fears the consequences of a habituation to bad ethos by means of negative *mimēsis*. This has led some commentators to believe that Plato would prefer to rescind *mimēsis* as much as possible.²²⁴ However, Halliwell’s careful analysis of different layers of *mimēsis* in Plato’s *Republic* shows that there are positive forms of *mimēsis* (e.g. 397d),²²⁵ which allows

the possibility that artistic representation might be productive of ethical understanding, though it insists on the separation of such understanding from the kind of full psychological immersion in a character that is involved, from the performer’s point of view, in what is here classified as the mimetic mode.

Moreover, this mode makes it possible to “recognize both deranged and evil characters” (cf. 398a) within narrative representation.²²⁶ This is still said for all the arts. Furthermore, Socrates’ assertion

that beautiful form (*euschēmosunē*) involves *mimēmata* of good character (...) contains one of the most wide-ranging statements about mimetic art to be found anywhere in Plato, and it rests on the proposition that in the visual arts (and elsewhere) form is not neutrally depictional but communicative of feeling and value. (...) *mimēsis* is

224. Comotti 1989, 38; Barker in GMW 1.128: “the prospective guardians of the city should not be encouraged to indulge in ‘imitation’ of any sort,” (based on *Resp.* 396e–397d; 595a–607a), while later adding: “if they imitate anything, it must only be what is good and noble (395c–e).” Halliwell 2002, 133–147, demonstrates how the tenth book of the *Republic* is to be understood as a rhetorical, even satirical argument against aesthetic naturalism but not as a rejection of the concept of *mimēsis* as such.

225. Halliwell 2002, 72–85.

226. Id., 79. It may be added that the concept of *mimēsis* is most probably Platonic, not taken from Damon, cf. Else 1958 and Anderson 1966, 40–41 with 222 n. 13, who sees in the traces of ὁμοίότης in Damon a much different conception, more like what Aristides Quintilianus developed.

taken to be inescapably engaged in making moral sense of the human world—not just registering appearances, but actively construing, interpreting, and judging them. (...) Mimetic beauty, for Plato, is an expressive form of ethical value.²²⁷

Plato says that all μουσική is mimetic (*Leg.* 668a–c; 798e), in the sense of “representational.”²²⁸ This assertion should not be understood as referring to music alone because, as we remember, the term also encompasses poetry, to which music is usually linked; Plato actually cements this connection by prescribing that there should be no melody or rhythm without words and no instrument without voice (*Leg.* 669e).²²⁹ His argument goes that without text it is hard to discover what is intended and expressed—this would break the ethical triangle by eliminating the “content” part.²³⁰ This is an important observation, because despite the power over the soul that Plato has attributed to music as such (here explicitly in the strict sense: melody and rhythm, see 401d), he tells us now that the intrinsic expressivity of ethos through music alone is limited; the external trigger of a “message” is desired to clearly identify the ethos of a musical piece. This could appear to be at variance with the clear attribution of ethos to specific *harmoniai* and rhythms, which should be recognizable. But the context of *Leg.* 669 allows us to assume that here he talks about the jumbled and confused music (as previously described)

227. Halliwell 2002, 132, with reference to Pl. *Resp.* 401a. About the first sentence: Plato’s text does not only speak of beautiful form, but also that ugly form (ἀσχημοσύνη) involves *mimēmata* of bad character.

228. Again, if Scruton argues that music (strictly speaking) does not really represent but can express things, especially emotions, his question about whether music *always* expresses something would depend on whether music always has a *meaning* that points beyond itself. We do not need to answer this question now in general, but it seems that Plato would respond with yes, even without an interpretative text going along with music.

229. For a more detailed discussion about Plato’s strong dissuasion from solo instruments, see Anderson 1966, 102–106 with 255–258, who assumes the underlying reason of suspicion against their “profound affective force” and irrationality, similar to poetic inspiration, which precludes understanding. Lippman 1964, 106–107, sees the main reason in the difficulty for purely instrumental music to express content. This changes as soon as music becomes expressive of harmony, wherefore “music in the *Timaeus* is thought of as a purely tonal art; all that matters is its ability to reflect the abstract values of noetic harmony; its slight imitative capacity in the absence of words and physical gesture has ceased to be of interest” (Lippman 1963, 197). This concept, however, does not seem to find entry into Plato’s treatment of the concrete practice of sonic music.

230. Arist. *Pr.* 19.27 (919b36–37) holds that a melody without lyrics (ἄνευ λόγου) still possesses ethos, but, as Plato has pointed out (*Resp.* 398d–e; 400a–c), the exact correspondence between music alone and ethos is only accessible to the musical expert and hence not effective enough.

which is deprived of a clear indication of ethos, and this is aggravated by the lack of lyrics.

Musical *mimēsis* can take the form of crude imitation of animal sounds or the incongruous expression of emotions and states of mind, especially within a dramatic (and hence musical) setting;²³¹ these forms are entirely rejected as “un-Muse-ical” and at best ridiculous (*Leg.* 669c–d; cf. *Resp.* 396b). At least for music, only *mimēsis* of positive ethos should be chosen, because Plato, as opposed to Aristotle, takes the homoeopathic approach that like produces like.²³² One should avoid, therefore, desires (ἐπιθυμήτικα), pleasures, and pains getting stirred up by harmful *mimēsis* (606d–e). Another problem arises when the artist (painter, poet, or musician), in seeking the appreciation of the audience, addresses the inferior (or mean, bad) parts (φαῦλα) of the soul instead of the better ones (*Resp.* 605a–b). All these stipulations further show “the very important connection between imitating goodness and stimulating good behavior—for Plato these are inseparable.”²³³

It is always interesting to test a theory on its promoter. Halliwell inspects the consistency of Plato’s dialogues with his own criteria for poetic censorship.²³⁴ In the case of musical *mimēsis*, an interesting observation has been made recently that I shall include, even if only as a curiosity: Jay B. Kennedy has presented stichometric analyses that seem to reveal a musically inspired structure in Plato’s works, and particularly in the *Republic*. This furthers the argument that there is a strong Pythagorean influence on Plato. If true, this could also mean that Plato perceived his work as a “harmony of the words,”

a musical scale, which organises a dialogue and yet is submerged beneath its surface—an unheard melody finally accessible to reason and measurement. Just as the individual in the *Republic* mirrors the order of the polis, and the individual in the

231. A vivid illustration of this practice in drama is derided in *Ar. Eq.* 522–524. The theory that even syllables are imitative is mentioned by later authors (*Phld. Mus.* 4.32 D146; *AQ* 2.13–14); Anderson 1966, 162, holds that “there is no indication that Plato himself ever subscribed to such doctrines.” Plato does mention something of the kind in *Crt.* 424b, acknowledged by Anderson on p. 281 n. 30.

232. This is said against the assumption that Plato advocates musical catharsis; see above n. 166. Hence, I disagree with Busse 1928, 47–48, who suggests a homoeopathic procedure in *Leg.* 790d (cf. above n. 179), but it is much more probable that Plato followed the allopathic tradition of the Pythagoreans.

233. Beardsley 1975, 49.

234. 2002, 84–85. He comes to a nuanced result, for which he needs to distinguish between Plato’s level of dramatic development of arguments and the very arguments brought forth.

Timaeus mirrors the order of the cosmos, each dialogue is another microcosm mirroring macrocosmic principles of order.”²³⁵

Without committing myself to the truthfulness of this finding, I believe it would be in line with ancient (and even medieval) custom to load a work of art with formal symbolism. If substantiated, it serves as an impressive stamp to the conviction that musical harmony permeates all realities that are good and beautiful.

Music, Cosmos, and the Soul

Greek music was an imitation (...) of disposition or temperamental nature, expressed most typically in measured language and tone. But by virtue of a rapprochement between musical theory and harmonic metaphysics, it also enjoyed the privilege unique among the arts of imitating divine and ideal order.²³⁶

What Lippman says here about Greek music in general, applies to Plato's theory as well. At the end of the *Republic* and especially in the *Timaeus*, Plato takes up Pythagorean musico-cosmical speculation but gives it a deep psychological relevance. For example, his claim that deviation from musical norms (especially in children) leads to a mentality of licentiousness and lawlessness is not self-evident; for while it is clear that children need to learn to follow norms, the idea that listening to or making music that is overstepping norms creates the mentality of political revolutionaries presents more difficulty. How should the children be aware of these norms? Andrew Barker, in his reading of the *Timaeus*, proposes a solution culled from within Plato's own theory:²³⁷ the structure of the soul and musical (melodic and rhythmical) patterns are analogous, so thereby the one is able to imprint its “character” upon the other through participation in the same “form.”²³⁸ This happens in education through steady and repeated exposure, even if unconscious, to the same musical pattern. According to the *Timaeus*,

235. Kennedy 2010, esp. 16–18 and 25.

236. Lippman 1963, 196–197.

237. 2005, 33–47, and again in 120–128. Another very detailed analysis of Plato's *Timaeus* offers Pelosi 2010, 68–113, with particular attention to the recovery of proper rationality in the soul through music.

238. I shall not take sides whether this is in anticipation of Plato's philosophy of “forms/ideas” as developed later in the *Republic*; Barker 2005, 46–47, holds that “εἶδος” (in 402c) “is being used in an entirely non-technical sense, and refers straightforwardly to the visible ‘shape’ or ‘appearance’ of human body” in contrast to the Theory of Forms where the virtues are considered in what they are in themselves; Shorey's note (1930, 402, n. a) seems to argue rather in favor of including the full theory here. The exact ontological status of the ethical patterns/forms is of little bearing for our general discussion.

the same mathematical principles govern the harmony of the “World Soul,” the human soul, and music, and “although human music inevitably falls short of the perfection of cosmic attunement, there are links between them” (Barker, *ibid.*). To restore the soul’s harmony, which got disturbed by bodily and sensual influence and thus became prone to error and loss of reason (*Ti.* 43a–44b), both vision (through astronomical contemplation) and hearing (through harmony and rhythm) serve in an immediate sensual way for ordinary people and in an abstract way for the philosophers who gain an understanding of the mathematical underpinnings (47c–e; 80b; 90c–d). Reading the *Republic* and *Timaeus* together, Barker deduces that some *harmoniai* conform better to the cosmic harmony than others, which then leads to the corresponding judgment of the educated philosopher. This whole process, he concludes, is therefore therapeutic—not healing of particular illnesses but of the “original stain” of a disharmonious soul²³⁹—in order to achieve the ultimate end of human life: the likeness to what is understood, the divine and cosmic order.²⁴⁰ Exposure to music reflecting cosmic harmony will dispose the children’s souls in a way that is also favorable to attaining harmony and proper balance in their own ways of life; and if the norms of music blend with the norms of the State, the immediate response of the soul will be favorable towards them.

But if the ideal music is in heaven, what does that mean for the “real” music? Anderson thinks that Plato was mostly interested in the “inaudible cosmic *harmoniai*,” reachable only in the science of harmonics which deals with the mathematical ratios as laid out in the Pythagorean lore and to be visited in the *Timaeus*. Audible forms of music, so Anderson, served only for “their supposed power to shape people’s ethical natures.”²⁴¹ However, if Barker’s analysis is correct, then

239. This takes place in two stages, which “correspond significantly to those envisaged in the third and seventh books of the *Republic*. There too, in the first phase of education, music influences the soul non-rationally, in the guise of ‘images’, while in the second the underlying structures, which ‘encode’ these images are unravelled by a mind trained in mathematical analysis” (Barker 2005, 126–127).

240. “τῷ κατανοούμενῳ τὸ κατανοοῦν ἐξομοιῶσαι κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν, ὁμοιώσαντα δὲ τέλος ἔχειν τοῦ προτεθέντος ἀνθρώποις ὑπὸ θεῶν ἀρίστου βίου πρὸς τε τὸν παρόντα καὶ τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον/to liken the understanding to what is understood according to the original nature, but to have, [our thoughts] having been made alike, a goal of the best life set before men by the gods both regarding the present and the later time” (90d); this is in some way analogous to the idea that the sense or the soul or intellect becomes what it perceives (cf. Arist. *De an.* 2.5 416b32–418a25; 3.8 431b20–28; Thomas Aquinas *Summa theologiae* 1.14.2; 1.85.2 *ad secundum*).

241. Anderson 1994, 166.

Plato is the first theorist who explicitly develops a system in which music, cosmos, and the soul, and with it the well-being of human life and society, are all bound together through the kinship (cf. *Resp.* 401: “ἀδελφά”!) between beauty and goodness, between aesthetics and ethos. The foundation for this relationship lies in the mathematically pursuable rationality as evidenced in harmonic science.²⁴² Herein finds its place the first literary account of the theory of the “harmony of the spheres” seen at the end of the *Republic* (the famous Myth of Er).²⁴³ While good music is beneficial for every human being, the deeper *understanding* of harmonics, which discovers in human music the “*mimēsis* of divine harmony,” provides delight where the uninitiated only feel enjoyment.²⁴⁴

Conclusions and Questions

A summary of what Plato would consider good or bad music has already been given above. I believe it would be helpful to gather in a systematic order the most important tenets and presuppositions that underlie his ethos theory and that have surfaced on the way.

242. For an illustration of this in *Ti.* 35a ff see Kytzler 1959. A recent comment on the harmonics in the *Timaeus* offers Barker 2007, 318–327, who also explains (pp. 323–324) how the “metaphysical” upsetting of the human soul is equivalent to the same musical distortions that characterize the “New Music” of the fifth century, which shows once more that Plato’s cosmic speculations were not meant to be just that; he clearly states (in 44c) the need of a proper musical education “to restore our souls to rationality and health” (p. 324). For the role of aesthetics in Plato, in addition to Halliwell 2002, see recently also Rocconi 2012b, 126–127, who sees his main contribution on this field in “the importance of consistency between form and content in artistic production” and in “the role of the listener in the final assessment of their value.” Any such “contribution” needs to be seen under the general axiom that the good and the beautiful converge.

243. We shall not pursue this concept further as its details do not advance the discussion of musical value. For a list of all ancient witnesses of this theory see Pépins article “*Harmonie der Sphären*” in the RAC 13.594–618. There is a lot of popularizing literature about the history of the concept, e.g. James 1993.

244. *Ti.* 80b: “ὅθεν ἡδονὴν μὲν τοῖς ἄφροσιν, εὐφροσύνην δὲ τοῖς ἔμφοροισιν διὰ τὴν τῆς θείας ἁρμονίας μίμησιν ἐν θνηταῖς γενομένην φοραῖς παρέσχον/hence, [these sounds] provide pleasure for the senseless, intellectual delight, however, for the sensible, through the *mimēsis* of the divine harmony brought forth in mortal motions.” As nice as this may sound, Barker 2007, 326–327, notes that Plato’s move to a “science of harmony” that is only accessible for a few marks the beginning of the divorce between music as a practical art and the musical theorists debating within an “ivory tower.”

1. Music has a most powerful influence on the soul.
2. This power consists in the fact that music is expressive of ethos and as such is able to influence the interior order of an individual's soul along with its exterior manifestations.
3. Music contains and produces ethos by *mimēsis*, i.e. specific sound patterns in some way refer to and evoke extramusical dispositions or attitudes (such as manliness and strength, weakness and relaxation). It induces ethos in musicians and spectators in a similar, but not identical way.
4. Good ethos consists for one part in the proper order of the soul, i.e. the correct hierarchy of the different faculties and tendencies within it which need to be balanced and "attuned;" for the other part it consists in virtues or qualities that are fitting for the individual, according to sex, social status, age, profession, etc.
5. Pleasure in itself is no criterion for good ethos; however, the educated critic will discover good ethos in the objective beauty that good music possesses and find enjoyment therein: *bonum et pulchrum convertuntur*.²⁴⁵
6. The soul is most influenced and shaped in young years, wherefore musical education is crucial for acquiring good ethos.

245. Cf. *Leg.* 655b. Pelosi 2010, 52–67, points at the tension between this principle (without phrasing it thus) and the fact that Plato rejects elsewhere (aesthetical) pleasure as criterion for good music. He traces the cause of enjoying certain music in whether it matches one's own (ethical) nature and habituation (*Leg.* 655d–656), which can easily be distorted. "As with all *mimēsis*, it is necessary to know the model and mechanisms through which it is realised" (57; cf. *Leg.* 668c–d), in the case of music this is the model of good (or bad) ethos. I believe we need to distinguish different levels of pleasure: one, which arises blindly from whatever taste a person has developed, and another, which is "purified" by reason, the one the elders are supposed to feel. Unpurified pleasure will lead to erroneous judgments about what is good. The coincidence of beauty and goodness, therefore, is fully achieved only in taking pleasure in what has been identified by reason as truly good. Now, the intellectual delight in *Ti.* 80b, as Pelosi (p. 66) correctly remarks, stems from the insight into music as *mimēsis* of eternal harmony, not of virtuous attitudes. But if exposure to this harmony is supposed to bring order into the soul, this order would precisely establish virtue; cf. the anthropological development in *Resp.* 588–592b: the animalistic parts of human nature need to be dominated by reason, with the result: "ἀεὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἀρμονίαν τῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕνεκα συμφωνίας ἀρμολύμενος φανέεται (...) ἔάνπερ μέλλῃ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μουσικός εἶναι/it will always be clear that the harmony in the body is harmonized for the sake of the 'symphony' in the soul (...) if he wants to be in truth a 'musician'" (591d); Emlyn-Jones/Preddey translate μουσικός with "culturally attuned;" meant is the full accomplishment of what the Muses can inspire to.

7. Like produces like: people need to be exposed to good ethos in order to be disposed to it. Consequently, negative ethos ought to be eliminated from education or at least be clearly identifiable as to be rejected.
8. That the citizens of a State possess good ethos is paramount for its stability and well-being. Given the powerful influence of music in forming ethos, music education and the choice of music conducive to good ethos is of great relevance for the State and therefore requires regulation through those who are best trained and experienced; any innovation is to be carefully checked.
9. The universe (“World Soul”) and the individual soul are set up according to musical proportions, mathematically describable.
10. The science of harmonics, which studies these realities, provides the advanced student with the necessary insight to the inner workings of music, producing in him interior harmony and delight to the fullest degree and enabling him to judge musical ethos properly according to reason and wisdom.
11. The ultimate goal of music is love for the good/beautiful.

Questions regarding Plato’s tenets, which modern science could help to resolve, are:

1. Are there proofs for a particular power of music over the human psyche? What does this power consist in?
2. Is there any evidence for an intrinsic (i.e. nature-given) correspondence between music and extra-musical content, which it is supposed to express (or “mean”), and if there is, how does this correspondence work?²⁴⁶

246. One may, of course, talk of a conventional correspondence, developed in a cultural context and acquired individually by ontogenetic habituation—and even this is denied by the “formalist” school of music theory. But if certain extra-musical features (character, emotions) can be expressed in music by means of convention, it seems that there has to be some inner connection between music and ethos that suggests such a connection in the first place; here is decisive again the concept of *mimēsis*, cf. Halliwell 2002, 160: “mimetic likenesses share by nature (not convention) some of their properties with the things they signify” (cf. also 244). Plato simply affirms (*Leg.* 655b) that those qualities of music related to goodness or badness of soul or body are generally (ἀπλῶς) and all (ἅπας/σύμπας) good or bad. See also *Leg.* 657a–b: certain melodies possess correct features by nature (“φύσει”)—and in the case of Egypt, the objective goodness of the traditional melodies is sanctioned by their divine origin (Isis). Anderson 1966, 106–107, asserts that “Plato always recognizes” that “no mode or rhythm can be good or bad in itself,” but that Plato instead links “the two provinces by association.” The fact that Plato would hardly identify ethos in music without text (*Leg.*

3. Can musical parameters have ethical value and effect? How exactly does melodic or rhythmic *mimēsis* of character function? Plato keeps this mystery for himself; the description of ethos in dance, which he does give, does not help too much since dance is visual, not acoustic.²⁴⁷
4. What psychological effects, positive or negative, can specific forms of musical parameters (rhythm, mode, melodic lines, timbre, etc.) have, and how far are they ethically relevant? And are any of Plato's classifications correct (does, for instance, extended exposure to "soft" music really create unstable, angry, and discontent personalities, as he claims)?²⁴⁸ Lastly, is it

669d-e) seems to confirm this, but on the other hand stands the "φύσει" quoted above and that musical *mimēsis* of ethically charged utterances or movements cannot be wholly arbitrary.

247. Pelosi 2010, 199–200, after a long study of what Plato tells us about the "complex interactions between musical, psychic and corporeal movements," has to admit that "there exists no definitive explanation in the dialogues of how these interactions come to pass."

About dance see Anderson 1966, 101–102 with 254 nn.75 & 76, based on *Leg.* 814e–816d.

248. Anderson 1966, 74: "We question the possibility of actual evil being impressed upon the hearer." Another example may be allowed to illustrate the question: at least in the Western Christian tradition, the prominent place the pipe organ took (in an astonishing turnaround career from an instrument banned because of its use in pagan spectacles to become the strongly preferred instrument in Catholic liturgy) appears to contradict blatantly Plato's stipulations: it is the instrument with the absolut widest pitch range and allowing all sorts of modulation, brought to an exuberant perfection by probably the greatest master of organ and polyphony, Johann Sebastian Bach. It is based mostly on the sound of wind instruments, and although it is called the "Queen of Instruments", a sound conspicuously absent is what would correspond to the ancient lyre or cithara (or the modern guitar). But does the organ elicit the negative effects Plato is eager to avoid? The contrary seems to be the case. Whoever has listened to a Prelude and Fugue by Bach in a cathedral, with all its rhythmic, harmonic, and instrumental variety and virtuosity, will confirm the tremendous force that it has on both bringing serenity and balance to the soul and lifting up the spirit to prayer and devotion. On the other hand, the guitar is now an instrument popular among young people, constituting a more fashionable approach to sacred music, more tolerated than promoted by Church authorities because it provokes associations with the profane. This is also true of the piano or even more so drums and other instruments used by rock bands (I am referring to the occidental cultural and liturgical tradition; the state of affairs in Africa or Latin America, for instance, is different.). Does this inverted experience of musical ethos invalidate all of Plato's suppositions about the effect of particular musical features or simply relegate them to the taste of a particular period, which Plato, as a conservative, kept endorsing out of personal preference? In other words, are there any constants in musical ethos, or does its perception fluctuate completely according to times and cultures? An aggravating factor is that Plato's judgments about music probably do not reflect the

possible to establish a taxonomy of musical ethos that is more precise than Plato's general characterizations (and those of most other authors)?

5. Is it possible to establish objective criteria for beauty (or its opposite) in music, which are, at least partially, detached from enjoyment?
6. Is it true that musical formation at a young age is more effective? What does this mean for limited moments of musical exposure as implied in the "ongoing" musical formation suggested in Plato's *Laws*?²⁴⁹
7. Does music therapy function with homeopathic or allopathic methods, or are there different cases of valid application for each of these?
8. Plato's assertion that degenerate democracy originates in a sort of musical anarchy faces two difficulties: one is the accuracy of his historical example Athens, which for us is difficult to assess;²⁵⁰ the other is his inductive inference that, even if the development in Athens was the way he describes it, a general rule can be established that musical "lawlessness" necessarily leads to socio-political degeneration. About the latter more could be said if there were at least another example from history that would be able to corroborate the nexus between music and morals. Not a few authors have argued that the development of music especially in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries offers another striking example. When Plato has the protagonist in the *Laws* draw a direct line from musical deviation in ethos to the eternal suffering of the Titans, he comes fairly close to Tolkien's conception of the origin of "bad" music and its consequences as we presented it at the outset, or to those who observe demonic forces corrupting culture "out of the spirit of [Dionysian] music."²⁵¹ What proof can there be given for attributing to music any responsibility for the moral and political development in society?

common opinion or practice of the people whose preferences may rather have been in line with what he criticizes (about this see e.g. GMW 1.133 n. 32 concerning instruments). Plato himself is very much aware of this because he bluntly declares that the crowds do not know the difference between good and bad music (*Leg.* 670b: "γελοῖος γὰρ ὁ γε πολὺς ὄχλος ἡγούμενος ἱκανῶς γινώσκειν τὸ τε εὐάρμοστον καὶ εὐρυθμον καὶ μὴ/It is ridiculous of the crowd to believe that it sufficiently recognizes what is well harmonic and well rhythmical and what not;" cf. 655c; 700e–701a).

249. About the tension between the indelible "dyeing stamp of education" in the *Republic* and the ongoing musical formation in the *Laws* see Pelosi 2010, 14–28.
250. See about this Anderson 1994, 162–165, and Wallace 1997, 101, who summarizes various theories and seems to favor Athen's defeat in 404 BC as the date for marking the beginning of her "degeneration."
251. In allusion to Nietzsche 1872 and Jones 1994.

9. Is there any trace of scientific evidence for some sort of “cosmic harmony” that is reflected in our psyche and transmitted through music?

It will also be worth exploring further how this “interface” between soul (emotions), ethos, and musical structures can be explained and substantiated in modern scientific terms. Plato’s theory may be no more applicable with regard to particularities (e.g. his condemnation of solo instrumental music, etc.), but there might be intuitions of principles with lasting validity. We shall address some of these questions in ch. 4.

On the level of political and musical development, despite his confidence in the predominance of established ritual chorus songs (*Leg.* 657b), Plato’s call has *in praxi* remained widely ineffective—the “New Music” takes its route into full-fledged Hellenistic “Baroque,” which continues throughout the Roman period when the sensual exploits of an increasing musical artistry reach the extremes and excesses of Nero’s court.²⁵² Notwithstanding the external course of music history, the idea and ideal of musical ethos has not died with Plato but resonates in many other authors throughout antiquity and beyond.

Plutarch

Having reviewed extensively Plato’s approach to musical ethos, we now move several centuries forward to Plutarch. His monumental literary output covers a huge range of areas, but he is certainly not a music theorist. Nevertheless, he touches upon music with some frequency. We shall discuss here some of the more relevant references, while some other comments of his are included elsewhere in the context of other authors.²⁵³

Music Excesses at Symposia

Plutarch seems to be the only author who uses the term “κακομουσία.”²⁵⁴ An illustration for this is the discussion of an instance where a musical performance during

252. See p. 180.

253. The works by Plutarch are cited from the Loeb Classical Library edition, with various translators.

254. LSJ references it for *Quaest. conv.* 9.15 = *Mor.* 748c (deploring the degeneration of dance) and indicates the definition “corruption of music;” however, the *Supplement* (p. 164) corrects this to “the quality of offending against the principles of art.” This is certainly the better rendering of the referenced passage, but the word occurs also in the heading of the section discussed here (*Quaest. conv.* 7.5.1–4 = *Mor.* 704c–706e), without doubt meaning what the former definition formulated.

dinner deteriorates into getting temporarily out of control (with an effect analogous to what one might experience in a modern-day discotheque). An unnamed *aulētēs* takes on the task of spellbinding and inebriating his audience “more effectively than wine.” The participants first shout and clap, then they begin to dance disgracefully, employing rhythm and melody that exhibits a kind of madness (μανία). Once the rage dies down, a brief debate arises between three of the symposiasts about how to judge the incident, which caught everyone a bit by surprise.

At first, Callistratus tries to excuse it by dismissing the possible accusation of a “lack of self control” (ἀκρασία). He assembles various points in a not very stringent argument: that “beautiful” (καλῶς) can be applied to the enjoyment of all senses, not just hearing and sight, that such enjoyments are not limited to humans but also animals;²⁵⁵ that auditive and visual enjoyment, particularly melody, rhythm, and dance, give joy to the soul (and not just the body as the other senses) through delighting and “tickling;” that there is neither ἀκρασία nor ἡδυπάθεια (“luxury, passion for pleasure”) in such enjoyments since they are pursued in public places such as stadia and theaters, for a freeman’s and citizen’s pastime (διατριβή). Only this last point contains some real substance pertinent to the actual occasion (however, just because an event may be public, it does not necessarily follow that the mentioned vices are avoided).

This assessment is countered by Lamprias who argues that “ἀκρασία” cannot be applied to people who out of ignorance fall prey to inordinate pleasure due to a surprise, as just occurred. He warns of weakness (μαλακία) and luxury (ἡδυπάθεια), for the performers are tickling ears and eyes and not just smell, taste, or sexuality: whoever exposes himself to melody and rhythm allows such enjoyment to manipulate and corrupt his soul,²⁵⁶ for they are more pungent (δριμύς), varied (ποικίλος), and stronger than food or smell; they are dangerous precisely because they captivate judgment and understanding more than anything else, and worse, they are available for free, without other “passions” or obstacles to impede their impact;²⁵⁷ hence, readily available, almost omnipresent, music easily corrupts (διαφθείρω) the “musomaniacs.” What exactly such corruption consists of is not said. Platonic concerns clearly echo in these phrases.

Plutarch has the narrator object in ironic terms against hyperbolic precaution, whereupon Lamprias drives his point home with the exhortation to lead

255. He adds a number of examples for the “enchanting” effect of music on various animals, a topic found also in other texts of Plutarch (in the tables of the appendix).

256. 705f: “ἐγκέκλικε καὶ παρέδωκεταῖς ἡδοναῖς ἀγειν καὶ φέρειν τὴν ψυχὴν.”

257. Plutarch gives examples where a high price discourages the pursuit of certain pleasures in effect of the other πάθος of avarice.

the one enjoying badly fabricated (κακότεχνος) and styled (κακόζηλος) mimes, melodies, and tunes back from the Sirens to the Muses, to Euripides, Pindar, and Menander, cleansing the ears with the fresh water of reason.²⁵⁸ One should not get overwhelmed (ἐκπλήσσω) or carried away by these tumultuous frenzies, yellings, and neck-tossings like by a stream but rather return to the holy, august, and noble songs and poems.²⁵⁹

The meat of the discussion lies in whether vision and hearing have a more prominent effect on humans than the other senses and whether the enjoyment they bring presents any danger of corruption; both parties admit that the soul (or mind) is more affected. The problem consists in the extravagant practice of music and dance. When performances of music and poetry do not offer any restraint, the only solution is seen in “washing by reason” and leading people back to good art and taste.²⁶⁰ It remains interesting, though, that Lamprias praises three poetic-musical innovators, especially Euripides who had received much flak by Aristophanes.²⁶¹ We can observe here again that what was considered bad in one period has become good in another, but this happens because the road of “excessiveness” has since been pursued further.

In another “Problem” (*Quaest. conviv.* 7.8.1–4 = *Mor.* 711a–713f), the interlocutors sift through literature and music in order to establish a fitting canon, not for a State, as Plato, but for symposia. An unnamed sophist suggests suppressing all forms of entertainment except a new form in which characters of Platonic dialogues are expressed by a voice style, movement, and delivery according to the text—something, which purportedly has been welcomed by the “austere” and graceful people while rejected by unmanly, enervated, unmusical, and aesthetically

258. This last phrase is from Pl. *Phdr.* 243d: “ποτίμῳ λόγῳ ἀλμυρὰν ἀκοήν (...) ἀποκλυζόμενον.”

259. 706e: “τῶν ἱερῶν καὶ σεμνῶν ἐκείνων γραμμάτων ἀναμνησκόμενοι καὶ παραβάλλοντες ψῆδας καὶ ποιήματα καὶ λόγους κοινούς οὐκ ἐκπλαγησόμεθα παντάπασι νῦν τοῦτου, οὐδὲ πλαγίους παραδώσομεν ἑαυτοὺς ὥσπερ ὑπὸ ῥεύματος λείου φέρεσθαι/if we recall those hallowed and venerable writings and set up for comparison common songs and poems and tales, we shall not be altogether dazed by these performances, nor shall we surrender ourselves, as it were, to float reclining on the gentle stream of the music” (tr. E. Minar, slightly altered). Instead of “κοινούς,” there are other readings (γενναίους [preferred by Minar who translates: “[songs] of true nobility], κενούς).

260. There are antecedents to this view in Pl. *Prt.* 347c–e and *Symp.* 176e where the music is only deemed a distraction in symposia of the educated; cf. Anderson 1966, 143.

261. One critical point on Pindar, which Plutarch himself mentions, quoting Corinna, is that he was missing out on myth (and with it poetical substance) within all the ἡδύσματα of style, melody, and rhythm: *De glor. Ath.* 4 = *Mor.* 347f–348a.

ignorant ones²⁶² who follow the growing fashion of effeminacy (θηλύτης). Such vocabulary is familiar to those aware of the antagonism between the “old” and “new” music style, but it is applied here in quite an unconventional, inverted fashion in order to defend an innovation—something that evokes the immediate opposition of Philip (although his main point is the irreverent use of Plato’s dialogues). Diogenianus then begins to sort appropriate pieces from inappropriate ones, praising especially the New Comedy as fitting and morally acceptable. Eventually, the narrator addresses music directly and admits both cithara and *aulos*, but not for dirges or lamentations. The *aulos* is praised for its soothing effect on the soul as long as it guards the proper measure (μέτριον) and does not fill with emotion (παθαίνω) or rouse (ἀνασοβέω) with low tones and “multichords” (πολυχορδία, as already criticized by Plato and others), adding to the effect of alcohol. He explains that this has a non-rational effect, like what the herdsmen do with their flock, which does not understand words.²⁶³ At the same time, he stresses that at symposia, but even at other occasions, the *aulos* or lyre should never be played without sung words, or else one would be carried away like by a stream (see above at 706e), for the rationality (λόγος) would be excluded.²⁶⁴

In another text, Plutarch observes that just as gluttony has befallen people, so also hearing has fallen sick and corrupted music, which stirs the desire for shameful and “womanish” tickling. Shameful debauchery leads to unmusical sounds, abominable melodies, and things to hear lead to horrible theater performances and these for their part to insensibility and crudeness towards people.²⁶⁵ Moral decline and ultimately loss of humanity appear as the consequences of excessive sensual indulgence in food and music.

262. “ταῦθ’ οἱ μὲν αὖστηροὶ καὶ χαρίεντες ἡγάπησαν ὑπερφυῶς, οἱ δ’ ἄνδρες καὶ διατεθρυμμένοι τὰ ὦτα δι’ ἀμουσίαν καὶ ἀπειροκαλίαν, οὓς φησὶν Ἀριστοξένος χολὴν ἔμεῖν, ὅταν ἐναρμονίου ἀκούσωσιν, ἐξέβαλον” (711c; tr. as above; the end says about those who reject it: “who, as Aristoxenos says, throw up gall whenever they hear of [something] enharmonic”; Minar translates with “in tune”).

263. The benefit is particularly helpful when the dinner gets agitated and headed with anger; music then can put out abuse, take hold of an unpleasant discussion, and restrain political controversies (713e–f).

264. A poetic image is chosen: we should not listen to the sound of *psalterion* and *aulos* on their own knocking at (the door of) our ears, but to lead them in when it comes with words and song to entertain and please reason in us. Plutarch suggests here that the crime of Marsyas (see ch. 2 n. 37) was that he tried to prevail with instruments only against song and cithara together (713b–d).

265. “οὕτως ἔπονται παρανόμοις τραπέζαις συνουσίαι ἀκρατεῖς, ἀφροδισίοις αἰσχροῖς ἀκροάσεις ἄμουςοι, μέλεσι καὶ ἀκούσμασιν ἀναισχύντοις θέατρα ἔκφυλα, θεάμασιν ἀνημέροις ἀπάθεια πρὸς ἀνθρώπους καὶ ὠμότης.” (*De esu carnum* 2.2 = *Mor.* 997c).

The Spartan Tradition

Probably as a reaction to concerns about hedonistic degeneration, the Spartan way of life, which was marked by harsh discipline, sparks interest, and music plays an important role in it. Plutarch reports (*Instituta Laconica* 14 = *Mor.* 238a) that the Spartans consciously used melody and songs as an incentive (κέντρον) to awaken high spirit (θυμός) and resolution (φρόνημα) and to arouse an ecstatic and vigorous impulse,²⁶⁶ along with lyrics about noble and heroic deeds, performed by three choirs representing the stages of age—Plato’s stipulations in *Leg.* 664b–667a are strikingly similar to this account. Their marching rhythms in battle, along with the *aulos*, instilled manliness, boldness, and contempt for death.²⁶⁷ Lycurgus managed to couple their love for music with war exercise so as to achieve concord and harmony through the combination of both.²⁶⁸ Here music has the same mitigating function that Plato applies to equilibrate the hardening effect of gymnastics. This double function, here united in one passage, is found separately in other places of Plutarch’s works where music is described as either stimulating or diminishing θυμός, which, depending on the sense of the term, can mean either “high spirit, courage” or “anger.”²⁶⁹

Moderation and *Mimēsis*

In Aristotelian terms, Plutarch emphasizes the importance of the proper mean (μέσον) and measure (μεσότης) in virtue as moderating passions and compares it with the harmonious (ἁρμονική) mediating between the extremes of high and low pitch (*De virtute morali* 6 = *Mor.* 444e–f)—an image already used by Plato (*Resp.* 443d–e).²⁷⁰ This means that the extremes are not to be abolished, but the blend (τὸ ἁρμονικόν) of both is pursued in music and elsewhere (*ibid.* 12 = *Mor.* 451e–452c).

266. “ἐσπούδαζον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ μέλη καὶ τὰς ψῆδας οὐδὲν ἦττον κέντρον δ’ εἶχε ταῦτα ἐγερτικὸν θυμοῦ καὶ φρονήματος καὶ παραστατικὸν ὁρμῆς ἐνθουσιώδους καὶ πρακτικῆς.”

267. “οἱ ἐμβατήριοι δὲ ῥυθμοὶ παρορμητικοὶ πρὸς ἀνδρείαν καὶ θαρραλεότητα καὶ ὑπερφρόνησιν θανάτου, οἷς ἐχρῶντο ἔν τε χοροῖς καὶ πρὸς αὐλὸν ἐπάγοντες τοῖς πολεμίοις.”

268. “ὁ γὰρ Λυκοῦργος παρέξεν τῇ κατὰ πόλεμον ἀσκήσει τὴν φιλομουσίαν, ὥπως τὸ ἄγαν πολεμικὸν τῷ ἁρμονικῷ κερασθὲν συμφωνίαν καὶ ἁρμονίαν ἔχη.” It is also mentioned that, before battle, Lycurgus sacrificed to the Muses as a motivation for the soldiers to want to be remembered later in songs of worthy deeds.

269. Thus in *De virtute morali* 12b = *Mor.* 452, legislators in general used music to increase the fighting spirit, while according to *De cohibenda ira* 10 = *Mor.* 458e, the Spartans strove to remove anger and let reason (λόγος) reign.

270. A much more detailed development, based on the Platonic analysis of the soul, can be found in *Quaest. Plat.* 9 = *Mor.* 1007e–1009b.

In a similar work (*Prof. virt.* 13 = *Mor.* 83f–84a), progress in virtue is equal to preferring Dorian over Lydian by favoring a life-style that is more hard or austere (σκληρότερος), more deliberate (βραδύτερος) in actions, and admiring (θαυμαστός) teachings and people instead of living in a rather soft or lax way (μαλακώτερος), falling into precipititious action (προπετέστερος), and being contemptuous (καταφρονητός) towards others—although one should eventually avoid the extreme in any direction. Here the example of Phrynis is given who had to cut off two extra strings either on the top or at the bottom of his lyre—but to pursue the proper mean (μέσον) for virtue and in dealing with passion, one would have to cut off on each end.

An interesting parallel to Plato's view on *mimēsis* is *Quomodo adul.* 3 (= *Mor.* 18a–f), even though it refers only to painting, poetry, and simple sound imitation: a young person to be educated should relish the artistic value in a well-crafted depiction of an immoral scene; this value rests on the equivalence between the “content” (story, scene) and its representation.²⁷¹ Plutarch first introduces this as an aesthetic category, but then also “justifies” this procedure in moral terms: if it is taught that evil people perform evil acts, there is no danger of actually promoting evil actions. Plutarch has no more need of censuring artistic representations of “bad” content as long as the moral message remains clear and the teacher procures a positive antidote for a negative example in order to balance it out. This principle can *mutatis mutandis* apply to music as well, even though Plutarch does not mention this explicitly, insofar as its parameters express the ethos of the person or action, which the music interprets. In this case, Plato's ethical triangle would be dissolved, because the ethos of the soul would no longer agree with the ethos of content and artistic expression, even though the last two aspects still are bound to match up.

Plutarch also treats the harmony of the spheres (with the proportions between planets being analogous to musical intervals); this is in *De animae procreatione in Timaeo* 32–33 = *Mor.* 1029a–1030c with particular reference to the end of Plato's *Republic* (the Sirens). Plutarch assumes that the creator of the world brought about the World Soul by establishing order in the whole universe. Images of the gods show them with musical instruments in their hands not because they are actually playing lyre or *aulos* but because no work is so much of the gods as harmony and concord.²⁷²

271. “οὐ γάρ ἐστι ταὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν τι καὶ καλῶς τι μιμεῖσθαι, καλῶς γάρ ἐστι τὸ πρεπόντως καὶ οἰκείως, οἰκεῖα δὲ καὶ πρέποντα τοῖς αἰσχροῖς τὰ αἰσχρά.” For a deeper discussion of Plutarch's conception of *mimēsis* see Halliwell 2002, 296–302, but he does not mention this passage.

272. “οὐδὲν ἔργον ... θεῶν οἶον ἁρμονίαν εἶναι καὶ συμφωνίαν” (1030b).

In summary, the dangers of music according to these accounts lie in the greater (and possibly corruptive) impact, which the senses of vision and hearing have on the soul, especially because they affect reason, as does alcoholic intoxication. Bad music itself is deprived of reason, if it is badly composed (meaning mostly exaggeration in the various musical parameters or the bodily movements in dance), if there is no text, which gives it proper meaning, and if no exterior measure (like payment) puts a constraint on indulgence. The “corruption” brought about is not specified further, but some long-term effect seems to be considered as well when Plutarch quotes Homer to the effect that bad music and songs create unmanly *ēthē* and lives and men who love luxuriousness, softness, “womanish behavior,” etc.²⁷³ Good music is characterized by maintaining due measure and balance, by avoiding excessive emotion, and by bringing about desired states of mind, either by arousing the spirits or mitigating existing passion in order to prevent disproportionate behavior.

Plutarch is very well aware of the magic power that music possesses: “The name for pleasure, which comes through the ears, is enchantment.”²⁷⁴ The seasonings (ἡδυσμα) that music adds to words through melody, meter, and rhythm make their educational function more exciting, but also any harmful effect more inevitable; they are like the intriguing exterior grace of women.²⁷⁵

Strabo²⁷⁶

This Greek geographer from the early Empire offers a succinct but insightful comment on music in the context of his explanation of the name “Curetes” as war-dancers or dancing ministers of Dionysius or Cybele on Crete.²⁷⁷ Strabo describes the role of music, defined as dancing, rhythm, and melody, within religious festivals according to both Greeks and barbarians. His main points are these: music joins humans to the gods because of its enjoyment (ἡδονή) and well-craftedness (καλλιτεχνία), thus pointing out an aesthetic dimension, which does not seem primarily to aim at

273. Plut. *Quomodo adul.* 4 = *Mor.* 19f–20a: “διδάσκει (...) ὅτι μουσική φαύλη καὶ ἄσματα πονηρὰ καὶ λόγοι μοχθηρὰς ὑποθέσεις λαμβάνοντες ἀκόλαστα ποιοῦσιν ἥθη καὶ βίους ἀνάνδρους καὶ ἀνθρώπους τρυφὴν καὶ μαλακίαν καὶ γυναικοκρασίαν ἀγαπῶντας.”

274. Plut. *De soll. an.* 3 = *Mor.* 961d: “ἡδονῆς δὲ τῇ μὲν δι’ ὧτων ὄνομα κήλησις ἐστί τῇ δὲ δι’ ὀμμάτων γοητεία.”

275. *Amat.* 23 = *Mor.* 769c–d: “καθάπερ δὲ λόγῳ ποιήσις ἡδύσματα μέλη καὶ μέτρα καὶ ῥυθμοὺς ἐφαρμόσασα καὶ τὸ παιδεῦον αὐτοῦ κινητικώτερον ἐποίησε καὶ τὸ βλάπτον ἀφυλακτότερον οὕτως ἡ φύσις γυναικὶ περιθεῖσα χάριν ὅψεως καὶ φωνῆς πιθανότητα καὶ μορφῆς ἐπαγωγὸν εἶδος.”

276. Text and tr.: Jones 1928.

277. This wider context is 10.3.8–13. The passage on music is in sections 9 and 10.

pleasing the gods but those who celebrate them. For men resemble (μιμέομαι) the gods more in being blessed (εὐδαιμονέω) through celebrations, philosophy, and music, than in showing kindness (εὐεργετέω). At the same time, Strabo is aware of some sort of degeneration of music in public spectacles to “ἡδυπάθεια,” apparently some sort of unhealthy excitement, the cause for which he sees in education. Here Strabo refers to Plato and the Pythagoreans by stating that every musical form (πᾶν τὸ μουσικὸν εἶδος) is a work of the gods who assembled the universe through harmony. Strabo reiterates the idea that moral customs are trained through music (τῶν ἡθῶν κατασκευή), and this corrective force for the mind (τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν τοῦ νοῦ) is as close to the gods as poetry. He goes on mentioning the divinities involved in music, especially the orgiastic or Bacchic rites, and concludes that all educated men are servants of the Muses, especially the musicians.²⁷⁸

Strabo is merely reporting and not voicing his own opinion, but we learn from him a view that links good music to divine origin and cosmic harmony and suspects the origin of bad (or lesser) music as displayed in certain public settings in problems within the education system. For all of this, Plato and the Pythagoreans are called witnesses. Already early in his work (1.2.3), Strabo cites the Pythagoreans and Aristoxenus in supporting the music teachers in their claim that they are “educators and restorers of ethos,”²⁷⁹ while elsewhere corrupt (παραφθείρων) poetry seems to be linked to an immoral life (14.1.41, mentioning various individuals).

Nicomachus²⁸⁰

This second-century mathematician, Nicomachus, is a fervent promoter of Pythagorean number theory, even though he probably draws from Aristoxenus as well. His *Manuale harmonices* in twelve chapters, written in letter-style, is nevertheless mostly of a technical nature. It is mentioned here because in ch. 3, Nicomachus derives concept and names for the diatonic scale from the planets, building on the Pythagorean vision of the harmony of the spheres (οἱ φθόγγοι σφαίρας), which

278. “πρόπολοι δὲ τῶν Μουσῶν οἱ πεπαιδευμένοι πάντες, καὶ ἰδίως οἱ μουσικοί.”

279. “παιδευτικοὶ γὰρ εἶναι φασὶ καὶ ἐπανορθωτικοὶ τῶν ἡθῶν.” An example from Homer follows (*Od.* 3.272), which above all seems to show the presumed personal integrity of a bard to whom Agamemnon entrusts his wife Clytemnestra during his absence. But Strabo apparently takes this for a proof that, if music forms good character, the musician should have such a character in the first place—in line with Plato’s teaching in *Resp.* 420b; see on this idea also Theon of Smyrna 10.17–12.9, even though “musician” here might rather mean the Platonic philosopher who climbs the heights of harmonic science.

280. Text: MSG 237–265; tr. and comm.: GMW 2.245–269 and Levin 1994. Summary and discussion: Mathiesen 1999, 390–406; Gersh 2005, 196–197.

here are the tones produced by planets as they rotate through the ether with the Sun in the middle, thus forming a heptachord.²⁸¹

These notions are repeated and expanded in the (only fragmentarily transmitted) *Manuale harmonicum*.²⁸² In ch. 6, the seven planets are now also linked to vowels (which would imply some sort of timbre specification), and further number speculations of Pythagorean origin are added, accounting for the lyre strings. New is the notion that within the cosmic harmony, the combination of a harmonic principle with matter (e.g. the string of the lyre) brings about a living thing just as when the soul enters a body, which can be used to call upon the divinities.²⁸³ This idea of giving to the moment of the actual music production a metaphysical weight attributes to music an almost hypostatic quality and explains why later authors who draw much from Nicomachus, especially Aristides Quintilianus, continue the path of giving to music such a central place in human life. In ch. 7, he parallels the three genera to the three parts of the soul (rational, irrational, and physical), but this analogy is not further developed.

Ptolemy²⁸⁴

The second-century Alexandrian scholar Ptolemy, mostly known for his astronomical writings, was also engaged in music theory (in the *Harmonica*), bringing its Pythagorean-Platonic brand to a culmination,²⁸⁵ but also incorporating some aspects from the Aristotelian-Aristoxenian tradition. His is a unified view of reality expressible in mathematical terms, but at the same time, they should also be empirically verifiable, as Barker describes it:

Because the harmonic structures are expressions in sound of a mathematical order that is not peculiar to music or sound as such, but is the rational order underlying formal

281. See above n. 122.

282. Text: MSG 266–282; tr. Levin 1994, 186–199; summary and discussion: Mathiesen 1999, 406–411.

283. “ὥσπερ ἡ ψυχὴ μὲν τῷ σώματι, ἡ δὲ ἁρμονία ταῖς χορδαῖς, ἀποτελεῖ ἡ μὲν ζῶα, ἡ δὲ τόνους καὶ μέλη, τὰ δὲ δραστικὰς δυνάμεις καὶ τελεστικὰς τῶν θεῶν.”

284. Text: Düring 1930 (Ger. tr. and comm.: id., 1934); tr. and comm.: GMW 2.270–391, Solomon 2000; discussion: Mathiesen 1999, 429–494; Barker 2005, 171–190. I shall quote indicating page and line numbers according to Düring 1930. For more on Ptolemy’s scientific method see Barker 2000.

285. One could consider giving Aristides Quintilianus that honor, but while Ptolemy’s work is more limited in scope, it is nevertheless more solid in its scientific value. The next high point of this kind after Ptolemy is probably Johannes Kepler’s *Harmonices mundi* from 1619. About Kepler as the “last Pythagorean” see Kahn 2001, 162–171.

perfections throughout the universe, Ptolemy can argue that the same principles are at work in the soul and in the heavens. (...) The task of harmonics is to explicate the mathematical foundations of systems whose beauty and excellence is evident to the ear, not those of some other, purely theoretical constructions. It seeks, in fact, to show that it is on rationally coherent mathematical patterns of order that the perceived beauty of real music rests.²⁸⁶

The task is to find the most perfect rational description of a (presumed) perfect order in the world and to find ways to realize this perfection in actual music.²⁸⁷ Much of his concern remains again on the technical level such as tuning systems—“good” and “bad” is not applied to discern the value of particular compositions, but he develops an impressive analogy between music, ethos, and cosmos based on the same principles:

In different material matrixes, the same formal relations create musical beauty, excellences of character and intellect, and the perfect celestial geometry of the skies. It is these intelligible relations that underlie perceptible beauties wherever they are found, and it is only these formal aspects of things, susceptible to mathematical analysis and understanding, that can be completely and scientifically known.²⁸⁸

From the first book we can highlight in ch. 3 the explanation of different “shapes” that sounds can take in pitch, volume, and timbre, which is the foundation for the attribution of ethos.²⁸⁹ He ends ch. 4 with an unusual outburst, calling the (human) voice the most beautiful of sounds.²⁹⁰ The further exposition of the science of harmony is centered on the discussion of the musical parameter of genus. Like most authors who simply explain the functioning of music, he does not yet add ethical characteristics to his discussion of the genera beyond the usual generic terms of “tense” (σύντονος) and “relaxed” or “soft” (μαλακός).²⁹¹ Their value, however, is at

286. Barker in GMW 2.271.

287. Ptolemy’s word used in this context is “ἀκριβής”: “exact, accurate, precise.”

288. Barker in GMW 2.274.

289. Ptolemy understands these parameters in a quantitative way, measurable in different degrees, as opposed to Theophrastus’ approach (see below).

290. 10.26–28: “συμφώνους δὲ ἔτι φασὶν εἶναι παρὰ τὸν κάλλιστον ἥδη τῶν ψόφων, τὴν φωνήν, ὀνοματοποιούντες, ὅσοι τὴν ὁμοίαν ἀντίληψιν ἐμποιοῦσι ταῖς ἀκοαῖς, καὶ διαφώνους τοὺς μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντας/Lastly, they say that they named the consonante notes after the most beautiful of sounds, the voice, which make a similar impression on hearing, while dissonante notes are those not doing so” (tr. Solomon)—hence consonance takes its name from it (συμ-φωνία). What effect exactly consonant notes have on hearing is not specified.

291. 28.29–29.5; again 34.33–35.7, 38.2–9, etc.; the term “ἥθος” is used (29.1; 32.15, 38.5, 44.6), but here without any notable “ethical” implication; Barker explains that “relaxed” and

least aesthetic because audiences feel familiar with (συνήθης) and take delight in (χαίρω) some characteristics more than in others.²⁹² Ptolemy is interested in the effect the genera have on the listener; he gets most descriptive regarding the even (or equal) diatonic: it sounds foreign, rustic, but for the trained ear rather gentle,²⁹³ for it is orderly (τεταγμένος) and does not cause offense to the sense.²⁹⁴ He mentions a whole series of types of tuning based on genera (39.8–14), but they are not qualified in value.²⁹⁵

Barker has elucidated how Ptolemy manages, perhaps for the first time, to link convincingly mathematical proportion, or συμμετρία, with visually or acoustically perceived beauty:²⁹⁶ tuning chords according to consonant intervals to the point of greatest satisfaction reveals that at the same time a mathematically “symmetric” pitch proportion has been achieved. *Ratio et pulchrum convertuntur*. The combination of mathematical harmonics and acoustical aesthetics, which in

“tense” refer here to the pitch of the movable notes within the tetrachord (GMW 2.302 nn. 107 and 108); I propose that it simply means “types” of genera as characterized by the range between soft and tense.

292. Cf. 38.1–6; 74.5–75.1; similar Aristox. *El. Harm.* 22.31–23.1 who speaks in terms of “accepting” (ὁμολογέω, so also Ptol. *Harm.* 42.8). Ptolemy affirms the general preference of diatonic over chromatic and the too lax ones (σφόδρα ἐκλελυμένος). Another positive term is “εὐμεταχείριστος” “manageable/agreeable” (42.2).
293. 38.30–32: “ξενικώτερον μὲν πως καὶ ἀγροικότερον ἦθος καταφανήσεται, προσηνὲς δ’ ἄλλως καὶ μᾶλλον συγγυμναζόμενον ταῖς ἀκοαῖς.”
294. 38.34: “οὐκ ἐμποιεῖ ταῖς αἰσθήσει προσκοπήν,” Barker (GMW 2.312) translates: “it gives no offensive shock to the hearing.”
295. For a further discussion of these: GMW 2.313–314 n. 145 and again later to 80.6–81–21 GMW 2.356–361. It may be noticed that the mixing of genera is taken for granted here—something that was seen very problematic in earlier authors such as Plato; cf. GMW 2.312 n. 144. Modulations (μεταβολή) do not change the type (or ethos) when it is just a transposition of the *tonos* (melody) to a different pitch level; ἦθος does change with changes in genus or *systema* (54.12–56.1) or even *tonos* (57.10–58.20, with a helpful explicatory note in GMW 2.332 n. 60 and Mathiesen 1999, 463–466). *Tonos* modulations a fourth or fifth apart are more suitable (πρόσφορος) than those based on adjacent notes (62.13–15)—this is analogous to the fact that in the Western harmonic tradition modulations and chord progressions proceed preferably between keys related in the circle of fifths (or fourths).
296. Barker 2010, esp. 411–418. He clarifies (at p. 407) that “συμετρία” does not correspond to our modern term “symmetry” but means something like “due proportion” or, in Ptolemy, commensurability understood as “simplicity of comparison”: the ratio between consonant intervals is simpler than for dissonant ones.

Plato remained regrettably obscure or even breached,²⁹⁷ finds in Ptolemy a striking renewal and explanation.

In the third book, after finishing the technical exposition of harmony, Ptolemy reflects about the status that harmony possesses within the whole of the world. He identifies it as the *causa efficiens* for the proper form of good melody, rhythm, order, and beauty,²⁹⁸ given its rationality, which it shares with God and distributes to nature as good (τὸ εὖ). The function (τέλος) of harmony is to cooperate with reason (λόγος) by bestowing order (τάξις) and due proportion (συμμετρία) to audible things on the (divine) level of intelligence (νοῦς—the laws of what is good: ἐμμέλεια), the (rational) level of skill (τέχνη—the practical execution), and (natural) level of habit (ἔθος—experience: conforming the material).²⁹⁹ The senses of hearing and sight are the most prominent ones because only their perception reaches, beyond enjoyment (ἡδονή), the realm of the good/beautiful (τὸ καλόν) or the bad/ugly (τὸ αἰσχρόν) and also what is useful (τὸ χρήσιμον), all of which occur in melody, shape, movements of the celestial bodies, or human actions. This makes these senses like sisters who serve reason by mutually supplying and intensifying each other's perceptions as Ptolemy illustrates with examples: thus a poetic expression (ἐρμηνεία) makes something visually known (e.g. waves, places, battles, circumstances of passion/emotion) shine forth “more expressive” (μιμητικώτερος),

297. Huffman 2010 adds insightfully to Barker's essay how Ptolemy returned to the Pythagorean occupation with real sound, which Plato had abandoned, and for which Aristotle and later authors had falsely accused the early Pythagoreans. How far the “radical split between reason and perception” (424) in Plato goes depends, however, on the reading of Plato's remarks in *Resp.* 531c against “heard harmonies,” which Huffman calls as witness for this “split;” Halliwell's arguments to not take at face value as Plato's position what is said in book ten of the *Republic* might also apply here—but we cannot pursue this question further.

298. 92.14–16: “ἀπεργάζεται τι τέλος, οἷον ἐμμέλειαν, εὐρυθμίαν, εὐνομίαν, εὐκοσμίαν, ἀλλ' ὥς τὸ αἶτιον, δ' τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ περιποιεῖ τὸ οἰκεῖον εἶδος/[harmony] achieves some end, such as fair melody, rhythm, law, or cosmos, but as the cause which achieves for the basic subject matter the proper form” (tr. Solomon). The *causa materialis* would be the sound, *formalis* its goodness, and *finalis* the product of good melody, etc. Solomon 2000, 139 n. 69, notes that harmony takes the middle or center place (μεταξύ) both between matter and form (being movement) and between God and nature (being rational).

299. Barker GMW 2.372 n. 30 explains well the idea: “Intelligence in its perfect form is identical with God; through it the contents of its awareness are perfectly constituted. Skill is the capacity to impose excellence on material under the guidance of reason. Through habit or natural disposition things may be brought towards excellence independently of any deliberate rational guidance.” He further (n. 31) points out that Ptolemy goes beyond Plato by admitting that theoretical truth, beyond mathematical-theoretical abstraction, “can be exhibited and confirmed directly in perceptible phenomena.”

and our souls are disposed (συνδιατίθημι) towards reported images as if they were being observed.³⁰⁰ The pursuit of harmonical science extends good order (εὐταξία) onto those who got accustomed to it.³⁰¹ The power (δύναμις) of harmony is present in all self-moving and especially rational beings in which the likeness (ὁμοιότης) of the ratios that create appropriateness (τὸ πρόσφορον) and tuning (τὸ ἡρμωσμένον) is best preserved (95.8–10). On these grounds, in the following, Ptolemy seeks to show that the same harmonic principles are at work within music, the human soul, and the movement of the heavenly bodies (planets).

Important for us is the criterion he establishes, as a fruit of his previous elaboration, for this connection: that which is well tuned/harmonious (τὸ ἐμμελές) is the tones' "virtue" (ἀρετή), what is badly tuned/dissonant (τὸ ἐκμελές) is their "vice" (κακία), and the same applies to the human soul, in which virtue corresponds to its harmonious "tuning" and vice to its lack of harmony, for in either case the arrangement of their parts according to nature is what makes them harmonious, or unharmonious if beyond (or contrary to) nature.³⁰² "Proper tuning" here means, in the context of harmonic science, that the proper mathematical ratios be followed, and it is supposed that these are already equivalent in the natures of both music and the human soul.

Ptolemy sets up two systems, one in which he assigns specific powers to each of the soul's intellectual, perceptive, and animating parts—each of these parts, for specific reasons, belonging to one of the homophone or concordant intervals: octave, fifth, and fourth—with the same number of components (e.g. the senses to the perceptive part) equivalent to the number of tones within the musical intervals; the second system assigns in a similar way virtues to the soul's tripartition now into rational, spirited, and appetitive.³⁰³ In both cases, he follows the hierarchical order

300. 93.11–94.20. For the particularity of both senses see also Pl. *Resp.* 530d (they make the sciences of harmonics and astronomy possible), Arist. *Pol.* 1339b40–1340b19 (they have impact on ethos, but hearing much more than sight, similar Arist. *Pr.* 19.27, 29, cf. the analysis below); see also the discussion of the senses in Kivy 1990, 3–12 and our introduction, n. 26. All of this is, of course, diametrically opposed to what Philodemus says, that enjoyment is the only function of music.

301. 95.2–3: "διατείνον ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκ τῆς θεωρίας καὶ παρακολουθήσεως περιγινόμενην τοῖς ἐθιζομένοις εὐταξίαν."

302. 97.3–8: "τῶν φθόγγων τὸ μὲν ἐμμελές ἀρετὴ τίς ἐστὶν αὐτῶν, τὸ δὲ ἐκμελές κακία, καὶ ἀναστρέψαντι τῶν ψυχῶν ἢ μὲν ἀρετὴ ἐμμελεία τίς ἐστὶν αὐτῶν, ἐκμέλεια δὲ ἢ κακία, καὶ κοινὸν ἐν ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς γένεσι τό τε ἡρμωσμένον τῶν μερῶν ἐν τῷ κατὰ φύσιν ἐκατέρου καὶ τὸ ἀνάρμοστον ἐν τῷ παρὰ φύσιν."

303. 95.28–98.4; a parallel to musical genera is laid out in 98.6–29. Barker 2005, 177–181, gives a more complete description and evaluation of this procedure. Helpful diagrams for these classifications can be found in Mathiesen 1999, 481–482.

of powers or virtues as resembled in pitch levels.³⁰⁴ Next, Ptolemy draws a parallel between the musical genera and areas of application of the virtues (theoretically: theological-mathematical-natural; practically: political (State)-domestic-ethical (individual), on either level corresponding to the genus of diatonic-chromatic-enharmonic); all this culminates in the description of a harmonized whole, with all parts well integrated by the virtue of justice (δικαιοσύνη).

Up to this point, Ptolemy has not insinuated any nexus of causality for the attunement (ethos-value) between the areas of music and soul but seems to establish a mere analogy. In a last step of applying harmonic principles to the soul, he matches up changes in personal or collective life situations with harmonic modulations:³⁰⁵ e.g. peaceful, belligerent, or needful conditions each elicit a different nuancing of the virtues,³⁰⁶ which are similar to changes of musical *tonoi* (Dorian, Mixolydian, etc.). Even though he does not attempt to determine a precise equivalency here but contents himself with highlighting some few general similarities of ethos in melody and life, he does now justify such comparison with the (not further proven) statement that human souls “sympathize” with the (ethical) dynamics of melodies, recognizing their common origin (of ratio, or affinity: οἰκείωσις) and being molded or drawn according to the characteristics of melody.³⁰⁷ Ptolemy concludes by picking from the common stock of ethical effects of music and explicitly mentioning the Pythagorean

304. That would suppose the idea that the proper “tuning” of the parts of the soul happens by establishing the proper proportion between the various elements to be tuned (e.g. “endurance of deprivations” in relation to “non-arousal through anger”); however, it seems that the actual virtues (e.g. “self-control” or “gentleness”) should rather be reached by finding the proper (quantitative) measure of the underlying element (“endurance” and “non-arousal”) independently from the other elements—but perhaps one should not force the analogy too much. Barker 2005, 184 & 189–190, expects a correlation between the ratios of tones within each interval and the virtues within each part of the soul and points at the evasiveness of associating the virtues with exact musical tones and ratios.

305. From the two types of modulation (μεταβολή) that Ptolemy discussed earlier (54.12–55.12), not the simple pitch transposition is meant here but the change of genus or *systema*.

306. Again, here seems to be an inconsistency in the imagery: the nuancing can only be by reducing the (quantitative) degree of each virtue, while a musical modulation would imply changing from one *tonos* or *genus* into another, thus changing the proportions between the tones (i.e. the intervals between them).

307. 99.25–100.1: “ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αὐταῖς τῆς μελωδίας συμπάσχουσιν ἡμῶν ἀντικρυς αἱ ψυχαί, τὴν συγγένειαν ὥσπερ ἐπιγινώσκουσαι τῶν τῆς ἰδίας συστάσεως λόγων καὶ τυποῦμεναί τισι κινήμασιν οἰκείοις ταῖς τῶν μελῶν ιδιοτροπίαις;” see the similar explanation a bit later (100.5–7): “τοῦ μέλους αὐτοῦ τε μεταβάλλοντος καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἐξάγοντος ἐπὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὁμοιότητος τῶν λόγων συνισταμένας διαθέσεις/with the music itself changing and inducing the souls to dispositions consisting of similar ratios” (tr. Solomon).

practices of modifying the ethical state of a soul and the expectation that the gods gently hear human prayers brought forth with music and melody.

The last chapters of book three, partially of disputed status in terms of originality and integrity, refer to analogies between music and the zodiac of the various planets; no further information for our context is provided, except that the additional astrological considerations provided by a scholiast point out planets bringing good (ἀγαθοποιῶν) or destruction (φθοροποιῶν) are assigned in a balanced way to the Sun (which bears the qualities of hot, active/effective, and male) or the Moon (seen as damp, idle, and female)³⁰⁸—the identification of such characteristics will be significant in the ethical approach in Aristides Quintilianus, since the association of particular musical tones with planets possessing ethical value will have consequences there for understanding the significance of musical ethos at large.

Overall, the value of actual music is addressed inasmuch as music draws its characteristics from particular *tonoi* and genera and modulations between them. Ptolemy confirms the existence of the ethical value of music, which is founded on the mathematical framework of basic ratios common to the areas of music and the human soul in different life conditions (“modes”), as established by “harmonic reason” (92.27–30)—the relevance of astrological influence remains opaque given the doubtful or spurious material towards the end of the *Harmonics*. However, questions remain:³⁰⁹ does Ptolemy simply illustrate a striking resemblance between musical interval systems and the human soul which their common origin in harmonic reason (some sort of “intelligent design,” if that term is allowed) has bestowed upon them, or does he also suggest a *causality* of ethos between the one and the other? Is it sufficient to assume the soul’s recognition of some “sympathy” with parallel structures to explain why a specific order and ratio between tones or scales should be perceived in an ethical way? In other words, how should the fact that “moderation” sits on the same position as a specific tone within the fourth interval translate to an ethical behavior of moderation? Nobody will doubt that there is a “balancing” and “harmonizing” within the whole system of powers and virtues, but does it come about through music (or in the same way as in music? The only clear interconnection I can see is that which Ptolemy establishes between both spheres in the context of modulations, but there the *synergeia* does not consist in the numerical coincidence between intervals and virtues but in the exciting or

308. For further treatment see GMW 2.390–391, and Solomon 2000, 165–166, who also translates fully the scholiast.

309. These questions are also asked in view of the considerations offered in Barker 2005, 174–190, where Ptolemy’s system is attributed a greater degree of solidity than that of Aristides Quintilianus. I shall compare both further in the context of evaluating the latter author.

relaxing effect that parallels music to the emotions felt in the life situations that Ptolemy describes. But why does high pitch excite and low pitch relax? Why do certain *harmoniai* work in one way or another? We all recognize the effect, but the kinship of relation between both spheres remains for the most part a mystery, which, I believe, Ptolemy did not pretend to have resolved.

Plotinus³¹⁰

The highly influential Alexandrian Neo-Platonist Plotinus deals with music often within his own system, mostly as a means of comparison or metaphor, and incorporates traces from earlier treatments of music. As he explains how the universe is one, but composed of divergent elements, he compares this with the conflicting characters in a drama: the junction³¹¹ of high and low tones in a melody (3.2.16.33–52), the strings of an instrument at their proper place, or the different pipes in a pan-pipe, which in their inequality construct the whole of the melody (3.2.17.62–75).³¹² Here a very original conception of “bad” comes into play: “evil (κακά) in the dark and in Tartarus” still sounds beautiful/good (“καλὸν (...) φθγγεσθαι”) in the whole of the melody (harmony) because it comes from its proper place (“ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ τὸ πρέπον καὶ τὸ καλόν”), and each is contributing its own sound (“τὸν φθόγγον τὸν αὐτοῦ εἰσφερόμενος”). Plotinus’ intends to illustrate here his dualistic conception of the good and evil principle as being necessary and at work in order to form a harmonic whole. While Plotinus indeed means “evil” in the moral sense regarding the cosmos, the image of sounds proper to Tartarus must be understood aesthetically. Even though he does not use these terms, the metaphor could be translated perfectly to the interplay of consonance and dissonance: dissonance in itself sounds “bad,” but if resolved into consonance both elements create

310. Text and tr.: Armstrong 1966–1989 (except for *Enn.* 2 and 3 which are based on the OCT Henry-Schwyz text from 1982). Cf. also Mathiesen 1990, 40–41; Sorgner 2010, 275–294. A detailed analysis of all musical references in Plotinus offers Wegge 1999, with special attention to the musical conception of the soul and the universe and the musical images employed frequently within Plotinus’ philosophy. I shall only highlight the points most relevant for our theme. Gersh 2005 studies the metaphorical employment of “harmony” in the *Enneads*.

311. Plotinus speaks of “λόγοι” or “rules,” “proportions,” arranged hierarchically, that bring about the over-arching harmony within the whole.

312. He thus builds on the old (Pythagorean) idea that harmony is needed to unite what is unequal, cf. e.g. Philolaus in DK 44 B 6.5–9 and above n. 185. A brief analysis of this passage is found in Gersh 2005, 203–204; on p. 205 he collects passages where Plotinus uses harmony for “unity which contains multiplicity” and those where it stands for “unity which contains contraries.”

a beautiful song. In other words, the “badness” of sound is real when taken on its own, but it loses this badness if it is at the proper place to serve a beautiful whole.³¹³

This doctrine is applied to the souls as well, and their harmonious contribution to the whole within a cycle of re-incarnation is based on the description of the music of the heavenly spheres at the end of Plato’s *Republic*. Insofar as the souls are in harmony with their fate as determined by the figures of the stars, they never go out of tune (“ἐκμειλῶς”) (14.3.12.14–27). What matters here is the correlation between soul and cosmos, which is described in musical terms.³¹⁴ We see how this conception integrates and develops what we have observed in other authors about the context-based approach to musical value and the need for contrasting elements to ultimately achieve a harmonious (and ethically desirable) result, as it is sketched out also in the Aristotelian *Problems* (see below).

In a different passage, Plotinus deals with the “magic” power of music.³¹⁵ In general, he takes a critical approach to magic, e.g. when refuting the Gnostics’

313. Plotinus compares with the executioner in a city who in himself is bad but necessary and thus “καλῶς καὶ οὕτως κεῖται/he himself also is placed well” (3.2.17.86–91). See also this expression: “τὸ κακῶς αὐταῖς ἐν καλῷ κατὰ τὸ πᾶν κείσεται καὶ τὸ παρὰ φύσιν τῷ παντὶ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐδὲν ἦττον φθόγγος ἐλάττων/their evil-sounding singing will be beautifully disposed from the point of view of the All, and their unnatural sounds will be for the All according to nature, and none the less the sound itself will be worse” (ibid. lines 83–85, tr. Armstrong). Wegge’s first treatment of the passage (48–49) remains on the descriptive level, while later (54) he gives a deeper insight when “good” and “bad” dance are discussed, concluding: “By coupling ‘wicked’ behavior with weak or bad dancing, Plotinus justified both evil behavior as part of life and bad dancing as simply an unavoidable part of a good performance. (...) Plotinus thought that all opposites were resolved at a higher level, creating a greater good.” I do not think, though, that Plotinus is talking about “bad dance,” but of opposite movements, which he parallels to morally opposed values. Likewise, I disagree that the point is “performance” (or good/bad playing, so Wegge on pp. 94–95); not the technical skill of the musician but the intrinsic value of the music he plays is set parallel to moral ethos.

I am not going to discuss here the resulting question about the transcendent necessity of “evil.” Some comments on the difficulty in Plotinus regarding the origin of evil can be found in Sorgner 2010, 279.

314. See Wegge 1999, 12–25, who follows Plotinus’ descriptions of the soul’s “tuning” and the concept of consonance/dissonance within the soul (which corresponds to virtue/vice and to the unity within the soul and between soul and body), between souls, and between soul and the universe. In pp. 25–28, he shows how Plotinus describes the union between soul and the “All-Soul” as “συμφωνία” (*not* harmony), and in 55–62 the cosmic life as a “dance.”

315. For the whole question of magic in Plotinus (and in general) is helpful Hellerman 2010, esp. 122–129.

claim that chanted spells³¹⁶ are able to persuade the higher spirits to take away evils. Plotinus holds against this that such negative powers, and similarly the healing forces, reside rather in the natural causes of excess, defection, or decay. The idea that sounds could induce the higher spirits to obey our commands may sound devotional (σεμνός) but actually deprives these powers of the devotion owed to them (*Enn.* 2.9 (33).14). Plotinus does accept, however, a “magic” force of music over the “irrational soul” (ἡ ἄλογος ψυχή), acting without reason or understanding (*Enn.* 4.4.40.21–27).³¹⁷ This is possible because of the natural organic interconnectedness of all things in the cosmos,³¹⁸ the συμπάθεια and συμφωνία between equal things and the antagonism (ἐναντίωσις) of unequal ones, the Empedoclean forces of attractive φιλία and repulsive νεῖκος (love and strife). We do not need to enter further into Plotinus’ conception of such cosmic correlation or correspondence,³¹⁹ but it is important to take note that he does not understand this interdependence in a mechanistic or deterministic way. Human beings ought to freely choose virtue and control their passions (2.3.7, 9).³²⁰ Enchantment is not only seen negatively because it can serve to unite the soul to the One (5.3.17), but in general Plotinus prefers that humans use their reason in order to bring about good and rise

316. He gives a full list of them: ἐπαιοιδή, γοητεία, θέλξις, πείσις, all of which supposedly need to be pronounced in a very specific way of words, voice, timbre, etc.

317. This is in line with what Philodemus says (*Mus.* 3.39 D81, see below p. 301) that nothing irrational like music could exercise influence on reason (λόγος); this was apparently held by Diogenes; see Anderson 1966, 163 with 282 n. 34.

318. See *Enn.* 4.4.33.2–5: “‘Λόγῳ τῷ κατὰ τὸ θῶρον φερομένης, ἔδει καὶ συμφωνίαν τοῦ ποιούντος πρὸς τὸ πάσχον εἶναι καὶ τινα τάξιν εἰς ἄλληλα καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα συντάσσουσιν/ [the heavenly circuit] goes according to the rational principle of its living organism; there must therefore be a ‘symphony’ between action and what is suffered, and a certain order which arranged things together, adapting them and bringing them in due relation with each other,” etc. (tr. Armstrong, slightly altered). This is compared to the synchronized but varied conjunction of dance, *aulos* playing, and song (ibid.9–12). The following point is from 4.4.40.1–19, and the comparison of cosmic harmony and “sympathy” is further illustrated by strings that resonate when another from the same *harmonia* is plucked, even on another instrument (4.4.41.4–10; this effect we explain today by means of the overtone series: strings belonging to higher harmonics vibrate together with a sounding base tone).

319. For this I refer again to Hellerman 2010, 129–137. The cosmic harmony is described in musical terms in 4.3.12.25–27. See also Wegge 1999, 43–48, about the importance of number; Wegge does not consider connections with the Pythagorean numerology. Alexandrakis 2002 offers a brief account of Pythagorean influence on Plotinus’ notion of beauty.

320. This might prompt his aside that people like to be enchanted but they do not ask this from the musicians (4.4.40.26–27): there is some reluctance in delivering oneself up to these irrational forces. After all, the (rational) contemplation of the One is not achieved through audible music, which affects the irrational part of the soul, cf. Wegge 1999, 38–39.

up to virtue. After all, the higher parts of the cosmos are transcendent, immaterial, and without emotion or passion, and to these neither magic nor the enchanting use of music ascend.

Nevertheless, in another sense, music presents the first step for a human being that wants to reach the heights of philosophy and dialectics in order to contemplate the Good, the Origin and the First.³²¹ Plotinus describes the musician as someone who is well moved and excited towards the Good/Beautiful as he discovers the good/beauty in sounds;³²² while he always flees what is unharmonic or not one (i.e. unified) in melodies and rhythms, he pursues what has good rhythm (τὸ εὐρυθμον) and good form (τὸ εὖσχημον). Eventually, the musician has to move on beyond musical “matter” to understand its proportions and principles towards the universal good/beautiful (“αἱ ἀναλογίαι καὶ οἱ λόγοι εἰς τὸ κάλλος”) and harmony, leading, like in Plato, to philosophy.

About the actual music, he says elsewhere that (together with rhetoric) it changes the soul to the better or to the worse. The reason for this seems to consist, as in Plato and Aristotle, in the likeness which links the part to the whole.³²³

321. 1.3 (20).1.3: “ἐπὶ τάγαθὸν καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν πρώτην;” the following quotes are from 1.3 (20).1.20–34. The second stage is the lover (ὁ ἐρωτικός), who contemplates the visible and other forms of beauty, and the third is the philosopher (ὁ φιλόσοφος). Sorgner 2010, 286–289, explains how each of these is responsible for one part of the soul: music for the sensitive, love for the volitive, and philosophy for the intellectual part; in comparison with the other mimetic arts, music obtains a privileged function as *pars pro toto* or *primus inter pares*, because music contains the numeric proportions that are proper to the higher forms of being; however, music in itself is not sufficient to unite with the One; it only prepares for the ascent through an analogous form of ecstasy which unites as to the whole sensible world.

A thoughtful general study, which includes the Platonic texts from which Plotinus draws for his reflections on beauty, love, and goodness, is García Castillo 2010.

322. “Θετέον δὲ αὐτὸν εὐκίνητον καὶ ἐπτοημένον μὲν πρὸς τὸ καλόν, ἀδυνατώτερον δὲ παρ’ αὐτοῦ κινεῖσθαι”—that the musician is unable to be moved *by* the Good/Beautiful (just *towards* it) may mean that the audible music is conceived to be only a vehicle, not yet the direct impact of the καλόν, the union with which is only reached through the soundless beauty of philosophical contemplation. See about the ascent of the soul to the One, which, on one hand, is described in musical terms, and on the other, occurs through the intellectual grasping of mathematics see Wegge 1999, 29–33 and 68–74. The identification of good and beautiful (and of evil and ugly) is explicitly stated in 1.6.6.21–27.

323. *Enn.* 4.4. (28) 31–32. The power to change: “ῥητορεῖαν δὲ καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ πᾶσαν ψυχαγωγίαν ἢ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἢ πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον ἄγειν ἀλλοιοῦσας/but rhetoric and music and all the class of arts which influence the soul must be said to lead men to the better or worse by changing them” (31.20–22, tr. Armstrong). Likeness combines, lack of likeness divides and is not agreeable: “τὸ μὲν οὖν ὁμοιότητα πρὸς τὸ ποιοῦν ἔχον πείσιν ἔχει οὐκ

Melodies (ἁρμονίαι)³²⁴ that are in agreement with the “measured numbers” that are productive of form and life, show beauty and therefore lead the soul upward. Good music, therefore, needs to be beautiful according to the measures of the not-sounding melodies (φωναὶ ἀφανεῖς) in order to lead to union with the One (1.6.3.28–33). Even though the soul needs to leave behind the sensual world in order to reach the higher intellectual realm, the return of the enlightened mind to the sensual world allows one to discover there the real Truth and Beauty—and this applies to the musician as well.³²⁵ Thus Plotinus defends the value of sensible music against the Gnostics, but we also notice here some tensions within Plotinus’ theory: if only good/beautiful music (either sensitive or intellectual) leads the soul upward, “good” and “bad” cannot indiscriminately contribute to a harmonic whole

ἄλλοτρίαν, ἀνομοίου δὲ ὄντος τοῦ ποιούντος ἄλλότριον τὸ πάθημα καὶ οὐ προσηγὲς τὸ πάσχον ἴσχει/So, then, that part which has a likeness to that which is acting upon it has an experience which is not alien to it, but if that which is acting is unlike, that which is affected has an experience which is alien and unpleasant” (32.23–26, tr. Armstrong). Wegge 1999, 64–65, discusses the passage and says that the “effect occurs through *mimēsis*,” however, Plotinus does not use this term here but “ὁμοιότης” (but see below). This is not said particularly about music, but we can infer that the process of participation should explain that certain musical proportions are thought to affect proportions in the soul positively if they are similar.

324. This term seems to mean in Plotinus either a concrete melody or an “ideal” melody (or even its form); a clear definition, if at all achievable, would require a precise terminological study of its use in Plotinus.
325. 2.9 (33).16.39–41: “Τίς γὰρ ἂν μουσικὸς ἀνὴρ εἴη, ὃς τὴν ἐν νοητῷ ἁρμονίαν ἰδὼν οὐ κινήσεται τῆς ἐν φθόγγοις αἰσθητοῖς ἀκούων;/For how could there be a musician who sees the harmony in the intelligible world and will not be stirred when he hears [it] in sensible sounds?” (tr. Armstrong, slightly altered). The visible and of the invisible world inspire each other’s beauty. The requirement of the musician (and artist in general) to follow the higher principles is expressed in 5.9.11.10–28.

Wegge 1999, 72–73 claims that Plotinus rejects “proportion” as criterion for beauty (in 1.6.1; Wegge uses Armstrong’s translation), but how could he then establish “harmony” instead, which relies on the “agreement of the parts” (in 1.6.2.19–21)? Plotinus’s exact word for what he rejects is “συμμετρία” (which Wegge would have done well mentioning; this is correct in Alexandrakis 2002, 152) as the *only* criterion, which would exclude the beauty of something simple or of the parts of the whole, while ἁρμονία (or κοινωνία, ὁμολογία, etc.) is the composition of forms already beautiful in themselves that participate in the divine forms. Harmonic theory, which is heavily based on “proportions” between tones, seems therefore not to be affected by the argument against συμμετρία. Sorgner 2010, 284 explains Plotinus’ position as a reaction against the Stoic aesthetic theory. That συμμετρία can still be a valid aspect emerges from 5.9 (5).11 (among other places); it is a manifestation (rather than the essence) of beauty (6.7.22.20–30).

as he has claimed in what we quoted above; the same objection can be made about the point that the soul needs to be purified from the filth and ugliness of the body (1.6.5).

This being said, the effect of music requires some explanation. If the artists produce their works by “imitating nature” (“μιμούμεναι τὴν φύσιν,”), one needs to consider that nature is also just an “imitation” (“τὰς φύσεις μιμεῖσθαι ἄλλα”); therefore, art goes back to the original principles (λόγοι), and likewise music derives from a still higher sort of music, the celestial one (5.8 (31).1.33–36; cf. 5.9 (5).11.). In 3.6.4.41–53, Plotinus says further that the Form (εἶδος)³²⁶ is activity or movement (ἐνέργεια, κίνησις), creating movement and affection (πάθος) directly or through some sense perception, just as the melody causes the movement of strings by mediation of the artist.³²⁷ Hence, the soul is moved to emotion through music by the Form (the melody with its underlying abstract principles). The significance of this concept is well summarized by Wegge:³²⁸

Plotinus explained that form created motion in the soul. The soul comes into contact with form and the soul attempts to imitate it, creating motion. (...) All motion is in response to the forms, and music is involved in all motion. Additionally, because music contains the forms, and the forms excite a soul about the intelligible, music instructs the soul about the forms.

326. Wegge 1999, 74–80 explains the concept as similar to Aristotle’s categories, but it also has resemblance to Plato’s Ideas; they are different in the material world and in the world of the intellect.

327. “Αὐτὴν μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὴν τοῦ εἶδους φύσιν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι καὶ τῇ παρουσίᾳ ποιεῖν, οἷον εἰ ἡ ἁρμονία ἐξ αὐτῆς τὰς χορδὰς ἐκίνει.” Ἔσται τοίνυν τὸ παθητικὸν πάθος μὲν αἴτιον ἢ παρ’ αὐτοῦ γενομένου τοῦ κινήματος ἐκ τῆς φαντασίας τῆς αἰσθητικῆς ἢ καὶ ἄνευ φαντασίας. (...). Τὰ δὲ αἴτια τοῦ κινήσαι ἀνάλογον τῷ μουσικῷ· τὰ δὲ πληγέντα διὰ πάθος πρὸς τὰς χορδὰς ἂν τὸν λόγον ἔχοι./So, then, the actual nature of the form must be an activity, and produce by its presence, as if the harmony proceeding from it plucked the strings. The part subject to affections, then, will be the cause of the affection, either because the movement starts from it, from the mental picture produced by sense-impressions, or even without a mental picture (...). The causes of the movement are like the player, and the parts on which the affection makes its impact might correspond to the strings.” Cf. Wegge 1999, 79. The passage seems both to use music as an explanatory metaphor and also to explicate the moving effect of music itself as participatory of the Form’s movement through melodic form. Gersh 2005, 207 (and similarly before on p. 197), states that for the Pythagoreans “the distinction between harmony as an image of reality and harmony as a constituent of reality is not strictly maintained,” but that Plotinus is more keen on making this distinction; however, it needs to be clear that also for Plotinus harmony maintains its status as constituent of reality and music its mediatory function in the ascent of the soul.

328. Wegge 1999, 96–97.

Plotinus does not offer any explanation, however, of how different ethical or aesthetical value could be traced back to their metaphysical origin.³²⁹

Two different concepts of musical value seem to be present in Plotinus: on the one hand, good or bad music constitutes the necessary opposing principles to form a harmonic whole, whereby “good” corresponds to “consonant” and “bad” to “dissonant”—even though the opposites might also be both good in themselves, such as in “high” or “low” notes; on the other hand, only music that is beautiful, i.e. in agreement with the transcendent Beauty and Goodness, leads the musician towards philosophy and the contemplation of Beauty/Goodness (the One) itself: beautiful music reveals celestial harmony;³³⁰ it does not seem that “bad” music has any place here. Regardless, the effect that sonic music has appears to be irresistible, magic; it is helpful only as a vehicle towards intellectual harmony where eternal Beauty imprints its affection on the human soul that is able to re-discover Beauty in art. Although Plotinus does not develop an educational (or else institutional) strategy as Plato or Aristotle, his conception strongly proposes the necessity for musicians to keep their music “in tune” with the cosmic harmony, which is represented and even, in a way, realized through the performance of good music.

Empirical Approach to Musical Ethos

Actual music practice served, to a certain extent, as a source for the reflection on musical ethos as laid out in the previous section. Still, the authors seen so far

329. It is evident that Plotinus saw beauty realized both on the aesthetical and the ethical level, cf. 1.6.2–5; Sorgner 2010, 279–281. Wegge 1999, 97 points at the Neoplatonic belief that music, for its effect on the irrational part of the soul, aids to adjust this part “to the other parts of the soul [trained by reason] by means of harmony, creating virtue.” I have not found an explicit mention of this idea in Plotinus, except for the general notion of (not exclusively musical) harmony as Wegge develops it on pp. 18–21; music appears here mostly as a point of comparison rather than as a cause.

330. Moutsopoulos 2008 offers an analysis of the concept of harmony in Plotinus, as particularly indebted to Plato, and concludes (pp. 116–117): “Thus harmony regulates the life of the universe at all levels: cosmic, divine, intellectual, psychic, behavioral, since all of them, as a whole, form a *continuum* in perpetual descending and ascending motion,” while pointing out that the correspondence between harmony and virtue (as opposed to discord and wickedness) “stresses the ethical dimension of the notion of harmony”, which requires then “for a convenient ethical behavior, as well as a convenient behavior in music (...) to avoid discord and to seek for harmony which unites antagonistic values.” With this last remark Moutsopoulos gently glosses over the unresolved tension in Plotinus as we have pointed out: how harmony may for one part require goodness/beauty/virtue, and for the other part the combination of positive and negative.

have in common that their approach to musical ethos depends to a greater degree on general theoretical assumptions or principles and often also on a theory of cosmic harmony. For the authors represented in the current section, the point of reference lies more in the observation of reality as such; that is, they employ more an inductive methodology. In addition, there is a stronger line of dependence upon the following authors as a “school” in contrast to the previous who are often assembled into the Pythagorean-Platonic (or the “neos” of each) tradition. As said earlier, these classifications simplify, and cross-references between schools are frequent, but they help to identify general trends of thought.³³¹ Not all authors included in this section expound theoretically on music; some are included because they provide interesting empirical material that illustrates ethically relevant effects of music.

Aristotle³³²

Music receives little treatment in the Aristotelian corpus; the main relevant source for our purpose is the last book of his *Politics*. Here Aristotle reveals his empirical approach: he sets out from the observation of how people are dealing with music. In addition, his objective differs from Plato in that he seeks to clarify whether music has a place in education at all, and if so, for what purpose and within what parameters. We shall review briefly his train of thought with particular attention to the value and ethos of music.³³³

Functions and Ethos of Music

Aristotle considers three functions of music (1339a11ff): relaxation (ἀνάπαυσις) as a pastime game (παιδιά),³³⁴ its propensity to create a specific ethos and hence

331. The difference between the Pythagorean and Peripathetic “schools” is explained well in Moutsopoulos 2002, 72–82, and Barker 2007.

332. Text: OCT (Ross) 1957; text and tr.: Rackham 1944; GMW 1.171–182; discussion: Busse 1928; Anderson 1966, 111–146; Lord 1982, 68–150; Halliwell 2002, 234–259; Barker 2005, 99–108; Gagliardi 2013.

333. Lord 1982, 69–70, describes the goal of the chapter as a defense of music education “by an appeal to something higher than pleasure.” Against whom did Aristotle have to defend music education? The only critical voices that we preserve are from the Epicurean camp and posterior to Aristotle, but apparently the core of their arguments was already voiced in Aristotle’s time; its later reheating was part of a general exchange between various philosophical schools.

334. Anderson 1966 264 n. 25, with reference to Jaeger 1954, 247–248 (vol. 2), points at the paideutic role of the symposium, but since Aristotle explicitly limits the educational value

to virtue (ἀρετή), and its promotion of a way of life (διαγωγή)³³⁵ and thought (φρόνησις).³³⁶ Music brings enjoyment (ἡδονή) as it pertains to the most pleasant experiences; education is indicated here so that the adolescents learn how to find the best form of enjoyment,³³⁷ but it is still more needed in view of the second function insofar as music can shape ethos. Aristotle then (1340a7ff) evaluates the *ēthē* that music can produce: “enthusiasm,”³³⁸ but especially “sympathy” in the sense of feeling along with what music is expressing, even without words.³³⁹ Similar to Plato, Aristotle works with the concept of μίμησις and “representations” (ὁμοιώματα).³⁴⁰ rhythms and melodies express wrath, meekness, manliness, and moderation along with their opposites, and other *ēthē*. Aristotle strengthens

to the second function of music, it is improbable that he thought of the symposium in that way here, especially since we can assume that the educational value of the *skolia* lies more in the text than in the music. See also later id. 143: a use of Dorian in the *skolia* might have made symposia somewhat educational (see below n. 363).

335. About this term see GMW 1.172 n. 2, Barker 2005, 101–102, Anderson 1966, 269–271 nn. 51 & 54, Lord 1982, 81–82, and Neubecker 1986, 159. In 1341b38–41 the terms differ slightly (παιδεία, κάθαρσις, διαγωγή); see below n. 357. Anderson 1966, 122, notes that Aristotle omits the liturgical use of music to which Plato had given more weight.

336. About this term and the difficulty to accommodate it in the context see Lord 1982, 72 n. 8.

337. Music can help to “get used to be able to rejoice properly” (1339a24–25: “τὸ ἡθος ποιὸν τι ποιεῖν, ἐθίζουσιν δύνασθαι χαίρειν ὀρθῶς;” again in 1340a17 where it is added that the enjoyment is based on right judgment, fitting *ēthē*, and good deeds: “τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς ἐπικέσιν ἥθεσι καὶ ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν”). This is because the best man (ἄριστος) has the best reasons (or sources) for his enjoyment (“τὴν ἡδονὴν (...) τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν καλλίστων”) (1338a7–9)—something to be learnt from. Such enjoyment is also useful, providing relaxation or recovery from hard labor and toil (1339b15–17). Ultimately all tends towards the end (τέλος) of leisure (τὸ σχολάζειν; cf. the Ciceronian *otium*) —, which needs to be properly understood as εὐδαιμονία (1337b33–1338a6). About leisure as the highest goal (ἀκρότατος) of human life see also 1333a33–133b5. This conception approximates what Democritus says in DK 68 A 167 (cf. below n. 544).

338. Olympus is mentioned whose melodies had Phrygian character, traditionally linked to this ethos (cf. ps.-Plut. *Mus.* 5.1132f; 7.1133d; West 1992, 181).

339. The corresponding passage is disputed and requires textual emendation to make proper sense; for the discussion see Anderson 1966, 125–126, 186–188; GMW 1.175 n. 10. Lord 1982, 87–89, assumes poetic instead of musical “imitation;” many general shortcomings of his interpretation are addressed in Halliwell 2002, 244 (and elsewhere).

340. Neubecker 1994, 134 n. 19, remarks that these terms have here, other than in Plato, no deprecatory connotation—although we have seen that even Plato takes a quite differentiated approach to *mimēsis*. That most music is based on *mimēsis* is also stated in *Poet.* 1447a13–28; see about this Halliwell’s commentary on the passage in his 1987 edition of the *Poetics*.

the thesis that these musical features express most closely the real ethos with the observation that “we change in the soul when we hear such (music)” (1340a22–23);³⁴¹ he states that other perceptions (touch and smell) do not express any ethos, and sight only to a lesser degree than hearing—only melodies have in themselves the very *μιμήματα* of ethos, whatever that may mean.³⁴²

A division of *harmoniai* follows:³⁴³ by Mixolydian, people are disposed³⁴⁴ to becoming mournful and anxious³⁴⁵ (“ὀδυρτικωτέρως καὶ συνεστηκώτως”), by other ones softer (“μαλακωτέρως”), by Dorian intermediate (“μέσως”) and most steady

341. Aristotle compares this with enjoying the sight of a statue vs. the represented person; today we could say that contemplating the photograph of a beloved person elicits feelings similar to those experienced when seeing the real person.

342. He contrasts similarities (*ομοίωμα/μιμήματα*) of ethos, as applied to sound, with signs (*σημεῖα*) like forms and colors that indicate only the bodily expression of ethos but not ethos itself. Another explanation of the difference between the senses can be found below under ps.-Arist. *Pr.* 19.27. For further discussion of the current passage see Halliwell 1999, 14–21; Barker 2005, 107–111. Gagliardi 2013 believes that Aristotle means by “ethos” the same as Schopenhauer or Nietzsche by “*Wille*,” music as a dynamic-practical expression (or representation) of itself or of “characters”—which she believes are just what music itself produces. Such a self-referential interpretation of ethos does not seem to me supported by the text: Aristotle enumerates, following Plato, extra-musical *ēthē*.

343. I would like to propose the possibility that Aristotle does not always distinguish in a technical sense between “*harmonia*” and “melody” (cf. also Lord 1982, 110); see e.g. 1340a39 ff: the swift switch from “μέλος” to “ἁρμονία” can hardly indicate a difference in meaning, for what people hear are not abstract patterns but melodies. If this is true, Barker’s argument (2005, 110–111) for a shift from finding ethos in abstract patterns (Plato) to ethos in concrete melodies (Aristotle) would need to be reconsidered. Furthermore, even if in 1341b32–37 a terminological distinction is made, Aristotle cannot mean that ethos “resides” in melody and not in the *harmonia* when he discusses the “nature of the modes” (τῶν ἁρμονιῶν φύσις) (earlier in 1340a40–1340b5 and later again in 1342a1–5 and 1342a28–1342b33) with their corresponding emotional reactions, but that each melody receives its ethos precisely from the underlying *harmonia*. The most striking passage to illustrate this last point is 1342a28–29 where Aristotle talks about the “ethical” group of melodies and harmonies. How could *harmoniai* possess an ethos without *mimēsis* of ethos? At any rate, a distinction between melody and *harmonia* is, for the assessment of ethical value, not too relevant since Aristotle does not assume in this context that the ethos of a μέλος would stem from text (if μέλος were to mean “song” and not just “melody”—although I believe that the distinction between μέλος and rhythm in 1340a14 suggests that with this term he does not denote “song” as a whole).

344. Aristotle is precise here in not calling the *harmoniai* themselves mournful, etc., but the people who are disposed by them (διατίθημι); later he does not keep this distinction for the rhythms or melodies.

345. Barker’s translation (cf. GMW 1.175 n. 13); LSJ has “in a constrained way.”

(“καθεστηκότως μάλιστα”), and by Phrygian enthusiastic (“ἐνθουσιαστικός”). Similarly, rhythms are of an either more stable (“στασιμώτερον”) or moving (“κινητικόν”) ethos, the latter subdivided into more vulgar (“φορτικός”) or free (“ἐλευθέριος”).³⁴⁶ All of this, Aristotle claims, is said well by those who investigate this and find it empirically confirmed (“ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων”). Ethos-training through music recommends itself, therefore, but also because of the sweet enjoyment connected to music—ideal for children—, which Aristotle explains by the mysterious kinship (συγγένεια) between the human soul and its harmony and the musical harmonies and rhythms, which the “wise,” meaning Plato and the Pythagoreans, already considered (1340b17).

Aristotle raises the question, which did not matter much to Plato, whether it is proper for a noble person to actually perform music, and hence, to educate by active music-making. After initially presenting arguments to discredit this practice as “vulgar” (“βάνυστος,” cf. 1339a37–1339b10),³⁴⁷ he decides in favor of performing music because of the following reasons:³⁴⁸ it fosters the ability to discern between good and bad music and enjoy the beautiful (τὰ καλὰ κρίνειν καὶ χαίρειν ὀρθῶς)³⁴⁹ from one’s own experience; it keeps the children occupied and educates in civic virtue (πρὸς ἀρετὴν πολιτικὴν). All this should happen within the frame of melodies, rhythms, and instruments pre-selected according to the proper age, changing to mere listening at a certain stage, and avoiding professional and showy practice—just enough to be able to enjoy the beautiful melodies and rhythms apart from the common way of slaves and children.³⁵⁰

The instruments for education should be only the ones that help to learn better.³⁵¹ Aristotle bans the *aulos* only for education since its effect is not ethos-building

346. Cf. also below a similar division in Cleonides. Treitler (in Strunk 1998, 46 n. 20) compares Cleonides’ division to Arist. *Pol.* 1341b34–35, but there Aristotle does not actually classify the *ēthē*.

347. The “bizarre ring,” which Barker hears in this passage (GMW 1.173 n. 7), finds explanation in the fact that Aristotle, to a certain extent, is playing here the *advocatus diaboli*, gathering arguments against musical practice, some of which he later disagrees with.

348. This and the following paragraph summarize 1340b20–1341b19.

349. See below n. 373.

350. An example for “bad” musicians (φαῦλοι αὐληταί) we find in *Poet.* 26 1461b30ff, but not so much because of bad music but because of undignified movements.

351. Aristotle says “either for music or other instruction” (1341a20), so apparently they played also during other lessons, maybe already with the idea of stimulating the mind or calming the pupils down. The idea of adding pleasure to education is developed in Plut. *Quomodo adul.* 1 = *Mor.* 14e–f.

but arousing (ὀργιαστικός); this effect is good for purification³⁵² but not instruction, and it prevents “word/speech” (λόγος).³⁵³ He calls to mind an earlier prohibition, which was loosened but then recovered in Sparta and Athens due to experiencing what directs towards virtue (ἀρετή) and what not.³⁵⁴ We do not hear about the exact reason for this ruling unless it corresponds to what is mentioned in the next paragraph: the professional *aulos* player subdues the coarse pleasure (ἡδονή φορτική) of the audience, makes this his base objective (πονηρός σκοπός) and adapts to it his music, body, and personality—hence it is nothing for freemen. For education, in addition to the *aulos*, no other “technical” or professional instrument, not even the cithara, is allowed. This is more restrictive than Plato’s norm which does allow the cithara (*Resp.* 399d).³⁵⁵ One wonders what instruments are left to be used.³⁵⁶

Upon confirming with other experts and philosophers the educational force of the *harmoniai* and rhythms, Aristotle reminds us of the three functions of music³⁵⁷

352. See also later in 1341b39. Whatever role the *aulos* may have in producing this effect within tragedy, children would not be ready for a refined sort of ethical enhancement but need to be trained on a much more basic level. About the difference of educational habituation and instantaneous dramatic stimulation see Barker in GMW 1.177 n. 22, even though he still holds the traditional view of *catharsis* as a mere discharge of “emotional steam,” as opposed to Halliwell’s analysis (see below in our text).

353. This may mean that the *aulos* player cannot sing at the same time—but Aristotle is not as adverse to solo instrumental music as is Plato. Another interpretation could be that the *aulos* is so loud that it will not serve as background music for conversation or other instruction.

354. Aristotle adds the story about Athena throwing away an *aulos* (cf. Ath. 616d–617a).

355. Wilson 2004 explains this with the changed perception of the cithara as “banausified” by the promoters of both “New Music” and democratic ideals.

356. Barker 2005, 103, suggests: “No doubt Aristotle is thinking principally of the tortoise-shell lyre, which was regularly used in traditional Athenian education.”

357. Cf. 1339a11–29 (see above n. 335). Now he uses “παιδεία,” “κάθαρσις,” and “διαγωγή.” One could think of a transcription error, using “παιδεία” instead of “παιδιά,” while “κάθαρσις” had not been used earlier because it does not mean the function of music in *children’s* education; but the terminology is not completely consistent in any case, for what earlier was “παιδιά” is here called “διαγωγή” (which now goes together with “ἀνάπαυσις”), and the second (ethical) function earlier now receives a subdivision, distinguishing “παιδεία” (of children) from “κάθαρσις” (for adults). See also the interpretation offered by Busse 1928, 44–45 and Lord 1982, 111.

This paragraph summarizes what Aristotle says from 1341b19 until the end of book eight.

and proceeds with a corresponding distinction of *harmoniai*³⁵⁸ between ethical, invigorating, and enthusiastic ones.³⁵⁹ Based on this division, an application of musical parameters is possible, more differentiated than in Plato who evaluates them, at least in the *Republic*, with the sole focus on education. In Aristotle, all the *harmoniai* can be used in their proper context: the ethical type for education (including active playing), the invigorating one for relaxation, and the enthusiastic one for “purification” (κάθαρσις, the last two only through listening),³⁶⁰ mainly in dramatic performances. The invigorating type is assigned to the vulgar and lower-class people and includes, for their enjoyment, even “deviated” ones;³⁶¹ the one bringing about purification belongs to the free and educated people. In reference to what Aristotle describes in *Poet.* 1449b27 as κάθαρσις, Halliwell³⁶² sees in it not just an “emotional outlet and release” but a deep experience that, among other elements, renders tragedy “psychologically rewarding and ethically beneficial.” This seems to apply here as well.

358. He never gets to talk further about rhythms; for this and other reasons it is commonly held that the *Politics* is unfinished. The only moment he goes into some detail is 1340b8–10 where he classifies rhythms as stable (στάσιμος), moving (κινητικός), including some vulgar ones—φορτικός), and free (ἐλευθέριος, corresponding to a freeman).

359. “τὰ μὲν ἠθικά τὰ δὲ πρακτικά τὰ δ’ ἐνθουσιαστικά” (1341b34). Barker in GMW 1.179 translates “moral,” “invigorating,” and “inspirational” (more proper than Rackham 1944, 671 who has “ethical,” “of action,” “passionate”) and explains this translation in n. 31. I differ from Barker to stay consistent with my own terminology of using “ethos” for “ἦθος” and because I believe that “enthusiastic” captures better the “pathos” (cf. 1342a5), which is involved in that type while maintaining etymologically the relationship to the divinity. Strunk 1998, 32–33 emends Rackham to “ethical, practical, and divinely suffused.”

This distinction parallels a threefold distinction of *mimēsis* in *Poet.* 1447a28; cf. Anderson 1966, 273 n. 66.

360. Barker GMW 1.180 n. 31, together with 177 nn. 21 & 22, explains the difference between education, which forms ethical habits by repeated dealings with positive character-forming music, and the purgation as a brief exposure to intense emotion, which one should not live through constantly. That the professional musicians have to do this does not concern Aristotle but will be one reason for their non-free and morally questionable status, which he harps on repeatedly in these passages. Lord 1982, 112–113, argues convincingly *contra* Schadewaldt 1955 that Aristotle treats catharsis indeed as ethical, but separate from the education of the young.

361. “παρεβάσεις” (1342a23); further characteristics are “σύντονος” (intense, high-pitched) and “παρεχρωσμένος” (irregularly colored, cf. GMW 1.143 n. 61).

362. In: Aristotle 1995, 18–19.

A few assignments of concrete *harmoniai* and melodies to each type are given: Dorian, for being most steady and manly,³⁶³ is fitting for education of the younger, along with the Lydian for being beautiful and educative.³⁶⁴ Even though Aristotle does not explicitly say whether he approves of Phrygian mode for education or not (which is rather improbable because of the effect he attributes to it), he does criticize its inclusion in Plato's *Republic* for being inconsistent with the ban of the *aulos* because both have the same ethos: orgiastic and passionate,³⁶⁵ which seems to recommend them for the "enthusiastic" or cathartic type. Aristotle does not discuss any further details; the book ends, again contrary to the *Republic*, with the admission of *harmoniai* that are "relaxed" (ἀνεμῆνος), and therefore easier to be used, in advanced age.³⁶⁶ He distinguishes three criteria for the choice of music in education: the mean, possibility, and suitability:³⁶⁷ suitable is the ethically desired

363. 1342b12–14: "περὶ δὲ τῆς δωριστὶ πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν ὡς στασιμωτάτης οὔσης καὶ μάλιστα ἦθος ἐχούσης ἀνδρείον."

364. 1342b31–32: "διὰ τὸ δύνασθαι κόσμον τ' ἔχειν ἄμα καὶ παιδείαν." About the difficulty of accepting this passage as originally from Aristotle (because it contradicts in a way the earlier praise of Dorian and Plato's explicit exclusion of this type: *Resp.* 398d–399a), see Anderson 1966, 145 with 274 n. 74. Lord 1982, 115–118, suggests an assignment of the various *harmoniai* to the three general classes and, in 203–219, interprets the end of book eight as an interpolation by an adherent of the Damonian school. Some of the arguments for this thesis I do not share, e.g. that AQ 2.14 80.23–81.6 should vouch for an education of the young and the *very* old in Damon's theory (as contrary to Aristotle), a rather bizarre concept.

365. 1342b2: "ἄμφω γὰρ ὀργιαστικά καὶ παθητικά." Anderson 1966, 107–109, holds that by rejecting Phrygian, Aristotle maintains the ancient Dionysian stereotype while Plato apparently had in mind an extenuated Athenian practice. It is a much-discussed question as to why Plato appears to differ from the "mainstream" characterization of the Phrygian mode. Pagliara 2000, 178–181, suggests that Aristotle criticized Plato's exclusive ethos attributions to the *harmoniai* but maintains that the prohibition of the *aulos* is inconsistent; on p. 183 n. 58 however, he considers that its versatility for manifold imitations could have been Plato's real motive, and regardless of its connection to the Phrygian which he allows, cf. Gostoli 2007, 28 n. 20 and esp. Tartaglioni 2001, 296–299, who shows, with reference to Pl. *Resp.* 411a *et alii loci* that the *aulos* finds also positive areas of application, especially in the context of catharsis, *which* is not contemplated in the pedagogy of guardians; the problem is its excessive, deleterious usage. A review of some other arguments is given above in n. 166.

366. Earlier on (1339b10), there was the exception that active music making as παιδιά was allowed even for adults; in view of this, the younger should also have some exercise in the *harmoniai* that can only be performed in advanced age (as πρεσβύτεροι); cf. GMW 1.182 n. 41.

367. 1342b34: "τό τε μέσον καὶ τὸ δυνατόν καὶ τὸ πρέπον."

effect, possible the vocal range according to age, and the proper mean can be found in the Dorian mode, which maintains a middle position between extremes.³⁶⁸

Good and Bad Music

From this overview of Aristotle's discussion of music, we can see that he is shifting some gears in his concept of music as good or bad. He follows Plato in acknowledging that music is overall a pleasurable experience and that this should not be the standard for a value judgment. But for Aristotle, no intrinsically bad music seems to exist; any musical form finds its justification and application in a given suitable context, either of social status, age, or defined by a particular function such as relaxation, education of children, emotive "cleansing" while living through a dramatic performance, or ecstasy occurring in religious rites. The only directly negative judgment he issues concerns professional musicians,³⁶⁹ first because professional music as τέχνη includes manual labor, which, for a free citizen of ancient Greece, is considered demeaning; secondly, because those professionals draw their style from audiences, which, if themselves rather lower in class, expect vulgar musical forms—unfortunately, Aristotle does not tell us exactly what characteristics these would show; and lastly because the musicians, by playing in such a way, influence their own character in a vulgar way. But this crude or mean (κοινός) music, however "distorted" on an absolute scale, is still in some way "good" for the people it corresponds to, for it serves the purpose of relaxation—so the workers keep their spirits high and can later engage anew in their tasks. This view seems to betray a rather utilitarian view of the lower classes: he bothers little about their personal character development as long as they effectively fulfill their assigned role in society.

368. This was applied to ethos earlier in 1340b3–4 where the modes and their characteristics were first discussed; as Barker points out (GMW 1.181 n. 38), Dorian is intermediate also with regards to pitch. As Lord 1982, 219, keenly remarks, in that conception, Aristotle does not need another mode to balance out the personality as in Plato who seems to have perceived the Dorian and the Phrygian *harmoniai* as complementary to fine-tune the soul.

About the necessity of avoiding extremes see also *De an.* 426a28–426b7: excessively high or low tone destroys (φθείρω) the hearing—this means probably here that it takes away the enjoyment of the melody rather than destroying the sense (for which actually the pitch is not so significant than the volume); the greater pleasure is found in a (balanced) mixture of pitch.

369. The negative context contrasts with the characterization of such performances as astounding and extraordinary ("τὰ θαυμάσια καὶ περιττὰ τῶν ἔργων," 1341a12), which Anderson 1966, 133, calls "sarcastic," while LSJ offers for both words also negative meanings ("strange" and "excessive, extravagant" respectively).

Since a good part of Aristotle's concern is education, much of his explanation serves to identify the music suitable for the purpose of character formation in young people through musical features that express the desired traits; through familiarity with what is truly beautiful, they will themselves rejoice in fitting ethos and good works.³⁷⁰ As already briefly mentioned, this conception is based on the same tenet as Plato's, that music through *mimēsis* expresses ethos, but Aristotle provides us with even fewer clues than Plato about why and how this is meant to work.³⁷¹ How exactly the mimetic force of music is imagined remains unclear also in Halliwell's mostly exegetical treatment, which halts at stating the general conception of "iconicity," i.e. "music's capacity to embody 'likenesses of character' as a matter of *intrinsic* qualities of tone and rhythm, qualities that are 'in' the sounds." According to Aristotle, "the patterns of music have properties 'like' the emotional states that can, for that reason, be the objects of their *mimēsis*." We do not learn what patterns and properties these are and how they correspond to emotions; the only proof is the "emotional-cum-ethical" effect music has on the audience as attested by common experience.³⁷²

At one point, the issue of learning how to discern good (or useful) from bad (or not useful) music is raised³⁷³ but not discussed since the context is the question

370. 134017–19: "τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς ἐπεικέσιν ἤθεσι καὶ ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν"—this is Plato's idea of becoming friends with virtue through enjoying the proper musical ethos, recognizing it also outside the sphere of music (cf. *Resp.* 401d–402a).

371. In *Poet.* 1447a26–28, dance is mentioned, which, through rhythm and movement, represents *ēthē*, passions, and deeds: "μυμοῦνται καὶ ἡθῆ καὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις." Plato gives a better idea of how dance does this concretely (see above n. 247).

372. Halliwell 2002, 160 and 159. He refers further to the aspect of movement (*κίνησις*) "as the experience of affective sequences or impulses," common to music and the soul, but his reference to the *Politics* (1340b8–10 and 1342a8) does not really provide substance to a clear theory here; the point is developed systematically only later in *Pr.* 19.27. Helpful, in anticipation of Philodemus' objections, is the clarification that for a "quasi-semantic and affective correlation" a "complete correspondence" between the media (emotion—hearing) is not necessary, but the only proof again is the "common testimony" that this is so; we are left with the vague notion that "*mimēsis* entails something like a kinetic or dynamic correspondence between the use of rhythms, tunings, and melodies, on the one hand, and the psychological states and feelings belonging to qualities of 'character,' on the other: the music 'moves' emotionally, and we 'move' with it" (245).

373. 1339b3–4: "κρίνειν ὁρθῶς (...) τὰ χρηστὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ χρηστὰ τῶν μελῶν," referred to again in 1340b24–25 and 1340b36–39; regarding the latter, Anderson 1966, 131 with 268 n. 42, criticizes Rackham's translation of "τὰ καλὰ (κρίνειν καὶ χαίρειν)" with "beautiful," but, as we have stated earlier (ch. 1 n. 148), the concepts of goodness and beauty converge in this term (see also 1341a14 where, as in the first passage, also "χαίρειν" occurs, which calls up

of whether to learn music actively or only passively. Apparently, a student should by his own practical experience become familiar with precisely what Aristotle is laying out in these passages and acquire a sense for what music is fitting (*πρέπει*) for whom, when, and where. In this context, the Dorian mode receives some preference for its “middle” position and balance between extremes, a concept very prominent in Aristotle’s ethics.³⁷⁴ The highest form of music, it seems, would be the one performed for the free citizen’s *διαγωγή* or *σχολάζειν* (leisure, in Latin later *otium*). As Anderson shows,³⁷⁵ Aristotle gives the impression that music also has an influence on the intellect and contributes to intellectual well-being but does not tell us in what way it would do that. In setting intellectually engaged leisure as the highest goal of human life,³⁷⁶ he insinuates that music could find its ultimate function in providing delight and stimulation to the intellect, something that Barker describes as “refined appreciation” or an

aesthetic and intellectual contemplation, closely related to the philosophical contemplation of truth, which is represented as the highest perfection of human nature at the end of Aristotle’s *Ethics*.³⁷⁷

Concluding from this, however, that it is Aristotle who takes the first step towards musical aesthetics would not be appropriate, from what we remarked earlier

aesthetical connotations); Anderson is right, however, in excluding a judgment of “technical excellence” here, for only an expert is fit for properly judging works of art (*Eth. Nic.* 10.9.20 1181a18–24)—and Anderson elsewhere (119–120) shows (with reference to *Eth. Nic.* 2.4.3 1105a27–33) that the latter must mean an aesthetic (hence technical) value judgment, not a moral one. Lord 1982, 99–104 attempts to prove that “the ‘judgment’, which music education is intended to form, is not an aesthetic judgment (...) but rather of the things they [music and poetry] imitate—of ‘decent character and noble actions’ (1340a17–18)” (103–104). I believe that the conceptual dichotomy between aesthetic and moral is anachronistic; but this particular statement by Lord obscures the fact that the moral benefit of music education, for both Plato and Aristotle, consists in attaching the aesthetic preference (“taste;” “*what* is enjoyed”) to those musical features, which at the same time express positive ethos. The aesthetic judgment is streamlined with the ethical one.

374. See above n. 368.

375. See his development of the argument in 1966, 136–137 with 269–271 nn. 51–55: the connection of music with *διαγωγή* and the rejection of the non-intellectual *aulos* music by Athena (1341b6–7).

376. Combining 1334b15–17 with 1337b38–1338a3 and 1339a25–26.

377. Barker 2005, 102. This sounds as if Aristotle had in mind a custom of performances similar to classical music concerts in the Western musical tradition since the Renaissance period; similar Anderson 1966, 265 n. 31. However, I am not aware of evidence for such practices at Aristotle’s time.

(p. 55ff, section “Aesthetics?”). On one hand, the ethical function of music cannot be reduced to its pedagogical purpose,³⁷⁸ because the assumed moral nature of a musical piece or feature does not present itself only in the context of forming character traits or habits; in Aristotle’s conception it is also an important ingredient for music being able to elicit a catharsis. On the other hand, both Plato and Aristotle affirm repeatedly that enjoyment comes along with music, regardless of its purpose—but the experience of enjoyment in music must have its origin in its aesthetic appeal. Aristotle seems to feel that pleasure (and with it music) can have a negative impact when he uses the attribute “harmless” (ἄβλαβής), but he does not say anything more concrete here (1342a16).

Bad music may certainly occur on the aesthetical level, as a phrase suggests that sounds at first little more than a truism: A musician enjoys good melodies and is distressed by bad ones (*Eth. Nic.* 9.9.6 1170a10–11).³⁷⁹ But in the context of the *Politics*, bad music is music performed (or listened to) in a way that is improper to the circumstances. Orgiastic Phrygian *aulos* music may lead into an “enthusiastic” or poetic-prophetic state, which in itself is neither good nor bad but simply outside the rational;³⁸⁰ such music may also have a cathartic effect, by homoeopathically³⁸¹ cleansing a perturbed emotional state, along with the affective import of the dramatic action, in a pleasing way,³⁸² which is good for adults but not proper for

378. Here I disagree with Anderson (and similarly with Lord 1982, esp. 99–100), who seems to tie these two concepts too closely together, reducing musical “ethos” to what serves character formation during childhood. While it is true that *paideia* and *catharsis* in Aristotle are realities separate not only in concept but also according to the stage of life, both participate in the ethical function that music possesses (see Aristotle’s own classification in n. 357 and as understood in our previous definition). To this we can join the force that music adds to the paideutic function of dramatic works, which Anderson justly admits (1966, 271 n. 55).

379. “ὁ μουσικὸς τοῖς καλοῖς μέλεσιν ἡδεταί, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς φαύλοις λυπεῖται”—this phrase serves as a comparison to the good man who rejoices over virtuous actions while he is displeased by bad ones.

380. Cf. Anderson 1966, 125 with 266 n. 33, with reference to Pl. *Leg.* 801b.

381. Cf. Anderson 1966, 273 n. 67. Lord 1982, 119–134, after careful examination, confirms that Aristotle’s (homoeopathic) concept of catharsis is unique and new, since the Pythagoreans proceeded in an allopathic manner, and ritual purification was not to be understood psychologically or at least it did not come about through music. He also concludes that there are different types of catharsis: enthusiastic vs. pity/fear, and the cure of a “normal” state vs. a pathological state in either passion. To infer from the observation that catharsis in the *Poetics* has no explicit reference to music (131, 139–140) that the cathartic effect in tragedy was thought independent of music does not seem to me fully conclusive.

382. 1342a14–15: “γίγνεσθαι τινα κάθαρσιν καὶ κουφίεσθαι μεθ’ ἡδονῆς.” Barker 2005, 106–107, gives a more detailed explanation about how this musical catharsis would come

education; the same is said about the theatric tendency of musical vulgarization and sophistication, which has found entry into education.³⁸³ Aristotle proposes, therefore, a separation of audiences between vulgar and “free-born,” and it seems that the characteristics roughly correspond to the New Music for the former and the traditional music for the latter audience and for education.³⁸⁴ From today’s perspective we would probably question this distinction because in an anthropology that assigns equal dignity and right to full human development to any human being, it would not make sense to reserve the highest goal of human life as expressed in the concept of *διαγωγή* only to the upper class of society and disregard the ethos development of those living under lower economic or social conditions.

While propriety is still determined by interior characteristics which link musical features to human ethos, this link, as in Plato, remains unexplained; it would require, in classical terms, to investigate further the relationship between music and the human soul: why does specific music evoke specific affections and, in their repetition, shape or change ethos? While Plato endeavored to seek an answer in the cosmological speculations of the Pythagorean tradition, Aristotle, who is highly skeptical about the idea of the “harmony of the spheres,”³⁸⁵ refrains from such attempts and leaves a detailed explanation of music’s ethical force in the hands of other (contemporary) authorities whose doctrine, nevertheless, he explicitly endorses as based on empirically provable facts.³⁸⁶ Whether these authors

about. Lord 1982, 132–134, interprets this passage as a proof that the same “sacred tunes” (1342a8–9), which provide a catharsis to the possessed, offer simple pleasure of harmless excitement to other people. On the historical development of the concept of musical catharsis, see Provenza 2012.

383. 1341a12–13. This might actually have been the motivation for his whole section on music in the first place since the intrusion of “vulgar” music into traditional *paideia* would mean “a completely upside-down standard of values” (Anderson 1966, 133).

384. Cf. Lord 1982, 141–146. He suggests that the former would use the chromatic genus and the “extreme” (the “relaxed” and “strained”) Lydian *harmoniai*, and the latter, especially for tragedy, the Phrygian (or Mixed Lydian) *harmonia* in the enharmonic genus. However, I do not think Lord is right in asserting that Aristotle “remove(d) the new music from the theater” (141) because the “vulgar” class would have its own competitions with the new style in the theaters, probably at separate events. We know that even slaves had access to theater spectacles (cf. Hansen 1999, 63).

385. See above n. 109. The furthest he goes is what he says in 1340b18–19 about the kinship (*συγγένεια*) between the human soul, *harmoniai*, and rhythms, and referring to the “wise” who talked about the soul as being or having harmony.

386. Cf. 1340b7–8; 1341b27–33. Anderson 1966, 127–130, sifts through the arguments and finds them weak, concluding that Aristotle’s “empirical handling of ethos strongly suggests that he could find no valid theoretical basis for analysis.” It remains odd that Aristotle

achieved anything more than working on a “purely impressionistic basis, governed by cultural connotations associated with the appraised characteristics,”³⁸⁷ we cannot tell for lack of evidence.³⁸⁸ Certain is, as Barker concludes, that such connections were widely accepted and almost taken for granted:

Questions about the value of music, about its effects on human beings and about its potential for use in education were discussed widely in this period, and were debated by intellectuals of several different sorts. They are not just the eccentric obsessions of two very unusual thinkers, Aristotle and Plato.³⁸⁹

Anderson formulates “the difference between Platonic and Aristotelian music theory” in the following terms: “For Aristotle *paideia* constitutes one goal, for Plato the only one.”³⁹⁰ Both authors are writing with the intention to define parameters for ethos education through music, and in this context Aristotle admits other (public) usages as well. However, if we remember the multiplicity of musical functions as outlined in our second chapter, it strikes us that a number of these are passed over or by either author or are barely mentioned (e.g. songs for weddings, work, love, lullabies, etc.). It is hard to imagine even Plato disapproving these or prescribing a specific mode for them (except for stating, perhaps, that some modes or rhythms would come more naturally for each of these than others). Rather than being an oversight, this seems to show that neither author attempts to discuss and legislate about every possible musical phenomenon. From this follows then that Plato did not see *paideia* as the only legitimate purpose of music, but as the

should refer approvingly to other authors if there had not been much substance to their points. Neither Plato nor Aristotle needed to go into further detail for their own purposes, which would have been a wide digression; to interpret their own silence on it as “wise restraint” (Hagel Forthcoming, 14) is possible, but not conclusive. Anderson 1966, 266 n. 34, himself reports striking ethnomusicologically founded examples of conceptual communication (mimicking language) in the use of instruments among “primitive” peoples, far beyond what ordinarily would be expected. One could imagine some similarly sophisticated system of *ethical* codification, especially in the conjunction of instrument, rhythm, dance, and melody. The difference here is that there seems not to have existed an explicit code but a rather half or unconscious system of common association since musical ethos develops more on the level of *pathos*. About the methodological difficulties see Anderson 267 n. 38 and Richter 1960.

387. Hagel Forthcoming, 11.

388. Unless one would re-project Aristides Quintilianus’ system unto these authors, something, which is disputed and hardly upheld by the most recent scholarship; see again Hagel Forthcoming.

389. Barker 2005, 100.

390. Anderson 1966, 143.

principal one for performances with *public* relevance, precisely because as soon as the ethical dimension of music comes into play, the State is affected. Aristotle is more explicit about other usages, but also his discourse is mainly centered on educational purposes. On the other hand, if music really shapes character, then it does not only do so at school or in other public settings. How could musical features, which are bad for children, be kept from them if adults apply them in their presence at home? It is not until Quintilian (1.2.6–8) that we hear about the conflicting musical influences children are exposed to, against, which the best pedagogical efforts seem pointless; that does not mean that this problem did not exist in earlier times.

Pitch and Timbre Evaluated

A few observations are added here that belong to the work *De audibilibus*.³⁹¹ The author discusses issues of sound production and reception and in that context addresses the quality of clear, bright vocal or instrumental sound, which appears to be seen as the most preferable timbre.³⁹² The idea follows that harsher (τραχύτερος) and confused (ὑποσυγκεχυμένος) voices fit better (μᾶλλον ἀρμόττουσιν) for calamities³⁹³ or old age; we encounter again the concept of the correspondence between quality of sound and a circumstance they express. However, even though a hoarse sound “befits” or expresses something properly, it still seems that the aesthetical value is not considered equal despite the somewhat surprising previous expression that “grey” (= rough) voices are not worse (οὐ χείρων) than “white” (= clear) ones.³⁹⁴ In general this text reveals keen insights into the nature of sound

391. Text: Düring 1932, 67.24–77.18; text and tr.: Hett 1936, 50–79; tr: GMW 2.99–109. Although Porphyry attributes it to the Stagirite, it is usually considered pseudo-Aristotelian; however, Barker holds that the case against authenticity is not conclusive (GMW 2.98). Düring 1932, 67, after citing contrary opinions: “*ego autem non uideo, cur Aristoteli abiudicandum sit.*”

392. Esp. 801b; terms are: σαφής (“clear, plain, distinct”), ἀκρίβεια (“exactness, precision”), λαμπρός (“bright, radiant,” in comparison to the brightness of colors, which stimulate the senses best), πυκνός (“firm, solid”), καθαρός (“clear, pure”), ισχυρός (“strong”), dullness is associated with small children, drunk, or old people; confused, undistinct sound (συγχεύω; ἀποκρύπτω, ἀσαφής) is negative.

393. “τὰ πάθη”: Hett translates “illnesses”, which would require the feminine article; Barker says “emotions;” but the context suggests a rather negative connotation.

394. 802a2–3. Barker (GMW 2.103 n. 19) concludes that this phrase shows that “‘clarity’ of sound is not always desirable,” but “not worse” could also be understood simply that the rough voice has its proper application (which is mentioned in the text right after), not meaning that it would aesthetically be considered equal to the clear voice.

as emitted by different instruments and the aesthetic consequences of various scenarios and ways of producing instruments. Particular attention deserves the section that speaks of the thin, weak, or husked sound (λεπτός), produced through little breath flow, and occurs in children, women, eunuchs, sick or exhausted people. In a similar passage (*Gen. an.* 5.7 786b35–787a), an explicit value judgment is made in favor of the deep sound (βαρυφωνία), which, in contrast to the high-pitched (ὀξύς) voice, is of a nobler nature (γενναιότερος), has superiority (ὑπεροχή) and hence is better (βελτίων)—, which also applies to melodies.³⁹⁵ At any rate, the ethos of the sound-producing person (and an instrument in *mimēsis* of it) determines the ethos of the sound, which seems to include both pitch and timbre (as terms such as “λεπτός” suggest).

We observe in these texts a fine perception of musical sound with the attempt to relate particular characteristics to ethos. Adding timbre and articulation to the analysis usually restricted to rhythm and melody provides a richer arsenal out of which variform shades of ethos *mimēsis* could be furnished.

Summary

The most important particularities of Aristotle’s position on good and bad music seem to be the following:

1. The value of music depends on its function (which can be pastime, the creation of ethos, and considerate-thoughtful aesthetic appreciation) and on the nature of the person performing or listening to it (especially age and social stratum).
2. Music belongs to the most pleasant experiences and, at the same time, is able to change the ethos of a person and stimulate intelligence.

395. Cf. further *Gen. an.* 5.7 787a23–788a34, where it is stated, however, that such attribution is not absolute. See also *Eth. Nic.* 4.3.34 1125a13–16 where a deep (speaking) voice (φωνὴ βαρεῖα) is attributed to a magnanimous person just as steady diction and slow movement, while a high voice (ὀξυφωνία) and hastiness correspond to a hastily and easily aroused character; similar Dio Chrys. *Or.* 32.54; Dem. 37.52, 55; 45.77; ps.-Arist. *Phgn.* 2 806b27–29: a full and tightened voice (βαρεῖα, ἐπιτεινομένη) expresses manliness/courage (ἀνδρεῖον), whereas a high and weak one (ὀξεῖα, ἀνειμένη) signifies meanness/cowardice (δειλόν). Some further elaboration in similar terms follows at 807a13–25, including also the volume. In all these examples, of course, it is the human (or, in analogous terms, the animal) ethos which determines an outward expression with no indication of an inverse influence, but these associations are valuable hints to our understanding of how the ancients thought that musical ethos would work.

3. Music (in terms of rhythm, melody, *harmonia*) expresses ethos, more than any other object of sense perception, because of a kinship between the human soul and musical parameters, which, through *mimēsis*, intrinsically resemble emotional states.
4. Plato's "ethical pyramid" is maintained (the equivalency of content, expression, the soul, and context and their contribution to establish ethical value).
5. Making music actively is advised for early stages of education for a deeper understanding, discernment of good and bad, and appreciation while avoiding professional artistry or exposure to "vulgar" forms (in the case of the upper classes).
6. Apart from *paideia*, arousing musical features can serve, in adults, to evoke catharsis homoeopathically as a remedy to an inordinate emotional state.
7. Moderation and the proper mean (middle between extremes) apply in music as the best criteria for educational purposes.
8. Aesthetically displeasing music is bad, and so is music of a specific ethos if used outside of the context to which it belongs.

The Pseudo-Aristotelian *Problemata*³⁹⁶

This compilation of post-Aristotelian doctrine contains in book 19 a series of questions and answers about "harmony." Some of these are relevant for our topic and add interesting details, especially about why certain musical features are pleasing, i.e. experienced positively, over others. References that are dealing with particular musical phenomena are not included; here I am briefly discussing those that are of more general interest. Overall, we cannot say to what degree these points are representative of music theory at the time, but at least they seem mostly compatible with Aristotle and, to a lesser degree, with Plato.

Ethos in Movement

Pr. 19.27 (919b26–37) provides a remarkable reflection about how the connection between music and ethos could be understood psychologically. The question as to why only sound³⁹⁷ (and not other sensations) has ethos is answered: because its

396. Text and tr.: Hett 1953; Mayhew 2011; tr. and comm. (selections): GMW 1.190–204; 2.85–97; discussion: Barker 2005, 108–112.

397. The context makes clear that musical sound is meant, particularly music without words (λόγος). Plato had issues with acknowledging ethos in music alone (cf. *Leg.* 669e).

movements—but only rhythms and intervals³⁹⁸—belong to “action”, which for its part is a sign of ethos.³⁹⁹ Other senses also include a perceptive process (“movement”), whereas in the case of a musical stimulus, structured in time (rhythm) and tone (pitch), we perceive the very movement of it,⁴⁰⁰ which lends itself to being a “code” and thus has a resemblance (ὁμοιότης) to ethos. In short, tunes are a movement or action, which signifies ethos. This seems to mean that humans associate the melodic up and down, rhythmically structured, with similar exterior human movements that reveal an ethos. The passage does not explicitly establish two meanings of “action” (the perceptible sonic one and an exterior one), but this needs to be assumed because otherwise the whole concept of ethos within action would remain locked up within the musical context and not explain anything. Consequently, there is a twofold transformation in this chain: musical movement is converted exterior human movement (or, we could say, behavior), which, for its part, is ethos visibly manifested. This double step blurs the correspondence between tune and ethos and requires conscious reflexion in order to detect it clearly. Upon a closer look this can be identified as a new edition of Plato’s ethical triangle (music—content—ethos) in which “content” (or text) is now substituted by

398. Literally “the arrangement (τάξις) of high and low notes,” excluding their combination/consonance (μίξις/συμφωνία). The explicit exclusion of chords from ethos surprises because it is generally held that the Greeks did not venture into real polyphony; cf. GMW 1.197 n. 55. For another trace of harmony as concurrent sound see Theon 51.2–4 who describes the pleasing effect of “sympathetic” tones played simultaneously. Moberg 1930, with reference to a passage from pseudo-Longinus, suggests that at least in the first century AD accompaniment in fourths and fifths was practiced.

Pelosi 2009 addresses the question of musical “consonance” (“harmony” in the modern sense) in the *Problems* and other texts and shows that there must have been an accompaniment other than octave parallels.

399. “αἱ κινήσεις αὐταὶ πρακτικαὶ εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἡθους σημασία ἐστίν.” *Pr.* 19.29 puts this in slightly different terms: (musical) movement is (like other actions) an ethical operation (ἐνέργεια ἡθικόν) and creates ethos (ποιεῖ ἦθος), which probably means that movement is bound to produce in the observer the ethos that it resembles.

400. “τῆς ἐπομένης τῷ τοιοντῷ ψόφῳ αἰσθάνομεθα κινήσεως.” We do not perceive smell, touch, or sight as movement (even if the perceived object moves) while hearing depends completely on the sequential nature of sound. Barker (GMW 1.197 n. 53) suggests two slightly different possible interpretations. Hett 1953 translates “αἰσθάνομεθα” with “we are conscious”, which seems not precise, because even though we “perceive” the movement (of perception) as such (and not only perceive *through* movement like with the other senses), this is not necessarily conscious but can become so as soon as we reflect about how the perceived music relates to “action” and action to ethos; the fact that it is rather subconscious makes the whole reflection about ethos in music necessary in order to make it explicit.

“movement”. But how exactly do we have to imagine the correspondence between the elements within this new triangle of musical form, movement/action, and ethos? For sure, the whole reasoning relies fully on the concept of *mimēsis* even though the term is not mentioned. The ethical significance of music depends on the previous codification of certain external movements with ethical connotations;⁴⁰¹ ethos is extrinsic to music, but the capacity to reflect movement is intrinsic. It is not determined by numbers but by melodic and rhythmic patterns—a qualitative approach Theophrastus would have agreed with (see below).

Why Music Is Enjoyable: Order, Balance, Appropriateness

The section of *Pr.* 19.38 (920b28–921a7) discusses reasons why humans enjoy (χαίρω) rhythm, melody, and consonances (συμφωνία) in general. The following instances and reasons are given: (1) humans, according to nature, enjoy movements according to nature (ταῖς κατὰ φύσιν κινήσει χαίρομεν κατὰ φύσιν)—and here it is interesting that even newborn children are attested to enjoy them;⁴⁰² (2) because of the ethos⁴⁰³ of the melodic patterns (τρόποι μελῶν); (3) rhythm is enjoyed because it has a counting that is organized (τεταγμένος) and recognized (γνώριμος) and moves us in an organized way, which is according to our nature—this idea is illustrated by the fact that organized actions in general (hard work, eating, drinking) make us healthy and grow in contrast to disorganized procedures; (4) consonance is enjoyed because of its combination of related opposites, and the relation implies organization, which by nature is pleasing—also because what is mixed is more pleasing than the unmixed, especially when the relationship in the perceivable

401. This interpretation would correspond to Plato’s description of rhythmical ethos in *Leg.* 654e–655b where it is said that certain σχήματα reveal the state or ethos of a soul. In general the idea seems to be: if the ethos is “manly”, for example, then the modest, grave, balanced musical pattern will evoke the association of a “manly” way of walking or behaving (“action”).

402. I.e. they enjoy music (if αὐτοῖς referred to “movements” instead of musical elements, nothing about music would be proven): for the point is “κατὰ φύσιν”: if infants already enjoy music, it must be something innate. The aspect of movement refers back to *Pr.* 19.27 (919b26–37) from where it is clear that “movement” here does not apply to rhythm alone but also to melody. Barker (GMW 1.199 n. 67) shows parallels in *Pl. Leg.* 653d–e and 664e–665a, where this observation is applied to the educational value of music in that it creates order in the human being.

403. Here the form “ἔθος” occurs, but seemingly with no semantic difference from the usual “ἥθος” and meaning more than a mere moral qualification. Barker (ibid. n. 68) refers again to Plato (*Leg.* 655d–656a) where the enjoyment of musical representation fitting to one’s own nature is stressed.

consonance has its strength from the equality in both opposites. In summary, this argument deduces musical enjoyment from our inborn tendency and preference towards order and balance.

Building on the previous problem, in *Pr.* 19.39 (921a8–31) the octave is declared more pleasant than unison because of the added structured complexity; it is also more pleasant than other parallel intervals (fourth, fifth) because the tones are completed together,⁴⁰⁴ especially at the end after previous divergence (διαφορά). There is a clear preference for naturally harmonized sounds and balanced complexity over unaccompanied unison or unorganic mixtures without any true blend (cf. about this *Pr.* 19.43 922a1–20), and harmony is expected and particularly enjoyed after a discordant development. Francisco Pelosi expounds on how musical ethos, based on the *mimēsis* of physical movement, in principle could not exist in simultaneously produced sounds (consonances) since in those there is no movement.⁴⁰⁵ On the other hand, the trace of “chord progression” that is contained in *Pr.* 39 (from dissonance to consonance) corresponds to a transition from “pain” to “enjoyment.” We can deduce⁴⁰⁶ that such a progression brings back the aspect of movement and thus gains another element, that of consonance, within the complex determination of musical ethos within a piece, according to the holistic approach of Aristoxenus which we shall see later on.

Pr. 19.9 (918a22–29) explains that the accompaniment of a voice should not obscure (ἀφανίζω) the song in order to be more pleasing (ἡδίων)—another indication of a sense of balance and proper measure. A similar point is raised in *Pr.* 19.16 (918b30–33) where obscuring occurs due to magadizing in intervals other than the octave,⁴⁰⁷ which therefore is considered less pleasurable.

Pr. 19.48 (922b10–27) discusses the *ēthē* of different *harmoniai* in the context of tragedy. For our purpose, only the criterion of appropriateness (ἁρμόζω) may be pointed out: the *harmonia* needs to correspond respectively to the ethos of the chorus or the character of the play. In *Pr.* 19.1 (917b19–21), it is stated that *aulos* playing both weakens suffering (λυπέω, πονέω) and increases the capacity to rejoice (ἀπολαύω, χαίρω). In other words, the *aulos* is said to support an emotionally positive state.

404. I.e. the impulse of the sound waves of both tones coincides at each end of the lower tone.

405. Pelosi 2002, esp. 217–223.

406. Pelosi surprisingly does not draw this conclusion as he drops the thread of ethos right before illustrating the aesthetic effect of “chord progression” and after preparing the whole argument very well.

407. The ancient Greek term “μαγαδίζω” refers to parallel accompaniment of a voice by an octave (cf. Ath. 635b; GMW 1.194 n. 35); later it can refer also to parallels in another harmonic interval (fifth or fourth), cf. the medieval *organum*.

Building upon Aristotle's distinction between professional and "lay" musicians, *Pr.* 19.15 (918b13–29) points out that professionals are good in representing all sorts of characters and are able to use complex metrical and musical features, while the chorus, made up of the free people, is limited to simple pieces. This is a mere aesthetical consideration, taking into account realistically the ability of the different performers within a dramatic performance.

Finally, *Pr.* 19.5 (918a3–9) raises the point that more pleasure lies in songs one is familiar with than in new ones⁴⁰⁸—because it is more pleasant to recognize or contemplate more clearly the attainment of an end (σκόπος) than to learn, and what is familiar (σύνηθες) is more pleasant.⁴⁰⁹ *Pr.* 19.40 (921a32–39) basically repeats this argument (5 is about singing, 40 about listening) but adds a rare consideration of social dynamics: there is a "sympathy" between listener and singer when the tune is known, and the listener is able to sing along—thus music forms a bond between those who share familiar tunes.⁴¹⁰ The last sentence of 40 is does not directly contribute to the previous point but is still of interest, as it states that everyone enjoys singing if they do not do so out of constraint (ἀνάγκη).

We notice that neither emotions nor passions nor any educational aspects are mentioned in these passages. In all the *problems* listed here, except for the first one, the main interest rests on aesthetical categories that foster pleasure. Plato would not have approved this emphasis on pleasure as apparently the main objective, but the particular considerations are not too far from his thought as they continue to sustain the idea of *ethos* and *mimēsis* within music, the characteristics of appropriateness, order, and balance leading to harmony.

Theophrastus⁴¹¹

Theophrastus was Aristotle's successor in the Peripatetic school at Athens (the Lyceum) and prominent in natural sciences but also engaged in the fields of metaphysics, psychology, and ethics. About his music theory only a small number of fragments remains, but among them are a few strong statements that relate to

408. The opposite is said in Hom. *Od.* 1.351–352; see GMW 1.26 n. 21: the point in Homer might rather be the new text; but newness can also have its appeal in music, see above p. 114.

409. Barker (GMW 1.190 n.1) interprets this pleasure as "perceiving a performance as correct;" it could also be, on a less technical level, the satisfaction of fulfilled expectation.

410. This is a function of music that plays an important role in the studies of ethnomusicologists, but it is also something that everyone will easily confirm from personal experience.

411. Text and tr.: Fortenbaugh 1992; tr. and comm.: GMW 2.110–118; discussion: Barker 2005, 131–137, who is my main source for the discussion of the fragments. The commentary to Fortenbaugh's text edition for the section on music is still pending.

the problem of ethos in music. According to fr. 724, a quotation within an Arabic source, and fr. 720 (in Philodemus, incomplete), he seems to be skeptical about relating music to virtue⁴¹² and never expounds positively on music as useful for character formation—in this regard he would have to be considered a precursor of the “formalist” Epicureans. On the other hand, he does support the relationship between music and emotion. According to Plutarch, he even holds that hearing is the most emotional of all senses, for no other sense provides so many “distractions (ἐκστασις), disturbances (ταραχή), and terrors/excitements (πτοία)” as all the various noises that lay hold of the soul through hearing; still, hearing is described as more rational (λογικώτερος) than emotional because virtue enters only through the ears if the proper words enter and the flattering and mean (φαῦλος) ones are warded off.⁴¹³ This is said without direct reference to music; but elsewhere Theophrastus develops concrete ideas about the musical function of expressing emotions, namely of grief, pleasure, and “enthusiasm” (Barker: “ecstatic inspiration”).⁴¹⁴ “[Music’s nature] is the movement of the soul, which occurs in connection with its release from the evils caused by emotions,” or, it is “a kind of psychotherapy”⁴¹⁵, which takes place by means of a melody accurately designed according to the emotional

412. fr. 724: Since a deer likes the sound of instruments, he should also acquire some virtue if that were associated with listening to music; frs. 719, 720, and 721A, on the other hand, seem to imply some sort of ethical effect of music.

413. *De recta ratione audiendi* 2 = *Mor.* 38a–b: “οὔτε γὰρ ὁρατὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε γευστὸν οὔτε ἀπτὸν ἐκστάσεις ἐπιφέρει καὶ ταραχὰς καὶ πτοίας τηλικαύτας ἡλίκαι καταλαμβάνουσι τὴν ψυχὴν κτύπων τινῶν καὶ πατάγων καὶ ἤχων τῇ ἀκοῇ προσπесόντων. ἔστι δὲ λογικώτερα μᾶλλον ἢ παθητικώτερα. τῇ μὲν γὰρ κακία πολλαχώρα καὶ μέρη τοῦ σώματος παρέχει δι’ αὐτῶν ἐνδύσαν ἄσασθαι τῆς ψυχῆς, τῇ δ’ ἀρετῇ μία λαβὴ τὰ ὥτα τῶν νέων ἐστίν, ἃν ἡ καθαρὰ καὶ ἄθροπτα κολακεία καὶ λόγοις ἄθικτα φαύλοις ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς φυλάττηται.”

414. Fr. 719A (= Plut. *Quaest. conv.* 1.5.2 = *Mor.* 623a): λύπη, ἡδονή, ἐνθουσιασμός are mentioned as “sources for music” (μουσικῆς ἀρχαί) that change the voice—at any rate, the voice expresses them too and hence might also cause them in the listener, although this is not said in this text; in 719B (= Aphthonius, *De metris* 4.2), the emotions aroused by song (apparently) are almost the same: *voluptas, ira, enthusiasmos (sacri furoris instinctus)*, but the text is also somewhat ambiguous since it starts with a description of how the stimuli (“*incentivum et non parvos impetus*”) of an *incalescens ingenium* produce πάθη, which then bring forth *sublime cothurnatum canorum et tragici ponderis carmen*. The interpretation of the rest all depends on what the subject in the following sentences is, whether still “*incentivum*...” from before, or “*carmen*”. Barker 2005, 133 points at a similar phenomenon in Aristox. *Harm.* 9.29–33: πάθος sometimes leads to a voice movement rather of singing than of speaking.

415. ἀπόλυσις “τῶν διὰ τὰ πάθη κακῶν;” Barker 2005, 133 (tr. of fr. 716.130–132 from the English manuscript, amending the tr. in GMW 2.118). The power of moving the soul is quoted in fr. 721B (= Censorinus, *DN* 12.1): “*animis permovendis plurimum valet*.” About alleviating labor through music: frs. 552A (= Ael. *VH* 9.11: the painter Parrhasius used to

pattern it is meant to express (fr. 716.7–9)—evidently an idea that supposes active music-making, not just listening. In fr. 719B, however, the concept is extended to listening as well, possibly similar to the Aristotelian catharsis. Later sources quote Theophrastus even concerning bodily cures by means of music.⁴¹⁶ Barker justly points out that the sense for the psycho-somatic unity of the human person made the Greeks keener to believe in effects of καταύλησις, which they would be less likely to consider as superstitious as some scholars would have it; modern music therapy has a lot to say about this as we shall see in ch. 4. But regardless of what he really thought of such things, Barker suggests that “Theophrastus, so far as we can tell, is the first theorist to have treated therapy as music’s primary function.”⁴¹⁷

At the same time, Theophrastus refutes the musical number theory of Pythagorean and Platonic origin, especially in its quantitative approach, and holds instead that melody is generated based on specific qualities of each tone (fr. 716).⁴¹⁸ Unfortunately, we have no information about how he would fathom the correspondence between emotion and melody without the recourse to considerations of cosmic harmony.

Theophrastus does not expound directly on good or bad music, but since he establishes a parallelism between melody and emotional expression—emotion being both at the origin and a product of music—we can surmise that for him, as in Aristotle, good music is the one proper to the purpose of expression and healing. Bad music would counteract such purpose. Only one text, reported by Aspasius, uses the negative word “ἀκόλαστοι” (intemperate, licentious) right after mentioning that pleasurable songs can drive out hunger: to fully avoid being distressed and suffering, people provide for themselves great and excessive enjoyments.⁴¹⁹ This is

sing and hum, thus working εὐθύμως and ῥαδίως and easing the toil) and 552B (= Ath. 543f, although this quote presents singing more a consequence than a cause for “ῥαδίως”).

416. Ath. 624a–b (= fr. 726B): καταυλεῖν in Phrygian *harmonia* should heal from sciatica; Apollonius *Mir.* 49.1 (= fr. 726A): “music heals many of the sufferings (παθῶν) that affect the soul and the body, such as swoon, fear, and long lasting ecstasy of the mind;” a story follows of how Aristoxenus restored with the *aulos* someone who had lost his mind because of the sound of a *salpinx* (on this story see Provenza 2012, 120–122); also in Gell. *NA* 4.13.1–2 (= fr. 726C) do we hear about healing from severe sciatica “*si modulis lenibus tibicen incinat*/ when the piper entones with calm melodies.” Mention to alleviate hunger (“rejoicing exceptionally over a song or something heard”) is made in fr. 555.

417. Barker 2005, 135.

418. Fr. 716 is the longest of the frs. on music and is cited in Porphyry’s commentary on Ptol. *Harm.* 1.3.

419. “ἀκόλαστοι γίνονται ἄνθρωποι· ἰν’ ὅλως γὰρ μὴ λυπῶνται μηδὲ ἀλγῶσι, μεγάλας καὶ σφοδράς ἡδονὰς ἑαυτοῖς πορίζουσι” (fr. 555 = Aspasius, *In Arist. Eth. Nic.* 7.14.4–6 1154a27–1154b15—Aristotle himself speaks in general terms, with no reference to music).

an interesting psychological insight, with ramifications and points of comparison to our own times.

Aristoxenus

Aristoxenus, who shares the hometown Tarentum with Archytas,⁴²⁰ grew up in an environment strongly influenced by Pythagorean teaching and thus assimilated ideas of the ethical power of music.⁴²¹ Nevertheless, this great master of music theory distances himself from the mathematical Pythagorean-Platonist system and takes a new empirical-descriptive approach by emphasizing the need for both hearing and understanding: the relationship between intellect and auditive sense in grasping what music does.⁴²² His rather conservative stand regarding musical style has already been mentioned in the first section of this chapter. Eleonora Rocconi identifies as his original contribution to the theory of musical ethos that all musical parameters, not just the *harmonia* or the genus, need to be considered in their combination (μίξις: combination of note, time, text, etc.; and σύνθεσις: the perception of everything as a whole) as responsible for the ethical effect of a melody,⁴²³ something considered in the theory of melodic composition (μελοποιία).⁴²⁴ The ethical objective for a melody in general will indicate the proper parameters, and judgment requires both perception and understanding of the final product

420. A Pythagorean philosopher with his *floruit* between 400–350 BC, attributed especially with the first mathematical description of the three harmonic genera.

421. Rocconi 2012a, 72–74; at 66–67, she mentions his stay in Arcadia around 350 BC, which might have provided him with “psychagogic” impressions of music as described by Polybius for the Mantineans (see next section).

422. Cf. Mathiesen 1999, 321–324. Barker 2007, 105–112, explains the Aristotelian conception of science as the gnoseological framework for the empirical (or inductive) road taken by Aristotle and, even more, by Aristoxenus whom he discusses in the following (113–258).

423. This is said in particular about genus and rhythm: “[οὐ] ἤξει ποτὲ ἔχον τὴν τῆς οἰκειότητος δύναμιν τελείαν καὶ καθ’ ἣν τὸ τοῦ πεποιημένου μέλους ἦθος/[neither the chromatic nor the enharmonic genus] ever brings about a grip on the accomplished power of propriety and according to which the ethos of the melody made [composed or performed] becomes manifest” (ps.-Plut. *Mus.* 33.1143a); “τούτου δὲ φαμεν αἰτίαν εἶναι σύνθεσιν τινα ἢ μίξιν ἢ ἀμφοτέρα/we say that the origin of this [ethos] lies in some combination or mixing, or both” (33.1143b). The point is made in the discussion of the extent to which harmonic or rhythmical science and composition are able to assess the appropriate (“οἰκεῖος”) ethos. This passage parallels Pl. *Leg.* 670a–671a.

424. Rocconi 2012a, 76–81, based on ps.-Plut. *Mus.* 32.1142db33.1144e, esp. 1143a–d; see also AQ 1.12; Neubecker 1994, 135–136, and above n. 423. This section is analyzed with much detail in Barker 2007, 235ff.

in its elements,⁴²⁵ resulting in the aesthetic and ethical appropriateness—the former is the degree to which a piece has been performed in accordance with the composer’s intention, the latter is described as the purpose (τέλος) of a performance or composition. Both ought to correspond: the performance needs to be appropriate to the composition and to what the performer wants to pursue or interpret (μεταχειρίζω; ἐρμηνεύω), especially in view of the emotions (πάθη) that the composer has indicated to be awakened. Pathos and ethos are closely related, and this relationship can only be judged when considering the whole. We recognize here a conception very similar to Plato’s “ethical triangle” (Aristoxenus does not talk about context) and to the principle of identifying beauty and goodness, but with a tendency to accentuate beauty as good rather than goodness as beautiful.⁴²⁶

Ancient music theorists differ essentially about whether perception or understanding is primary for musical judgment; Aristoxenes stands for the first, the Pythagorean tradition for the second position.⁴²⁷ Nevertheless, also for him, similar as for Plato, music education serves as a *praeambulum* for philosophy, which in

425. This idea, extensively elaborated upon in ps.-Plut., is summarized in this sentence: “τὸ γὰρ εὖ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίως οὐκ ἐν ἀφωρισμένοις τοῖσδε τισι γίγνεται φθόγγοις ἢ χρόνοις ἢ γράμμασιν, ἀλλ’ ἐνσυνεχέσιν· ἐπειδὴ μίξις τις ἔστι κατὰ τὴν, χρήσιν τῶν ἀσυνθέτων μερῶν/ for the good/beautiful and the opposite are produced not in separate notes or times or letters/sounds, but in a continuum; for it is some mixing of the separate parts according to the employment [of the whole].” (35.1144b).

426. Rocconi 2012a, 82, to support the “identification of aesthetics with ethic ‘goodness’” as something “inherent in the Greek conception of ‘art’ (the meaning of which was determined by *mimēsis*),” quotes conveniently Arist. *Rhet.* 1.9.3 1366a33–34: “καλὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστίν, ὃ ἂν δι’ αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν ὄν ἐπαινετὸν ἦ, ἢ ὃ ἂν ἀγαθὸν ὄν ἡδὺ ἦ, ὅτι ἀγαθόν/the good/beautiful, then, is, being chosen on its own account, is praiseworthy, or being good is enjoyable because it is good”—*bonum et pulchrum et delectabile convertuntur*. This is essentially the result of Barker’s quest of distinguishing an “ethical” or “aesthetic” evaluative judgment: “The Greek language marks no clear borderline between these kinds of value, and perhaps we should not try to foist the distinction on Aristoxenus.” He still suggests, however, that Aristoxenus would speak of ethos as something intrinsic in music rather than as of something enhancing the character of the hearer (2002, 257). The problem is that terms of Greek evaluation in “their descriptive meanings carry essential reference to attributes of human character and action” (id. 256). In 2001, 369–370, Barker suggests that Philodemus used Aristoxenus for his attack against musical ethos as presented by Diogenes of Babylon and the Stoic tradition. Similar patterns of argument may not suffice to justify associating Aristoxenus with the “skeptical” tradition, but in the Aristotelian-Aristoxenian school we observe a greater detachment from the idea that music shapes ethos in people.

427. See GMW 1.244 nn. 239, 240, referencing Aristox. *Harm.* 32.18ff; Ptol. *Harm.* 11.1ff, 19.16ff and Theophr.; Pythagoras judges according to the proper proportions: ἀναλογικὴ ἀρμονία, not just hearing.

turn is the discipline that is able to discern what is appropriate regarding musical ethos.⁴²⁸

Little is preserved from the many works Aristoxenus wrote on different topics about music. In the extant text of his *opus* on harmony,⁴²⁹ he mostly deals with technical explanations and clarifying terminology, but at times he also indicates some criteria about proper composition, e.g. the “correct constitution of melody” (harmonic (τὸ ἡρμοσμένον μέλος) and non-harmonic melody (τὸ ἀνάρμοστον μέλος) (*Harm.* 18.16–23), concordant (τὸ σύμφωνον διάστημα) and discordant intervals (τὸ διάφωνον διάστημα) (19.30–20.2). A general principle in music found in various musical parameters is the dualism of tension (ἐπίτασις) and relaxation (ἄνεσις)⁴³⁰—terms which can be understood also in an ethical way, even though Aristoxenus does not often enter into this realm. When discussing the genera, he does argue that the melodic composition (μελοποιία), based on the enharmonic genus, is not the worst (φauλοτάτη) but perhaps the best/most beautiful (σχεδὸν ἢ καλλίστη), while those preferring the fashionable chromatic genus are drawn by the desire to sweeten (γλυκαίνω)—and here the word “ἦθος” is used.⁴³¹

At the beginning of book two (*Harm.* 31.18–29), Aristoxenus clears up the misunderstanding that studying τὰ ἁρμονικά would make “βελτίους τὸ ἦθος,” meaning that certain musical parameters benefit character while others harm it,⁴³² and that people did not understand that he wanted to limit the extent to which

428. Cf. Rocconi 2012a, 85–86, with reference to ps.-Plut. *Mus.* 32.1142c–d and Aristox. *Harm.* 41.10–25. Barker 2007, 243, distinguishes two judgments: one about ethos and one about appropriateness of ethos to a particular composition.

429. Text and Ger. tr.: Marquard, 1868; text and tr. (Eng.): Macran 2004 [1902]; text and tr. (It.): da Rios 1954; tr. and comm.: GMW 2.119–189.

430. These terms are introduced in the context of pitch (*El. Harm.* 10.24–29); see also GMW 2.133 n. 42 explaining that the sound itself is meant, not the source producing the sound.

431. The phrase “συνεπισπώμενος τοῦ ἦθους” (23.22) is translated very differently: Marquard 1868, 33, translates: “weil ihr Charakter sie dahin zieht/because their character drags them there,” whereas Barker (GMW 2.142) has: “and the melody is correspondingly pulled out of shape.” I believe that Marquard caught it better in the sense that their tendency to sweetness leads them back into their favorite genus; but see Barker *ibid.* n. 91 treating the issue further; he points out that later authors (e.g. AQ 1.9 16.14–18) explain the loss of the enharmonic by the difficulty of singing quartertones rather than aesthetical or ethical considerations. From some indirect references to Aristoxenus we can gather more evidence for his favoring of the enharmonic genus and its connection with the Dorian *harmonia*: frs. 83–85 Wehrli. Following the Aristoxenian system, Vitruvius (*De arch.* 5.4.3) mentions the ethos of the enharmonic and chromatic genus; he does not give an ethos for the diatonic except that it is “*naturalis*” and “*facilior*.”

432. 31.25–26: “ἡ μὲν τοιαύτη βλάπτει τὰ ἦθη ἢ δὲ τοιαύη ὠφελεῖ.”

music can be useful.⁴³³ Barker concludes that Aristoxenus must have shared at least part of the ethos-theory.⁴³⁴ Still, when he discusses the *tonoi* and the *genera* here, Aristoxenus refrains from attributing any ethical characteristics to them. In general, melodies are understood (συνήμι, διάνοια, παρακολουθέω) through perception (αἴσθησις) and memory (μνήμη) (38.27–39.3).

What remains to be seen further about Aristoxenus' reflections is the relationship between ethos and musical composition: Can we really say that the ethos of a particular piece resides ultimately and only in the whole, the combination of all parameters? But how can the whole acquire ethos if ethos is not already contained, at least *in nuce*, within those very parameters? Can individual non-ethical parameters produce an ethical compound? I believe Aristoxenus did not attempt to deny that the individual elements (e.g. *harmoniai*, rhythms, etc.) in themselves are ethically charged,⁴³⁵ but that the *full extent* (δύναμις τελεία, ps.-Plut. *Mus.* 1143a) of ethos in a piece cannot be grasped without judging the whole as such.

Polybius⁴³⁶

As a historian, Polybius touches upon music *en passant* at several instances, but for our purposes a section in book four (20–21) of his *Histories* may be pointed out. He advances the idea (21.1–2) that the adversities of human life such as hard labor and gloomy weather conditions necessarily (κατ' ἀνάγκην) make humans similar to this (συνεξομοιῶ); i.e., they develop under such circumstances a severe character (τῶν ἡθῶν αὐστηρία). This reality was noticed in particular by the ancient Arcadians.⁴³⁷ In order to counteract this natural development, they instituted, along with other practices, an intensive musical education from childhood onward

433. 31.28: “τὸ δ' ὅτι καὶ καθ' ὅσον μουσικὴ δύναται ὠφελεῖν οὐδ' ἀκούσαντες ὅλως.” That the study of harmonics alone does not resolve these questions is also said in ps.-Plut. *Mus.* 33.1142f–1143a.

434. GMW 2.148 n. 6.

435. It seems that Barker 2007, 245, assumes this when he writes that, according to Aristoxenus, “it is not, for example, the enharmonic or the chromatic genus as such that is appropriate to a specific *ethos*.” Barker is certainly correct in stating that Aristoxenus does not and cannot offer “recipes” for the combination of parameters to achieve a desired ethos, but the impossibility to “imitate” existing compositions (cf. ps.-Plut. *Mus.* 1137b) might have more to do with the artistic genius in them (or the “feeling” Barker speaks of on p. 249), which goes far beyond the application of compositional rules, be they of technical or ethical matter.

436. Text and tr.: Paton 1922/2010 (vol. 2). The account is also cited in Ath. 626a–f.

437. Arcadia is located in the central region of the Peloponnese (OCD 138).

to the age of thirty in order to soften and mix up (or temper) the stubbornness and harshness of nature⁴³⁸ and to tame and mitigate the hardening of the soul by the habituation to such (musical) exercise.⁴³⁹

Polybius describes with some detail the effort the Arcadians made to educate their children and to bring music into their lives—which does not appear very different from what we generally know about Greek musical practice—and he proves the point through a negative example: the Cynaetheans, inhabiting the place in Arcadia with the worst geographic and climatic conditions, totally neglected musical exercise, and became brutal perpetrators of the most sacrilegious crimes, thus staining the fame of virtue, humanity, and hospitality, which characterized the rest of Arcadia. Polybius ends his discussion with the exhortation to never neglect music and to “tame” oneself through education and especially through music⁴⁴⁰ as the only means to avoid falling into savagery.

While this humanizing function of music formed a real necessity (ἀναγκαῖον) in the case of the Arcadians, Polybius considers music (and he stresses: truly music, probably meaning the actual use of it and not just the theory) useful (ὀφελος), probably in a similar fashion, for all human beings (20.4).⁴⁴¹ He even strikes a certain apologetic tone when emphasizing that music was not introduced by the Arcadians out of luxuriousness (τρυφή) or superfluity (περιουσία) (21.1) or, still worse, as guile (ἀπάτη) or a trick (γοητεία) against people, a charge, which he attributes to the historian Ephorus (20.5).

Polybius does not enter into the debate about what type of music could be more beneficial than others and why so, but his historical example intends to show how music as such can have a significantly positive influence on the character of a people as a whole. His picture of a culture penetrated by music is different from Plato’s approach, which restricts its usage to precise limits and even bans much of the musical business from his ideal State (cf. *Resp.* 373b)—even though one could argue that the stipulations in favor of choral chant made in the *Laws* might suffice to lead to the results envisioned by Polybius. Regardless, we have here another claim that music and the political-moral status of a society depend, for a good part, on music.

438. 21.3: “βουλόμενοι δὲ μαλάττειν καὶ κινᾶν τὸ τῆς φύσεως αὐθαδὲς καὶ σκληρόν.”

439. 21.4: “σπεύδοντες τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀτέραμον διὰ τῆς τῶν ἐθισμῶν κατασκευῆς ἐξημεροῦν καὶ πραῦναι.”

440. 21.11: “τραπέντες πρὸς παιδείαν ἡμερώσιν αὐτούς, καὶ μάλιστα ταύτης πρὸς μουσικὴν.”

441. This argument, as we shall see, contradicts the reasoning brought forward by Philodemus who claims that musical practice does not stem from any need.

Dio Chrysostom

Dio of Prusa, also called “Cocceianus” or “Chrysostom,” a wandering orator with a Stoic-Cynic philosophical background, directs his thirty-second of seventy-eight preserved discourses to the people of Alexandria, probably held during the time of the Roman emperor Trajan.⁴⁴² We anticipate the discussion of this later text here because it contrasts with Polybius’ account in an interesting way. Certainly not without some rhetoric exaggeration, Dio decries the corrupt morals in that city which used to be the cultural center of Hellenistic civilization and does not tire of juxtaposing ancient Hellenic nobility with contemporary vulgarity, as displayed particularly in the theater. The problem is not the kind “theatrocracy” which Plato railed about, but the complete lack of seriousness, order, and moderation in basically any public event. The Alexandrians’ obsession for music plays an important role in this scenario:⁴⁴³ the constant strumming of chords (4) and their overreaction to even mediocre musical performance has led them to destruction, at least of their honor, worse than what the Sirens did (47).⁴⁴⁴ Other people turn to song and dance when they are drunk, but for the Alexandrians it is song that produces a drunkenness (μέθη) and derangement (παράνοια) much worse than wine or inhaling intoxicating fumes (55–56).

Dio identifies the culprit for these effects in the attitude of the Alexandrians towards music, because elsewhere music would rather heal the passions and transform roughly and savagely disposed souls,⁴⁴⁵ for which purpose it was even invented, as much as for one to become orderly (εὐτακτος) and settled (καθεστηκός) when sacrificing to gods with song. Similarly, other songs with *aulos* would heal the harshness and relentlessness of passion in mourning and eliciting mitigation

442. Text and tr.: Crosby 1940, 171–271.

443. 41: the city is crazy about music (“μαινομένην δὲ ὑπὸ ψῶδης”); 51: no other city has such a passionate love (ἔρω) and madness (οἷστρος) for singing and *aulos* playing, among other entertainments. This observation is somewhat at variance with Dios regret for his own lack of musicality when he says that song and cithara would be an antidote (ἀλεξιφάρμακον) to the city’s problems (20–21).

The problems described here seem somewhat particular, wherefore this account is not included in the above section on musical decadence.

444. 48: The excitement over musicians far from possessing any magic power and skill or ones elsewhere even considered displeasing proves the levity (κουφότης) and weakness (ἀσθένεια) of the city.

445. “ἢ τε μουσικὴ θεραπείας ἔνεκα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εὐρῆσθαι δοκεῖ τῶν παθῶν καὶ μάλιστα διὰ μεταστρέφειν ψυχὰς ἀπηνῶς καὶ ἀγρίως διακειμένας.” Dio then mentions the Pythagorean practice of “harmonizing” (ἀρμόζω) themselves with the lyre in the morning to relieve the perturbation from the dreams (“ἀποπαύοντες τῆς διὰ τῶν ὄνειράτων παραχῆς”).

of grief (57).⁴⁴⁶ The power of music would also “provide spontaneous harmony and order into the soul” and thus tune and moderate the effects of drunkenness in social gatherings.⁴⁴⁷ Instead, the Alexandrians react to music as if possessed (κατέχομαι) by Corybantes or raging (μαίνομαι) from music like Bacchants or Satyrs; if they hear just a string, they cannot keep peace as if they heard a trumpet (*salpinx*) (58–59).⁴⁴⁸ Their main problem, according to Dio, is lack of the proper balance, which he illustrates by hinting at Nero’s musical crazes (60).

Dio drives his point home further by pointing out that none of the great ancient masters of music (Ismenias, Timotheus, Arion, or Orpheus, son of a Muse) is making music for them, whereas they stem from Ἀμουσία (Not-Music) herself, having distorted and abased the dignity of melody and maltreated the old custom of music (61). Here Dio takes up well-known criticism of musical degeneration, from accomplished (τέλειος) song and noble (γενναῖος) rhythm to women’s songs, strummings for dancers and drunken hummer movements with every kind mixed together to move the ignorant and curious crowds. Their music is taken not from swans or nightingales but from the whining and howling of dogs.⁴⁴⁹ Amphion’s song built city walls, but here they are destroying; Orpheus made animals tame and musical through song, but here they have converted humans into crude and uneducated beings (“οὗτοι δὲ ὑμᾶς, ἀνθρώπους ὄντας, ἀγρίους πεποιήκασιν καὶ ἀπαιδεύτους”) (62).

The Alexandrians’ irrational reaction to simple cithara play and their empty and senseless character (“εἶναι δὲ τῷ τρόπῳ κοῦφον καὶ ἀνόητον”) is explained by an unflattering story about their origin as a particular Macedonian tribe⁴⁵⁰ stemming from animals that had followed Orpheus but had been transformed into human bodies (still maintaining their animal souls) (63–65). And even worse, some of them, their citharedes, stem from transformed dogs who had tried their

446. “ἰωμένων οἶμαι τὸ σκληρὸν καὶ ἄτεγκτον τοῦ πάθους, θηλυτέραν δὲ τὴν λύπην ἐργαζομένων.”

447. “ἡ μουσικῆς δύναμις, ἁρμονίαν καὶ τάξιν αὐτόματον ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐπεισάγουσα καὶ τὸ σφαλερὸν τῆς ἐν οἴνῳ τέρψεως παραμυθουμένη (...), ὥσπερ αὐτῷ (...) ἐμμελὲς γίγνεται καὶ μέτριον.”

448. To this fits the ironic comment that the Alexandrians go to war with the cithara while the Spartans did so with the *aulos* (60).

449. Tounge-in-cheek Dio speaks of philosophers called Cynics (Κυνικοί, from κύων = dog)—he himself has been associated with them—, “but only by you have been engendered Cynic (dog) citharedes (κιθαρωδοὶ δὲ Κυνικοὶ παρὰ μόνοις ὑμῖν γεγόνασιν).”

450. As opposed to the other Macedonians who are manly, warlike, and steady of character: “ἐπεὶ τοὺς γε ἄλλους Μακεδόνας ἀνδρείους καὶ πολεμικοὺς γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ ἦθος βεβαίους” (65).

own canine music, retaining only little from Orpheus' original instruction (66). Dio finishes his tirade against the Alexandrian attitude towards music by recalling the Spartan's severity towards musical innovation, recalling the removal of a citharede's strings and banishing him in order to not get corrupted (διαφθείρω) in their hearing or becoming effeminate (τρυφερός).⁴⁵¹ The Alexandrians instead became enslaved to such enjoyment (ἡδονή), and in their zeal and passion for music they now accompany any activity with singing, be it a trial, a lecture, physical exercise, or even medical treatment (67–68).⁴⁵²

Dios exposition constitutes an interesting variation of the theme of decadence related to music: most texts discussed earlier show decadence in the music itself (musical style and performance) which is seen both as a reflection and a cause for general cultural decline; here it is less the music itself but the obsession with and the artlessly excessive treatment of music which shows forms of vulgarity. His account contrasts in a certain way to Polybius' assertion of the humanizing function of music which seems not to have been effective among the Alexandrians.⁴⁵³

Cleonides⁴⁵⁴

Only at the end of his rather technical essay on music, which follows Aristoxenian doctrine, does Cleonides touch on the question of ethos in the context of modulation. Here he mentions three *ēthē*,⁴⁵⁵ all of which are said to lead the soul into a specific state: the “diastaltic [uplifting] ethos” of melic (or melodic) composition, used especially in tragedy, “marks heroic deeds, the magnificence and elevation of

451. This story is used as an argument also in Dios' next discourse (33.57).

452. Dio does not mean here “musical therapy” but rather something like humming during surgery.

453. Dio illustrates his point thus (46): they notice when a citharede sings dissonant (ἐκμελῶς) or out of tune (παρὰ τὸν τόνον) but do not realize when they themselves fall fully out of the nature-given harmony (ἔξω τῆς ἁρμονίας τῆς κατὰ φύσιν) and behave much unmusically (ἀμουσῶς).

454. Text: MSG, 179–207; text, tr., and comm.: Solomon 1986; tr.: Strunk/Treitler 1998, 35–46; summary and discussion: Mathiesen 1999, 366–390; Barker 2007, 255–256.

455. Cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1340a40–1340b11 and above n. 346, but see Solomon 1981, 98, about the difference between these types, even though I do not agree that Plato and Aristotle consider the harmonic *ēthē* to be merely “musicological constructs” as opposed to real “emotional-physical” experiences. It is clear, however, that these three are not *harmoniai*—for an attempt to assign *harmoniai* to these *ēthē*, see Solomon 1981, 100 n. 40. See also AQ 1.112 30.12–15 and Heraclides Ponticus in Ath. 624d.

a manly soul, and a condition similar to these”;⁴⁵⁶ the “systaltic [depressing] ethos,” used in the context of eros and for dirges, mourning, etc., creates “dejection and an unmanly condition”;⁴⁵⁷ and the “hesychastic [soothing] ethos,” used in hymns, peaeans, encomia, counsels, etc., accompanies “quietude of the soul and a liberal and peaceful state.”⁴⁵⁸ No further comment is made—these characterizations enrich the catalogue of ethos classifications from a perspective of the first century BC and will be taken up again by Aristides Quintilianus.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus

In the context of instructing on literary composition,⁴⁵⁹ Dionysius, at some point (*Comp.* 11), takes recourse to music based on the assumption that music and speech achieve enjoyment or attractiveness (ἡδονή) and beauty (τὸ καλόν) in a similar way.⁴⁶⁰ Enjoyment stems from the following characteristics: springtime-bloom/elegance, grace, goodness of taste/pleasantness, sweetness, and persuasiveness. Similarly, elements of beauty are: magnificence, dignity/gravity, impressiveness, honor/dignity, and “coating.”⁴⁶¹

In order to elicit enjoyment, both literary style (λέξις) and music need all of the following ingredients: melody, rhythm, variety, and the appropriateness (τὸ πρέπον) of the use of the other three.⁴⁶² About melody and rhythm, the author

456. “σημαίνεται μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ διάγραμμα ψυχῆς ἀνδρῶδες καὶ πράξεις ἥρωικαὶ καὶ πάθη τοῦτοις οἰκεία;” this could fit to the Dorian *harmonia* (or Hypodorian as described in ps-Arist. *Pr.* 19.30). See Solomon 1981 about the philological difficulties regarding the term “διασταλτικός” and his reasoning for translating it with “distinguishing, uplifting;” he also contributes interesting reflections about the medical origin of this and similar musical terminology.

457. “συνάγεται ἡ ψυχὴ εἰς ταπεινότητα καὶ ἄνανδρον διάθεσιν;” this seems to fit with Mixolydian (Pl. *Resp.* 398e; Arist. *Pol.* 1340b1–2; ps.-Plut. *Mus.* 16.1136d) or Lydian.

458. “παρέπεται ἡρεμότης ψυχῆς καὶ κατάστημα ἐλευθέριον τε καὶ εἰρηνικόν;” this could fit Plato’s Lydian, as an intermediate between the other two.

459. Text and tr.: Usher 1985.

460. In the preceding section 10, he even says that if found together in any human artefact, these two fulfill all desire of human sensitivity: “ὅταν εὕρισκῃ τὸ τε ἡδὺ ἐνὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ καλόν, ἀρκεῖται καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι ποθεῖ.” He holds that music and oratory differ only in degree, not in kind (*Comp.* 11, in Usher 1985, 77).

461. “τάττω δὲ ὑπὸ μὲν τὴν ἡδονὴν τὴν τε ὥραν καὶ τὴν χάριν καὶ τὴν εὐστομίαν καὶ τὴν γλυκύτητα καὶ τὸ πιθανόν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὑπὸ δὲ τὸ καλόν τὴν τε μεγαλοπρέπειαν καὶ τὸ βάρος καὶ τὴν σεμνολογίαν καὶ τὸ ἀξίωμα καὶ τὸν πίνον καὶ τὰ τοῦτοις ὅμοια.”

462. The author calls experience (πεῖρα) as witness for this affirmation, hence follows the method of introspection or induction.

notes the difference between certain (good) melodies (ἐμμέλεια) or rhythms (εὐρυθμία) that have the capacity to draw (ἄγω) and “bewitch” (γοητεύω) the listener and give him enjoyment (ἡδονή), and other (bad, or badly performed) ones that make people feel weary (διοχλέω), displeased (ἀγανακτέω), and annoyed (δυσαραστέω). He goes on to explain why even the technically uneducated theater audience is able to spontaneously identify small discordant (ἀσύμφωνος) elements in a performance: because the aesthetical distinction depends on πάθος⁴⁶³, which nature has bestowed upon all human beings (πάθος ὃ πᾶσιν ἀπέδωκεν ἡ φύσις), and therefore the sense for what makes music (as much as speech) enjoyable are common to all (ὑπὸ πάντων ὁμοίως). The absence of variety at the proper time, or of propriety, leads to a “heavy” satiety and a distasteful want of harmony. Our hearing delights in melodies, is drawn by rhythms, welcomes variety, and desires what is proper with regard to everything.⁴⁶⁴ The author does not tell us what sort of melody or music has a positive or negative effect but only exemplifies the aesthetic value of a good or bad performance.

It is interesting to learn how Dionysius joins qualities or “powers” (sweetness, bitterness, roughness, and smoothness) to particular letters and also syllables and words, which they possess by nature and cannot be changed, along with some more technical aspects such as easy or hard pronunciation, length and shortness, etc. Their effective combination is then the task of a good orator; “effective” meaning that the phonetic expression should agree with and reinforce the ethos of the expressed content.⁴⁶⁵ This observation is made about text, but it is an important predecessor for Aristides Quintilianus’ general theory of ethos in music.

In line with a development that Plato tried to stem, Dionysius states that in music the words or speech (λέξις) should submit to the melody and not vice-versa (illustrated by an example from Euripides where the word accents change

463. This term is hard to translate; Usher 1985, 75, uses “feeling,” but the concept is much more complex. The idea could be phrased here as a natural conditioning of human emotion to find harmonious sound patterns agreeable. We shall deal in ch. 4 with some of the psychological questions that arise from this assumption, for the conditioning could also be cultural or linked to expectancies.

464. “ἡ ἀκοὴ τέρπεται μὲν τοῖς μέλεσιν, ἄγεται δὲ τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς, ἀσπάζεται δὲ τὰς μεταβολάς, ποθεῖ δ’ ἐπὶ πάντων τὸ οἰκεῖον.”

465. He goes into more detail about this in the following sections of the treatise, illustrating the mimetic function of lingual sound and rhythmic patterns with regard to ethos, especially in Homer. The harder task is, of course, to show how musical sound, through its parameters, can reflect ethos, something Dionysius does not explore. He relies on Theophrastus who in his work *On Style* distinguished words according to beauty and ethos; this reference is included in Fortenbaugh 535, Theophr. fr. 688; no direct text from this work survives.

according to the melody).⁴⁶⁶ The Hellenistic tendency to indulge in form at the expense of content can be sensed here, but as mentioned, Dionysius still holds firm on the principle of appropriateness.⁴⁶⁷ Style and composition (e.g. word choice and order) should be “expressive” (μυμητικός) of what is described in words as he sets out to illustrate in a passage from Homer’s *Odyssey* (11.593–597): all parameters of speech work together in order to reflect in sound the envisioned image.⁴⁶⁸

Here the argument could seem somewhat inconsistent, as already observed in Plato. “Enjoyment,” as related above, is to be associated with positive characteristics throughout; at the same time, for enjoyment the category “appropriateness” is required. However, in order to express negative ethos (e.g. harsh, painful, mean, etc.) within the context of an epic poem or a dramatic action, style or music are required to put on these same negative characteristics. Now, such a negative but properly expressed ethos cannot be enjoyable in the original sense (graceful, sweet, etc.). Can a piece of literature or music be dignified if it properly expresses the lack of dignity as prescribed by a particular story line or context? A solution might be expected along the lines of the Aristotelian catharsis, but the author does not move in that direction. When he discusses later the three main styles (interestingly called “ἁρμονίαι”), he does consider “negative” elements (e.g. “rough” and “repelling” for the “austere” style), but they are seen positively within the general tone of the whole, and his third (“tempered”) style as the golden mean between the austere and the polished ones receives the greatest praise. We are led to assume that what counts is the overall positive impression of balance and reconciled contrasts.

In summary, Dionysius offers some valuable reflections about the concept of enjoyment and beauty in art by spelling out criteria for their effective achievement, namely “good” melody, rhythm, variety, and propriety. That last principle confirms the idea of the “ethical pyramid,” demanding congruence between form, content, context, and pathos (the emotional reaction caused in the soul). Even though text should adjust to melody in some formal parameters (accent,

466. See Anderson 1994, 123–124, about the problem of the historical accurateness in comments of Hellenistic critics on classical authors.

467. This is discussed further in *Comp.* 20; cf. similar Arist. *Rh.* 3.7.1–11, the beginning runs: “τὸ δὲ πρέπον ἔξει ἢ λέξις, ἔαν ἢ παθητικὴ τε καὶ ἠθικὴ καὶ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασιν ἀνάλογον.”—pathos, ethos, and content need to be in agreement; Cic. *Orat.* 21.70–74 (“*decorum*”).

468. We need not discuss to what degree Dionysius’ analysis is accurate or whether it is probable that Homer composed his text exactly with such criteria in mind; what we can learn from this analysis is how the ancients ideated *mimēsis* on the level of language, which sheds some light on how it might have been conceived for music.

length of vowels, etc.), the melody as a whole, however, just as in rhythm, needs to reflect the ethos presented by the text. In contrast with Plato, no particular ethos is promoted except for the overall balance and nobility of the final product in order to be enjoyable and beautiful. All humans possess by nature the ability to recognize and feel ethos within music or speech and whether it has been effectively conveyed or not.

Hippocrates

It might seem strange to insert Hippocrates (or, rather, a piece from the *Corpus Hippocraticum*) at this point, especially since it interrupts the chronology of the authors presented, but there is a little passage in *De victu* (1.18),⁴⁶⁹ which fits neatly into an aspect that we have just dealt with in Dionysius. The unknown author⁴⁷⁰ draws a comparison between the delight of food (since “diet” is his main concern) and that of music where he makes the point that the best harmony⁴⁷¹ comes from the greatest variety while the least variety produces the worst harmony; so the greatest delight (τέρψις) comes from the greatest changes and varieties.⁴⁷² We have here the rare case that it is not music borrowing imagery from other senses, but the reverse happens: the tongue “imitates” (“μιμείται”) music in discerning the sweet

469. Text: Jones 1931, 254–257. Barker (GMW 2.458 n. 1) quotes this text as evidence for the “popular” idea that “music can give nothing but enjoyment.” The text supports the concept of pleasure through music, but its point is that variety and good tuning are important ingredients for this; I do not see any denial of other (such as educational) functions that music could have since they are just not addressed.

470. Authorship is discussed in Jones 1931, xlv–xlvii, who at xliii states Pythagorean influence; Boccadoro 2002, 115–116, treats this text as part of the Pythagorean development of an understanding of musical ethos that applies ingredients of particular effect just like producing a medication.

471. Literally: “what is most joined together;” the text goes: “τὰ πλείστον διάφορα μάλιστα συμφέρει, τὰ δὲ ἐλάχιστον διαφορά ἥκιστα συμφέρει” (1.18.5–6).

472. 1.18.8–9: “αἱ πλείσται μεταβολαὶ καὶ πολυειδέσταται μάλιστα τέρπουσιν.” Likewise, a meal with everything the same would not give delight either, nor all mixed together into one. Boccadoro 2002, 116, expresses the idea in these words: “L’unità è di regola, ma il piacere richiede varietà, come vuole l’adagio latino «in varietate voluptas». La dissonanza è il sale della musica: stemperata in giuste dosi nella melodia, moltiplica la sua carica emotiva, sovvertendo gli stati d’animo dell’ascoltatore (...), il valore patetico dell’armonia è direttamente proporzionale all’alterità delle parti. Unity comes from the rule, but pleasure requires variety as the Latin proverb has it: ‘pleasure lies in variety.’ Dissonance is the salt of music: dissolved in proper dosage in the melody, it multiplies its emotive charge, subverting the states of mind of the listener (...), the emotional value of harmony is directly proportionate to the alterity/diversity of the parts.”

and the sharp, the discordant and the concordant,⁴⁷³ and finds pleasure if well attuned (καλῶς ἡρμοσμένος), but pain if not attuned (ἀναρμοστος).⁴⁷⁴

The idea of pleasing variety is not unknown to Plato (cf. *Leg.* 665c) who probably wrote almost contemporaneously to the current text, but, as we have seen, he is very careful in allowing any of this—and his “legislation” might be a response to the tendency, the popularity of which might just well be reflected in this Hippocratic text.

Philostratus

There is an anecdote in Philostratus’ *Life of Apollonius of Tyana* (5.21)⁴⁷⁵ in which he relates how the philosopher questions the *aulos* player Canus at Rhodes about what his work contains. The answer is: “anything that the listener wants”—a response typical to the audience-oriented approach of professional musicians. Upon denying that he can provide richness or external beauty, which Apollonius suggests the listeners might desire, he then says that the *aulos* puts to sleep the mourner’s sorrow, makes those who rejoice still merrier, heats up the lover more, and inspires the one who loves religious sacrifice to sing hymns.⁴⁷⁶ In the first example, music has the force of healing or mitigating; in the remaining ones, it increases in degree something already present.

As the conversation continues, the question is posted about what it is that bestows on the *aulos* such power. Not its material, certainly, but the music, styles, combinations, the variations of the *aulos*-playing, and the ethos of the *harmoniai*—all these “harmonize” the listeners and renders the souls composed, resting in themselves (σφός) as they wish.⁴⁷⁷ To this response, Apollonius adds the

473. The first two terms, even though very frequent for sounds, do stem originally from taste, but the other two certainly not: “γλῶσα μουσικὴν μιμεῖται διαγινώσκουσα μὲν τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ ὀξὺ τῶν προσπιπτόντων, καὶ διάφωνα καὶ σύμφωνα” (1.18.16–19).

474. It might be of interest to notice that in this text notes are actually called “up/high” (“ἄνω”) and “down/low” (“κάτω”) rather than “sharp” (“ὀξύς”) and “heavy” (“βαρὺς”) as usually done. The concept of pain caused by bad tuning is also found in *Ar. Pr.* 919a13–23.

475. Text and tr.: Jones 2005.

476. “τὸν λυπούμενον μὲν κοιμίζεσθαι αὐτῷ τὴν λύπην ὑπὸ τοῦ αὐλοῦ, τὸν δὲ χαίροντα ἰλαρώτερον ἑαυτοῦ γίγνεσθαι, τὸν δὲ ἐρῶντα θερμότερον, τὸν δὲ φιλοθύτην ἐνθεώτερόν τε καὶ ὑμνώδη.”

477. “ἡ γὰρ μουσικὴ καὶ οἱ τρόποι καὶ τὸ ἀναμιξ καὶ τὸ εὐμετάβολον τῆς αὐλήσεως καὶ τὰ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν ἦθη, ταῦτα τοὺς ἀκροωμένους ἀρμόττει καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἐργάζεται σφῶν, ὅποιας βούλονται.”

need of artistic skill (breath, lips, wrist, and fingers) in order to be blessed by the Muse Euterpe.

This brief discourse confirms that, at the time of Philostratus, all different musical parameters were considered contributing and necessary to elicit a particular effect on the listener, just as Aristoxenus taught. About the effect on the musician himself we read nothing here, but interestingly, Plutarch (*An seni* 5 = *Mor.* 786c) quotes probably the very same Canus with the phrase that making music gladdens (εὐφραίνει) him much more than those who hear him—and if people knew this they would ask him to pay for his playing instead of him being paid by them. No word is said about the reasons why these effects would come about. Obviously, only positive effects are mentioned, as a professional would not want to put his job in danger by displeasing or harming his audience—at least not in a way they would be aware of.

Musical Ethos Questioned

The discussion whether music is good or bad according to the levels two and three of our previous division rests on the supposition that music has an effect on human affairs. Despite some yet unresolved problems about the interface between music and the human psyche, the vast majority of writings preserved from antiquity takes the existence of such an effect for granted. Since the eighteenth century AD, there has been a so-called “formalist school” of music philosophers that claims that music neither represents nor expresses anything beyond itself and hence has no meaning outside its own realm of aesthetical appreciation.⁴⁷⁸ This view has a precedent in antiquity and is represented by essentially three preserved texts (apart from a few isolated statements in other authors such as Theophrastus or Cicero that could be interpreted in similar ways). The oldest is short and anonymous, while the other two are open adherents of the Epicurean philosophy, according to which sense perception is irrational and the acoustic sense does not work in any different way than the others.⁴⁷⁹ A review of

478. See ch. 4; the distinction between formalists and expressionists is attributed especially to Leonard Meyer 1956.

479. See e.g. Wilkinson 1938, 178–180. In Plut. *Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum* 13 = *Mor.* 1095c–1096c, it is said that the Epicureans shun music, which seems to mean more specifically that they enjoyed music performances but abhorred theoretical discussions about it; see also below Cic. *Fin.* 1.21.71. Plutarch, on the other hand, thinks that theorizing about musical issues is more exciting than the actual music, so much so that it

these texts shows that they challenge nearly everything that has been said by the authors discussed up to this point.

The Hibeh Papyrus⁴⁸⁰

One of the papyri found at El-Hiba in Upper Egypt contains the oldest extant criticism against the ethos-theory of music and forms part of a speech which resembles the style of the renowned orator Isocrates (436–338 BC). It is directed against an unidentified group of *harmonikoi*, apparently associated with the Damonian tradition.⁴⁸¹ After ridiculing their incompetence⁴⁸² in judging music on a more technical level since they declare not to be active musicians themselves (1–13),⁴⁸³ the author addresses their claim that melodies⁴⁸⁴ produce character, such as being self-controlled (ἐγκρατής), prudent (φρόνιμος), just (δίκαιος), manly (ἀνδρείος), and—the only negative one—vile (δειλός). These characteristics are attributed no longer to *harmoniai* or rhythms but to the genus (“vile” to chromatic, “manly” to enharmonic). The author’s counter-argument is that some peoples who use the diatonic genus⁴⁸⁵ are manlier than those who sing enharmonic in tragedy.

makes the lover forget his love (τὸν ἐρῶντα ποιεῖν ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι, citing Xenophon, *Cyn.* 33). About Plutarch’s criticism of the Epicurean attitude, see Jufresa 2001.

480. Text in Grenfell/Hunt 1906 (attributes it to Hippias, contemporary of Socrates); text and comm.: West 1992b, 16–23 (I am following his edition, which differs from Grenfell/Hunt in some significant readings); tr. and comm.: GMW 1.184–185; discussion in Anderson 1966, 147–152 (includes a tr.); Brancacci 1988 (attributes it to Alcidas, prae-Aristoxenian); Avvezzi 1994 (with a good summary of the *status disputationis* with a detailed comm.); Lapini 1994 (discusses some of the assumptions of the previous authors); Neubecker 1994, 19, 131–132.

481. Wiliamowitz-Moellendorff 1921, 66, argues that Damon cannot have been directly the addressee since he was not a ἁρμόνικος (practicing musician—“*Kapellmeister*”)—but Barker (GMW 1.184 n. 3), in agreement with the definitions given in LSJ, interprets the term as meaning students of the theoretical harmonic analysis, cf. also West 1992b 18. Richter 1961, 23 and 41, suggests that it refers to Damon’s followers, similar Anderson 1966, 150–151, Wallace 1991, 44 n. 43, and West 1992, 248.

482. They are accused of judging at random (ὡς ἔτυχεν; εἰκῇ), without clearly defined criteria.

483. At least not professional ones, as they do seem to play to a certain extent, cf. 23–26.

484. Notice that “μέλος” is used, not “ἁρμονία”—the actual tune is meant, not just a pattern.

485. As West 1992b, 20, to lines 21–22, explains, the diatonic genus “diverges still further from the enharmonic in the same direction as chromatic, so that if diatonic does not impair manliness, chromatic certainly will not.” Barker (GMW 1.184 n. 8) ponders the possibility that genus is not used in the strict sense as defined by later authors. About the change from *harmonia* to genus as the principal carrier of ethos see above n. 120.

He then goes on to point out the hypocrisy of his adversaries in that they criticize the professionals while their own performing is pathetically amateurish. Pretending to be situated in the science of harmonics, they are not able to articulate anything meaningful but instead, carried away (“ἐνθουσιῶντες”), reveal their ignorance by hammering the wrong rhythm on their wooden seats. This comment is typical for oratorical invective, meant to further discredit the *harmonikoi* in order to make their theory, about which the author (at least in the extant text) has rather little to say, appear still less believable. He accuses them of not being ashamed of deeming (ἀξιῶν) certain melodies to belong to Apollo and Dionysius respectively.⁴⁸⁶ Satyr dancing is mentioned at the end of the fragment, which, according to various conjectures, might have included also something about *mimēsis* or the *aulos*, but the text is too corrupt to draw further conclusions.

The author’s only substantial argument is that experience disproves that the ethos of people preferring a specific melodic type has been shaped by this type. We shall analyze the validity of this reasoning later together with those brought forth by Philodemus and Sextus Empiricus. Even though the fragment issues no direct statement about good or bad on the ethical level, the writer voices strong opinions on the aesthetic level while discarding the possibility of positive or negative musical influence on the character of human beings.

Philodemus⁴⁸⁷

From this Epicurean philosopher we preserve substantial parts from the fourth book of his work on music in which he gives an account of the doctrine on the

486. The text has “δάφνη” (“bay”), which stands for Apollo, “κίττος” (“ivy”), which stands for Dionysius; cf. West 1992b, 22, defending the ethical implications against interpreting the songs as mere visualizations; similar already Anderson 1966, 151, with some interesting further points at 277 n. 10.

487. Text: Kemke 1884; more recent editions of what used to be considered book one: Rispoli 1968 (with It. tr. and comm.); of book four: Neubecker 1986 (with Ger. tr. and comm.); of all: Delattre 2007 (with Fr. tr. and comm.). No English translation of this work exists as of yet (except for a few excerpts in Bychov/Sheppard 2010, 112–116). Delattre has revolutionized scholarship by demonstrating that all remaining fragments actually belong to the same book four (see clxiv–clxxxiii of his introduction).

Since Kemke used to be the standard point of reference until recently, I still reference according to his numbering and add Delattre’s with “D[number]” while indicating exact line numbers only for the latter edition (line numbers are mostly the same in what Kemke takes for book four). For discussion see also Wilkinson 1938 (a succinct treatment of the most important questions); Wille 1967, 432; Anderson 1966, 153–176; Halliwell 2002, 249–259 and 280–286.

usefulness of music as exposed by the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon (ca. 240–152 BC) and subsequently argues against them.⁴⁸⁸ Since Daniel Delattre's new critical edition has not yet been translated into English and none of the current anthologies on musical texts contain anything substantial from this author, I deemed it beneficial to present a general summary of the main traits of this seriously damaged and incomplete text as pieced together by Delattre from the Herculanean fragments (omitting most of the dubious sections) in order to address the question of the value of music in it.

We hear a philosopher who passionately lashes out against those who attempt to exalt the usefulness of music above philosophy (and other sciences).⁴⁸⁹ Often times, he contents himself with simple denials of his adversaries' affirmations, seasoned with polemics and ridicule;⁴⁹⁰ other times he contributes arguments of logic, *ad hominem*, or a *reductio ad absurdum*. Despite a general line of argumentative development, the text is full of repetitions and cross-references, making the reading at times somewhat tedious. The first main part of the preserved text consists in an extensive exposition of Diogenes' (and others') tenets, the second, following roughly the same order, reviews and refutes them. Many—but not all—of the points Diogenes puts forth remind of concepts already presented by other authors such as the Pythagoreans, Damon, Plato, and Aristotle.⁴⁹¹ We can only speculate concerning Diogenes' intentions, whether he simply wished to acclaim music for

488. I have not included Diogenes as a separate author since all we know about his music theory is transmitted through Philodemus. Neubecker 1956 contains a thorough comparison of both positions along with a critical evaluation and a schematic synopsis, still helpful despite Delattre's new edition, which has brought about changes on the level of details. See also more recently Barker 2001, who especially points at the closeness to [Arist.] *Pr.* 19.27 with regards to the concepts of ethos, *mimēsis*, and movement, and at the same time some distance to Aristoxenus who seems to lend himself to be used rather by Philodemus for his own cause—even though he is not always in agreement with Aristoxenus, cf. 3.76 D109.

489. The antithesis between both disciplines emerges at various places, but most explicitly in 4.33 D147.

490. One needs to be a bit cautious whether the representation of the ideas he proposes as to be rejected are correct, since he tends to push them to an extreme that obviously will appear exaggerated; as an example for this may serve that music supposedly increases a painter's accuracy (4.9 D 123, discussed in Anderson 1966, 167).

491. For a thorough comparison between what seems to emerge from Philodemus as the position of Diogenes and Philodemus himself with Plato and Aristotle see Anderson 1966, 154–176. We shall only highlight a few aspects that are of major interest in our pursuit. Important is Anderson's observation (ibid. 172–173 & 284 n. 53, confirming Neubecker 1956) that Diogenes maintained a theory of individualized musical ethos, as evidenced from 1.22 D36 ("not everyone will be moved in the same way by the same music", tr.

its manifold service or tried to defend it against people like Philodemus who protested against the privileged status that music seemed to enjoy in society, education, and even some currents of philosophy.

Diogenes of Babylon About the Usefulness of Music,
as Presented by Philodemus

Music serves pedagogically to establish a harmony between the different parts of the soul, like gymnastics does with the body (1.8 D8). Melody and rhythm correspond to modes with their own relation to passions (D9). Music serves for leisure (διαγωγή) (1.4 D12), the pursuit and safekeeping of virtue (ἀρετή) (1.5 D13), can stimulate through *mimēsis* to the exercise of specific virtues such as manliness (ἀνδρεία) and courage (θάρσος), moderation (σωφροσύνη), shame (αἰσχύνη), and order (κόσμος) (D14).⁴⁹² The joy and pleasure (χαίρω) music provides moves to good things (D16). All people enjoy rhythm and melody without need of instruction (1.7 D17). Music helps children to develop sensitivity (1.8 D 18). Damon is quoted for asserting that music brings forth virtues and pleasure⁴⁹³ in children who become more manly, moderate, and just.⁴⁹⁴ Music is universal and exerts its influence even before the age of reason (1.15 D25); beyond what gymnastics and painting have to offer for what is useful (χρησίμως), it aims at beauty *par excellence*—a strongly aesthetical category (1.16 D27). Within the context of a historical review, Diogenes says that laws prohibiting innovation have long been abandoned (1.18 D31) and revisits the lawgivers' considerations upon making musical harmony and rhythm useful (χρήσιμος) in education in order to live in a good or beautiful way ("καλῶς ζῆν") (1.12 D32) and train good habits (1.20 D33). Reflections follow about what is natural (innate) or acquired scientifically and subject to education,

Anderson), which will also be adopted by Aristides Quintilianus. This is a topic on which modern music therapy can shed more light.

492. Cf. similar 1.9 D 20, mentioning magnificence (τὰ μεγαλοπρεπή) (conjecture), moderation, manliness, cowardice (τὰ δειλά), lack of discipline (τὰ ἀκόλαστα), ugliness/evil (τὰ αἰσχρά), which music can strengthen, but under the condition that they are already pre-existent in the human person—this sounds more as if that limitation were placed by Philodemus himself and not by Diogenes. See also 1.13 D22 with the superlatives of "moderate" and "manly."

493. In this case, I find Kemke's and Rispoli's reading ("ἡδονάς" instead of "ἡ μουσικὴ") more convincing.

494. Cf. 3.77 (DK 37 B4) D22.7–15/D100.37–45. Both places quote virtues similar to those mentioned in *P Hib.* 1.13.14–15: manliness (ἀνδρεία), moderation (σωφροσύνη), and justice (δικαιοσύνη). See also above n. 143. Delattre restores the virtues in forms of comparatives, not nouns as Kemke has it.

and there is a difference between what causes pleasure (ἡδονή) or pain (λύπη) (1.21 D34), probably meaning that children are educated to “serious” virtue by the “trick” of a pleasurable means (cf. 1.11 D34.37–45). A melody can change the state of a soul into its opposite or increase or decrease its disposition (1.22 D36). Scenarios and negative experiences (apparently excesses: πολυπληθεία) in theater music are discussed (1.24 D37). Then he gives an account of the usages of music: worship, education of children (1.23 D38), love and marriage, war, gymnastics, and competitions (1.25 D39),⁴⁹⁵ choral and dramatic dances (1.26 D40), and work.⁴⁹⁶ Music has influence on both soul and body (1.27 D41); apparently in this context the famous story about the *aulos* changing the character of an adolescent is told (D42);⁴⁹⁷ then music’s positive and problematic role in human love is discussed, as employed by several musicians (Agathon, Democritus, and Timotheus are mentioned explicitly) (1.28 D43), and then its place in the symposia (1.29 D46), promoting friendship and benevolence and bringing about reconciliation (with reference to Terpander and Stesichorus) (1.30 D47). After this, he explains how different melodies are offered to honor various divinities, and that music is useful for the intelligence; he is referring here rather to the harmonic theory than to actual musical sound (1.31 D48).⁴⁹⁸ A section follows in which the position of Heraclides of Pontus (fourth century BC, Platonic school)⁴⁹⁹ about musical ethos is presented: melodies can be fitting or not (πρέπων/ἄπρεπής) to what is masculine (ἄρσιν) or soft/effeminate (μαλακός) or harmonizing (or not) with dramatic character action; the general utility of music for any area of life and or many virtues is re-emphasized as well as melody’s ability to calm people and animals down—particularly in

495. Delattre has here a reading significantly different from Rispoli who thinks that the first section (in Delattre: love and marriage) deals with general considerations about art.

496. (*Aulos*) music is able to inspire movement; the mythological “rock-moving,” with reference to Orpheus and, in Delattre’s reading, Amphion, is explained by the actual musical motivation of those who would move the rocks and other things; music makes work easier.

497. This refers to either Pythagoras or Damon, see above nn. 126 and 150.

498. Rispoli 1969, 231, and Delattre 2007, 77 n. 5, explain that this is something like “applied harmonic theory,” e.g. the mathematical deduction of specific intervals, something, which Plato (*Resp.* 531a) had classified as “useless,” but given the just previously mentioned divine worship I would not exclude the possibility that some sort of “higher harmonics” was sought for, which Plato later himself deems worth considering and useful (*Resp.* 531c)—but certainly for the sake of the good and beautiful (τὸ καλὸν/ἀγαθόν), not as a vehicle to become more intelligent. Regardless, in the present argument, intelligence seems to be achieved by means of the reasoning in mathematical speculation about music, not what nowadays is referred to as the “Mozart effect;” on the latter, see below ch. 4, n. 142.

499. The attribution of these points to him results from the later reference at D137 and is somewhat reflected in Ath. 624c–e.

(political) upheavals, discord, or disorder—whereby he quotes Archilochus that any mortal being is charmed by song (1.32 D49). A paraphrase from Plato follows (*Leg.* 669b–670a) about erroneous or unfitting ethical attributions of music within the context of *mimēsis*, including the problem of determining the ethos of music without text (1.1 D51.15–52.3).

Philodemus About the Uselessness of Music, Except for Pleasure

At this point, according to Delattre's reconstruction of the text, Philodemus begins his refutation of Diogenes' exposition.⁵⁰⁰ After some reflections about the role of music in the State (3.3 D56), negative effects of music are mentioned in the context of the cult of Dionysius and (according to Delattre's conjecture) Cybele: exaggeration in greatness, rushed tone and rhythm to the effect of disturbance, terror, and irrationality (3.6/2 D59.1–12). Then he begins to argue against the traditional evaluation of musical ethos, e.g. that in view of sweetness in voice,⁵⁰¹ tone, melody, and rhythm, what is relaxed (τὸ ἐκλελυμένον) should be considered vulgar (φορτικός), or that what is simple and not sweet should be thoughtful (σύννοος)—all of this he dismisses as an error of words or homonymy and confusion of terms (3.7–8, 22 D60–61).⁵⁰² Music does not instill moderation (σωφρονσύνη) or chastity because the virgin Muses are its patronesses—much more should then the art of weaving be associated with these virtues since the virgins Athena and Artemis are its patronesses (3.10 D63); the case of Agamemnon entrusting his wife to a poet⁵⁰³ does not prove that music makes a person more virtuous because he could just be a wiser man—music does not belong to the discourse about moderation and what is fitting and what not (3.11 D65). Several

500. The first section contains mostly the fragments of what Kemke had attributed to book three. Delattre's new arrangement is not in every case convincing, but I have refrained from the attempt of an alternative proposal. Afterwards follows what since Kemke had been called book four in unchanged sequence. The first part is much more fragmentary than the second.

501. Before this word Delattre reads (in D60.36) “διαβοία”, which does not seem to fit in the context.

502. According to Anderson 1966, 155–157, this is the argument with the most weight in the whole treatise: tracking the metaphorical (and then ethical) attribution from an originally technical description of musical forms (e.g. as “slack”). This explanation would have to be checked against others, such as the deduction of the *harmoniai* from ethnical characteristics.

503. Cf. Hom. *Od.* 3.266–268; cf. about the point Delattre 2007, 385 n. 3. The argument is dealt with also in Sext. *Emp. Mus.* 10 & 20 although his point is that the poet should have been able to correct (or perhaps first control) the passions of Clytemnestra, not so much the integrity of the poet, which is usually the way this passage is interpreted.

traditionally assumed functions of music are denied or played down: to induce Bacchic trance (3.12–13 D66–67), emotional arousal in war (except for signals and battle cries), assemblies, competitions, funerals, etc. (3.14–15 D68–69); some of Diogenes’ witnesses for his affirmations are dismantled for not proving what he wants them to prove (3.19, 16–17 D71–73). Philodemus discards claims that dance originates from the desire to exercise the body and good manners (3.20 D74), but holds instead that it stems from an instinctive excitement, driven by the visual beauty of rhythmic movement (3.21 D75). Musical compositions (*harmonia*, rhythms, etc.) are not arranged, as some claim, according to parts of the soul (stable, emotional-enthusiastic,⁵⁰⁴ moderate-serious) (3.23–24 D76–77.12). He rejects the analogy between music and soul on the one hand and gymnastics as beneficial for the body on the other, and he denies the idea that music moves (e.g. softens) the affections better than other things (3.25–27 D77.34–78.45). Music can cure neither the body nor the soul, even if it relieves some pain; it does not balance out (“harmonize”) or shape character traits (3.28–30, 36 D79–80)—thus he dismisses Theophrastus’ deliberation that music might bring about virtue or the opposite; also the theory that music incites intemperance (ἀκολασία) is declared to be without proof (3.35, 33 D81). His own thesis is that all music serves relaxation (ἄνεσις) and enjoyment (τέρψις), denying, then, that music is mimetic; he finds Theophrastus’ claim that music moves the soul contradictory (3.32, 37 D82).⁵⁰⁵ That exercise and food make the body healthy does not mean that music must make the soul virtuous (or the opposite); irrational things (music) cannot produce a rational moral disposition better than the art of cooking (3.39, 31 D83).⁵⁰⁶ If music leads to virtue, as philosophy does, then Philodemus, by being a philosopher, should also be a musician, which he is not (3.48–49 D84);⁵⁰⁷ music is not

504. Anderson 1966, 158, believes to detect here a school tradition different from Plato or Aristotle, according to which “rapture, ‘enthusiasm’ in its powerful original sense, regularly attends upon ethical habituation by means of the various types of character attributed to the modes.”

505. These sections are translated as Theophr. fr. 720 and 721a in Fortenbaugh 1992 2.574–577.

506. Halliwell 2002, 251 n. 37, notes a contrary opinion by another Epikurean, Lucretius, who refers to an effect on the mind: *haec [= querellae dulcis] animos ollis mulcebant*/these [sweet lament songs] sooth the minds for them” (5.1390)—ironically in the context of food, since Lucretius continues: “*atque iuvabant cum satiate cibi; nam tum sunt carmina cordi*/and they delighted with plenty of food; for then songs go to the heart.”

507. Anderson 1966, 155, thinks that Philodemus admits here, similar to Plato, that he is no expert on music. The context suggests, however, that this is less a humble recognition of a personal limitation than saying that it is not necessary for a philosopher to know music because it does not play a role in determining ethos.

the theoretical science about fitting or unfitting melodies—hence it is philosophy that educates through music (3.50 D85.1–16).⁵⁰⁸ Previously drawn restrictions on learning music are questioned (3.45–46, 38 D85.30–86). Music does not necessarily cause virtue (3.41–43 D87.29–88) and does not belong more to a serious context than to enjoyment. Philodemus rejects the idea that affections (τὰ πάθη) like manliness (ἀνδρεία) work on virtues like courage (θάρσος) and that *mimēsis* brings about virtue, and then music and *mimēsis* also cannot inflate affections or put them back in order—hence, musical *mimēsis*, contrary to other arts, is ineffective in the education of children; music serves no better than food and perfume for enjoyment (ἡδονή), love (φιλέω), and to rejoice (χαίρω) properly in what is good/beautiful—therefore, there is no need to teach children music, even less than other arts, for it does not change their affections (3.44, 51, 52, 59, 55, 53, 54. 58 D89–92); music does not lead to virtue by the natural enjoyment (τέρπειν) it provides (3.62 D94.29–44); rhythm and melody are not the means to making the impulse towards virtue stronger (3.63 D95.1–20). Then follows the refutation of the ability of *harmoniai* to produce trance, calm after divine ecstasy, or to chase away terrifying thoughts: divine submersion and text, not musical elements such as specific instruments, have these effects or lead out of such states—no irrational sound can change a terrible δόξα or mental illness (3.64–66, 57, 67 D95.29–97.45). Specific characteristics are attributed to musical patterns with no more reason than to food and drinks, which differ in nature (3.72, 68 D98). Philodemus then considers poetry as the first form of wisdom and poets as the first people of wisdom (3.73 D101.35–45). Returning to music, he mentions that the enharmonic (genus) is considered beautiful and amazing (3.74 D106); music does not beget progress in education and intelligence just because the poem is monotonous; it is a lie that music is useful for ethos (3.78 D107). Aristoxenus was wrong in saying that vision and hearing are the most divine senses; music prepares a child for courage, but does not incite it to courageous acts (3.76 D109); a child won’t accept and cherish beauty because it has been habituated to it by music;⁵⁰⁹ legislators about music act according to other interests, not because some melodies were harmful; understanding what is harmonious or not, or good rhythm, does not contribute to

508. This somewhat surprising statement (“τὴν φιλοσοφίαν διὰ μουσικῆς παιδεύειν”—Delattre’s heading (2007, 161: “*c’est bien la philosophie qui éduque, non la musique*”—is rather imprecise)—can hardly express properly Philodemus’ opinion as Anderson 1966, 175, supposes, unless it means that it is philosophy that educates for which music can be a vehicle—but elsewhere he even denies that music can make the effect of the text stronger (4.10 D124–1–28).

509. This is directed against Pl. *Resp.* 402d.

education, or to the virtuous life, any more than the understanding of spice or of what smells good (3.75 D112).⁵¹⁰

The rebuttal continues by asserting that no music engenders nobility (γενναιότης) and earnestness (σπουδή) (4.1B D15.8–12). Perception is non-rational and in all people the same, just as all agree whether something produces pleasure or the contrary (4.1B–2 D15.35–116.5).⁵¹¹ He continues: any further judgment differs according to opinion (δόξα) as can be seen by the diverging judgments about the enharmonic and chromatic genera.⁵¹² Some⁵¹³ would call the one august (σεμνός), noble (γενναῖος), simple (ἀπλός), and pure (καθαρός) and the other unmanly (ἄνανδρος), vulgar/coarse (φορτικός), and unfree (ἀνελεύθερος, meaning unfitting for free men), while others would call the first austere (αὐστηρός) and despotic (δεσποτικός) and the other tame/civilized (ἥμερος) and persuasive (πιθανός). In other words, the positive or negative connotations are imposed from outside and do not reside (πρόσειμι) by nature in the musical sound, be it genus (as explained), rhythm, or melodic composition (4.2 D 116.5–38).

Music, despite its many forms (πολυειδεστάτη), will never produce ethos (4.2 D116.38–44) or exact knowledge about perception.⁵¹⁴ No melody arouses (ἐγείρω) a soul from immobility and rest according to its (the melody's) natural ethical disposition,⁵¹⁵ nor does any melody soften (πραύνω) and settle down to quiet (εἰς ἡρεμίαν καθίστημι) a rushing soul, nor does it turn the soul away from an impulse towards another,⁵¹⁶ nor does it augment or lessen an existing

510. Here ends what used to be considered the fragments from books 1 and 3. The text following is less fragmentary and hence notably more continuous and consistent.

511. Philodemus does not further prove this thesis, which could be questioned easily.

512. Just like in the Hibeh fragment, not the *harmonia* but the genus is the primary matter of ethical attribution. See about this above n. 120.

513. Neubecker 1986, 128, attributes this position to the Stoics and rejects Rispoli's ascription of the opposing view to the Platonists without being able to provide an alternative; the concluding position, according to her, is the one of Philodemus himself, which is indeed the most convincing solution.

514. Also Plato rejects in *Resp.* 522a the concept of ἐπιστήμη for the discipline of music as taught to the guardians in the early stages of education.

515. D117.15: “κατὰ φύσιν ἐν ἡβῇ διάθεσιν.” Neubecker 1986, 129, believes that this expression refers to the soul, which is supposed to be brought back into its natural state; this does not convince because, according to the Pythagorean therapy, the soul can be in either state and in need of being changed, but this change occurs according to a melody that carries the desired ethos in its own nature.

516. D117.19–20: “ἂπ' ἄλλης ὁρμῆς ἐπ' ἄλλην ἀποστρέφειν.”

disposition.⁵¹⁷ Music is neither mimetic nor has it mimetic similarities to ethos (4.3 D117.26–27),⁵¹⁸ nor is it capable of displaying (ἐπιφαίνω)⁵¹⁹ *ēthē* such as being magnificent (μεγαλοπρεπής) or base (ταπεινός), manly (ἀνδρώδης) or unmanly (ἄνανδρος), well-ordered/moderate (κόσμιος) or rash (θρασύς). The claim that music can express these traits are reduced *ad absurdum* by saying that it can as much as cookery (4.3 D117.28–35).⁵²⁰

The discussion so far covers a range of slightly different points: music as possessing ethos, imitating ethos, expressing ethos, creating or changing ethos, all rejected. The only real argument has been the one about contradictory assertions regarding the ethos of tonal genus. Next, Philodemus undertakes a full scale attack against the supposed usefulness of music in different fields: first its role in religious worship where music fails to bring any advantage to the gods or to men unless in some simpler fashion, occasionally, and relegated only to a few Greek professionals—other (unnamed) practices have become much more prominent for worship (4.4–5 D118.2–119.12; cf. 1.23 D38). He observes a similar withdrawal of music's importance for panegyrics (only recited), weddings and funerals (only the text matters),⁵²¹ epithalamia (have almost disappeared), and the development of

517. D117.21–22: “τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν διάθεσιν εἰς αὔξησιν ἄγειν καὶ ἐλάττωσιν.” These rejected theses are presented already earlier (1.22 D36); cf. Neubecker 1986, 129 and Rispoli 1969, 163–166.

518. About the difficulty of understanding Diogenes' idea that music, not being mimetic, still possesses likenesses (ὁμοιότηται) of *ēthē*, showing without doubt all qualities of *ēthē*, see Anderson 1966, 164–165: how can “these likenesses... manifest ethical qualities without employing *mimēsis*”? I believe this would depend on how exactly musical *mimēsis* was thought to work. Philodemus might be attacking the idea of musical “representation” while not denying its expressivity (see the distinction made above on p. 213). About this argument see also Wilkinson 1938, 176, who suggests that Philodemus may have applied this word “to music, which was in the crudest sense imitative, such as Plato himself deprecated (*Laus* 669c).”

519. See the discussion of this term in Halliwell 2002, 256–257 (n. 52), who translates “cause to appear” and emphasizes the distinction between “mimetic” and this verb indicating an “epiphenomenal” level. I do not quite see the “weaker” type of argument in the second but believe that this passage simply mentions the two sides of the coin, which Halliwell calls earlier the “mimetic-cum-expressive” category (e.g. p. 239).

520. Anderson 1966, 282 n. 35, gathers older references for cookery (Ar. *Ach.* 1015; Pl. *Resp.* 332c; Arist. *Pol.* 1255b25–26; *Eth. Nic.* 1153a26), though none of these is an ironical comparison like here. Philodemus brings it up in similar ways quite frequently but it is certainly unwarranted and cannot claim argumentative force without further examination.

521. Anderson 1966, 163, assumes a contradiction in Philodemus when he speaks about intensified sorrow through threnodies—however, the author clearly states that he is talking about

love in general (neither music nor poetry fosters it) (4.5–6 D119.13–120.26). The only real contribution of music to competitions is enjoyment (“τέρπεσθαι”), and not even dance adds any beauty or nobility.⁵²² Against an alleged benefit towards nobility, moderation, and order, he suspects that music education could actually become very dangerous and engender intemperance and disorder in Bacchic rites (4.7 D121.11–22). If this argument is not meant ironically (which is quite possible), one would not see why Philodemus does not admit positive but only negative effects, thus jeopardizing his claim that music is without effect. He then attacks melody’s supposed natural ability to move to action⁵²³ since it cannot furnish the necessary intention (προαίρεσις) or the strength for manual labor (rowing, mowing, etc.) to which it simply adds pleasure and alleviates distraction—the same applies to the charm-stories mentioned earlier. Then Philodemus challenges the affirmation that melody can influence not only the soul but also the body: his question about what a song would add (συμβάλλω) to make a painter perform his art more accurately is keenly asked and penetrates the center of the whole issue of musical effectivity (4.8–9 D122–123).⁵²⁴ That melody renders poetry more august (σεμνότερος) may just be due to some delight for the ear, or it could be explained by the solemn context, or music could even be counterproductive to the text’s idea (4.10 D124.1–28). The appreciation of music by the ancients and the common people or its derivation from the Muses should not be an argument in favor of music’s usefulness (εὐχρηστία) valid for an educated person and less for a philosopher;⁵²⁵ what is profitable is the poetic text, which made music admirable; music on its own contributes only delight (τέρψις), amusement (ψυχαγωγία), and furniture (κατασκευή) for what really matters (4.11 D125). Music cannot improve

an effect of the text, which melody, according to him, cannot have; cf. Anderson’s comment on p. 170.

522. D121.7–8: “οὐδεμίαι πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ γενναῖον.” About ethos and dance in Philodemus, see Rispoli 2007.

523. D121.24–27: “φύσει τὸ μέλος ἔχειν τι κινητικὸν καὶ παραστατικὸν πρὸς τὰς πράξεις;” cf. already above 1.27 D41.17–28 including the next argument.

524. He does so on different levels: logic (one would rather first expect music to influence bodies than the soul), fact (the body is moved to sing; singing does not move the body), and the examples chosen (the one regarding the soul would fit better for the body and vice-versa).

525. Philodemus rejects justly the simple *argumentum ad verecundiam*; but he then commits a similar fallacy in claiming that the rejection by later times should overrule the acceptance in earlier times—for on what grounds would later times possess a better judgment? Time in itself is no argument either.

the mental state affected by wine, and Philodemus asks how it could instill virtue and educate young or adult people (4.12 D126).⁵²⁶

Philodemus moves on to deal with music and love. Reasonable speech or poetry is able to either correct or incite improper or harmful erotic behavior, while melody is only a quality (ποιότης) of the voice: it cannot be classified to fit different sorts of love, is unable to win over someone's love, or to provoke in men and women bad sexual acts or womanishness in blooming adolescents, or to console in unhappy love (the most it does is *distract* like alcohol or sexual pleasures, or worse: *incite* in a bad way) (4.13–15 D127–129). Turning to the symposia, Philodemus admits that music has a place there, but it is not even the best entertainment, especially since the participants are lay musicians; again, the texts and the better poets matter most, not music as such (4.16–17 D130–131); and while listening to music can provide enjoyment,⁵²⁷ melodies and rhythms do not foster amiability or friendship; Philodemus rejects similarly the stories about Thaletas, Terpander, Stesichorus, and Pindar and their musical peace-making because conflicts are caused by ideas, which melodies, like eating and being without reason (ἄλογος), cannot influence other than through some amusement (ψυχαγωγία) (4.18–20 D132.1–134.27). That the multitudes honor the gods through music is rejected since the gods despise the common people because they regard them as ignorant of proper worship, which is brought about through poems with melody only as an addition (πρόσθεσις); much less are particular melodies dedicated to each divinity (4.20–21 D134.28–135.23).⁵²⁸

Concerning the more philosophical aspects of training the intellect, music theory has nothing superior to other arts or sciences (4.21–22 D135.23–136.9); Philodemus dismisses that melodies or rhythms possess any (moral or aesthetic) value (καλός or αἰσχροός) or convey critical judgment—something proper rather to the philosophers (4.22 D136.10–27). An analogy of music with poetry regarding *mimēsis* is rejected and regarding invention declared insignificant; an analogy with

526. He says that adults count as educated if they learned music, but that's all. For an explanation of the somewhat difficult but interesting passage see Neubecker 1986, 147–148.

527. He actually vacillates between retracting this statement shortly after, attributing the effect of relaxing and cheering up to thoughts only (D132.16–19), and then again admitting the possibility for music as well (D132.24–25).

528. This last point does not mean that nobody ever assigned specific melodies to the gods (which would just be false, cf. ps.-Plut. *Mus.* 7.1133d about *nomoi* dedicated to the gods), but the idea is probably that none of these melodies would *intrinsically* be connected to a divinity.

linguistics (γραμματική)⁵²⁹ with regards to acting is admitted for shrewdness and understanding but again not more than in other disciplines; at any rate, music must not be considered philosophy (4.22–23 D136.27–137.27). Philodemus now resumes summarizing his (not preserved) rejection of Heraclides’ theory about the distinction between fitting (πρέπων) and unfitting (ἀπρεπής) melodies, masculine (ἄρρην) and soft/effeminate (μαλακός) ethos, suitable (ἁρμόζων) or incongruous (ἀνάρμοστος) actions and how music is useful for the disposition (διατιθέναι) towards all virtues. He refutes in particular that music could promote justice⁵³⁰ because of the rational nature of a cost-benefit judgment and because justice would befit a musician not more than another craftsman, and lastly because music is not by nature in agreement with or against law while following the laws of music has nothing to do with the State laws.⁵³¹ There is no need, then, to learn music for virtue, neither for few nor for all, which is proven by those who did not learn music for virtue—with Socrates⁵³² as an implicit witness (4.23–25 D137.27–139.31). Useful are thoughts, not melodies and rhythms, which might actually distract from the content of the words (4.26 D140.4–14).

The section which Delattre considers to be the conclusion of the work⁵³³ begins with Philodemus defending himself against adversaries who call him uneducated (ἄγροικος) by repeating that music alone (melodies, rhythms, types of instruments and *harmoniai*) cannot lead to virtue (“ἐπ’ ἀρετὴν προτρέπειν”)⁵³⁴ or move the passions (“τὰ κινητικὰ τῶν παθῶν”) because these elements are only a coating around what really matters, the text. He quotes Cleanthes⁵³⁵ saying that music (meters, melodies, rhythms) bestows on speech divine greatness (θεῖος μέγεθος) and a

529. Neubecker 1986, 171, assumes that the science about language (“*Sprachgestaltung, Sprachbau*”) is meant here, not the general Hellenistic concept of *Sprach- und Literaturwissenschaft*.

530. For a discussion of the different views of δικαιοσύνη between Stoics (for whom it is a teachable moral virtue) and Epicureans (who consider it more a sort of contract) and the implications for the relationship to education and hence to music, see Neubecker 1986, 177.

531. Philodemus’ reference to Plato in support seems unwarranted; to the contrary, Plato holds views strongly opposed to many of his arguments, and particularly this one; cf. Neubecker 1986, 177–178.

532. He learned music only in old age (cf. Pl. *Euthydemus* 272c; Quint. 1.10.12; Val. Max. 8.7.8).

533. It seems to me that there is no noticeable break here within a continuous flow of arguments; a formal conclusion comes only at the very end.

534. This is in line with Plato’s rejection of pure instrumental music based on the observation that it is hard to determine any ethos without text (*Leg.* 669e and paraphrased by Philodemus himself earlier).

535. Cleanthes of Assos (331–232), Stoic philosopher and Zeno’s successor. For this phrase, I follow Kemke and Neubecker against Delattre in considering it a quote from Cleanthes, which seems to me more convincing in view of the overall argument.

stronger incitement (παρόρμησις), and he then objects, like earlier, that one would have to say honestly that the effect is at the most equal for text and melody, but probably less with melody because of pleasure and distraction due to the greater and particular sounds, the unnatural diction, the context of the performance and other causes—any sung advice or consolation would just be ridiculous (4.26–28 D140.14.–142.45). The general uselessness of melody and rhythm independent of the degree of education or professionalism is confirmed; all usefulness comes from conceptual content (διάνοια) (4.29 D143).⁵³⁶

Philodemus now addresses the theory of the harmony of the spheres. He states that analogous proportions do not prove a real dependence (συγγένεια) on things, which otherwise do not have much to do with each other, and so the idea of relating virtue or character to these distances is untenable; there is no reason for music to get involved in astronomy for which it is not required (4.30–31 D144–145).⁵³⁷ Neither musicians nor listeners nor composers show the bad expressions that certain melodies allegedly provoke, and ethos changes⁵³⁸ through “mimetic” voice or rhythm are no more possible than through perceptions of smell and taste (that is, not at all) (4.32–33 D146–147.11). The claim that music is universally (παντελῶς)⁵³⁹ useful is rejected with the argument that other τέχναι respond to actual needs while music only provides enjoyment naturally (“τέρπειν... φυσικῶς”). Considerations follow (textually corrupt) about the utility of music education, including a reference to Damon; for Philodemus, the high esteem for music in Athens and all of Greece does not count since many bad things (κακά) receive

536. This last idea rests on Neubecker’s text reconstruction of lines 39–43; Delattre’s text, philologically perhaps more probable, gives a very different sense (confirming a definition of music as melody/rhythms alone, not “poetry” as a whole), which does not seem to fit well into the flow of ideas.

537. This is again at variance to Plato, cf. *Resp.* 530d: astronomy as counterpart (ἀντίστροφον) to harmony.

538. Whether the examples Philodemus gives here (see in the table below) possess positive or negative connotation is not fully clear. Neubecker 1986, 192–193, comments on the term “τὸ θυμοειδές,” ambivalent already in Plato (there it is a part of the soul); it seems that the “melting” (κατατήκω) of the “high spirit” is negative (for it affects also the σοφία), the softening towards compassion positive.

539. In the reading of Kemke and Neubecker (Delattre has “πᾶν γένος”). The meaning of this expression can be understood in different ways. Neubecker 1986, 194, assumes “complete” along with “for all people without distinction.” Philodemus’ adversaries will have in mind the wide spectrum of musical functions/applications that we have laid out earlier; that these functions mostly accompany other activities and enhance them on a predominantly psychological level makes it easy for Philodemus to proclaim the absence of usefulness in view of a particular practical necessity.

honor as well (without that examples are given), and philosophy, for not receiving prizes at competitions, would have to be depreciated. At any rate, the strong praise for music rests on what it accompanies (i.e. the text) (4.33–34 D147.11–148.22).

About the origin of music, Philodemus rejects the widespread tradition of the divine invention and transmission to humanity in favor of a simple human development.⁵⁴⁰ If it came from reason, the worst things (χείριστα) would stem from it; if it did come from the gods, so did all the other sciences—there is no reason to treat music in a special way. He refers to stories such as Athena’s hatred of the *aulos* and concludes: god is no musician. Consequently, music has nothing to do with piety, as gods do not rejoice in musical worship (which then would also justify human sacrifices of the barbarians)⁵⁴¹ and at the most enjoy it for the same reasons as humans do; similarly, there are no good reasons (poetic testimonies do not count) why the ancient heroes should have practiced music (4.34–36 D148.23–150.8). Musicians are by no means special people, and if a great person ever did perform, it was for enjoyment. According to Democritus,⁵⁴² music is more recent (than other sciences)⁵⁴³ and arose not from necessity but out of an already existing abundance;⁵⁴⁴ but even if music were old, this might actually mean that music was appreciated like other more primitive things (φαυλότατα) before people became more reasonable and focused on what is useful (4.36–37 D150.8–151.8).

540. This is similar to Lucretius’ explanation (5.1379–1391).

541. According to Delattre’s text restoration of D149.26 (“σφαγήν”), against Kemke/Neubecker who read “τιμήν;” see Delattre 2007, 313 n. 5. Christian criticism against the thought that gods could be moved, appeased, or awakened by music is also voiced in Arn. *Adv. nat.* 7.32. About Athena see ch. 3, n. 343.

542. This passage has been included as fragment in DK 68 B144.

543. Cf. similar Lucr. 5.334; 5.1379–1417 recounts the invention of music by imitating the birds within an already developed agricultural setting. The significance of Lucretius’ demythologizing explanation from an Epicurean perspective is elucidated by Buchheit 1984.

544. As Anderson 1966, 154 with 279 n. 19, points out, Democritus mentions music elsewhere (DK 68 B179), along with grammar and sport, as origin of virtue (ἀρετή) and (self-) respect/dignity (τὸ αἰδεῖσθαι; αἰδώς), hence, according to him, it is not quite as useless as Philodemus wants him to have it; Polybius (see above) offers an illustration to the contrary. Anderson (ibid.) refers to Pl. *Resp.* 373b where a bulk of musical professionals are considered dispensable for his State—but one would have to consider that they represent only one side of the matter; for Plato, the proper type and application of music has very much value as we have seen. In general we can observe that Philodemus uses his witnesses in a quite selective and tendentious way (see on this also Anderson 1966, 165–166). Democritus is quoted by Stobaeus along with Plato to have taught that εὐδαιμονία consists in εὐθυμία, εὖεστώ, ἁρμονία, συμμετρία, and ἀταραξία (DK 68 A 167).

To conclude, Philodemus belittles as meanspirited (μικρόψυχοι) those who, having nothing better to do, take up the toil of learning music instead of going to public performances; for the small pleasure it brings is not worth the effort and keeps people from greater things; in addition, our nature does not suffer music that lasts long. Any profit (περιουσία) or reputation (δόξα) from knowing music (theory) is surpassed by many other pursuits, including unprofitable toils, and is valid much more for competitors than for music theorists (ἁρμονικοί); musical contributions at symposia are not always appreciated; the exercise of learning music theory, hard to understand, keeps one from the way to happiness (μακαριότης) or contentment (εὐθυμία)—an Epicurean core virtue. He finishes with a justification for the length of his work, given the reputation of those who advance the ideas contested by him and the multitude of people who believe them (4.37–38 D151.8–152.42).

The Question Whether Music Has Value

This is not the place to review or comment on the whole discussion of the usefulness of music; what we can see in Philodemus is especially the arguments about why music might actually not be responsible for many or any positive or negative effects. In general, he does not accept the attribution of musical features to ethos, neither in a positive (fitting) nor in a negative (inconvenient, harmful) way—he points at contradictory assignments, suspects terminological equivocity, and marks a blatant lack of proof for the effectiveness of music towards such dispositions or actions. What others believe music is or does by its own nature is usually confused with the effect of the text (or context) to which musical sound is attached: as a philosopher, Philodemus is convinced of the strength (and moral value) of ideas, not of sensitive perceptions. Music is not more than an accident to text and can even be counterproductive and distracting from grasping the essential content. So rather than discriminating between specific types of music, Philodemus seems to suggest staying away from it altogether, at least in education. Furthermore, Philodemus denies any correspondence between (parts of) the soul and musical characteristics, or between music and the cosmos, thus obliterating the whole Pythagorean-Platonic system of world harmony on the grounds that there is no evidence for the interconnectedness between soul (or body), music, and the movement of the celestial bodies. He equally dismisses the ethical or affective function of *mimēsis*. The only effect Philodemus admits for music alone is that it provides enjoyment, delight, relaxation, or leisure and, for that may reduce some pain or make things easier. None of this would be reason enough, though, for a freeman to engage in any serious musical education or practice, which should be left to the professionals who alone will spare people the deplorable dilettantism as displayed by would-be

musicians at the symposia. There lies no political relevance in following musical laws—something that Damon and Plato were so concerned about.⁵⁴⁵

From today's perspective, the assessment of the influence of music on the human soul or psyche, be it temporary or lasting, will shed further light on the weight of his arguments and the origin of the commonly assumed relationship between music and ethos. Philodemus admits that his position goes against a majority, but his conviction of the superiority of philosophy gives him enough confidence to maintain his viewpoint. Notwithstanding the belligerent tone of his tirade against the promoters of music, the task remains to evaluate to what degree he is objectively right in separating music from ethos. Is all the talk about music moving the soul no more than confused projection, a fallacious transfer of causality from reason to sound? One serious objection against Philodemus' standpoint comes from psychological anthropology: human ethos, decisions, and actions do not solely depend on reason; he underestimates the importance of emotions and semi- or subrational dispositions and the influence of music upon them, as modern psychology confirms.⁵⁴⁶ Similarly, the relationship between music and intelligence or understanding is much more complex than the way Philodemus seems to see it; certainly, he has only the limited knowledge of his time, but he himself is also limited by the Epicurean materialistic approach to epistemology.

However, regardless of the debate about true or false assumptions concerning the general utility of music—here generally understood as the combination of melody and rhythm, but at times also the study of music theory—, we are able to distill from his text the following positive or negative effects that music could have, mostly according to the positions, which Philodemus rejects. A positive one would be the creating of harmony in the soul, the instilling of virtue and ethos (in particular: manliness, courage, moderation, order, magnificence, justice, nobility, earnestness, simplicity, purity), sensitivity (especially for beauty), critical judgment, and the enhancement of intelligence—all of which suggest the employment of music in education, with the additional advantage of its pleasantness, facilitating the acquisition of these positive characteristics. Further positive effects could be the following: physical or psychological healing, the change of one general state

545. Anderson 1966, 175–176, acknowledges Philodemus as a valuable pendant to Plato's exposition: "The sharpness of Philodemus' criticism points up what is irresponsible or incompletely developed in Plato's thought, even as the broader Platonic approach serves to reveal any narrowness on the part of Philodemus. Without the one we could not so well understand the other."

546. To some extent this deficiency is quite obvious: "He goes against all common sense when he denies that music can be erotically stimulating" (Anderson 1966, 170). See more on this in ch. 4.

of the soul into another (e.g. from excitement to calm and vice-versa) or strengthening an existing one, the promotion of friendship and the resolution of conflicts or love issues through creating calm, inspiring better artistic performance (e.g. in painting), adding solemnity, divine greatness, or incitement to text, honor to the gods and piety, and finally chastity. The negative effects of music would be the vices of unmanliness, vulgarity, cowardice, lack of discipline, intemperance, sexual stimulation, rashness, harshness, ugliness, Dionysian disturbance, terror, and irrationality, distraction from the text, and finally the failure of pursuing true happiness. Since Philodemus rejects the notion of musical value, we do not learn anything from him about how these effects, if they did exist against his own judgment, would come about. For this question we need to turn to other authors.

One last insight stems from another of his works:⁵⁴⁷ He says there that human beings possess “an innate affinity with music, one which does not need to be learned. This is shown by the way infants are lulled to sleep with wordless singing.” This statement supports his adversity toward music education but stands in some contrast to his general thesis of music’s uselessness.⁵⁴⁸

Sextus Empiricus⁵⁴⁹

In book six of his work *Adversus mathematicos*, the Skeptic (Pyrrhonist) philosopher and medical doctor from the end of the second century AD, Sextus Empiricus, takes on the musicians in order to challenge the teaching of music. Even though he never mentions his name, it is probable that he knows and draws from Philodemus who holds a very similar position.⁵⁵⁰ His exposition is much shorter, less polemical, and adds some points that do not appear in the text that remains

547. *De Poematis* 2.47, quoted from Anderson 1966, 173; cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1340b17–18 who speaks of our συγγένεια (kinship/familiarity) with harmonies (meaning melodies) and rhythms. The five books of this work of Philodemus are published separately in different editions; for a full bibliography (until 2006) see <http://www.herculaneum.ox.ac.uk/?q=books> (accessed on January 15, 2013).

548. A generally more balanced approach is taken by Aristoxenus as his remark in *Harm.* 31.17–32.9 seems to show, despite some exegetical difficulties, cf. Barker 2007, 251–259 and above the section on Aristoxenus.

549. Text and tr.: Bury 1961; Greaves 1986 (the probably best critical edition and footnote commentary, available but with reduced footnotes in Strunk 1998, 95–109). In the references I follow the numbering of Greaves, which differs from the Bury (Loeb) edition.

550. Neubecker 1986, 185–186 revises an earlier opinion of hers (1956, 83) and adopts on the basis of numerous literal similarities the position of dependence; similar the introduction to the translation in Strunk 1998, 94–95.

from Philodemus. I shall not analyze all of the work but only the aspects and sections related to our topic; at the same time, I shall assemble the main arguments and their refutation together even though for the most part they are presented in the text separately (arguments: 6–14; refutation: 15–27).

To begin with a general objection against the ethical impact of a specific *melos* on the soul: Sextus says that people only ascribe such an effect to music in their own opinion (“προσδοξάζεται”) and it is not by nature (“φύσει”); for the same tune may be arousing (διεργητικός) for horses but not for men in a theater, or it may also be disturbing (ταρακτικός) for horses (15).⁵⁵¹ This argument raises the key issue of whether musical ethos is subjective or (at least to some degree) universal—and here he claims that, if anything, it would be conventional, a product of the human mind but not intrinsic to music.

He quotes those who assert that music exerts “enchanting persuasions” (“μετὰ θελγούσης τινὸς πειθοῦς”) on the soul, which moderate human life and restrain the soul’s passion, just as philosophy does, along with the famous anecdotal example about Pythagoras (6–7).⁵⁵² Next he illustrates the alleged invigorating function of music in battle (Sparta; under Solon), of turning cowards to manliness, and the opposite of calming anger (Achilles) (8–9). He objects in a similar way as Philodemus that all music distracts the mind like a drug without actually changing anything, since the mind reverts to the previous state after the melody ceases (16), which seems to allow some space for at least a temporary effect. He continues that the Pythagoras example would attribute to a musician more power over ethos than to a philosopher—for Sextus certainly an untenable conclusion (17). He rejects the war examples and the relief from toil of work, previously not mentioned, without further proof as merely showing music’s distracting effect (18). Achilles’ eagerness for music, furthermore, finds explanation in that he was amorous (ἐρωτικός) and intempered (ἄκρατος) (19);⁵⁵³ with this, Sextus inverts the argument: it is not (certain) music that stimulates love or intemperance as Plato would have it (*Resp.* 411a–412b), but the possession of such vices attracts to such music—an argument made elsewhere (cf. the case of Paris, see p. 61). The reproachful behavior of Clytemnestra and, in Sextus’ reading, of Penelope⁵⁵⁴ should not have happened if

551. The sense of this could be that the same tune is for some horses exciting, for others disturbing, or it may have this contrary effect at different moments to the same horses. Plutarch mentions the effect on horses—see the table below.

552. See above nn. 126 and 150.

553. This interpretation of Achilles’ behavior, as Greaves (n. 67) well points out, goes quite counter-current—other authors use the example “as evidence that music is fitting for a man” (ps.-Plut. *Mus.* 39.1145d–40.1145f); quite opposite also AQ 2.10 74.14–18.

554. He says she invited the suitors in, “falsely luring and increasing their desires” (tr. Greaves).

the music these two women were exposed to had corrected their passions (20). We must note that this is not more than a straw man argument, as if the mere presence of a singing bard should be an insurance against any possible wrongdoing, or as against any fault that could serve as a proof against any possible (positive) effect of music.

Another argument, that a wise man (σοφός) resembles a musician, having a “harmonized” soul, and that for being learned one should know music, even if one does so only at old age like Socrates (11), is rejected because music is not necessary for εὐδαιμονία, as the trustworthy followers of Euripides show (21). In a way, this is an *argumentum ad verecundiam* (from authority) and says nothing about why music should not contribute to happiness. The point itself aims deeper, though, because Plato did see music in the context of the pursuit of happiness.⁵⁵⁵

A further point brought forth by the promoters of music is that the dignity (σεμνότης) of manly (ἑπανδρος) ancient music should not be discredited because of disreputable (ἐπίτριπτος) and effeminate (κατεαγώς) contemporary music, which weakens the mind⁵⁵⁶ through broken tunes (κεκλασμένος) and womanish rhythms (γυναικώδης) (12); Sextus does not bring forth counter-arguments against this. Then, in the context of the discussion of the usefulness of music for poetry, expressing joy, and worship, music is said to turn the mind towards good things and bring about consolation and relief for the grieving (13–14). Against the consoling effect he writes in paragraph 16 (see above), but since he has said earlier that poetry, dealing with the mind, is useless or even harmful,⁵⁵⁷ equally music, dealing with melody, is produced only to give delight (τέρπειν) (22).

Some more propositions about the usefulness of musical training are discussed, which Philodemus has dealt with in a similar way;⁵⁵⁸ then, Sextus dismisses the statement that music prepares the way (προοδοποιέω) for the soul towards wisdom and virtue by asserting that it rather goes against that (“ἀντιβαίνει”) by

555. Cf. *Leg.* 660e–661c, see above n. 208.

556. διάνοια; Greaves translates with “heart” as the “part of the mind that is moved by music and may be considered what might today be called the ‘feelings’ or the emotional part of the intellect” (see his n. 49), but I prefer a term that does not associate only with the emotional sphere since “ethos” reaches further than that.

557. E.g. *Math.* 1.296–298 (Loeb numbering).

558. Among them is this: one is able to enjoy musical performances better; Sextus objects: delight, at least for common people, comes more from resolved physical needs, and for enjoying music no knowledge is required as animals’ attraction to music proves, as well as that one does not need to know cookery for enjoying food; even though experts may grasp better the technicalities, they do not reap more pleasing passion—this last argument is certainly quite debatable (23–25).

leading young people to licentiousness and salaciousness, illustrated by a quote from Euripides' *Antiope* (fr. 187.3–6) (26). This is similar to what Sextus said earlier about Achilles but is still an astonishing turn since Sextus had previously denied that music can change somebody's ethos (16); it reveals a tendency, found in Philodemus as well,⁵⁵⁹ maybe induced by the hyperbolic tendency within classical oratory, concerning ethos to negate any positive effects of music but allow the possibility of negative ones, at the expense of logical consistency.

The argument that musical concepts are similar to those of philosophy is rejected as obviously false without further reason beyond what has been said about music's impossibility of promoting wisdom or virtue; finally: neither the harmoniously furnished cosmos nor harmony in music can provide happiness, concurring thus with what Philodemus had said (27).⁵⁶⁰

The remainder of his work is dedicated to deconstructing musical science to show, as Sextus believes, that there are no such things as sound (φωνή), note (φθόγγος), or rhythm, which all lack substance. Within that part, the only other segment of direct interest for us is when he relates, without further discussion, the concept of ethos within traditional musical theory (35–36).⁵⁶¹ All that he brings up here he considers void as it crumbles under his denial of substance in music; still, for us the examples he gives provide some helpful illustration. He parallels human and musical kinds of ethos; human ones are “σκυθρωπός” (“severe, sad”),⁵⁶² “στιβαρός” (“strong, stout, violent”)—characteristics of the ancient people (ἀρχαῖοι)—contrasted with those easily yielding to love passion (ἔρωρς), drunkenness (οἶνοφλυγία), lamentation (ὀδυρμός) and wailing (οἰωγή); respectively, some melody creates in the soul august (σεμνός)⁵⁶³ and refined (ἀστεῖος) movements, another more base (ταπεινότερος) and sordid (ἀγεννής) ones. Our attention is called to the fact that,

559. Cf. *Mus.* 4.7 D121.11–22 with footnote.

560. The falseness of this concept, according to Sextus, can be shown by manifold proofs, but he does not tell us which ones; he can hardly mean by “τὸ δε κατὰ ἀρμονίαν διοικεῖσθαι τὸν κόσμον ποικίλως δέικνυται ψεῦδος/it has been shown false often that the cosmos is ruled according to harmony” that the universe has no order whatsoever; he might mean that the order of the universe is not a musical one in the sense of the harmony of the spheres (rejected also by Aristotle; see n. 109), but he might also aim at what Philodemus said (4.30–31 D144–145) that no interdependence between that order and the soul (or ethos) can be demonstrated. In ps-Plutarch (*Mus.* 1.1131c), education, including music, had been considered the “essence of happiness” (“οὐσία εὐδαιμονίας, αἰτία εὐβουλίας”), and its religious practice is primary (προηγούμενον) for mankind (2.1131d).

561. He introduces ethos as a γένος μελωδίας, a “type of melody.”

562. Ath. 624d has this as a characteristic for the Dorian *harmonia*.

563. This ethos is only found again in Theon 55.17 and in Phld. *Mus.* 4.2 D116.

except perhaps for “base,” none of these terms is commonly used for describing musical ethos, but even the terms for human characteristics were not chosen from any standard collection—maybe Sextus intended to make the whole point sound unusual and obscure. However, he keenly observes the fact that the adscription of such qualifiers to melody is sort of a hypallage, which attributes the effect to the cause of the effect.⁵⁶⁴ He identifies these types, as do Philodemus and the author of the Hibe fragment, with the musical genera of chromatic, enharmonic, and diatonic, but not with *harmoniai* as earlier authors do. To the enharmonic genus he assigns the ethos of being austere (αὐστηρός) and fit to provide dignity (σεμνότης); the chromatic is shrill (λιγυρός) and like a dirge (θρηνώδης), and the diatonic somewhat harsh (ἔντραχυς) and clownish (ὑπάγροικος). There are further subdivisions between lax/soft/weak (μαλακός) and (in)tense (σύντονος) (36). The value of these *ēthē* is not fully clear; it seems that the first one (chromatic) is considered positive while the other two (even though λιγυρός often has among the poets a positive connotation, it is linked here with mourning), seem here to be considered rather negative and are listed as such in the table in the appendix.

In summary, Sextus Empiricus does not seem to discard the effect of music as apodictically as Philodemus, but he denies likewise its usefulness to the point of suggesting a perverting influence. Music does not influence ethos in soul or mind but at the most provides distraction; but if there is any ethical effect, contrary to the standardized assignments given by music theorists, it is rather subjective and changeable. Most of his counter-arguments suppose the reader’s consent in appeal to common sense or experience; they are hardly conclusive but still open up valid questions, such as the possibility of intrinsic musical value and the interface between music and human psyche, which should be responded to by those who would defend the usefulness and ethical relevance of music.

Conclusion

All three critical texts that we have seen in this section have in common that they react against an apparent inflation of a system that attempts to classify musical ethos and apply it to all possible life circumstances.⁵⁶⁵ For them, “bad” music can

564. He means to say “wailing melody” or something of that sort. An example Sextus gives: “pale fear” for “fear that makes (someone’s face) pale.”

565. Schäfer 1934, 162, suggests that this arose from Sophistic circles, provoked by “the attempt to hunt up and determine ethos in music hermeneutically in singular factors and elements”, which could easily fall into “dilettantism, playful fantasy or pedantic-schoolmasterly dogmatism,” all of which had grown out of “destructive tendencies” of musical censorship within the Platonic-Pythagorean tradition (id. 157) and the “increased psychological

only mean aesthetically not pleasing music since any other function of music is denied. In their outright rejection of musical value beyond pleasure they stand in strict opposition to the great majority of ancient music theorists (and we could safely say, of those of all times).⁵⁶⁶ Halliwell, comparing and contrasting especially Aristotle and Philodemus, concludes that

Aristotle builds a theory that attempts to keep touch with the phenomena of aesthetic experience in his culture, whereas Philodemus commits himself to explaining away these phenomena and thereby, I suggest, to losing a sense of the very things that make certain sounds into music for their hearers.⁵⁶⁷

Driven by philosophical presuppositions, these authors seem to fall short in doing justice to the common experience of the power of music while their own arguments for the most part are not conclusive.

Musical Effect and Ethos in the Latin Tradition

Not too many classical Latin authors have elaborated on music. Three names stand out: Cicero, Seneca, and Quintilian; Varro wrote extensively on music, but little of his work is preserved.⁵⁶⁸ Some of their contributions to the debate of musical decadence have already been mentioned at the beginning of the current chapter. Some later writers are added here who elaborate especially on Cicero's legacy and take particular interest in the concept of the "harmony of the spheres."

Cicero

Cicero's approach to music is somewhat ambivalent. On the one hand, he has the Epicurean Torquatus expound that studying music (and other such arts) are just keeping one from the *ars vivendi* to acquire *beata vita* (*Fin.* 1.21.72)—a position

hermeneutic of *Tonkunst* through the Stoics" (id. 163, all my tr.). Schäfer summarizes and comments on all three critical documents (157–173).

566. There are a few other witnesses, so the often quoted comment in Eur. *Med.* 190–203, see p. 58 n. 85) in which the healing power of music is questioned. The inclusion of Democritus to this tradition, as we have seen, is not unproblematic.

567. 2002, 30; his full analysis can be found in 1999 and 2002, 234–259.

568. For this section see Wille 1967, 431–459, and 410–420 for his reconstruction of Varro's works. All of the cited texts in Latin are accessible in digitalized format at the *Library of Latin Texts—Series A* at <http://apps.brepolis.net/BrepolisPortal/default.aspx> (accessed on November 22, 2015).

that reminds of Philodemus. Elsewhere even deafness is declared not to be a great loss, for not hearing a citharede would not be worse than not hearing a screeching saw or a squeaking of a pig being strangled; a happy life and enjoyment of literature does not at all depend on songs.⁵⁶⁹ This is, of course, Epicurus who is quoted and who at another place seems to admit “*voluptates quae auditu et cantibus percipiuntur*/the pleasures which are experienced through listening and songs; among the pleasures of the other senses;” the speaker objects that in order to console someone in grief, a book by Socrates or Plato would be much more appropriate than listening to a water organ, a psalter, or receiving other sensual distractions (*Tusc.* 3.18.41–43; cf. 3.19.46).

On the other hand, Cicero entertained friendly relationships with *histriones* and showed “expressions of admiration for their skill.”⁵⁷⁰ In his defense of the poet Archias, he does not eschew reference, even though it may only be rhetorical, to the voice’s power to move rocks and animals.⁵⁷¹ We find him calling to mind that the Greeks considered music an essential part of education and a condition for excelling in other fields, a thesis for which he enumerates various examples.⁵⁷² As far as his own position goes, he admits that musical rendering of text makes it more enjoyable or interesting (*De or.* 3.44.174) and oratory more efficient. Cicero is familiar with the Pythagorean custom to calm down minds by song and lyre after intense reflection.⁵⁷³ In an isolated comment, Cicero recognizes the power music has to stir up the mind vigorously.⁵⁷⁴ At some point, he deliberates that without moving and pleasing us (“*nisi naturam moveat ac delectet*”), art would not have gotten very far; he proposes as proof that sounds and rhythms excite and calm down, gratify or sadden, which is true in the first place for words and song, but also

569. *Tusc.* 5.40.116: “*Et si cantus eos forte delectant, primum cogitare debent, ante quam hi sint inventi, multos beate vixisse sapientes, deinde multo maiorem percipi posse legendis his quam audiendis voluptatem*/And if by chance songs delight them, they must first think, before they [the songs/music] were invented, many blessed wise men lived, and then that they were able to find much greater pleasure in reading than in hearing them.”

570. In Macrobian *Sat.* 3.14.11–12; cf. Kaster 2011, 102 n. 120 with references to Ciceronian speeches as evidence. Histrions were some sort of actor who also used to sing.

571. *Arch.* 8.19: “*Saxa atque solitudines voci respondent, bestiae saepe immanes cantu flectuntur atque consistunt; nos instituti rebus optimis non poetarum voce moveamur?*”

572. *Tusc.* 1.2.4: “*Summam eruditionem Graeci sitam censebant in nervorum vocumque cantibus (...). Ergo in Graecia musici floruerunt discebantque id omnes nec qui nesciebat satis excultus doctrina putabatur.*” I have omitted the examples.

573. *Tusc.* 4.2.3: “*mentes suas a cogitationum intentione cantu fidibusque ad tranquillitatem traducere.*” Cf. 5.39.113, which suggests the same practice.

574. *Div.* 1.36.80: “*saepe vocum gravitate et cantibus ut pellantur animi vehementius.*” See also below in n. 596.

for string and wind instruments. As a reason for this, he mentions that nothing is more akin to our minds than music.⁵⁷⁵

More extensively does he elaborate on music and ethos in *De legibus*⁵⁷⁶ where he recalls some of Pythagorean and Platonic statements on musical ethos, but with some noteworthy modification. First, he points out, for the legislation of *his* ideal State, string and wind instruments should thrive in the theaters under the condition of *moderatio*⁵⁷⁷ for the reason that “nothing can influence more easily the delicate and malleable minds of young people than the various sounds of singing,” both for the good and for the bad. He admits that it is difficult to describe this in words, but nevertheless continues describing in Pythagorean terms how music can invert the state of the mind (by arousing or tranquilizing)⁵⁷⁸ and then mentions the Platonic argument that, when Greek cities left aside the traditional styles, both

575. *De or.* 3.51.197: “*Nil est autem tam cognatum mentibus nostris quam numeri atque voces; quibus et excitamur et incendimur et lenimur et languescimus et ad hilaritatem et ad tristitiam saepe deducimur; quorum illa summa vis carminibus est aptior et cantibus, non neglecta, ut mihi videtur, a Numa rege doctissimo maioribusque nostris, ut epularum sollemnium fides ac tibiae Saliorumque versus indicant; maxime autem a Graecia vetere celebrata.*”/But nothing is that akin to our minds than rhythms and tones; by them we are enticed and aroused and calmed and made languid and often led to cheerfulness and to sadness; this their supreme power is more suitable to poems and songs, which was, as it seems to me, not ignored by the very learned King Numa and by our ancestors, as the lyres and pipes for solemn banquets and the verses of the Salii indicate; but it was most used by ancient Greece.”

576. Especially *Leg.* 2.15.38–39: “*Adsentior enim Platoni, nihil tam facile in animos teneros atque molles influere quam varios canendi sonos, quorum dici vix potest quanta sit vi sin utramque partem. Namque et incitat languentes et languefacit excitatos, et tum remittit animos, tum contrahit; civitatumque hoc multarum in Graecia interfuit, antiquom vocum conservari modum; quarum mores lapsi ad mollitias pariter sunt inmutaticum cantibus, aut hac dulcedine corruptelaque depravati, ut quidam putant, aut cum severitas eorum obalia vitia cecidisset, tum fuit in auribus animisque mutatis etiam huic mutationi locus.*”/For I agree with Plato that nothing flows that easily into tender and soft minds than diverse sounds of singing, of which it is hard to say how great the power is towards both sides [good and bad]. For it stirs the languid and makes languid those who are excited, and sometimes it relaxes the spirits, sometimes it tightens them; this would have been good for many cities in Greek, to conserve the style of the ancient songs; their morals decayed towards weakness together with the change of songs, either deformed by that sweetness and corruption [in music], as some believe, or after their severity had given way to other vices, there was then space in their changed ears and minds also to this kind of alteration.”

577. This norm matches an indication preserved in a fragment from *De re publica*: “*leniter atque placide fides, non vi et impetu, concuti debere*” (Cic. *Rep.* fr. 9 Mueller 1889; fr. 6 Keyes 1928).

578. The translation by Keyes: “now it restrains our desires, now gives them free rein” (for “*tum remittit animos, tum contrahit*”) does not reflect the concept of relaxing and tightening,

music and ethos (*"mores"*) became softened and perverted by sweetness and corruption. New in Cicero now is that he considers a converse possibility: that the previous *severitas* was obstructed by other vices so that the spirits and ears gave room for that new musical style.⁵⁷⁹ After quoting Plato's famous statement: "[*non*] *mutari posse musicas leges sine mutatione legum publicarum*,"⁵⁸⁰ Cicero expresses uncertainty about such great an influence of music, but then he states that the stilted modern way of singing and moving would have been punished severely in old Greece, for it could suddenly ruin the minds of all citizens with bad desires and ideas.⁵⁸¹ In other words, Cicero does not want to be as apodictic as Plato but has at least a bad feeling about the contemporary practices; he has no actual proof for the ethical impact of music but suspects it from the testimonies he has studied from the past. However, his ambivalence about cause and effect with regards to music and State affairs is an important contribution to the reflection about the value of music.⁵⁸²

which shares both the psychological and musical sphere and is common in the tradition of music psychology of the time.

579. *Leg.* 2.15.38–39: "*cum severitas eorum ob alia vitia cecidisset, tum fuit in auribus animisque mutatis etiam huic mutationi locus.*" Probably without direct dependence, this idea is already present in the discussed discourse of Dio Chrysostom.

580. The Latin phrase is ambiguous and would allow for causality in both directions; but as we have seen, Plato (*Resp.* 424c) had in mind only the case that a change in music brings about a change in the State. Cicero repeats the argument in *Leg.* 3.14.32 (this time paraphrasing Plato thus: "[*Plato*] *musicorum cantibus ait mutatis mutari civitatum status.*") and then clearly takes sides for the second option, and more specifically: that a nation's *mores* degenerate when the *principes* become perverted, wherefore the ruling class needs to be ordered by law to be a good example ("*specimen*," 3.13.30).

581. *Ibid.*: "*nunc fit ut eadem exululent, cum cervices oculosque partier cum modorum flexionibus torqueant. Graviter olim ista vindicabat vetus illa Graecia, longe providens quam sensim pernicies illapsa civium in animos malis studiis malisque doctrinis repente totas civitates everteret.*" Cicero's only example is the well-known story of cutting away extra strings from Timotheus' lyre in Sparta—an anticlimactic conclusion that neither illustrates "severe punishment," nor does it substantiate ("*siquidem*") the very nexus between a certain musical style and moral decay.

582. Mountford 1965, 202, thinks that "in this piece of vacillating urbanity there is no flicker of personal musical experience or conviction; and nowhere else, even in his philosophical works, does Cicero offer anything except conventional and second-hand references to music." I would agree that Cicero certainly did not have a particular interest in music, but this passage does show a certain familiarity with the topic of musical ethos. Few philosophers at the time who were not music theorists would have been more specific. One has also to keep in mind that Cicero must have expounded more on music in the lost sections of his *De re publica*; cf. GMW 2.465 n. 42.

Finally, Cicero's exposure to Platonic and Pythagorean doctrine has lead him to adopt the idea about the harmony of the spheres (this time positively a "*dulcis sonus*"!) of which he gives a detailed account in the famous *Somnium Scipionis* at the end of *De re publica* (6.18.18–19). He does not draw explicit conclusions upon possible connections between cosmic and human (or musical) harmony, but he states that the practice of music derives from representing this spheric harmony to which men had later become deaf, and that therefore songs and string instruments form a way to connect back or return to the heavens just as much as others through *divina studia*.⁵⁸³ The concept of (real) musical harmony does serve him, however, as an example for uniting disparate elements (rhythm, tones, and modes) into one: this is how the different arts should be seen together.⁵⁸⁴ The same image facilitates a simile for the harmonious concord of different classes and groups within the State under the rule of justice⁵⁸⁵ or for the soul in its harmonizing function with regard to the body, an image attributed to Aristoxenus.⁵⁸⁶

In summary: while Cicero does not enter much into the discussion of what music is good or bad, he goes beyond the Epicurean tenet that the value of music

583. "*quod docti homines nervis imitati atque cantibus apauerunt sibi reditum in hunc locum.*"

584. *De or.* 1.42.187: "*Omnia fere, quae sunt conclusa nunc artibus, dispersa et dissipata quondam fuerunt; ut in musicis numeri et voces et modi.*" This has become a literary topos, which we shall find in many other authors as well with different applications. The tradition goes back as far as Heraclitus (DK 10.1.153.11); cf. Apul. *De mundo* 21.336 ("*Sic totius mundi substantiam, initiorum inter se inparium conventu[s], pari nec discordante consensu, natura veluti musicam temperavit*")/So has nature, just as music, tempered the substance of the whole world by an agreement of things, unequal among themselves in the beginnings, in an equal and not discordant consensus").

585. "*Ut enim in fidibus aut tibiis atque ut in cantu ipso ac vocibus concentus est quidam tenendus ex distinctis sonis, quem inmutatum aut discrepantem aures eruditae ferre non possunt, isque concentus ex dissimillarum vocum moderatione concors tamen efficitur et congruens, sic ex summis et infimis et mediis interiectis ordinibus ut sonis moderata ratione civitas consensu dissimillorum concinit; et quae harmonia a musicis dicitur in cantu, ea est in civitate concordia, artificiosum atque optimum omni in re publica vinculum incolumitatis, eaque sine iustitia nullo pacto esse potest*"/For as with lyres or pipes and also as in the chant itself and in voices there should be some concord between the various sounds, which for experienced ears cannot be brought to change or disagreement, and yet this concord is rendered united and fitting by the arrangement of very diverse sounds, thus the state sounds together in a concord of very different members out of highest and lowest and inserted medium classes as in a structure moderated by sounds; and that which musicians call harmony in song, that is concord in the state, the firmest and best bond of security in any political unit and which without that justice by no means can stand" (*Rep.* 2.42.69, completed from August. *De civ. D.* 2.21.1). The idea of justice as ruling the whole is also found in Ptolemy 97.27–33.

586. *Tusc.* 1.10.19–20, for the discussion, see above n. 112.

consists only in pleasure. He appreciates music in its therapeutic function as handed down by the Pythagoreans and lends general support to the Platonic idea of educating young people through music's reflecting a proper ("serious-severe-manly") ethos. He does not fully subscribe to Plato's theory of State corruption through corrupt music but sees the latter as a possible expression of moral decline. Corrupt music bears the characteristics of sweetness, softness, and exaggerated body movements, whereas good music transmits *severitas* and *moderatio*. Lastly, human music derives from the cosmic one and contains a path back to its divine origin.

Seneca

The Younger Seneca makes a few remarks that relate to the general concept of harmony. In one of his letters, he explains how to acquire, sift, and fuse elements of knowledge properly into one, "*in unum conspirata*": as an image for this serves the multitude of voices in a choir where the individual ones are hidden and the whole shines forth; and this even more so in the great musical performances of his day where there are at times more singers and instrumentalists than listeners: from all this multitude of diverse musicians, one concord is formed.⁵⁸⁷

As he is suggesting means to overcome anger, Seneca calls upon the theory of Pythagoras regarding the capacity of music to infer certain states of mind: the lyre settles perturbed minds, trumpets work as incentives (*concitamenta*), and certain songs as "smootheners" (*blandimenta*) by which the mind is relaxed.⁵⁸⁸ Earlier in the same work, he mentions that certain song and a swift tune rouse, as well as the martial sound of trumpets.⁵⁸⁹

In a last passage (*Ep.* 87.12–14), Seneca uses music to prove the thesis: "*Quod bonum est, bonos facit*/What is good, makes good [people]" by saying: "*Nam et in arte musica quod bonum est, facit musicum*/For also in the musical art that which is good, makes the musician."⁵⁹⁰ This stands in contrast to random (*fortuita*), which

587. *Ep.* 84.9–10: "*Unus tamen ex omnibus redditur (...). Singulorum illic latent voces, omnium apparent (...), fit concentus ex dissonis.*" This passage makes one wonder whether it is not an indication for some sort of polyphony; it is hard to imagine such an apparatus for unison performance, and the image would not be very striking either. Cf. *Dial.* 6.18.4 (*De consolatione ad Marciam*): "*concentu dissono,*" produced by the animals and birds of the forest. See also Hor. *Epist.* 1.12.19: "*quid velit et possit rerum concordia discors.*"

588. *Dial.* 3.9.2 (*De ira*): "*Pythagoras perturbationes animi lyra componebat; quis autem ignorat lituos et tubas concitamenta esse, sicut quosdam cantus blandimenta, quibus mens resolvatur?*"

589. *Dial.* 3.2.4 (*De ira*): "*Cantus nos nonnumquam et citata modulatio instigat Martiusque ille tubarum.*"

590. This phrasing shows that for Seneca a bad musician simply is no musician.

produces no good. A small virtual skirmish with the Peripatetics leads to the clarification that a good instrument is not sufficient to make a musician, but that the art itself, or rather the ability to exercise the art (*uti arte*), is necessary.⁵⁹¹ These reflections obviously refer to the artistic qualities, talent, dominion of the art and its rules, and not to ethos; good music here means simply the perfection or aesthetic fullness that a musician is expected to bring forth from his art.

Therefore, apart from the usual Pythagorean abilities of music to provoke a specific ethos in the soul, Seneca values music as a metaphor for the unity of diverse components and demands from the musician that he realize what is good in his art in order to be truly what he claims to be.

Quintilian⁵⁹²

Quintilian, Roman schoolmaster and rhetorician, writes from the educator's perspective and explains the need and reasons for learning other disciplines previous to oratory. The "perfect orator" should have an understanding of music beyond the common pleasure for the ears (1.10.4), for music deserves veneration,⁵⁹³ is united to poetry and philosophy and thus to the knowledge of even divine things (1.10.9–10); it is based on the ratios on which the universe has been formed;⁵⁹⁴ many prominent figures played instruments, the stirring effect of which plays an important role in battles (the more vigorous, the more glorious the victory),⁵⁹⁵ also labor like rowing

591. Cf. Pl. *Phd.* 85e–86d: the argument is brought forth (and debated) that harmony does not perish with the material of the lyre for being invisible and incorporeal.

592. Text and tr.: Russell 2011; presentation of the pertinent texts in Wille 1967, 449–456.

593. Here Quintilian mentions Orpheus and Linus, for the former of whom he recalls the magical wonders of charming animals, rocks, and trees.

594. 1.10.12: "*mundum ipsum ratione esse compositum, quam postea sit lyra imitata, nec illa modo contenti dissimilium concordia, quam vocant ἀρμονίαν, sonum quoque iis motibus dederint*" [Pythagoras and his followers taught] that the universe itself is arranged according to a principle that was later imitated by the lyre, and not content only with that concord of dissimilar things, which they call harmony, they gave [= attributed] also sound to these [celestial] movements." It is clear how Platonic and Ciceronian concepts are blended together, even Seneca's antithetic formula about harmony.

595. 1.10.14: "*quorum concentus quanto est vehementior, tantum Romana in bellis gloria ceteris praestat.*" But the Romans were not the only ones excelling in war songs, as Tacitus tells when he describes the stimulating effect of Germanic war songs in *Germ.* 3.1 (Wille 574 n. 196): "[*Hercule*m] *primumque omnium virorum fortium ituri in proelia canunt. Sunt illis haec quoque carmina quorum relatu, quem baritum vocant, accendunt animos futuraeque pugnae fortunam ipso cantu augurantur; terrent enim trepidantque, prout sonuit acies, nec tam vocis ille quam virtutis concentus videtur. Adfectatur praecipue asperitas soni et fractum murmur, obiectis*

is eased. Quintilian then shows the long tradition of music education since early Roman times and then discusses the advantages for an orator to be trained in it: the dominion (*“aptus quidam modus”*) of voice and gesture in order to give a plea the necessary emotional support,⁵⁹⁶ since even musical instruments are capable of stirring up various affections that cannot be expressed in words. Above (p. 197) we already quoted Quintilian’s rejection of modern-style music; what interests him really is the type which is able to move or calm affections and for which he relates the familiar story of Pythagoras (just here he “tames” a whole group of young people) and mentions Chrysippus’ cheer-ups for infants (1.10.32). Another story goes that a piper, playing in the Phrygian mode, drove a person mad who was sacrificing and then killed himself; for having caused this, the piper was put to trial (1.10.33)—certainly an indication that this mode was still considered somewhat dangerous.

In another context he addresses further the question of musical ethos, seeing it as part of our nature (*“natura ducimur ad modos”* 9.4.10).⁵⁹⁷ how could instruments without words otherwise induce the listener to different emotional

ad os scutis, quo plenior et gravior vox repercussu intumescat./When they are about to march into battle, they sing of Hercules as the first of all strong men. They also have such songs by whose utterance, which they call “baritus,” they kindle the minds and foretell the fortune of the coming battle in the very song; for they terrify or tremble, just as the army resounds, and it seems to be not so much an accord of voice but of strength. They foremost aim at roughness of sound and a broken roar, with the shields stuck at the mouth, so that the voice by the reverberation swell up fuller and deeper.” Wille 1967, 575 notes the alliterations in this passage and surmises that Tacitus is imitating formal patterns of Germanic song texts; this seems to me far-fetched—it might just be onomatopoeic useage for the overall sound. Interesting is their technique to increase reverberation, using the shields as resonance chambers.

596. This is exemplified: *“intentio vocis, remissio, flexus pertinent ad movendos audientium adfectus/* the tightening, relaxation, and bending of the voice belong to moving the emotions of the listeners” in order to elicit *concitatio* or *miser cordia*. He continues: *“cum etiam organis, quibus sermo exprimi non potest, adfici animos in diversum habitum sentiamus/we* experience that also with [musical] instruments, by which speech cannot be expressed, the minds can be moved towards a different state” (1.10.25). A bit further on we hear the example of Gaius Gracchus who had a musician help him during his speeches to hit the proper pitches (1.10.27–28; also in Gell. 1.11); Cic. *De or.* 3.60.225 mentions the *fistula* player for the purpose of calming or arousing Gracchus with a note—this seems to be a different interpretation of the same practice, and even though older, not the more probable one, because a single note/sound (*sonus*) seems not to be sufficient to elicit a significant emotional effect, especially if different notes should have a quite opposite one; unless the musician and the speaker had agreed on some musical “code” or signal where a high note, for instance, would indicate that the speaker should get more excited, and a lower one that he should calm down.

597. Cf. Wille 1967, 459 and 467.

states (*motus*)?⁵⁹⁸ Battle and entreaty, advance and retreat, each require their own modes. Again the Pythagorean practice of disposing the mind with the lyre in the morning and in the evening is mentioned as a *tacita vis* inherent in rhythms and melody styles (9.4.12–13). In all of this, Quintilian distinguishes the aspect of pleasure and the—intentionally controllable and usable—effect of moving the spirit or soul.⁵⁹⁹

For the formation of orators, Quintilian takes recourse to the similarity of speech and song, describing the ethos of spoken modulation in the same terms that are usually applied to music.⁶⁰⁰ Thus rhetoric borrows from music the arguments for the formal qualities in order to provoke excitement or compassion through melody, rhythm, and movements. It would lead us too far astray to analyze this rich arsenal of sonic expressivity as developed by Quintilian since it treats music only as a point of comparison and support for text.

598. "(...) *ut illi quoque organorum soni, quanquam verba non exprimunt, ut alios tamen atque alios motus ducerent auditorem. In certaminibus sacris non eadem ratione concitant animos ac remittunt, non eosdem modos adhibent, cum bellicum est canendum et cum posito genu supplicandum est; nec idem signorum concentus est procedente ad proelium exercitu, idem receptui carmen.*" [that also these sounds of [musical] instruments, although they do not express words, still lead the listener into ever different movements [of the soul, = emotions]. In sacred contests they stir up and relax the minds not with the same principle, do not apply the same methods when something warlike should be sung or when with bended knee one has to supplicate; nor is the tune of a [war] signal for the army moving forth to battle the same as the melody for a retreat" (9.4.10–11).

599. 9.4.9: "*non ad delectationem modo sed at motum quoque animorum.*" The strife for mere pleasure is criticized in 11.3.60: "*Et sunt quidam qui secundum alia vitae vitia etiam hac ubique audiendi quod aures mulceat voluptate ducantur!*" And there are some who, according to other vices of life, are guided by that pleasure of hearing everywhere what charms the ears." Again, Mountford 1965, 203, finds only "commonplace second-hand stuff" in these reflections, overlooking the importance that Quintilian gives to the element of music in the whole development of oratorical technique, but also in terms of character formation. Not being a musician himself, we should not expect from him any novelties on the topic, but we do find appreciation for it.

600. 1.10.24: "*namque et voce et modulatione grandia elate, iucunda dulciter, moderata leniter canit totaque arte consensit cum eorum, quae dicuntur, adfectibus.*" See also e.g. 11.3.61–65 where the relationship between various emotions is discussed and the voice as intermediary in order to express them. Wille 1967, 467–489 dedicates a long section to the musical element within the rhethorical delivery.

Censorinus

The only surviving work of Censorinus, a Roman grammarian from the third century AD, is *De die natali*.⁶⁰¹ It is a book about birthdays and, at the same time, an excuse for some academic showmanship. After discussing the Pythagorean idea that the human embryo develops differently according to the amount of weeks of pregnancy, in sections 10–13 he addresses the influence of music on the birth of a person; but before he gets to this, he undertakes an abbreviated general treatise on music: a definition of music; the explanation of tone and intervals; the difference between random sound and concordant harmony (which is achieved only by certain intervals that, combined, produce a soft consonant sound);⁶⁰² and the legendary discovery of the basic intervals by Pythagoras. He then parallels the stages of embryonic development in their proportions to harmonic interval ratios, engaging in a lot of number speculation.⁶⁰³

The influence of music on the birthday is underscored by showing music's power in general: it is divine and can move the souls,⁶⁰⁴ is pleasing to the gods (evident from theater plays to appease them, sacred tibia, triumph music for Mars, and musical attributes for divinities, festivals, etc.), reveals the divine nature of the human mind through song, lightens labor, and dispels fear in war; Pythagoras imbued himself with divinity through cithara and song before and after sleep; the doctor Asclepiades knew how to heal mentally ill people with *symphonia*, while his colleague Herophilus claims that the blood pulsates with musical rhythm—so if there is *harmonia* in both *corpus* and *animus*, music cannot be foreign to the birthday. Lastly, Censorinus refers to the Pythagorean idea that the whole universe is made up by musical ratios, especially the seven planets which regulate the births of

601. Text: Hultsch 1867 (digitalized in the TML at http://www.chmtl.indiana.edu/tml/3rd-5th/CENDIE_TEXT.html, accessed on November 22, 2015); Cholodniak 1889; Sallmann 1983; text and Ger. tr.: Brodersen 2012 (I was not able to consult this volume); Eng. tr.: Maude 1900, Parker 2007, 17–27; comm.: Richter 1965 (for section 10, including a detailed analysis of sources and influence of the whole section on music); Wille 1967, 594–598; Mathiesen 1999, 614–616.

602. 10.6: “*Est autem symphonia duarum vocum disparium inter se iunctarum dulcis concentus.*” Notice that the idea seems to be simultaneous sound. About the significance of the merely psychological definition of consonance, see Richter 1965, 94–98.

603. E.g.: The two types of pregnancy length are based on the numbers 6 and 7 respectively; this number, multiplied by 35 (which is the sum of fourth, fifth, and octave in a particular measurement) gives the day of birth.

604. 12.1: “*certe multum obtinet divinitatis et animis permovendis plurimum valet.*” For the following examples, Parker 2007, 81, in his notes provides multiple references to other authors.

humans, which leads him to speak of the harmony of the spheres in a way similar to Cicero;⁶⁰⁵ ultimately, the whole universe is harmonic and an “instrument of God.”⁶⁰⁶

Censorinus does not enter into a discussion of good vs. bad music, but he discusses a number of positive functions that music fulfills. Most of these are known from earlier authors, but here they are integrated into a universal system ruled directly by musical harmony.

Aphthonius

Marius Victorinus preserves in his *Ars grammatica* a work called *De arte metrica*⁶⁰⁷ by an author from about a century earlier, Aphthonius (or possibly Asmonius). Towards the end (158–160), the author defends the position of a natural origin of music (here understood in a wider sense, including poetry), given as a special gift to human beings together with the light of life and the sense, then perfected and transmitted through art. The natural impulse for music leads us, like a teacher, to the correspondence between the mental movement, the (melodic) “modulations,” and the bodily gestures (dance).⁶⁰⁸ Nature precedes art, in language, rhythm, and melody. Here Aphthonius agrees explicitly with Theophrastus who, as we have seen, considers the emotions (πάθη) and strong impulses to be the cause

605. 13.1: “(...) sonitusque varios reddere pro sua quaeque altitudine ita concordēs, ut dulcissimam quidem concinant melodiam, sed nobis inaudibilem propter vocis magnitudinem, quam capere aurium nostrarum angustiae non possint/and they provide various sounds each according to their distance, being harmonious in such a way that they sound together a certainly very sweet melody, but inaudible to us because of the greatness of the sound which the constrictions of our ears cannot catch.”

606. 13.5: “(...) hunc omnem mundum enarmonion esse ostendit; quare Dorylaeus scripsit esse mundum organum dei.” That the universe is ruled by music is implicit by another comment about the wedding numbers in Apul. *De dog. Plat.* 2.25: “Ad hoc ipsorum conubiorum quaeritur tempestiva coniunctio, cuius futuram stabilem fidem credit, si cum harmonia musicae dierum consonent numeri/For this, the timely joining of the very spouses is sought, the faith of which [Plato] believes will be stable, if with the harmony of music the numbers of days are consonant.”

607. Text: Keil 1874, 31–173; digitalized as part of the *Corpus Grammaticorum Latinorum*: [http://kaali.linguist.jussieu.fr/CGL/text.jsp?topic=de arte metrica \(cum poemate, compositione, structura, musica\)&ref=6,70,11–173,18](http://kaali.linguist.jussieu.fr/CGL/text.jsp?topic=de%20arte%20metrica%20(cum%20poemate%20compositione%20structura%20musica)&ref=6,70,11-173,18), accessed on April 4, 2013; discussion: Wille 1967, 601–603; for the name of the author see OCD 121. As far as I can see, no modern language translation of this text exists.

608. 159.2–5: “denique ad modulanda eadem sensu quodam animique motu instruente nos velut magistro ducimur gestusque etiam corporis imagini modulationis congruos incitati adfectibus commodamus.”

for the production of music, especially the songs within tragic drama.⁶⁰⁹ Following these affections helps the musician to be more successful, for if they are combined with musical instinct, they achieve a greater power. Aphthonius presents as a proof the tragic singers whose chant does not sound mortal and hence are called “*vates*,” divinely inspired prophet-poets, with the help of wine.⁶¹⁰ Feeling pleasure and relaxation renders the musical work more spirited and disposes one to sing in the first place. While wrath is an impediment for our senses, keenness and ease are added by the heat of love, which is able to convert even an ignorant person into an artist.

This passage confirms natural talent as the foundation and pleasure and emotion as incentive for music, which serves as their expression. It also sanctions the genius of divine frenzy as an important source of artistic inspiration. Thus the author seems to be the furthest away from considering musical functions and the closest to a merely aesthetic approach which, in addition, is devoid of any ethical or cosmological speculations.

Calcidius

The Christian writer Calcidius provides the translation of a part of Plato’s *Timaeus* (17a–53c) and adds an extensive commentary⁶¹¹ that is inspired widely by Pythagorean principles.⁶¹² The following ideas from this author are of interest for us: he mentions the harmony of the spheres as a consonance of intervals produced by the speed of planetary movement (73);⁶¹³ he also refers to Plato’s myth of the Sirens,

609. The following account of the three affective sources for music has already been quoted, see n. 414.

610. He calls at witness Pl. *Phdr.* 245a where is said that the Muses cause songs and poetry through “κατοκωχή τε καὶ μανία” (possession and madness), and that without madness nobody can be an adequate (ικανός) artist but remains unaccomplished (ἀτελής). The idea of wine as *incentivum* stems also from Plato (*Leg.* 665e–666c, cf. above n. 193), but Aphthonius quotes directly Hor. *Carm.* 3.21.11.

611. Text: Wrobel 1876 (digitalized in the TML at http://www.chmtl.indiana.edu/tml/3rd-5th/CHALTIM_TEXT.html, accessed on November 22, 2015). No translation into a modern language seems to exist. Discussion: Switalski 1902 (a study of the sources, considering the text rather a translation from a Greek scholar of the second century AD); Wille 1967, 599–601; Mathiesen 1999, 616–617.

612. He deviates from them in some points, such as considering geometry more fundamental for education than harmonics (32, to Pl. *Ti.* 35b).

613. “*Pythagoreum dogma est ratione harmonica constare mundum caelestiaque distantia congruis et consonis sibi invicem intervallis inpetu nimio et velocitate raptatus edere sonos musicos.*”

sitting on planetary circles, and their beautiful song (95).⁶¹⁴ The World Soul is “tuned” by the creator according to harmonic principles (40), and the nature of the soul in general corresponds to rhythmical and melodical principles (50).⁶¹⁵ Commenting on Pl. *Ti.* 47d (at 267), music is pronounced the remedy against the inharmonious (*inmodulatus*) state that the souls have entered into because of their union with the body. However, Calcidius is now more explicit than Plato about the type of music that should be applied for this therapy: “not the one which pleases the crowds and which, made for pleasure, excites sometimes to vices, but the one which may never be separate from reason and intellect;” melody (*modulatio*) lends to reason the strength to rule, and thus restores the “best symphony,” which is the virtue of justice, from which all other virtues come. Thus “music embellishes the soul according to reason, calling it back to its original nature and rendering it the way God the creator had made her at the beginning.”⁶¹⁶

Calcidius may think of that “divine music according to reason” in terms of harmonic theory, but this would not explain the *vigor* that this music should provide and the *modulatio*, which does not occur in the study of musical ratios; in addition, none of the previous authors seem to have thought of “good” music with healing effect but without sound. If this rationale is correct, Calcidius must have in mind a type of “real” music that is in agreement with divine order and reason, detached

614. “(...) *ut in Politia Sirenas singulis insistere circulis dicens, quas rotatas cum circulis unam ciere mellifluam cantilenam atque ex inparibus octo sonis unum concordem concentum excitari.*”

615. “*Timaes (...) ex Pythagorae magisterio fuit, quem rationabiliter inducit Plato domesticis et familiaribus sibi probationibus utentem docere animae naturam congruere numeris, concinere etiam modulaminibus musicae.*”

616. “*Medelam huius vitii dicit esse in musica positam, non in ea, qua vulgus delectatur quaeque ad voluptatem facta excitat vitia non numquam, sed in illa divina, quae numquam a ratione atque intelligentia separetur.*” He continues: “*Hanc enim censet exorbitantes animas a via recta revocare demum ad symphoniam veterem. Optima porro symphonia est in moribus nostris iustitia, virtutum omnium principalis, per quam ceterae quoque virtutes suum munus atque opus exequuntur: ut ratio quidem [or quidam] dux sit, vigor vero intimus, qui est iracundiae similis, auxiliatorem se rationi volens praebeat, porro haec provenire sine modulatione non possunt [or possint], modulatio demum sine symphonia nulla sit, ipsa symphonia sequitur [or sequatur] musicam. Procul dubio musica exornat animam rationabiliter ad antiquam naturam revocans et efficiens talem demum, qualem initio deus opifex eam fecerat.*” For he judges that this [music] calls the souls deviating from the right path back anew to the old ‘symphony.’ Moreover, the best symphony in our behavior is justice, the primary of all virtues, by which also the other virtues accomplish their function and work: so that reason, in fact, be the leader, a truly inner force, which is similar to passion, it may supply itself, wanting to be a help to reason; again this cannot come without modulation, modulation finally might be is nothing without symphony, the very symphony follows music.” The rest is translated above.

from mere pleasure-seeking. Since the cosmos and the soul function according to musical principles, virtue is sustained by music that agrees with these principles.

Favonius

Favonius of Carthage was a disciple of Augustine and wrote a commentary on Cicero's *Somnium Scipionis*,⁶¹⁷ a text much less extensive than that of Macrobius (see below) and also less known. In some sections he follows Calcidius almost literally, especially in his analogy between music and language. After reviewing the Pythagorean musical and cosmic number theory, in the second part he comments the harmony of the spheres (*symphonia mundi*). Here he offers his own definition of "*symphonia*" as "*consonae vocis continua modulatio*" (22.5 15.18–19); "*modulus*" means here "interval,"⁶¹⁸ and he insists on simultaneous sound by indicating the use of two strings instead of one (22.11 15.30–16.4). After establishing the distance intervals between the planetary spheres, he cites Cicero's thought that wise men imitated these and thus opened for themselves the return to the sky/heaven; then he adds, similar to Calcidius, that music purifies their souls from the stain of the body and opens through powerful songs a way to the galactic circle gleaming of light.⁶¹⁹

Lastly, Favonius explains how this overwhelming cosmic harmony unites in ratios a diversity of intervals (25.7 19.19–20: "*naturalem inter eas cerne concordiam*"); thus harmonic science teaches unity in diversity, converting apparent discordance into concord.⁶²⁰ He states that the heavenly music evolves in the Dorian mode and that the

617. Text: Holder 1901 (digitalized in TML at http://www.chmtl.indiana.edu/tml/3rd-5th/FAVDIS_TEXT.html, accessed on November 22, 2015); van Weddingen 1957; Scarpa 1974, text and tr. (It.): Marcellino 2012 (I am citing this edition with its chapter/section numbering, adding page/line numbers from Holder); discussion: Wille 1967, 630–634. Favonius is a Christian, but he is included in the current section because his point relevant to us is fully dependant on the Pythagorean tradition. Marcellino (pp. 25–26), after reviewing the scholarly debate, holds that Favonius and Macrobius may be writing independently based on the same Latin source.

618. It is not clear why Marcellino 2012, 79 translates with "*modulo*" instead of the Italian technical term "*intervallo*."

619. 25.5 19.3–6: "*quod et musica disciplina purgatos animos faciat labe corporea et imperiosis pateat via carminibus in usque illum <circulum>, qui dicitur galaxias, animarum beata luce fulgentem.*"

620. 26.4 20.18–21: "*Hoc igitur in sono[ro] servari musicorum scientia proficitur, ut sic diversis temperetur vocibus cantilena, ut ipsa fiat rata diversitas et concentum proficiat quicquid absonum canere videbatur.*" Cf. also 25.8–9 19.26–30: "*Atque ita naturalis illa unitas congruentiaque servatur, dum idem sunt extrema, quod media, mediumque in se versum extremorum efficiat quantitatem. Quid? quod item notare nos convenit ad perspicendam numerorum inter se caritatem.*" And so this natural unity and accordance is conserved, as long as the extremes are the same which render the means, and the mean turned in itself as the quantity of the extremes.

tuning of instruments should follow the (whole tone) ratios established in the celestial system—possibly aiming at the diatonic genus—in order to avoid dissonance.⁶²¹

In Favonius we find another representative of the Pythagorean/neo-Platonic tradition, endorsing consonant music that is in agreement with the cosmic ratios, so the soul may be reminded of and eventually reunited to its celestial home.

Macrobius

Having been probably the praetorian prefect of Italy, the polymath Macrobius has left us two major works in which music plays some part.⁶²² A number of pertinent references to music in the *Saturnalia* have already been cited earlier (p. 170). His *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis* conjoins, setting out from Cicero's *Somnium*, Pythagorean and neo-Platonic numerical and cosmological-astrological speculations together with discussions of other themes such as virtues or the immortality of the soul. In a brief remark within the context of numerological-geometrical considerations, Macrobius repeats Plato's tripartition of the soul into λογιστικόν, θυμικόν, and ἐπιθυμητικόν and then states that no philosopher has doubted that the soul consists of musical concords.⁶²³ He does not explain at this point how the concordant intervals of octave, fourth, and fifth, which he discusses next, are responsible for the soul's harmony.

The main section dealing with music are the first four chapters of book two, commenting on Cicero's description of the "harmony of the spheres." He explains the phenomenon with the planets striking the air. Now, if such a strike occurs according to defined numbers, the sound is soft and musical (*dulcis, musicus*), and a calm and agreeable (*compositus, consentiens*) melody is brought forth; if the strike is an unorganized clash (*tumultuaria et nullis modis gubernata conliso*), the sound is unfitting/loose and harsh (*ineptus, asper*), and a chaotic and crude noise (*fragor turbidus et inconditus*) offends the ear. But since in the heavens everything proceeds according to divine laws and order (*ratio*), the sounds of the celestial spheres are bound to be of

What? That it is convenient that we likewise should notice to perceive the affection of the numbers among themselves."

621. The inconsistencies and problems of detail that Wille points out in Favonius' interval theory do not need to worry us as we are only concerned with the general principles.

622. Cf. OCD 906; Mathiesen 1999, 617–618; for the Commentary: text: Willis 1994; tr.: Stahl 1952 (with an extensive introduction, notes, and a tr. of Cicero's text); for other recent editions see Kaster 2011, xii n. 3; discussion: Wille 1967, 623–630. I shall not evidence the cross-references to earlier writers, which can be found in Stahl's notes.

623. 1.6.43: "*nullus sapientium animam ex symphoniis quoque musicis constitisse dubitavit.*"

the harmonious kind.⁶²⁴ After retelling the legendary discovery and development of interval ratios by Pythagoras, Macrobius turns to elucidate the Platonic explanation of the World Soul from these ratios, born out of even (considered male) and uneven (considered female) numbers,⁶²⁵ hence the Soul's harmony and harmonious musical intervals correspond (2.2.17–19), and since the Soul produces the movement of the celestial bodies, their sound is harmonious (2.2.24). Music itself is considered here as identical with harmony, concord, order, and reason, of divine origin and perceived as soft and agreeable, while everything else is just obnoxious noise.

Turning to the spheric harmonies in particular, based on Plato's myth of Er at the end of the *Republic*, Macrobius explains the connection between the Muses and the planets, with Urania as an eighth representing the firmament and Calliope as a ninth standing for the excelling synthesis of all the others (2.3.1–4, with reference to Hes. *Theog.* 78–79). That “heaven sings” (*“canere caelum”*) emerges further from the use of music in worship, wherein the structure of strophe and antistrophe represents opposite celestial motions.⁶²⁶ Funeral songs signify the return of the soul to heaven, the origin of soft/sweet music.⁶²⁷ Once begun the account of musical applications, Macrobius continues enumerating the manifold effect and use of music by which in this life every soul is captivated,⁶²⁸ both in civilized and barbarian nations. Here he distinguishes positive (“to encourage to the fervor of virtue”) and negative effects (“to release to the weakness of pleasure”). The cause for this is that the soul conveys to the body a memory of the music of which it was aware in heaven⁶²⁹ that now is an irresistible charm, softening even the hardest hearts; thus did Orpheus and Antiphon charm animals and rocks, and barbaric-rough people are lead to a sense of enjoyment. Macrobius goes so far as to say that “music rules

624. Interesting is the definition of such sound (or rather tone), which includes movement and reason (2.1.7: “*et sonum ex motu fieri necesse est, et ratio quae divinis inest fit sono causa modulaminis*”).

625. The gender assignment is already done in 1.6.1. Harmony is, as the Greek philosophers said from the first beginnings, a proportionate composition of unequal elements (2.2.20–22).

626. He adds (2.3.5): “*ex quibus duobus motibus primus in natura hymnus dicandus deo sumpsit exordium*”/The first of these two movements took its origin in nature, called a hymn to God.”

627. 2.3.6: “*post corpus animae ad originem dulcedinis musicae, id est ad caelum, redire credantur.*”

628. 2.3.7: “*in hac vita omnis anima musicis sonis capitur.*”

629. Ibid.: “*vel ad ardorem virtutis animentur vel ad mollietatem voluptatis resolvantur (...) quia in corpus defert memoriam musicae cuius in caelo fuit conscia.*” Later (2.3.11) Macrobius gives as a cause that “*inesse enim mundanae animae causas musicae quibus est intexta praediximus, ipsa autem mundi anima viventibus omnibus vitam ministrat, (...) caelestis anima, qua animator universitas, originem sumpsit ex musica*”/For we have said before that the causes of music lie in the world soul, with which it is interwoven, but the very world soul administers life to all living things (...) the heavenly soul, which gives life to the universe, has taken its origin from music.”

every habit of the soul,” with the standard examples for the arousing (especially in war), calming, and healing effect (2.3.9). Music’s power over humans is not surprising if even birds and other species exercise it as if it were some discipline of art, and when it serves to hunt or tend to animals, for the musically woven World Soul gives life to everything. Nevertheless, the musical order of the incorporeal soul can only be perceived by the mind, not by the senses, and such is the case with the astronomical order of the planets (2.3.10–16).

In one last comment relevant to our purposes,⁶³⁰ Macrobius briefly mentions the three harmonic genera: the enharmonic is out of use at his time because of its difficulty; the chromatic suffers because of its notorious softness/weakness (*voluptas*); hence, the diatonic is the preferred genus, as already in Ptolemy, and it is also the one that is found in Plato’s *musica mundana* (world harmony) (2.4.13).

Macrobius, then, continues the tradition of seeking a causal connection between the origin of the universe in mathematically describable ratios, harmonizing opposites, and thus explains the power of music, mostly in positive terms, by the universal musical principles that govern animals, humans, and the stars. This effect is described as a magic, which appears to be almost irresistible; however, human beings can make use of it according to particular purposes. Music in its definition implies reason, order, and concord, so that contrary sounds amount to no more than noise. His view would represent a musical universalism where the effect of music is innate to humans given their natural structure, which is in agreement with the rest of the cosmos.

Ethos and Cosmos Revisited

Three authors conclude the classical segment on musical ethos. Until now, we have not encountered a single author who would make ethos the object of systematic reflection. Many authors have commented on particular aspects driven by specific interests or just touched on it in a cursory or elective way. At this point, we find three writers who attempt to pull together all or at least most the different loose ends that have been around for centuries. Aristides Quintilianus does this in form of a comprehensive synthesis, which goes even far beyond what previous theorists have laid out at least in the texts that have come down to us; Martianus Capella

630. The author discusses with more detail the qualities of high and low notes but adds nothing new to the general concepts of “tense” and “relaxed” respectively.

and Boethius also summarize the existing material but in a less original way: the former in a narrative, the later in a philosophical setting.

Aristides Quintilianus⁶³¹

The three books of “Περὶ μουσικῆς” by Aristides Quintilianus, an author of uncertain date and only known from this work, could justly be called the *Summa* of ancient music theory; Aristides seems to be correct in claiming that no one before him had written such a complete treatise on music (1.2 3.12–14). His exposition also contains the most material to establish “what is fitting/proper” (τὸ προσήκον) in music.⁶³² His system is an amalgam of a wide range of previous theories, even though there are very few literal quotations from other authors, at least from texts that are preserved. He seems to have drawn from those whom he considered most

631. Text: Winnington-Ingram 1963; Ger. tr.: Schäfke 1937; Eng. tr. and comm.: Mathiesen 1983; GMW 2.392–535; summary and discussion: Zanolcelli 1977; Mathiesen 1990, 50–63 (for book three); id. 1999, 521–582; Barker 2005, 137–171. In these works all necessary information is available about the biographical, philosophical, and stylistic background. For the dating of the text see the various arguments in Zanolcelli 1977, 86–93 (who argues in favor of 340–370 AD), and Mathiesen 1983, 10–14 & 1999, 521–424 (suggesting a wider range between the late third or early fourth century). I shall cite in the following format: [book].[chapter] [page in Winnington-Ingram].[line on that page]. The translations and paraphrases are taken, at times modified, from Barker, unless indicated otherwise. I shall abstain from repeating the numerous cross-references to other authors before and after Aristides, which may best be consulted in the commentaries by Barker and Mathiesen, except when this is of particular importance. Barker 2005, 158, gives a good summary of those ideas in Aristides that appear to be his most original contributions.

632. 1.1 1.5; Mathiesen 1983, 71 n. 2, refers to the importance of this term in Platonic philosophy. The idea returns in 1.4 5.10–13 (and thereafter *passim*) as “τὸ πρέπον.” See also *Anon. Bell.* 3.29: “τὸ πρέπον.” See also *Anon. Bell.* 3.29: “Μουσικὴ ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη θεωρητικὴ καὶ πρακτικὴ μέλους τελείου τε καὶ ὀργανικοῦ ἢ τέχνη πρεπόντων τε καὶ μὴ πρεπόντων ἐν μέλεσι καὶ ῥυθμοῖς συντείνουσα πρὸς ἡθῶν κατασκευὴν/Music is the theoretical and practical science of pure and also instrumental melody or the art of what is fitting and not fitting in melodies and rhythms, leading to the constitution of *ēthē*.” That same text takes up again propriety (this time using “προσήκω” and “ὀρθῶς”) in the context of melodic composition (3.45–47) where the order of tones and intervals should not be random but “harmonic;” what sort of “σύνθεσις” and “ιδιότης” would render a melody proper, should be expected in the later discussion (3.66–104), but the only place where some hint is given is 3.78 (that ascending and descending tone movement should be performed spread out in tempo, for an improved perception—but this is not really about the melodic flow either), the rest are just definitions of terms regarding scale, interval, melodic and rhythmic figures. Aristides is more specific, see 1.12 28.8–30.24.

competent in each field (Aristoxenus for technicalities, Plato for the parts of the soul, the Pythagoreans for mathematical and cosmological considerations, etc.), which he fuses into a quite original synthesis that is not without some philosophical weight. The exposition is largely well crafted in structure and style (notwithstanding minor inconsistencies and less well organized segments), with the author carefully and didactically guiding the reader step by step to prepare him for what will follow. But Aristides' major achievement consists in his ability to propose a solution to some of the difficulties that had plagued his predecessors with regards to musical ethos and its explanation. We shall follow his treatment as far as ethos is concerned and comment on the sections critical for our own endeavor. Even though the exposition may seem lengthy, this work deserves more attention for being, as it were, the climax of ancient ethos theory.

Importance and Usefulness of Music—General Considerations

Aristides begins each of the first two books in an apologetic tone to defend the discipline of music against those who despise it or consider it useless—apparently another generation of skeptics following Philodemus or Sextus Empiricus, although he does not mention any by name. His whole undertaking is geared to extol music in its universal usefulness beyond other arts, as “every stage of life, life as a whole, and every action can be perfectly ordered only through music”:⁶³³ the soul through beautiful melodies and the body through comely rhythms; children, adults, and elderly benefit from it each in their way (beautiful melodies, oratory, and the understanding of the cosmic harmony).⁶³⁴ He quotes the (otherwise unknown) Pythagorean Panaceus, saying that “the task of music is not merely to relate to one another the parts of musical sound, but to bring together in a harmonious relation all natural things.”⁶³⁵ In addition, this art procures pleasure and recreation in its own exercise, as much as usefulness for knowledge, increasing the

633. 1.1 1.18–19: “πάσα μὲν ἡλικία καὶ σύμπας βίος, ἅπαντα δὲ πρᾶξις μουσικῇ μόνῃ τελέως ἂν κατακοσμηθεῖη.” Aristides shows how each of the other arts depends in one way or another on music, which has the task to purify the soul (καθαρίζω) as will be shown. Cf. similarly at 2.4 57.23–24: “Οὐκ οὐν ἔνεστι πρᾶξις ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἣτις ἀνευ μουσικῆς τελεῖται/There is certainly no action in men that is performed without music.”

634. These are three stages of growing abstraction and penetration, from the sensory to the cosmic harmony, resembling the ascent of the soul as described by Plotinus. Barker (GMW 2.400 n. 3) clarifies that the assignment of rhythm to the body here does not mean that rhythm does not impact the soul, since that impact is addressed by Aristides later.

635. 1.1 2.18–20: “ἔργον εἶναι μουσικῆς οὐ τὰ φωνῆς μέρη μόνον συνιστᾶν πρὸς ἄλληλα, ἀλλὰ πάνθ' ὅσα φύσιν ἔχει συνάγειν τε καὶ συναρμόττειν.”

joy.⁶³⁶ A twofold invocation of a divinity is made: to the *mousagetēs* Apollo, but then also to the craftsman of the universe (δημιουργός) whom he considers to call form (εἶδος), ratio (λόγος), unit (ένάς), and unitary ratio (λόγος ένιαῖος),⁶³⁷ all of which in some way describe God's role in designing the world and keeping it together, despite its diversity, in a harmonic way (1.3 4.5–12). Thus, at the same time, Aristides anticipates with these titles already in an elegant way the final vision of the function and importance of music as a universal underlying principle for all of creation.

The book continues with definitions of music which we have looked at earlier (p. 33). In his distinction between the theoretical and practical part of music, the practical one has a primarily educational scope.⁶³⁸ What follows is a quite thorough and well-structured exposé of music theory (άρμονική), mostly inspired by Aristoxenus and general Peripatetic philosophical principles. As its “ingredients” he enumerates: note, interval, *systema*/scale, genus, *tonos*,⁶³⁹ modulation, melodic composition.⁶⁴⁰ We do not need to recapitulate here the chapters in which he explains each of these parameters, except for a few details. When he speaks of con-

636. For this last phrase (1.2 3.4–6), I am following loosely Mathiesen's rendering.

637. Mathiesen (p. 74 n. 24) strangely thinks that at 1.3 4.12 “τοῦτον” means “Apollo;” it is quite clear that the invocation goes to the creator God as Aristides is undertaking something of much wider scope than poetry for which Apollo is responsible (cf. 1.3 3.25–4.2). The whole passage breathes heavily Platonic and Plotinian spirit.

638. 1.5 6.14: “παιδευτικὸν καλεῖται.” Barker (n. 17 *ad loc.*) points out that “[m]usic's capacity to give pleasure (cf., for example, 60.10ff) is always subordinate to its role in moral education.” See also later in 2.6 61.1–3 and the definition of the *Anon. Bell.* quoted above (n. 632).

639. This term in Aristides is equivocal and hard to identify in its exact meaning, about which has been much debate. For some explanations see the notes by Barker to chs. 10–11 (GMW 2.421–430, esp. nn. 117, 120, 122, 125, 126, 130). The meaning vacillates basically between concepts such as “key,” “style,” or “mode.” The ethnic names of “Dorian,” “Phrygian,” etc. are applied to *systema*, *harmonia*, *tonos*, and *tropos*, none of which Aristides either defines exactly or uses in a precise sense. While Aristotle (*Pol.* 1340a40–1340b7) and Ptolemy (*Harm.* 2.7.58; 3.7.99) have Dorian take the middle position, Aristides assigns this place to Phrygian, with Dorian lower and Lydian higher (1.11 23.1–4).

640. 1.5 7.9–13. Nowadays we would add also articulation, reverberation (this is covered by Aristides under φωνῆς τόπος, see 1.6 10.11), and especially timbre (which would include instrumentation); the first ones were not discussed by the ancient Greeks, while timbre was occasionally considered (e.g. the Aristotelian *De audibilibus*, Nicomachus, and Ptolemy); he might aim at timbre when speaking of the various δύναμις that unison tones have (1.6 10.5); about this term in other authors see Barker n. 50 *ad loc.* The role of instruments is considered a different segment within the science of music (e.g. according to the classification of music in *Anon. Bell.* 2.13 and 3.30: harmonics, rhythmic, metrics, instruments, poetics, and mimics; about this catalogue see the discussion in Najock 1972, 194–196).

cordant (σύμφωνοι) and discordant (διάφωνοι) notes, he says that, when sounded simultaneously, in the former the melody is “fitting” (ἐμπρέπω) to both, in the latter only to one of the notes. Barker explains the first effect with a “blend” and the second with a “separation.”⁶⁴¹ Among other things, tones vary according to ethos, and this in particular through pitch (high-low) and genus (1.6 10.13–15); ethos, as in previous authors, also arises from the *systemata* (which are the various scale systems) (1.8 15.20) and the *harmoniai*, which seem to derive their ethos from the tones.⁶⁴² Modulations imply the change of *systema/harmonia*, of the “character of the sound” or “form of melody;”⁶⁴³ like Ptolemy, Aristides regards those modulations that occur between concordant intervals (fourth, fifth) more gracious (χαριέστερος).⁶⁴⁴ Among the parameters of melodic composition, it is the distribution of tones which brings about the corresponding ethos (1.12 29.20–21). Their styles (τρόπος, analog to a literary genre) are classified into nomic, dithyrambic, and tragic, and also erotic (including wedding-songs), comic, and encomiastic,⁶⁴⁵ each exhibiting the ethos of the mind (διάνοια). The mentioning of ethos as classification of these styles could appear to stand in some tension to the subsequent distinction between τρόπος and ἦθος (along with genus, *systema*, and *tonos*), when for the ἦθος a scale is drawn between “distressing” (συσταλτικός), an intermediate “quietude” (ἡρεμία), and “exciting” (διασταλτικός); Aristides clarifies, all in line with Aristoxenus, that the effect of therapeutic treatment is *primarily* determined by the composition’s ethos, but ultimately achieved only by the complete melody (“τὸ τέλειον μέλος”), comprising *harmonia*, rhythm, and text (diction).⁶⁴⁶ Rhythm sets the function (δύναμις) of *harmonia* in manifest order and

641. 1.6 10.1–5; Barker n. 59 *ad loc.* It is hard to distinguish this effect from what consonant or dissonant *intervals* are (since Aristides talks about simultaneous tones of different pitch); he seems to describe the effect from the perspective of melodic flow and the tones therein, rather than the effect an isolated interval would have (see on concordant/discordant intervals 1.8 14.7–11). See also [Ar.] *Pr.* 19.49 which appears to transport the same idea.

642. 1.9 19.6–9 and Barker n. 116 *ad loc.* Aristides quotes the *ēthē* Plato assigns to some *harmoniai*, adding “λίαν ἀνειμένας” to the Iastian/slack Lydian.

643. Also here Aristides uses various terms in semi-synonymous fashion (χαρακτήρ, ποιός, τύπος, εἶδος, and elsewhere, e.g. 1.12 29.1, also ιδιότης).

644. 1.11 22.11–18. See above n. 295.

645. 1.12 30.1–8. Barker in nn. 146–147 *ad loc.* explains the nomic songs as “emotionally affecting solo pieces,” dithyrambs as choral music with its range of applications, and tragic songs as “solemn and serious;” erotic songs, obviously, refer “to the broad genre of love-songs,” the comic ones may also be “related to revelry.” Encomiastic (or panegyric) seems to be the praise of a person.

646. 1.12 30.11–24; the elements of “complete melody” are mentioned at 1.12 28.1–2, see also GMW 2.402 n. 13 and about the ethos scale GMW 2.430 n. 150, above under Cleonides

moves the mind in an organized way (1.13 31.13–14). Its composition shows the same ethos division as melody and can lead to virtue or vice. Interesting is the idea that *harmonia* could be considered female and matter (inactive, receptive, a thing made), and rhythm as male and form (active, molding, maker) (1.19 40.14–25, explained in 2.12 77.5–16). Gender will later be an important factor to describe musical ethos. After laying out the basics about phonemes and meters, Aristides concludes that the well-fitting (εὐπρεπής) *systēma* of meters is called a “poem” (1.29 52.8–9); the metrical structure may vary, as long as the aesthetical expectations of order are met.

Music, Ethos, and Pathos—Education and Therapy

Aristides prefaces his proof of the educational value of music with an exposition, deeply indebted to Plato, about the structure of the human soul as suited to assist the body to live in order (τάξις) through both attraction to it and understanding, memory (to recall its beautiful transcendent origin) and sciences (to love the beauty of reason and virtue so as to live a blessed life). For all this, the soul is divided into a rational (λογικός, tended by philosophy in seeking φρόνησις, “understanding/wisdom”) and an irrational part, the latter of which is related to the body and has an appetitive nature, characterized by slackness (ἐπιθυμητικός, ἄνεσις), and a high-spirited nature, showing disproportionate tightening (θυμικός, ἐπίτασις ἀσύμμετρος); this irrational part is ruled over by music, which from childhood on molds the *ēthē* through *harmoniai* and renders the body more harmonious by means of rhythms (see below p. 369, fig. 3–3).⁶⁴⁷

Like Plato and Aristotle, Aristides acknowledges that music is particularly suited for education of the young because of the natural pleasure it provides to them before instruction through reason can take place (2.3 55.4–23).⁶⁴⁸ He addresses the sceptics who deny that music moves everyone by claiming that *all* children are by nature (φύσει) overcome by musical delight and that even people not naturally prone to music will over time be captivated by it (2.4 55.28–56.5).

our n. 456, and Solomon 1981. The concept of “complete melody” for ethos was already conceived by Aristoxenus.

647. 2.3 55.4–6: “μουσική πλάττουσά τε εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων ἀρμονίαις τὰ ἦθη καὶ τὸ σῶμα ῥυθμοῖς ἐμμελέστερον κατασκευάζουσα.”

648. See a quite similar idea in Cic. *De or.* 3.44.174, there not about children. The point returns at 2.4 57.19–22: instead of prohibiting children’s natural inclination to music, it is now even made useful. At 2.6 62.25–26, Aristides even states “ὅτι γὰρ ἰσχυρότατόν τε πρὸς παιδείαν ἡ μουσική καθάπερ οὐδὲν ἕτερον;” that music is more efficient for education than anything else;” according to 2.6 63.29, music is “πρώτη γὰρ καὶ τάξει καὶ δύνامي παντὸς μαθήματος/the first both in order and in efficiency in all learning.”

Aristides compares music here, like at several other places, with the way medicine works. The effectivity of music lies in the fact that its mimetic character extends to more than one sense.⁶⁴⁹ While Philodemus had argued that the emotive effect of poetry lies only in reason (the word), Aristides holds the opposite: only through melody are the passions always moved and through rhythm conformed to the content, as particularly evident in declamation where emotivity requires the voice to tend towards melody—something which the Roman orators Cicero and Quintilian had exploited, as we have seen. But Aristides goes so far as to demand a precise and detailed *mimēsis* of content,⁶⁵⁰ a concept we have found already in earlier authors such as Dionysius of Halicarnassus but now brought into its most sophisticated form. According to Aristides, music persuades most effectively (ἐνεργέστατος) because its *mimēsis*, contrary to the other arts, is brought about by the same principles that perform “actions” in real life.⁶⁵¹ Music expresses ethos and pathos through “notions,” words through melodies and the moulding of the voice, and action through rhythms and movement of the body.⁶⁵² Like Plato, he suggests that especially children should acquire through these *mimēseis* and likenesses a familiarity and usage (συνήθεια, μελέτη), through which they will know and desire

649. Painting and plastic arts only appeal to sight, poetry only to the ear and yet they arouse and astound (διεγείρω, ἐκπλήσσω) the soul, how much more then should music do so. Aristides seems to imply generally a visual concept of rhythm, based on dance, drama, or at least gestures in oratory. “Only music teaches both by words and by images of actions.” (“μόνη δὲ μουσικὴ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ πράξεων εἰκόσι πειθεύει”) (2.4 56.17–18). Cf. also GMW 2.462 n. 14 on the term “ὑπόκρισις” used in this context.

650. Cf. 2.4 56.19–21 for the example of gestures to be adjusted to the content: “[ἐμψυχοὶ καθ’ ἕκαστον τῶν ἀπαγγελλομένων ἐς τὸ οἰκεῖον τήν τε μορφήν καὶ τὴν κίνησιν μεθίστησιν/ they alter their form and their movement to fit every detail of what the words express.”

651. 1.4 56.27–57.2: “τοιούτοις γὰρ ποιεῖται τὴν μίμησιν οἷς καὶ τὰς πράξεις αὐτὰς ἐπ’ ἀληθείας τελεῖσθαι συμβαίνει.” The word “principles” is not there in the Greek but implied in the pronoun “τοιούτοις.”

652. 1.4 57.4–6: “ψυχῆς μὲν ἐννοίαις ἦθη μιμεῖται καὶ πάθη, λόγους δὲ ἀρμονίαις καὶ φωνῆς πλάσει, πρᾶξιν δὲ ῥυθμοῖς καὶ κινήσει σώματος.” The key term is the “ἐννοία,” see Barker n. 15 *ad loc.* (“the moral or emotional content of what the artist seeks to convey”); the question remains, as he points out in n. 16, “just what a given musical work ‘imitates’, and how well, or how a given ‘conception’ is to be successfully presented in musical form.” Mathiesen 1983, 31 n. 155 calls it “a leading concept held in the mind governing action or the creation of arts” (with reference to 2.7). See also later GMW 2.471 n. 76; Barker 1999 (an interesting study, comparing the term to the mainstream understanding of “metaphor”) and id. 2005, 146. The full meaning of this term will emerge in the course of this section. It is important, however, to notice already that “ἐννοία” is different from what I call “content” (the “message” or meaning of a sung text); it is the “notion” of its ethical value.

that which they will in earnest achieve later on in life; in other words, they should train themselves emotionally in familiarity with an ethos that they should later display in reality, and this ethos is expressed in some sort of musical “notion” (2.4 57.6–10; cf. 2.5 58.8–10). Without providing concrete examples, he asserts that the ancients used mostly music for correcting (ἐπανόρθωσις) because of its natural power and effectiveness (ισχύς, ἐνέργεια) (2.4. 57.11–14).

After praising music’s general usefulness for education, Aristides enumerates other well-known applications (beautifying worship, giving splendor to feasts, stirring and calming war and travels, easing hardships of work, breaking the sharpness of grief). The causes for music-making arise from passions or emotions within the different parts of the soul: in the irrational it is pleasure if one is cheerful (in the appetitive sub-part, mainly in children) or pain if one is suffering (in the spirited sub-part, mainly in women); in the rational part, if one is under divine impulse and breathing, it is inspiration/“enthusiasm” (mainly in old men); in young or old age there can be also a mixture between these.⁶⁵³ Such emotions (which do not disturb the σοφοί) may lead to harmful states of the soul. Therefore, in music, rather than in reason, is found therapy (θεραπεία, ἰατρεία) for each of these by means of a “fitting style” (ἁρμοστικὸν τρόπον), which transfers the person, without notice and under compulsion, into the proper state;⁶⁵⁴ in the case of moderate (μετρίως, συμμέτρως) emotivity, active music-making heals, whereas those suffering untempered or excessive (ἄκρατος, ὑπερβολή) disorder need to be taught through hearing, but always according to the same corresponding style (according to sex and age, as laid out above) (2.4 57.24–58.32).

Aristides takes Plato’s exposition on the effect of music and the proper legislation to prove that the ancients did practice music in the described way and decreed melodies, rhythms, and dances fitting to each context, and that they avoided changes, trying to restrain the movements within souls afflicted by

653. About this section see also Barker 2005, 138. As will emerge from the later discussion of various races emphasizing particular parts of the soul and still later the duality of male-female, the current distribution of age and gender is not absolute. What is said here is that these groups tend to *express* themselves in music according to the assigned parts of the soul, while the *effect* that music has on each part is certainly felt by any human being.

654. 1.5 58.21–22: “ἐκάστου δὴ τούτων διὰ μουσικῆς θεραπείας ἦν ἁρμόστικον τρόπον ἀγνοοῦντας ἐκ προσαγωγῆς ἐς ὀρθὴν κατάστασιν ὑπαγόμενος.” Both Barker and Mathiesen translate “ἐκ προσαγωγῆς” with “gradually,” but Schäfer seems to hit the mark better with “*zwangs-läufig*.” At this point Aristides gets closest to a magic conception of music from which he abstains for the rest.

untempered passions and leading it instead into a “sweet spirit” (γλυκοθυμία).⁶⁵⁵ People who neglect music (including poetry) appear thoroughly crude and foolish (ἀγροικώδης, ἡλίθιος), while wrong use of music results in deformed ethos;⁶⁵⁶ so, he says, the ancients used mainly the melodies fitting for education, and only for a restricted time (at festivals?) did they employ the relaxed ones (ἀνειμένος) to test the character or to attract to education. Here it is interesting to observe how Aristides blends Plato’s strict regimen for the guardians’ education (in the *Republic*) with the more differentiated approach to what is “fitting” (in the *Laws*), as also promoted by Aristotle, apparently reacting against musical purists who interpreted Plato in a very narrow sense and rejected musical enjoyment altogether (the end of the spectrum opposite the Epicureans).⁶⁵⁷ The educational value of music is prominent, but the effect of enjoyment, at least for common people, is also legitimate, along with other uses as mentioned—the criterion again is suitability (πρόσφορος, ἀρμόττων, ὠφέλιμος). Still, there is also such a thing like “bad melody” (φαύλη μελωδία, 2.6 60.23) that needs to be rejected (even though Aristides does not tell us what characteristics such a melody would show, only that they are composed to please the crowd), but the mere possibility of abuse does not justify the outright rejection of music; at any rate, the ultimate goal remains the pursuit of virtue (2.6 60.10–61.25). Examples from Roman history and practice are given.

Two main dangers linger through which persons and entire peoples may become subdued to their passions and acquire bad ethos: a lack of music (ἄμουσία) and education, and bad music/education (κακομουσία). Again similar to Plato (*Resp.* 410c–412a), but now on the level of whole populations, Aristides shows how those suffering ἄμουσία are imbalanced in either the appetitive or spirited part of the soul (being insensitive/bovine or savage respectively); κακομουσία

655. Aristides illustrates this idea with the poetic image of a gushing stream that is being directed into “an easily trodden and fertile plain” (2.6 59.11–13); cf. Pind. *Nem.* 7.13; Plut. *Quaest. conv.* 7.5.4 = *Mor.* 706e.

656. 2.6 59.19–21: “ὕπὸ (...) τὰ μὴ σπουδαῖα τῶν μελῶν ἢ ποιημάτων φιλοχωρίας ιδιότητά τινα ἥθους οὐκ ἀστείαν ἀποματτομένους;” cf. Pl. *Resp.* 410c–411e. The point of moral decay of society due to uncultured leaders (ἄμουσότερος) at the course of Roman history is made in 2.6 62.19–24, followed by more examples from other peoples; cf. Barker n. 50 *ad loc.* and Pl. *Resp.* 546e–547a.

Upon describing the “enslaving” power of music (*ibid.* lines 29–32), Aristides remains always faithful to Plato’s ethical triangle, maintaining the correspondence between music and text (content): “ἐξ οικειότητα τῶν λεγομένων”. This is not merely prescriptive: he seems to think that the intriguing effect of music is actually proportionate with its connection to content.

657. This is laid out mainly in 2.6 59.14–61.3; see nn. 36–40 by Barker *ad loc.*

(which is perverted against nature into φαλότης—meanness, badness) leads in the appetitive part to sluggishness and improper behavior with the bodies, in the spirited part to lack of order in thinking, drunkenness, excessive inclination to war and wrath. To the contrary, those who have used music properly (such as the Greeks) are blessed with virtue, every knowledge and exceeding humanity. In today's language we could say: without music, human beings remain underdeveloped in their emotional world; bad music induces to sins of defect or excess; good music provides a balanced and fertile emotive soil for virtue and any other cultural activity. Aristides then asks rhetorically: if entire cities and races can be delighted and changed to the better through music, should it not be capable of educating an individual? Of course, the whole argument depends on accepting the premise that music is truly the main cause for these *ēthē*. Aristides attempts to make evident the link between the ethos of a person or a people and their upbringing. But first he asserts, like Plato in Damon's succession, that music is also more than anything else capable of binding together (συνίστημι) the State and of maintaining this bond, while music is also responsible for constitutional decline or change.⁶⁵⁸

I am adding a diagram to show the division of the soul in its parts. The diagram already contains the male-female distinction and its characteristics as they are assigned throughout the following chapters (including 3.16, on general virtues, and 3.21). The “musical equivalents” will be explained further down in the text.

658. This section is developed in 2.6 62.25–63.31. Plato's point about the well-being of state and constitution is found in *Resp.* 424c and *Leg.* 701a–b. When Mathiesen 1983, 128 n. 123, claims that “many of the points of this first section [of book two] are debunked by Sextus Empiricus,” one must keep in mind first that the arguments Sextus brings forth, as we have seen, are hardly conclusive; mostly, argument is placed against argument without addressing logically the foundation for each. Secondly, remaining somewhat open the chronological sequence between both texts, neither author seems to be directly responding to the other; neither language, nor argumental structure, nor the examples are similar. The same can be said about Philodemus.




Figure 3–3. The division of the human soul and the effect of music on it according to Aristides Quintilianus

Musical Ethos—Its Inner Workings

Aristides now turns to elucidate the question of how music is able to indicate ethos. He begins by stating that people’s ethical preferences in life are equivalent to the type of music they prefer—hence music serves as an indicator (τεκμήριον) of ethos. He describes psychologically the process of acquiring ethos from music (with first a negative and then a positive example): if bad things (τὰ φαῦλα) are often promoted by song, habituation (συνήθεια) and familiarity (οἰκειότης) take place, which become nature (φύσις) and then engender appetency (ὄρεξις) towards

actions, strengthened and intensified through enjoyment until the individual and common life will be turned upside down.⁶⁵⁹ We could illustrate the point again in modern terms as follows: if someone, for instance, listens often to music which contains aggressive features, he or she would get used to such a state of mind, adopt aggressive traits in the personal character, and eventually feel driven to aggressive actions. For the good, Aristides recalls, without giving concrete examples (which instead we have seen especially in pseudo-Plutarch and Philodemus), how music contributed to restore civil order and peace between cities and races and is able to replace through common festivities mutual aggressiveness (ἀγριότης) with kindness (τὸ ἡπιον). In order to maintain love for order (τὸ κόσμιον) and humanity (τὸ φιλάνθρωπον), and to safeguard friendship within one's own soul and within the community, music is needed (i.e. prophylactically, not just to redeem problems once they have arisen). Aristides here builds strongly on the analogy, or rather interdependence, between individual and social concord/harmony (συμφωνία) as conceived by Plato (2.6 64.9–64.6).

Moving on to the various elements that constitute “music” (here now understood in the wide sense, like in Plato) and its education, Aristides lists the “notion” (related to content, ἐννοία), diction or verbal expression (λέξις), the melodic patterns (ἁρμονίαι), and rhythm (ῥύθμος).⁶⁶⁰ All these should be suitable (πρέπων) according to the ethical triangle, with the content as the determining factor for all the others, which should be, beginning with diction, a μίμημα of the content (2.7 65.22–28). But before treating each of these individually, Aristides assigns the duality (διπλόη) of male and female to the appetitive and spirited parts of the soul, each equipped with their particular ethos and passions;⁶⁶¹ for male: vehement and energetic (σφοδρόν, δραστήριον) in wrath and rashness (ὀργή, θράσος), for

659. 2.6 63.31–64.9. Barker in n. 59 *ad loc.* says that “the major source for the whole paragraph is plainly *Rep.* 424b–425b.” While it is certainly inspired by Plato’s text, the main difference is that Plato describes the course of institutional corruption, whereas Aristides clearly depicts the psychological process on the individual level.

660. A little correction is needed to GMW 2.469 n. 67: the ratios mentioned at 2. 7 66.1 (“λόγοις δὲ τοῖς συμφώνοις”) cannot be the “primary harmonic concords” but must be the rhythmical proportions as described in 1.18 38.15–39.25 (Schäfer 1937, 267, translates correctly with “*zusammenstimmend angeordnete [zeitliche] Verhältnisse*”).

661. He establishes duality, in Pythagorean and Platonic terms, as a general principle in nature (see GMW 2.470 n. 71), observing the fact that men may also show female traits and women male ones, thus acknowledging that the genders are not strictly exclusive contraries marked with “stereotypes” and do not apply as such to any individual (their sublunar manifestations are not particularly flattering for either sex). Multiple references in other authors to classifications similar to the ones here and in the following can be found in the footnotes of Barker’s and Mathiesen’s editions.

female: too slack (λίαν ἀνειμένον) in grief and pleasure (λύπη, ἡδονή), with any possible mixture. Since all perceivable objects in the world also represent the same duality, each individual's visual and auditive perception is guided by preferences (or the attraction) that emerge from his or her own male-female disposition, e.g.: women typically would prefer smooth and gentle sounds (λεῖος. προσηνής), men the roughest ones (τραχύτερος); again, mixtures are possible. The ethical-passionate evaluation of the outside realities in their correspondence to the interior setup of the soul is, then, what Aristides calls “ἐννοία” (2.8 66.6–2.9 68.14).

This description of the soul constitutes its starting condition, given by nature, but it is subject to being influenced (improved) by ideas (ἐννοήματα) transmitted through words (λόγοι) in education until reaching a habitual state (ἔξις). This may come about as therapy (rectifying vice/evil), through either a successive diminishing (τὸ μειωτικὸν) of an undesired passion or its eliminating (τὸ ἀναιρετικὸν) by a change (μετάστασις) of the listener; it may also consist in constructive promotion (τὸ ὠφελητικὸν), through either conserving (τὸ διατηρητικὸν),⁶⁶² i.e. confirming and maintaining, the best habit, or through incrementation (τὸ προσθετικὸν), leading a “moderate beautiful goodness” (καλοκάγαθία) to the pinnacle of virtue (2.9 68.14–69.1). In the following, Aristides exemplifies the corresponding creation of ethos within the four areas of “music,” beginning with ἐννοία, showing in a manner similar to Dionysius of Halicarnassus how Homer uses images and rhetorical devices to evoke certain feelings to accompany the narrative. It is interesting that he does not discriminate against the content itself, as Plato does, in order to achieve a particular preconceived ethos; the ideas offered are in the service of the story line, not of any extrinsic objective, but their analysis and classification according to gender-based *ēthē* provide criteria for their conscious use in any given context.⁶⁶³ The same applies to the second area of diction, which is treated in

662. Winington-Ingram supplies this to the Greek text (at 68.28) as a possible missing expression, supported by Barker and Mathiesen; Schäfer takes “τὸ ὠφελητικὸν” (“*unterstützend*”) as a term for the first subtype, leaving the second main type without label.

663. In ch. 10 he does give examples (again from Homer) of how ideas/stories can be used to change someone's state of mind: Achilles curing his grief by recounting heroic deeds (*Il.* 9.186–189), a singer trying to change the suitors' behavior by singing of Odysseus' homecoming (*Od.* 1.326–327), etc. These examples for “music” have their effect from the content, not from features of music (e.g. melody) in the strict sense.—I wonder whether these examples, which he interprets quite opposite to Sextus Empiricus (see above n. 553), give a hint that Aristides wrote his work *before* Sextus since he completely ignores that divergence (among many others); it would be surprising that he did not know *Adversus musicos* had it been written previously; that this is not impossible, however, shows the case of Athenaeus (see p. 166). On the other hand, the argumentation of Sextus would appear rather poor

ch. 11 where he endeavors to classify basic phonemes (letters and syllables) according to gender and ethos.

Before moving on to melody and rhythm, each representing a gender in particular (see above p. 319) but also containing a gender-based range on its own (e.g. more female rhythms), Aristides assigns gender to notes and intervals, which receive their ethos from the vowels assigned to identify the notes;⁶⁶⁴ these now determine, through position and frequency or dominance, the ethos of the scalar and modal system.⁶⁶⁵ He is convinced that words in their phonetic composition reflect their gender, and that melodies do so by their composition based on gender- (and ethos-) specific notes and intervals. This equipment enables the educator (or therapist) to apply the style of melody (τρόπος) according to the diagnosis and the processes of treatment laid out earlier (diminishing, eliminating, incrementing, etc.); in case of doubt, a trial-and-error method may be applied, responding flexibly (even through modulation) to feedback (2.12 76.31–2.14 80.22).

A famous passage follows where Aristides states that musical ethos depends on a chain of resembling/likeness (ἔοικα, ὁμοιότης; “μίμησις” is not used in this context) between melody, *harmoniai*, intervals, notes, and the “movements and the

before the humongous theoretical apparatus accumulated by Aristides. The best assumption probably is that neither of the two authors knew of the other's writing.

As interesting as these elaborate exemplifications are to helping understand his psychological approach, we need to skip over the sections not directly concerned with music. At 2.10 73.26–27 he indicates that in order to “persuade” someone, the homoeopathic method will work, to “overcome” the allopathic: “ὅτε μὲν ὁμοιότητι πείσεις, ὅτε δὲ ἀνομοιότητι καταγωνιῇ;” this will apply also to *harmoniai* as said at 2.14 80.11–16 (even though “πείθω” is used there for an “intermediate” treatment, while the homoeopathic is used for incrementation).

664. E.g.: η is female, ω is masculine; α is intermediate towards masculine, ε intermediate towards feminine; these are assigned to specific places within the scale system and the tetrachord. Intervals bounded by notes of equal gender (m-m; f-f) acquire that gender; otherwise, they are intermediate. Boccadoro 2002, 194–195 and 228–229, thinks that Aristides' return to the archaic view of attributing ethical value to individual notes is an additional argument in favor of the assumption that he indeed used ancient material (and not just processed compendia of his own time). A more detailed explanation of this and the subsequent “gender” assignments can be found in Barker 2005, 147–151 & 156–158 (sources). Jan 1860 makes some text critical comments regarding the vowel assignments.

665. Barker tries to explain the terms “συστήμα” and “ἁρμονία” in this context in n. 136 (to 2.14 80.10): the former seems to be “the framework of notes and intervals (e.g., the GPS [= Greater Perfect System, a specific combination of tetrachords] taken in one genus),” the latter a “particular scheme of tuning,” either a mode or a transposition—the exact concept remains subject to discussion among the experts. In any case, they are the basis for concrete melodies and confer onto them their ethos.

passions of the soul” (2.14 80.25: “τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς κινήμασι τε καὶ παθήμασιν”). As far as I see, despite of the fame of the passage, previous commentators still have not detected its full meaning for Aristides’ *mimēsis* theory. From what he is developing before and after it follows that in his theory the interface between music, soul, and ethos consists in the gender-ethical codification of letters and, through them, of notes.⁶⁶⁶ “Movement” and “passion” should be taken here as a hendiadys, for the role of movement in the connection between musical elements and ethos is conceived differently than what we have seen in pseudo-Aristotle: Aristides does not attend to the exterior motion’s equivalency to the perceptive process as a relevant factor in establishing ethos in music; we could perhaps say: pseudo-Aristotle pursued a formal approach of *mimēsis*, while Aristides choses a material one, in which musical elements are substantially charged with ethos and thus capable of resembling the irrational (passionate) part of the human soul on account of that very ethos. In other words, there is a common, pre-established ethos because of which both are similar, not a mimetic similarity that would make music ethical. We shall return to this point in our final evaluation.

Given the infinite possibilities of complex ethos traits both in the soul and in music, musical treatment needs to be individually adjusted. Here, similar to what was said in 2.6 about “educational music” and the sort that serves for pleasure only, Aristides resolves the tension that we observed in Plato and Aristotle between precise prescriptions and restrictions (*Republic*) and the concept of appropriateness to groups (*Laws*, *Politics*): Aristides clearly distinguishes between a more defined and limited use for pedagogical ethos formation (in earlier years: *παίδευσις*) and therapeutic or other uses, which require musical ethos to be concocted out of the full range of possibilities according to each individual and circumstance (*ψυχαγωγία*).⁶⁶⁷

666. Whether this theory goes indeed back to “οἱ περὶ Δάμωνα” (2.14 80.28–29) is heatedly debated (see above nn. 144, 146, and 147, and also Zancocelli 1977, 77–80 n. 16, and 82–84 n. 129).

667. 2.14 81.4–6: “ἡ καλουμένη πεττεία τὸ χρησιμώτατον ἐν ἐκλογῇ τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων φθόγγων ἐκάστοτε θεωρουμένη;” “πεττεία” is the distribution of notes within the melody; about the term see GMW 2.431–432 n. 145. The point becomes even clearer when he asserts at 81.7–8 that the lower *systemata* (e.g. the Dorian) serve the male according to nature, and ethos according to education (“τῶν συστημάτων τὰ μὲν βαρύτερα τῷ τε ἄρρενι κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἥθει κατὰ τὴν παιδευσιν πρόσφορα”), which means that their natural ethos connects directly to men and instills, for the same reason, ethos in the context of education; cf. further at 82.1–3: “ὧν τὰ μὲν ἀνδρώδη καὶ κόσμια πρὸς παιδευσιν, τὰ δὲ ἀλλοιότερα πρὸς τινὰς ἀναγκαῖα ψυχαγωγίας/[those melodies] that are male and decorous are needed for education, while those that are otherwise are required for influencing the soul in various ways.”

Aristides continues his analysis, assigning the lower *systemata* (and *tropoi*, e.g. Dorian) to male, the higher (e.g. higher Phrygian, Lydian) to female, a common and natural concept (given the different voice ranges of men and women), which he further explains, however, by the different sound production and ethical association: vigor and weight (τὸ γοργόν, ἐμβριθές) in the case of male, and mournful and shrill (γοερός, ἐκβοητικός) in the case of the female, with others being intermediate (e.g. Iastian, Aeolian).⁶⁶⁸ Continuous scales show evenness and ease (ὁμαλότης, ῥαστώνη); those with leaps (transilient) are rougher, disturbing, and “mind-boggling” (τραχύτερος, παρακεκινημένος, ἀντιτείνοντος)—to these he does not assign gender or any particular *systema*, *tropos*, or *harmonia* (2.14 81.7–82.3).⁶⁶⁹

We may notice at this point with astonishment that Aristides completely leaves out any discussion of ethos with regards to genus, which had almost replaced the consideration of ethos in *harmoniai* during the time after Aristoxenus. There is only one little paragraph (appended to book two and possibly not even by Aristides himself but an interpolation by a reader who noticed the omission),⁶⁷⁰ which declares the diatonic genus austere and manly, the chromatic very sweet and

668. 2.14 81.7–13; about sound production, Barker quotes *ad loc.* a number of Peripatetic sources; “ἐκβοητικός” appears only in the supplement of LSJ 1996. The level of tetrachords can vary, while the *tonoi* (or *tropoi*) differ only as much as their adjacent key signatures do. Aristides here only mentions Dorian by name; for the other assignments see GMW 2.484 nn. 151–152.

Schäfer in Aristides Quintilianus 1937, 284 n. 2 expounds nicely on the related fact that men and women used to magadize in octave parallels: “*Sofern die natürlichen Stimmlagen der Männer und Frauen in der vollkommenen Oktave miteinander harmonisieren, liegt in der Uratsache der Oktavharmonie zugleich der Gegensatz der Geschlechter wie ihre mystische Einheit, ‚Vollkommenheit‘ beschlossen.*” As far as the natural voice levels of men and women harmonize with each other in the pure octave, both the contrariety of the genders and their mystical unity, ‘perfection,’ rests the original fact of octave harmony.”

669. For the significance of this distinction, also in other authors, cf. GMW 2.413–414 nn 93–95.

670. At 92.19–30; cf. GMW 2.494; Schäfer and Mathiesen do not even bother translating this. I am including the ideas here because I am less concerned with what is authentic in Aristides but what ideas were out there at the time. The ethical descriptions are similar to *Anon. Bell.* 2.26. A technical description of the genera was given in book one at the beginning of ch. 9; Aristides mentions genus also later in book three for some of his cosmological analogies: 3.11 110.14–111.27.

mournful (and thus implicitly feminine), and the enharmonic, apparently medial, both stimulant and soothing.⁶⁷¹

In the discussion of rhythms, Aristides unfolds a wide spectrum of *ēthē* represented by the different types (which can be observed even in the way people walk)—being the only surviving author offering such treatment. Rhythms are mostly distinguished between the quiet, well-ordered, and healthy types and, on the other side, the agitated, disordered, disturbing ones. Some composed rhythms, because of their unevenness, enact a multiplicity of body movements and thus lead the mind astray into not little confusion;⁶⁷² similarly, modulations between rhythms “pull the soul violently in opposite directions, forcing it to accompany every turn and to make itself alike to variation.”⁶⁷³ Finally, also the tempo (ἄγωγή) of rhythm shows ethos as divided into swift, which is hot and active (θερμός, δραστήριος), and slow, which is diffusing, slack, and soothing (ἀναβεβλημένος, ἀνείμενος, ἡσυχαστικός); abbreviated rhythms are vehement, condensed, and stimulating to action (σφοδρός, συνεστραμμένος, εἰς τὰς πράξεις παρακλητικός), while expanded rhythms are supine and flabby (ὑπτιος, πλαδαρός), and the intermediate ones are moderate (σύμμετρος). Mixtures are possible also in the other categories. The only concrete applications that are offered refer to war-dances (for short rhythms) and sacred hymns (at 2.15 82.19–22). Aristides does not attempt to group these ethical types clearly by gender, even though the characteristics used often suggest one of the two according to his categorization elsewhere (e.g. at the tempo-indications) (2.15 82.4–84.10). It is striking, however, that the qualifications are more easily identifiable according to “good” and “bad” than the other parameters. The lack of gender assignment covers up some inconsistencies, e.g. when Aristides talks about an even and stable, “manly,” way of walking as opposed

671. Winington-Ingram 1963, 92–93 (in n. *ad loc.*), thinks that the last word (“ἥπιον”) is “*plane corruptum*” and suggests instead “ἡθικόν.” His judgment probably stems from the seeming semantic contradiction to “διεγερτικός.” However, if the ethos of the enharmonic genus is in fact medial, as the context and the characterizations by other authors suggest, it might indeed have either effect, depending on which one is activated by the other musical parameters. Barker apparently understands it this way as he does not support the emendation but translates the phrase with “stimulating and temperate.”

672. 2.15 83.15–17: “διὸ καὶ τὰς τοῦ σώματος κινήσεις ποικίλας ἐπιφέροντες οὐκ ἐς ὀλίγην παραχὴν τὴν διάνοιαν ἐξάγουσιν.” The connection between musical influence on body *and* soul is indicated at 2.3 55.3–6; see Barker’s note on that latter passage.

673. 2.15 83.18–21: “οἱ δὲ μεταβάλλοντες εἰς ἕτερα βιαίως ἀνθέλκουσι τὴν ψυχὴν, ἐκάστη διαφορὰ παρέπεσθαι τε καὶ ὁμοιοῦσθαι τῇ ποικιλίᾳ καταναγκάζοντες.” We see that, like in Plato, variety is thought to lead to an unstable and confused condition.

to hot and unstable like the pyrrhic war dance, then these opposites turn out to be both on the male side.

Regarding delivery (ὑπόκρισις), he just briefly states that the body movements should express by imitation (ἀπομιμέομαι) those musical features that are august (σεμνός), corresponding to men, and help to behave like a man (“εἰς τὸ ἀνδρίζεσθαι συναιρομένας”), and should be watched and imitated by everyone (“καὶ ὁρατέον τοῖς πᾶσι καὶ μιμητέον”). Regarding the *ēthē*, similar to Aristotle, he allows them, with some restraint, for ordinary people (οἱ ἀγελαῖοι), but persons of noble and serious character should stay away from them completely (2.16 84.11–19).

As the last of the musical elements, Aristides addresses the instruments and administers clear gender assignments along with ethos to the most common ones (e.g. salpinx and lyre as male because of low pitch, vigor, and roughness; Phrygian *aulos* and *sambukē*⁶⁷⁴ as female because of high pitch, mournful, and sordid qualities), allowing again intermediate instruments such as the cithara and assuming that the reader will easily determine by himself the nature of other instruments. At any rate, people cherish and honor those instruments that compare with their natural ethos (ὁμοίωμαι) (1.16 84.20–85.20). Aristides concludes this section with the advice that the “therapist” should combine all these musical parameters in a suitable way; normally, all ought to be of the same ethos, unless the effect would be too extreme for the person to be treated, in which case a mixture may be made—never, though, with an opposite (e.g. male *systema* and female rhythm, which would be unsuitable—ἀπρεπής), but with an intermediate (1.16 85.21–86.7).

At this point (ch. 17), Aristides sets out to explore further the reasons for the specific captivating effect of musical instruments. He dedicates a whole paragraph to a *captatio benevolentiae*, as if he himself were not so sure about the certainty of what he is going to say, making clear that he reports from other (undisclosed) sources.⁶⁷⁵ Unchallengeable certainty belongs to the empirical fact *that* “the soul is naturally moved by instruments of music,” as everyone’s experience can testify. His explanation, for our ears rather odd fantasy, but quite compatible with the ancients’ (meta-)physical conception of world and nature, starts with the soul’s “fall” from

674. See GMW 2.488 n. 180 with references to Ath. (e.g.: high-pitched in 633f) and explaining: “It has usually been identified as a triangular harp” or, according to others, “an instrument of the lute family.”

675. Barker, in his notes to chs. 17–19, provides some references to Plato (esp. *Phdr.* 246a ff), but many details of the account remain without parallel, even though they are close to Pythagorean, neo-Platonic, and Stoic thought. Earlier on, Aristides had “warned” that he was to disclose, for completeness sake, “esoteric” knowledge that previous authors had refrained from putting into writing, see e.g. 2.7 65.15–17. I am condensing his account to the minimum necessary to understand his main point.

the heavenly sphere towards the earth, picking up on the journey celestial elements of radiant aether, circles and lines, and vaporous air, from all of which on earth a part coagulates to the constitutive structure of the body with its breath, membranes, sinews, and veins through which the soul pulsates, holding everything together. Given that these “ingredients,” as much as the soul itself, possess certain harmonic qualities (still to be explored in book three), they respond through “sympathetic resonance (or vibration),” which indeed exists as a natural phenomenon, to musical sound with analogous qualities, e.g. the sinews respond to harmoniously plucked chords of the cithara, and the “breath” parts in body and soul respond to wind instruments. Now, since the aetheric elements (sinews, and the “dry and simple” part of the soul) are better (βελτίων) than the moist ones, which come from the lunar sphere and are changeable (εὐμετάβολος) and “too womanizing/enervating” (λίαν θηλύνοντα), it follows that string instruments are preferred over wind instruments (2.17 86.8–2.18 90.18).

It is impressive how Aristides is capable of contriving, within the world-view of his time, a consistent vision that combines physico-cosmological “realities” with anthropological-psychological and medical observations that bestow unifying substance on the century-old intuitions about musical ethos. He crowns his discourse by returning to the known ancient stories such as about musical rivalry between Marsyas, Apollo, and Athena,⁶⁷⁶ revealing, as it were, their most profound significance. Thus he arrives at a hierarchical sorting of good and bad music that interlaces the results of his analysis with traditional mythological personalities. To begin with the worst, the Homeric Sirens stand for melody that is bad, harmful, and to be avoided.⁶⁷⁷ Then, descending from the highest to the lowest, Apollo, as a man with the cithara, represents the music for the education of the best and the Muse Polhymnia, as a woman, the cithara music for pleasure of the crowd; Hermes is associated with the pedagogical type of lyre proper to men, and Erato with the relaxing type appealing to the appetitive (female) part of the soul. Euterpe is responsible for *aulos* music corresponding to the “crowd” of men and the pleasurable part of the soul, promoting both pleasure and goodness, while

676. For a full collection of references to authors telling these stories, see GMW 2.492 n. 202.

677. 2.19 90.27–30: “τὴν μὲν γὰρ βλαβερὰν καὶ φευκτὴν μελωδίαν ὡς ἐξ κακίαν καὶ διαφθορὰν ὑπαγομένην θηριώδεισι τὴν μορφήν καὶ θνηταῖς γυναιξὶ ταῖς Σειρήσι περιέθηκαν/the kind of melody that is damaging and to be avoided, because it leads on to vice and ruin, they ascribed to the Sirens, mortal women in the shape of beasts.” Odysseus does the only right thing: flee. For Aristides, the Sirens’ appearance as women in the shape of beasts is certainly not accidental.

another type (not further specified),⁶⁷⁸ which can bring benefit to those suffering from the toils of work but needs a lot of knowledge and moderation (ἐπιστήμη, σωφροσύνη), is attached to Athena being a warlike woman—and ultimately this form is not recommended for those seeking wisdom, as displayed by the stories of Athena throwing away the *aulos* and the punishment of Marsyas for esteeming it too high. Pythagoras supposedly considered the *aulos* as defiling the ears and had them washed after hearing it, for it deals with the inferior part of the soul while the lyre corresponds to the rational part. And so, since the whole universe follows (as still to be shown) the same order as the soul, the “wise men,” by means of only the pure cithara and lyre, reach out and cling to the beauties of the aetherial world in its simplicity and mutual concord, likening themselves to it through virtue (2.18 90.18–2.19 92.18).⁶⁷⁹

Cosmic Order Through Music

With this, the ethical part of Aristides’ treatment of music is technically brought to a conclusion. Nevertheless, he adds another whole book to undergird the previous with mathematical and physical principles⁶⁸⁰ and thus undertakes to develop once more, according to the Pythagorean (and to lesser degree the Aristoxenian) tradition, the ratio theory of musical intervals, concords, and proportions. This leads him to engage in number speculation (from ch. 6 onward).⁶⁸¹ In ch. 8 he

678. Maybe this refers to the male part of the soul with its aggressive, warlike tendency that needs to be tamed.

679. 2.19 92.16–18: “τῆς δὲ τῶν ἐκεῖθι καλῶν διηγεκοῦς τε ἀπλότητος καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα συμφωνίας διὰ τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὁμοιώσεως ἀντεχόμενοι.” These considerations roughly correspond to what we have seen early about Pythagorean music therapy. Schäfer 1937, 306 n. 2, believes that the lyre is more prone to support reason, due to the fact that it allows singing and playing at the same time.

680. He mentions at 3.1 94.5–11 the unreliability of the body and of sense perception (attributing this view in a questionable way to the Pythagoreans, cf. GMW 2.495 n. 3, and at 3.1 96.26–28 to Plato, cf. Barker n. 12 *ad loc.*). At 3.2 97.5–7, he again cites Pythagoras praising the greater perfection of intellectual (mathematical) “music” over the one that can be heard (“τὴν ἀκρότητα τὴν ἐν μουσικῇ νοητῶς μᾶλλον δι’ ἀριθμῶν ἢ αἰσθητῶς δι’ ἀκοῆς ἀναληπτέον.” In ch. 7, he contrasts the imprecisions and defects of this world with the purity and perfection in the higher regions and thus explains the inaccuracies in setting up music systems practically in agreement with the mathematically conceived numbers and ratios; numbers and proportions are of similar importance in other disciplines, conferring beauty to paintings and accuracy to medicine (ch. 8).

681. Some examples: “1” is the first principle (ἀρχή) and concord (συμφωνία) of the universe, holding all things together through ἁρμονία; “9” is assigned to music for being composed by the numbers displaying the three concordant ratios (2+3+4=9), further because the

shows how concordant ratios (“σύμφωνα”) are relevant in multiple areas of life, bringing about unanimity (ὁμόνοια), fortune (τύχη), understanding (φρόνησις), settled condition (κατάστασις), and friendship (φιλία), even transferring unharmoniousness into harmony. The spirited part of the soul is a mean between the appetitive and the rational, thus harmonizing both,⁶⁸² similar to different areas of politics where the mean is always the integrating factor for bearing a similarity to both extremes (“ὁμοιότητα πρὸς τοὺς ἄκρους”)—how the world could be organized in such a way and music not, thus Aristides rhetorically asks upon concluding this section on the arithmetic foundations of music (at 3.8 107.12).

As none of the beautiful things can be established apart from being in συμφωνία with the universe, so music draws its existence and power from the likeness (ὁμοιότης) to it, and it does so in a very particular way beyond the other arts, because in its composition out of opposites it bears the very image (εἰκὼν) of the universal harmony (3.9 107.13–108.5).⁶⁸³ Aristides goes into much detail to demonstrate all sorts of analogies between musical and cosmic or natural principles which cannot and need not all be reproduced here; I shall highlight the ones most relevant to us, without going into the particular reasoning behind each of them.⁶⁸⁴

Music as an art limits the possible infinity of note pitches, just as the demiurge gives boundary and balanced measure (συμμετρία), and thus their beauty, to

harmonia and rotation of the universe render 9, and because the seven planets and two not moving spheres make up 9. “12” is the “μουσικώτατος” of all numbers because of all the different ratios it contains. Some of these number speculations are found in a similar way in Theon of Smyrna, as Barker attests in his notes to this chapter. Augustine takes the same path in his *De musica*.

682. 3.8 106.80–82: “εἰ δέ γε καὶ τὰς ἐν ψυχῇ μεσότηας θεωρεῖν ἐθέλοις, εὐρήσεις λογισμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας μέσσην τὴν κατὰ τὸ θυμικὸν ἀμφοῖν ἀναλογίαν.”

683. Notice that he speaks here about human music, not music as such. At this point, Aristides adds another invocation of the divinity, which, as at the beginning (see n. 637), I believe to be directed to the demiurge (“κατ’ ἀρχὰς παραληπτέον τὸν πάσης μὲν σωματικῆς συστάσεως, πάσης δὲ ψυχικῆς ἁρμονίας ἐπιστάτην/we must call upon [the same god] that we invoked at the outset, the lord of the constitution of every body and the *harmonia* of every soul”) rather than to Apollo (so Barker in n. 78 and Mathiesen n. 140 *ad loc.*), for, with all respect, Apollo cannot be credited with the creation of all bodies; the god invoked should possess patronage over the subject that is treated, in this case: the universe. The clear invocation of Apollo (“μουσαγέτης θεός”) at the end (at 3.27 134.6–7) is evident as the author thanks him for completing his task, which certainly corresponds to this divinity. Thus the invocations throughout the work take up the symmetric pattern of AD: DA (A = Apollo, D = demiurge).

684. For a more complete summary, Mathiesen 1983, 42–57, is helpful.

bodies, souls, and climates (3.10 110.1–9). The concordant intervals of octave, fifth, and fourth correspond to the triadic nature of the beings in the universe: ever-living divine (complete—octave), lifeless bodies (fourth), and intermediate (mortal animals—fifth); similarly, the three genera correspond to the dimensions of line (enharmonic), depth (diatonic), and plane (chromatic), and for each of these assignments Aristides gives reasons and further subdivisions (3.11 110.10–111.27). He shows how all numbers related to music have particular importance in the universe (3.12 111.28–112.27).⁶⁸⁵ The total number of tones in all possible genera is 28, the number of a moon phase, with each 14 rising (waxing) and falling (waning) (3.13 112.28–113.14). Each of the tetrachords⁶⁸⁶ (as assembled in ascending order within the whole system) corresponds to a sense organ and element, from lowest to highest: touch/earth, taste/water, smell/air, hearing/fire, sight/aether (3.14 113.15–114.28), or also to a virtue, again from lowest to highest: moderation (σωφροσύνη) as abstention from illegitimate enjoyment, moderation as right measure in legitimate enjoyment, justice (δικαιοσύνη), manliness/courage (ἀνδρία) against vice and the attachment to the body, understanding (φρόνησις). Moderation and justice correspond to the appetitive part of the soul, manliness/courage to the spirited, and understanding to the rational part, each corresponding to one of the three fifths of the full *systema*, while the two octaves resemble the division of the soul into two general parts (3.16 115.17–116.12). The *systema* contains also the path of the soul from childhood onward to either vice or virtue (3.17 116.13–117.17).⁶⁸⁷ Harmonic and rhythmic ratios find equivalencies in pregnancy cycles⁶⁸⁸ and body proportions; bodies are beautiful when they are proportional to concordant intervals, that is, not ignobly effeminate (ἄδοξος θηλύτης) but when displaying the soul's fitness (ἐπιτηδειότης) for manly goodness (ἀνδραγαθία) from which stem virtue and friendship—Aristides here cites Plato's statement (from *Resp.* 403c) that the objective of music is the love for what is good/beautiful (“τὰ τοῦ καλοῦ ἐρωτικά”) (3.18 117.18–118.28). The four elements, and through them the seasons, are assigned to specific figures and numbers, and thus they relate according to the proportions of concordant intervals (3.19 118.29–119.20). These intervals also correspond to the universe: fourth to matter, fifth to aether, and the octave to the melodious movement of the planets, the harmony of the spheres, which he

685. He says, they are sacred and effective (at 112.14–15: “Τῶν δὲ διὰ κατὰ μουσικὴν ἀριθμῶν ἅπαντες ἱεροὶ τε καὶ τελεσιουργοί”).

686. The Greek scale system is based on tetrachords (four distinct tones, the extremes spanning the interval of a fourth).

687. Barker 2005, 165–168, discusses chs. 14–17 with more detail.

688. Barker (GMW 2.518 nn. 148–155) finds similar calculations in a multiplicity of other sources; one could add what we have seen in Censorinus.

then begins to explain in his own way (3.20 119.21–120.29).⁶⁸⁹ Letters, notes, and gods are dispensed to the planets and zodiac regions along with their male, female, or mixed characteristics, and to each of these also the appropriate (πρέπων) musical modes (συστήματα, τρόποι),⁶⁹⁰ rhythms, and instruments (3.21 120.30–3.22 123.4).

The last four lines in ch. 22 require comment, which will at the same time help to clarify an important point about all these analogies. Aristides states that rhythms and instruments will be chosen in a balanced way, fine-tuning excess or defect in activity. Barker comments here that “this sentence is not descriptive of planetary music. It returns to the recommendations for musical education and therapy set out in Book II.”⁶⁹¹ This leads to the question of what Aristides is actually doing in these chapters. Even though the idea of the audibility of the spheric harmony (even if rarely actually realized) might suggest that Aristides is composing (or rather, deciphering) a sort of “cosmic symphony” with the different musical parameters at work, this can obviously not be the case, because planetary movements do not show any “rhythms,” nor would it make sense to assume that they emit the sounds of the lyre or the *aulos*. We need to keep in mind that Aristides had set out to show the superior origin, and through it the great value and dignity, of our earthly music, both in terms of musical practice (with its various functions) and theory.⁶⁹² These assignments, then, are rather meant to signify a matrix of principles (mostly ratios) that are at work in the cosmos, human nature,

689. Part of his explanation is based on Aristotolian doctrine, but some is original. He states that we cannot hear this harmony because of the great distance and the soul’s union to the body, but the “higher powers” may permit it to become at least in part perceptible for those who are particularly virtuous (at 3.20 120.13–14: “τοῖς δὲ βελτίοσι τῶν μὴ φαύλως ἐν ἀνθρώποις βεβιωκότων”) and understanding (ἐπιστήμων). Notice that a virtuous life is the condition for being *allowed* to hear it, not *per se* for being *able* to hear it.

690. Barker clarifies (GMW 2.523 n. 182) that these are now “corresponding to *harmoniai* in the old sense,” not just key transpositions. Helpful diagrams for the various distributions can be consulted in Mathiesen 1983, 43–54, or id. 1999, 563–578.

691. GMW 2.524 n. 187. The relevant passage reads (123.19–22): “ὅπου μὲν πλείονος ἐνεργείας χρειαί, δι’ ὁμοιότητος τὴν ἀκρότητα προσκαλούμενοι, ὅπου δὲ ὑφειμένης, διὰ τῆς τῶν ἀνομοίων μίξεως τὰς ὑπερβολὰς ἀνακεραννύντες/Where greater activity is needed, we shall summon up an extreme by means of similarity, and where more muted activity is needed we shall dilute excesses with an admixture of things that are dissimilar.” Notice that in the Greek edition, these lines do not even form a fresh sentence but continue the current one directly after a comma.

692. Cf. Mathiesen 1983, 42; 45: “With these associations, Aristides Quintilianus is able to show (...) how music presents a paradigm for ‘every age and the whole of life’” (the reference is to 1.1). For the following, see also id., 54.

and equally in music. The ultimate goal for human nature is to recuperate the perfect order and harmony, which it had lost due to the soul's union to the body and the imperfect conditions on earth. The mediums to recover this order are music education and therapy, because music possesses in itself the ingredients to match the cosmic order. But since human music suffers the same limitations as humans themselves, musical science helps us to adjust music and its use to the ideal celestial harmony; the use of such music, then, will also restore the original order within the human body and soul. If this interpretation is correct, then the lines at the end of ch. 22 do not form a (quite abrupt and unexpected) break of topic. All of the distributions of analogy were ruled by "likeness" (ὁμοιότης) (e.g. male letter → male tone → male planet → male divinity → male *tropos*, etc.); having accomplished the discussion of musical parameters, Aristides is now simply reminding us that, as Barker correctly points out, in education and therapy all of these will need to be adjusted according to the particular requirements and circumstances. Music, which is composed according to the interplay of male and female elements as also observable in the physical and cosmic qualities and processes of elements, senses, seasons, weather, growth in shape and virtue, planets, and even divinities, will seek the balance reflected in them and use tones, modes, instruments, and rhythms in a formula of purity or mixture that is "appropriate" to the desired function.⁶⁹³

For the remaining chapters, Aristides first turns to the musical dimension of the World Soul, based on Plato's *Timaeus* and the related writings by Plutarch and

693. A similar point should be made about the analogies of elements, senses, and virtues to tetrachords, which, as Barker 2005, 168–171, demonstrates, cannot constitute the attempt "to create a consistent 'musical map' of the soul," where, as he has noticed earlier (163), the absence of mathematical ratios (which, for the rest, play such an important role in Aristides' system) is quite conspicuous. One could point out in addition that the ethical value of "high" and "low" would be described in a contradictory way, as e.g. in 3.14 for the elements the least noble ones (earth and water) belongs to the lowest (and therefore male) tetrachords, while in 2.14, lower pitch systems received positive and the higher rather negative ethos assignments (cf. especially 82.1–3). Aristides, then, does not intend to say that particular musical pieces, by applying particular tetrachords, would conjure up certain virtues or activate particular senses. Here the relationship between the musical elements and those of the soul, virtues, etc. is only "real" regarding the principle of a proper hierarchical order, which is governing both spheres. Therefore, the examples of how this order is present in both do not need to be mutually compatible as long as general order is achieved. It is also clear that virtues and vices in their relationship are not mathematically quantifiable. While the musical elements analyzed in book two indeed aim at a direct ethical effect on the soul for the sake of education and therapy, book three exemplifies for a good part the fundamental principles of consonance and dissonance and illustrates the scalar nature of opposites in all different realms of the world.

Proclus, applying the previous number speculations to the zodiac, which contains rhythmic and harmonic ratios (3.23 123.23–125.20). Then he deduces from these numbers an astrological influence on the soul's power and essence, insofar as the basic numbers correspond to the four basic virtues as the soul's "greatest goods" ("τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν") and to the body's good fortune (εὐποτμία), in the following way:⁶⁹⁴

Table 3–2. Benefits for soul and body in AQ.3.24 127.1–12.

Number	Soul	Body	Explanation
1	understanding (φρόνησις)	/	γνώσις is μοναδική/ἀπλή (simple)
2	manliness/courage (ἀνδρία)	strength (ισχύς)	ὁρμή/μετάβασις (impulse/shifting) from one part to the other
3	moderation (σωφροσύνη)	beauty (κάλλος)	συμμετρία of parts/colors
4	justice (δικαιοσύνη)	health (ὕγεια)	ὁμόνοια (concord) between parts
7	?	?	?

Mathematic-geometrical-musical proportions conclude the analysis of the balanced relationship between body and soul and illustrate the gender-based polarity between them (1.24 125.21–128.27). With this, all things are in place to return to the topic of musical therapy, now within its full scope of meaning.

Given the divine nature of music, melodic composition takes its natural origin in the soul through "ἐνθουσιασμός"⁶⁹⁵ as a way to overcome the ignorance, forgetfulness (ἀγνώσια, λήθη), disorder, vehement emotion, and madness (ταραχή, πτοίησις, μανία), which it suffers since its union with the body. This negative state is sedated (καταστέλλω) or cleared (ἐκκαθαίρω) through mimetic melody and dance either performed directly (for people with a savage nature) or rather through listening and hearing (for people with a more educated and ordered nature); thus the Bacchic rites have their cathartic function here.⁶⁹⁶ Just as Apollo, the sun god,

694. I am providing this table as there is no diagram in Mathiesen and it is a good example for the type of classifications that Aristides sets up. The Greek text is corrupt upon introducing the number 7 when he notes that an equivalent for "prudence" for the body is lacking. Probably more was said on other numbers in the missing section since the preserved text resumes discussing a double *tetraktys* with odd and even numbers.

695. Little does it seem to matter here what Aristides said earlier, that this occurs usually just in "old men" (2.4 58.1–5).

696. This idea certainly recalls Aristotle's concept of musical catharsis, with all the difficulty of properly understanding it (see nn. 381 and 382). If we take what Aristides remarked earlier

orders matter with his plectrum, so the melody made up of solmisized notes (based on the vowels with the prefixed “τ” and their respective ethos) is order (κόσμος) for the soul. Rhythm, Aristides briefly adds, is composed out of arsis (destructive) and thesis (constructive). He draws no further conclusions from this (3.25 128.128.28–130.24). The work ends with a reflection on fate, which can, in things not essential for the course of the universe, undergo modification just as a melody may continue the way it started or modulate differently (3.26 130.25–132.30), and lastly with the affirmation that music (here understood as the compound of science as laid out in his own work) is the initiation (μυσταγωγία) and gentle preparation (προτέλειος εὐμενής) for philosophy,⁶⁹⁷ which, as Plato had taught, is the ultimate path for the soul away from the body and the changing world in the sublunar realm (3.27 133.1–134.11).

Evaluation

Mathiesen states that for many neo-Pythagorean (and neo-Platonic) authors music is prominently seen “as a physical manifestation of cosmic harmony,” which requires them “to understand and judge music in terms that suit its paradigmatic role.”⁶⁹⁸ Aristides has probably advanced the furthest in this direction. For the modern reader, much of what Aristides writes in the second half of his work is hard to swallow. The accuracy or consistency of all these analogies—often provided by previous authors in various, mutually exclusive forms—is in many ways questionable, and we might be tempted to simply dismiss them. Among several present-day scholars his elaborations evoke more pity than admiration.⁶⁹⁹ We

about the proper dosis of elements for musical therapy, this catharsis is hardly imagined to be “madness” itself, but the homoeopathic strategy is indicated by the mimetic nature of the procedure (see n. 566).

697. This is a somewhat surprising turn, not prepared for in the introduction, even though fully in line with Aristides’ mentor Plato.

698. Mathiesen 1990, 42, with reference to authors such as Archytas, Theophrastus, Thrasyllus, Eratosthenes, and Dionysius who feature in Porphyry’s commentary on Ptolemy’s *Harmonics*.

699. E.g. Hagel Forthcoming, 14, calls the system simply “poor” (cf. nn. 386 and 387); Anderson 1966, 155, talks about the “wearying amount” of cosmic speculation in his work, something that Aristotle and Philodemus “condemned.” The point about Aristotle probably rests on his rejection of the Pythagorean concept of the harmony of the spheres (see above n. 109). One cannot deny, however, that also Aristotle, in many of his physical writings, was relying on ancient theories about the cosmos and elements that do not hold any longer in modern science. Even hard-core scientists such as Ptolemy and later Kepler and Newton had no scruples against entertaining such “speculations.”

might find the analogies forced, and from the point of view of modern scientific knowledge and method in many cases they simply cannot be upheld. On the other hand, the ancient philosophers were no less than our physicists in search of an integrated explanation of the universe and were eager to draw connections of all kinds. In order to appreciate Aristides correctly, we need to evaluate the significance of his system within the mindset and scientific tenets of his own time and the explicatory force of musical ethos within such a framework. Afterwards, in a separate step, we shall consider whether some of his reflections may be of lasting value.

What then can we draw from this long exposé for the value of music? Unfortunately, Aristides does not provide a final synthesis in which he would pull all strings together. I propose consolidating the points relevant for us as follows:

1. Order and beauty in the universe rest on the harmony (concordant musical ratios) between elements which are by themselves ethically determined.⁷⁰⁰ Therefore, music, in its “divine” form of a harmonized ethical polarity, penetrates all realities. Earthly music, then, derives its ethos not through mimetic adoption from exterior ethos-reflecting movements but possesses it *a priori* as its intrinsic structure. Musical *mimēsis* is simply the adjustment of particular parameters to fit a given “notion” (ἔννοια, ethical content).
2. Musical ethos can be gaged by means of a duality of characteristics, and mixed combinations thereof, as reflected in nature and human nature (male-female).
3. All parameters in music are ethically relevant: content, diction (if there is text), tone, intervals, *systema/harmonia/tonos*, genus, style, melody, rhythm, modulation, instruments, and delivery; only the “complete melody” achieves the full psychological effect. Reversely, (human) music is expected to reflect the ethical “notion” precisely in all these parameters through *mimēsis*.
4. Music is the best means to bestow order and harmony onto the irrational part of the soul. Its effect is subconscious and automatic. Its main goal is to achieve virtue, either in pedagogy (establishing it) or therapy (restoring it).
5. All musical elements should be adjusted to each other in a balanced way so as to reach the ethos required by context and purpose (worship, work, war, education, entertainment, etc.). The “ethical pyramid” is fully in place.

700. We need to keep in mind that “ethically,” according to our earlier terminological clarification, does not (yet) mean “good” or “bad,” but bearing certain characteristics.

6. Both homoeopathic and allopathic therapy find applications (even though not too clearly specified and explained).⁷⁰¹ Discordant relationships (ratios) are rendered harmonious through a mean that is concordant with both extremes.
7. People reveal their character by the ethos of the music they prefer, for the soul may express its state through specific musical ethos.
8. The noblest (and for education only) way of using music is to listen to (not perform) “manly” style; performing music, also of other styles, is acceptable for people not seeking excellence (the “common people” and when pleasure is sought, relief from toil, etc.). Hence, whether music is good depends on the propriety of ethos with regard to the audience in achieving a particular objective.
9. Good music, being in agreement with the cosmic and natural order, serves to bring enjoyment, harmony, and order into human realities, bestows stability to the State, and, in the best case, disposes to virtue, humanity, and philosophy.
10. Bad music (e.g. too much variety) perverts the soul to confusion, disorder, and vice, but already the lack of music creates imbalance in the soul. Bad music, especially through habituation, brings about the corruption of individual and communal life.

Metaphysics of Ethos. We are here at the high point of a development that began with the Pythagoreans, according to which all areas of life have been submitted to the interpretative key of harmonic analysis, the balanced order between opposite forces.⁷⁰² Aware of the audacity of doing so, I venture to call the first thesis above a “Copernican Revolution” in ancient music theory. Neither Aristides himself claims such a thing nor has there been any acknowledgment for it elsewhere. But I believe that Aristides Quintilianus is the only known ancient music philosopher who leads the century-old arithmetic, psychological, and cosmological theories to its ultimate consequence which rests mainly on two pillars: one is the duality

701. The most probable meaning is this: allopathic treatment strengthens the passions of the soul that are overpowered by the excessive dominion of others, whereas homoeopathic elements are indicated in cases when the first method would have driven the soul too much to the other extreme; cf. Barker 2005, 140–141.

702. Or, as Boccadoro 2002, 13, puts it: “*Convertito il confronto fra qualità antagoniste in una relazione fra numeri interi, l’analisi armonica estenderà le proprie competenze all’intera compagine dei fenomeni sottoposti a mescolanza.*”/Having turned the confrontation between opposing qualities into a relationship between whole numbers, the harmonic analysis will extend its own competences to the whole structure of phenomena that are subject to mixture.”

of male-female, which, according to Aristides, pervades all realities; the other is the already known principle of harmony. If the universe has been created out of elements that received in the very creative act an intrinsic quality charged with ethos, i.e. characteristics that establish a polarity or duality between the building blocks of all creation, and if these elements and their derivatives relate to each other in musically describable ratios that again in themselves possess ethos, then the dilemma of explaining the possibility of ethos in music is turned upside down, because the presence of harmonic principles in everything becomes the answer to the question why there is ethos in the world at all.⁷⁰³ Universal gender assignments are the condition on which the construction of an equally universal harmonic principle can be built. For this to be effective, Aristides transcends the level of imagery, analogy, and metaphor,⁷⁰⁴ which seemed still to be prevalent in Ptolemy, and dares to take for real and explain down to the smallest units of physical and spiritual nature the idea that musical ethos rules everything. Only if the elements out of which the universe is made *really* carry “male” or “female” characteristics, can they relate harmonically; and since they are the same ones that are composing body and soul, they are able to interact, resonate, between the different “harmonics” of reality (cosmic, earthly, body, soul), one influencing the other. The power of music on the human soul is then, as it were, astrology transposed an octave lower. This explains also why astrological considerations are naturally included into Aristides’ vision.

703. Mathiesen 1999, 544, gets close to the point when he states about Aristides’ theory: “Mimesis in music is not simple imitation of things but rather is an imitation of life itself, capable of raising the soul once again to the harmonia of the universe. This is why it is the most powerful art.” However, he does not see that, in a way, the other elements in the world are imitating music and not the other way around; he also does not draw the connection with the concept of ethos. Contrast Barker in GMW 2.396: “The thesis is not that the organisation of the universe is based on music. It is the converse, that music’s patterns of construction are drawn from those of the cosmos, and this fact is the basis of music’s power” with AQ 1.1 2.18–20: “the task of music is (...) to bring together and harmoniously combine all that belongs to nature” (ἔργον εἶναι μουσικῆς (...) πάνθ’ ὅσα φύσιν ἔχει συνάγειν τε καὶ συναρμόττειν), a Pythagorean tenet which Aristides brings as a confirmation for what he just said before, that the art of music reveals the ratios of the soul of the universe: “περὶ ψυχῆς (...) τῆς τοῦ παντὸς λόγους ἔχουσα παρασχεῖσθαι” (15–17; cf. also 2.19 92.3–5).

704. In this aspect, Zanolli 1977, 82–85 misses the point when she, in her just endeavor to show how Aristides goes beyond Plato, characterizes Aristides’ understanding of the mimetic character of music “*in un nuovo senso analogico-simbolico*.” If this were so, we would be back at square one asking ourselves: how is it that music can *symbolize* ethically relevant movements and then become itself ethically effective? Aristides, I believe, would respond: because music is not a symbol of ethos, but *is essentially* ethical.

A full treatment of this thesis is certainly not possible in the context of an author survey. Nevertheless, since, as far as I see, it has not been yet formulated in this way, in order to explain it at least incipiently, I see the need to clarify four points. First, as already hinted at (p. 336f), there is a difference between “music” as a cosmic principle,⁷⁰⁵ which is necessarily in harmony and keeps the all pervading ethos-polarity of elements in constant balance,⁷⁰⁶ and the sublunar earthly music, which is subdued to the changing contingencies of this realm and lacks the perfection that only harmonic science, by discovering the underlying mathematical ratios, can fathom. Human music participates in the cosmic one, but to different degrees. The key concept here, with which Aristides begins his work, is “propriety”: whatever music contributes to establish on earth and in human beings, especially in their soul, that harmony which the cosmos exhibits, will be “proper.” Since the different parts of the human soul respond to music that is of their kind (whithin the whole scale of mixtures that either natural character or the movements of the passions may bring forth), properly chosen music is able to provoke in the soul (and through instruments also in the body, according to Aristides’ distribution) the desired ethical state by making those areas resonate that need to be strengthened. “Proper” and “improper” now adopt also a moral quality, for the soul’s confused passions are prone to produce bad attitudes (vices), which lead to evil behavior and actions. Previous authors already envisioned that music, by somehow resembling and expressing good behavior (or generally “action/movement”), forms or restores order in the soul. New in Aristides is that the very fabric of the soul is not only metaphorically analogous but *ontologically identical* with the ethos-elements that compose the universe, and the principle of this correspondence is music.⁷⁰⁷

705. While “music,” thus understood, appears to be such a thing only in a metaphorical way—music (b) according to our definition—, as that definition of music departs from the sonic phenomenon human beings are familiar with, for Aristides the celestial music is the *principes analogatum* for “earthly” or human music (cf. 3.7 105.18–22 vs. 3.9 107 15–20).

706. Therefore I disagree with Barker 2005, 156, who states that “male” in Aristides has, among other characteristics, the general meaning of “good” and “female” the one of “bad.” The cosmic duality is reconciled and none of the poles is intrinsically bad. Aristides shows no signs of adhering to gnostic metaphysics of two eternal principles of good and an evil. The “negativity” commences only once the soul enters the sublunar sphere. With respect to this, notice that the duality between “consonance” and “dissonance” (which do have the value of positive and negative) corresponds to ratios, *not* to its elements (of “male” or “female” ethos) themselves. See also below the third clarification.

707. Cf. Mathiesen 1999, 524: “Music provides a paradigm for the order of the soul and the universe,” for music is an art that “transcends time and physical nature and offers a key to the order of the soul and the universe.” Human music, we must specify, while music *per se* is this order.

Human music “incarnates” these principles and thus forms the natural pathway between ideal and psychic ethos. Its power lies in the significance of its elementary components, and its value, for the good or the bad, lies in the ability to bring about (or not) cosmic harmony in human beings. One last use of “music” is that of musical (or harmonic) science, a prelude to philosophy as in Plato. Upon reading Aristides, one will need to carefully discern which of these three uses of music he means by μουσική: universal (the rational principle of harmony), earthly/human (sonic-practical, including the art, sometimes in a wide sense including poetry and dance, sometimes in a narrow sense), and scientific.⁷⁰⁸

Secondly, by shifting the vantage point from movement and its ratios, prevalent e.g. in pseudo-Aristotle and Ptolemy as the basis to explain the perception of order and ethos, to a more ontological conception (characteristics inherent to the elements that constitute the world, conceived as the male-female duality), with Aristides ethos becomes an intrinsic factor of the nature (cf. the notorious “φύσει”) of all beings, which is the condition for their ability to relate in a *harmonious*, that is, musical way—while that relationship as such is one of proportion and reason.⁷⁰⁹ Still, this does not mean, as we have seen, that all connections that Aristides draws, are to be taken in an ontological sense. In book two (chs. 12ff), he does literally mean a direct ethos-coloring of language and music on the one hand and the parts of the soul on the other. In contrast, his comparison of senses, elements, virtues, etc. to tetrachords in book three (which are comparable to ones in Ptolemy, cf. above at n. 303),⁷¹⁰ rather serve to illustrate the common ruling principle of polarity

708. Martianus Capella summarizes these functions of music (there “*harmonia*”) at 9.922–924, for the science then 9.930ff.

709. Barker 2005, 174–175, compares the scientifically proceeding “harmonic reason” in Ptolemy’s conception with Aristides’ “very vaguely conceived” first principle. One could argue that Aristides, even though he does not state it as explicitly as Ptolemy (at 3.3 92.27–93.4), took it for granted that the demiurge applied the same mathematical reasoning that he also exposes in his treatise. Barker admits that Ptolemy’s analysis of the soul no more satisfies his expectation of mathematical precision than Aristides. The reason for this seems to me to lie in the fact that “movements of the soul,” virtues, and emotions, ultimately ethos, are not mathematically quantifiable (see already above at n. 693). I confess that I do not quite comprehend Barker’s suggestion of how else this could be achieved (pp. 189–190).

710. Barker favors Ptolemy for his clearer scientific method and the more mathematical approach to establish the parallelisms between cosmos, music, and the soul. But Ptolemy’s analogies still do not seem to me more convincing than those of Aristides. In 2005, 185, Barker claims “that there is nothing arbitrary about Ptolemy’s lists of the soul’s powers and virtues,” but the grounds for this statement are only similar lists in other authors (with the underlying principles remaining obscure) and the statement that their numeric matching with notes of the intervals could hardly be a coincidence. I believe, both could be said

as expressed in a scalar order, but they are not intended to establish a nexus of causality or direct mutual influence between these categories (cf. above n. 693).

Thirdly, it is important to distinguish different levels of *mimēsis*. At 2.4 56.27–57.6, Aristides describes music *quoad nos* as mimetically similar to previous authors, since, at this point, he has not yet introduced the ontological dimension of ethos; human music (i.e. when the composer seeks to make his music match the content—“τὸ ἀπαγγελλόμενον”, 56.20) represents (“μιμεῖται”) “real” human actions (“τὰς πράξεις”), so here the actions precede musical *mimēsis* (as explained in book two), and also musical science is derived from the “nature of the universe” (3.7 105.18–19). On the cosmic level, however, the opposite is true: it is the universal harmony, from which earthly realities are imitated.⁷¹¹ The “notes” of the universe are elements and planets, performing harmony through ratios. The complete order, then, consists in the following: celestial harmony governs the perfect realm of the (supralunar) universe; this, through the World Soul, governs the sublunar movements and actions; these are resembled by human music, which, for being music, is able to be re-identified (and purified) with the celestial harmony by means of the science of music (or harmonics) and, through the art of music, it is able also to restore harmony in human souls and affairs.

Male-Female. Fourthly, it is important to notice a differentiated use of gender terms in Aristides, something which he does not make very explicit but which we can trace. The assignment of gender to vowels and other realities is old,⁷¹² and so is the traditional, certainly somewhat “chauvinistic”⁷¹³ tendency to interpret male characteristics as more positive than female ones. It calls the attention, however, that many of the descriptions of the passions in the spirited part of the soul, identified with “male,” are also less than complimentary (e.g. 2.6 62.25–63.24; 2.8 67.3–68.13, cf. n. 661), and, after all, human beings of either sex possess both parts.

about Aristides as well. When Barker states (p. 186) that “the species of concord and of virtue correspond *because* they are alternative manifestations of the same formal property” (i.e. “melodiousness,” cf. above n. 302), then I would respond: yes, they correspond well on the level of *analogy*; but does this establish an effective causality of ethos? Only Aristides’ ethical metaphysics provides this link.

711. 3.7 104.4–7 together with what follows from 3.9 onward; also 3.20 119.22: “Ἔστιν οὖν κἀν τῷ τοῦ παντὸς σώματι παράδειγμα μουσικῆς ἐναργές”: the universe is a clear model of music, i.e. it is modeled according to music: it corresponds to male and female notes and their mutual relationship (ratio).

712. Barker 2005, 156 gives evidence of some earlier conceptions of gender classifications; cf. above n. 147.

713. Barker 2005, 155.

But especially when Aristides assigns gender to elements and planets, it becomes obvious that he cannot be thinking simply of “male” as “good” and “female” as bad (Jupiter, for instance, is curiously attributed with female ethos, quite positively tinted, at 3.21 121.28–122.7).⁷¹⁴ As already mentioned, in the cosmic sphere there is no imperfection, and both genders possess equal validity and importance in establishing harmony. In the human soul, suffering change and limitation, the irrational parts of the soul need to be “tuned” so that the best possible ethos is achieved—for which again both parts are required and have their positive value; they become negative if one of them is excessive. In music therapy, each gender is emphasized according to context and need.

This being said, there seems to be in Aristides an unreconciled conflation of conflicting gender qualifications, one prompted by the cosmological-metaphysical vision of untainted harmony and its resulting ideal for the human soul, the other by traditional stereotypes, reflected, for instance, in the clear preference to the male as in the stipulation to follow “male” ethos for the education of the best. But apart from these shortcomings, a more fundamental question arises: on what grounds are the genders assigned to specific notes as the foundation for the other melodic elements? Barker has highlighted a certain arbitrariness, since Aristides derives the *ēthē* from a solmization system.⁷¹⁵ Does it make sense to claim hearing a male or female tone (especially if it were without singing it to a particular vowel)? An answer to this question might be found if we detach ourselves (and Aristides’ theory) from the controversial gender association and instead reason in more general terms of duality. If we summon the various characteristics under different labels (such as “being tense” and “being relaxed”—two terms which Aristides actually uses when he introduces the general division of the irrational part of the soul in 2.2 54.23–26)—, we might find confirmed that these principles are applicable to many realities in the world. But even to individual tones? This would depend on how much one were willing to subscribe to a theory that establishes ethos for either specific pitch levels absolutely or, at least, to pitches in relationship to each other (intervals). We need to leave this discussion for a later moment, but with regard to the value judgments of “good” or “bad,” they would only apply to musical parameters in dependence of the pedagogical or therapeutical functions which Aristides has described. For intrinsically good or bad music independent

714. This may be one of the reasons why Aristides does not consistently assign a gender to all phenomena (e.g. he omits it completely for rhythm at 3.25 130.16–24). Jupiter is associated with Phrygian *φθόγγος* in Plin. *HN* 2.84 (with Saturn sounding in Dorian) and (according to a text emendation) in Mart. Cap. 2.196.

715. Barker 2005, 159.

from context, Aristides does not offer any example. While he mentions “bad” and harmful melodies, he does not take sides in any dispute about particular musical styles such as treated in pseudo-Plutarch or Athenaeus.

Despite Aristides’ claim of completeness, a few aspects seem to be left out in his work. We already mentioned earlier that he passes over the ethical value of genus. Furthermore, he takes no stand on the legitimacy of pure instrumental music (most of his exposition seems to be based on the archaic combination of song, music, and dance).⁷¹⁶ Then, he does not censure any concrete “content” (the text to be sung) as Plato did. And we would have expected him to elaborate more about the congruency between text and melody (not just between text and diction), for he analyzes how vowels and tones correspond, and that only for the artificial case of solmization, but not how words or sentences and melody/rhythm would. That last omission, especially, could be taken as an indication that his theory is out of touch with the actual musical reality—something hard to imagine for someone so passionate about the benefits of music, including the practical ones. It seems, then, that he decides to remain on the level of principles and leaves to the reader the task of applying them to existing musical pieces and performances.

Conclusion. Overall, Aristides’ analyses are much more nuanced than most of the material that we find in earlier authors, probably the result of long centuries of discussion and dispute about the original theses as stated by Damon, Plato, and Aristotle. On the other hand, as mentioned, we cannot deny that a detailed analysis of his work reveals a lot of problems. This has led scholars like Barker, who honestly intends to treat Aristides with benevolence, to judge that his analogies hardly “rest on firm foundations,” and that, “for all their ingenuity, they are unsystematic, impressionistic and vague.”⁷¹⁷ Without pretending to be a “honey-tongued advocate”⁷¹⁸ of Aristides, I believe he still deserves more credit first for his achievement of reaching a unique synthesis of the ancient view on musical ethos, and second for his fascinating idea of giving musical ethos an ontological foundation that

716. Zanicelli 1977, 82–84 with n. 130, argues that “*l'utilizzazione della musica al servizio di un testo diventa predominante*/the use of music at the service of a text becomes predominant,” but she seems to confuse text with “ἔννοια,” which is the *ethical* “notion” (or content) which leads everything (“προκαθηγείται (...) παντῶς”, AQ 2.7 65.24–25). Even though Aristides does not say this explicitly, we should be able to deduce from the equivalency between the ethical value of the elements of diction (λέξις), letters, and those of music, tones, that melody is able to create ἔννοια as much as text, which, then, should also work *without* text.

717. Barker 2005, 162.

718. Barker 2005, 171.

offers a consistent explanation for the actual effectiveness of music,⁷¹⁹ certainly within the limits of a quite particular cosmology. But since we cannot really accept that multitude of theories and assumptions such as a perfect planetary world with its divinities and World Soul, the ensoulment of the body as described, and the ancient physics of elements, the question remains how much value his system can have for our own questions on musical ethos.

Without anticipating the still pending systematic analysis of musical value, the following points may be kept as valid contributions or at least “talking points”:

- Musical ethos, and with it the question of musical *mimēsis*, might be founded on a universal principle of duality within nature (such as “tension and relaxation”) which would explain both the influence of music on the human psyche and the musical representation of emotion. For this, the question needs to be answered whether it makes sense to attribute a musically describable ethos to constitutive elements in the world and their relations towards each other.
- Musical value needs to be judged in view of the specific function (or purpose) that its ethos elicits on the human being, namely whether it promotes concordance and harmony or not.
- Musical ethos needs to be judged from the compound of all parameters in their combination.
- The effect of music on the human psyche is complex; therapy needs to proceed with care and testing so as to ascertain the proper musical “mix.”

Aristides’ cosmic vision of “musical” planets and gods is surprisingly similar to the vision at the beginning of Tolkien’s *Silmarillion*: male and female “divinities,” each one with his or her particular ethos, join into harmony which will be resembled in the world’s movements and actions. Music and song, in Tolkien’s epic, is also more than enjoyable entertainment: it re-unites to the world of the past and, ultimately, makes present anew the harmony as it was conceived by the Ainur.

Martianus Capella

The ninth and last book of Martianus Capella’s *De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii*,⁷²⁰ a literary rendering of ancient scientific knowledge in the context of an allegorical

719. By the way, not only on the human soul and on the body; its often described “magic” impact on animals and other elements might find explanation through this as well.

720. Text: Dick 1969 (book nine is digitalized at http://www.hs-augsburg.de/~harsch/Chronologia/Lspost05/Martianus/mar_nu09.html, accessed on November 22,

wedding feast, deals with “harmony.” The more technical second part (on melody and rhythm) follows closely, but not without changes, the footsteps of Aristides Quintilianus (and in some sections Cleonides and even Aristoxenus), whereas the first part on the power of music is probably drawing from the lost musical works of Varro and a number of other sources (e.g. Theophrastus). Musical ethos is dealt with only sporadically and without offering any theoretical reflections. Traces of Aristides’ system, however, can be observed. I shall give only a brief overview of those descriptions that relate to points seen earlier on.

The poetic opening of the whole work invokes Hymenaeus “*psallentem*” who through “sacred embrace” promotes “*dissona nexa*” (1.1)—the concept of the unifying function of harmony is present from the outset. A little later on, as Mercurius is seeking for Apollo and finds him at the Parnassus, he is surrounded by a remarkable “*canora modulatio melico*” produced by the trees of Apollo’s grove, with high notes from the wind’s rustling in the upper branches of the tall trees and the lower ones uttering a shaking “*gravitas rauca*,” together with the intermediates, this *carmen* resounds in a divine harmony framed by the concords of octave, fifth, and fourth. Apollo himself, here identical with the sun god, is its origin for he is also responsible for the equally crafted (“*parili ratione*”) harmony of the spheres⁷²¹ (1.11–12). This spheric harmony is mentioned again shortly after (at 1.26–27) as Apollo ascends with his chariot and the Muses, carried by a white shining and melodious bird (swan); the music of the planets and seven spheres is described as exceedingly sweet,⁷²² with each of the Muses sitting on one of them. As the story goes on, each of the major divinities receives an instrument as attribute (1.66–67).

In the context of marriage number speculations, the perfect number 3 (corresponding to Mercury) is exalted with reference to the three *symphoniae* (intervals), the number 4 (belonging to Philology) as containing the basis for all other *symphoniae* or concords (cf. again at 7.733) and thus for all songs—hence the union of both numbers suggests a happy marriage between the two spouses; other number associations follow, combining musical with non-musical realities, and even gender, as odd numbers are male and even ones female (cf. p. 178 n. 117). All

2015); Willis 1983; tr.: Stahl 1977; comm. (on the sections on music): Wille 1967, 634–655; Stahl 1971, 53–54 (on the sources), 202–227; Mathiesen 1999, 622–629 (with a useful concordance between Mart. Cap. and AQ on pp. 627–628).

721. “*Nec mirum, quod Apollinis silva ita rata modificatione congrueret, cum caeli quoque orbes idem Delius moduletur in sole*” (1.12). For another musical description of nature sounds in a later author see Clem. Al. *Strom.* 6.3.33.

722. “*Superi autem globi orbesque septemplex suavius cuiusdam melodiae harmonicis tinnitibus concinebant ac sono ultra solitum dulciore, quippe Musas adventare praesenserant.*” These spheres are revisited as Philology passes through them on her way to heaven (160–209).

culminates with the octave, and the fullness of harmony is reached (2.105–108). Difference (in character) and similarity (in perfection) are the foundation for harmonic union.

As Philology dresses for the marriage, the Muses intone a whole concert outside her door, accompanied by pipes, strings, and organ; these instruments give way to a final a capella chorus of the Muses which surpasses the charms of all instruments, each Muse with reference to her own quality to the bride's praise, interviewing solo and common chant (2.117–127).⁷²³ The preference for vocal music over instruments despite all their bombast is still present, and its variety brings the greatest charm. Only the excitement of the Graces' dance to the booms of percussion overpowers the ongoing song of the Muses (2.132–133). In the following, music is frequently mentioned in different moments of the account (e.g. 2.145; 2.209) which we do not need to report in detail.⁷²⁴ Just one instance be highlighted: at her arrival in heaven, Philology enters an assembly of ancient celebrities; the Muses again are constantly singing, but there is also a group of Greeks which produced a rather dissonant sound, fortunately not to be perceived within the Muses' concert (2.213).⁷²⁵ It is the only moment, as far as I see, that "bad" music is mentioned in the work; how these musical renegades found access to mingle into this illustrious celebration, remains mysterious.

In book nine, then, *Harmonia* is called upon to enliven the heavenly audience stunned by the erudite exposition of Astronomy that just concluded (*"permulcere aethera cantibus numerisque laetificans,"* 899).⁷²⁶ Her arrival, in company of the most outstanding musicians from of old, creates an outburst of a *plenitudo cuncticinae voluptatis* (fullness of all-sounding delight, 905). Martianus pulls all the registers of vocabulary and style to describe the musical sweetness and charm invading the

723. 2.117: "*Quidam dulcis sonus multifidis suavitatibus cietur (...). ac tunc ille omnis chorus canoris vocibus dulcique modulatu praevertit omnes organicas suavitates.*" 2.127: "*Musae nunc solicanae nunc concinentes interserunt vicissimque mela dulcia geminantur.*" The Muses sang interspersed now solo, now together, and again they repeat the sweet melodies."

724. See for references Wille 1967, 638.

725. "*Multusque praeterea palliatorum populus studiis discrepantibus dissonabat, qui quidem omnes inter Musarum carmina concinentum audiri, licet perstreperent, nullo potuere rabulatu.*" These cannot be Linus, Homer, Vergil, Orpheus, and Aristoxenus, as Wille (ibid.) suggests, for they were mentioned earlier (2.212) or later (9.907–908) in a positive way.

726. Some critical remarks (taken up again at 921) about the status of humanity whom she had abandoned for their lazy dullness (*"stoliditatis ignavia"*) may be a literary topos or a factual hint at the decline of true poetic and musical spirit at the time of Martianus Capella; similar remarks in Boethius (*Mus.* 1.1 181.8–14) could support the latter, with which we return about a thousand years later to the starting point of the current chapter: the complaint about decadent music.

illustrious gathering. Orpheus, Amphion, and Arion besing their own achievements of musical magic over plants, animals, and rocks, praising Harmony for her inspiration (907–908). In the following, each new musical performance surpasses the previous in sweetness. As Harmony brandishes her musical shield (echoing those of Heracles, Achilles, and Aeneas), a *concentus* emerges that makes all other music appear dissonant and fall silent in awe before such “intelligence” that is out of this world.⁷²⁷ She then addresses Jupiter and other great divinities and promises that her song will gratify and deduce, stimulate and soothe her audience.⁷²⁸ These are principally the effects of music that recur in the following passage (and in her song): enjoyment, enchantment, and calming (913–919). After she finishes, some conversation arises about the effort (*industria*) needed to produce a song that would liquefy the innermost enclosures of the mind.⁷²⁹

The remainder of the book consists of a long speech of Harmony in which she first celebrates the importance and benefits from harmony (in effect identical with music) (921–929) and then expounds on music theory (930–995). The following comments are of interest for our investigation: Harmony assigns tones (“*modi*”) to the celestial spheres, governs the souls descending to earth and, being the sister of Arithmetic, administers ratios on these realities and confers tempered proportion (*congruentia*) to things.⁷³⁰ As a consequence of this, the Pythagoreans applied their musical therapy and deduced the connection between bodies and souls.⁷³¹ She introduces instruments, provides musical worship of humans towards the gods, and rouses the spirits in war or sport to win victories (924–925). Several stories of musical therapy follow, both for mind and body, and also of animals charmed by songs so they can be hunted; some of these accounts sound quite fantastic and are not found in other extant texts (e.g. moon eclipses or the recovery of drifting islands through *tibia* tunes). The section finishes with examples of naturally produced musical sound by the sea or by a rock when stricken (926–929). No other explanation for these alleged phenomena is offered except for the general power of music.

727. 910: “*Cuncta illa, quae dissona suavitas commendarat, velut mutescencia tacuerunt, (...) caelestesque divi superioris melodiae agnita granditate (...) paululum in venerationem extramundanae omnes intelligentiae surrexerunt.*”

728. 913: “*Suisque cunctos allubescens tonis deducet, urget atque ciebit locis stimulosque rursus lene permulcet melos.*”

729. 920: “*Ut in tam dulcem eblanditamque mollitiem intima mentium liquescat affectio.*”

730. 922: “*Denique numeros cogitabilium motionum totiusque voluntatis impulsus ipsa rerum dispensans congruentiam temperabam.*”

731. 923: “*Pythagorei etiam docuerunt ferociam animi tibiis aut fidibus mollientes cum corporibus adhaerere nexum foedus animarum. membris quoque latentes interserere numeros non contempsit.*”

From the technical section should be mentioned that the principle of what is appropriate takes a similar importance as in Aristides Quintilianus, here in terms such as “*bene modulandi*,” *legitimus* (930), “*apte et cum ratione*” (931), etc. A few ethical attributions are given, such as the softening (*mollesco*) of deep notes (932), the *affectio* of the tetrachord’s bounding tones (935, cf. 960), active or passive tones (940),⁷³² and the general difference between consonances and dissonances in tones and intervals (947; 949–950). Like Aristides, Martianus considers ethos as one of the various tone categories, depending on pitch, but he does not go into further details (947).⁷³³ Some of the genera receive ethical description (959).⁷³⁴ The classification of melodies (into tragic, dithyrambic, nomic, erotic, etc.), again along the lines of Aristides, implies ethos as well (965). Lastly, in the discussion of rhythm, the effect of “holding back” (*reprehendo*) is stated for the Ionic type of meter (984); the iambus is used for disparaging (*detraho*), pouring out the venom of insult (*maledictum*) and spite (*livor*) (988). All other characterizations are of more technical nature.

The male-female distinction appears only two times: once in the context of modulation, “*cum a virile cantilena transitus in femineos modos fit*/when a transition occurs from a virile song into female modes” (964), and later in the general distinction of melody as female (“*sine propria figura*”) and rhythm as male (“*tam formam sonis quam varios praestat effectus*.”) (995). The reader is supposed to be familiar with the ethos of each gender.

In summary, Martianus Capella presents a largely positive concept of music, panegyriizing it exuberantly for all that the sceptics had denied. This approach is certainly suggested by the setting in heaven and serves to illustrate the beauties of divine musical entertainment. The only condition set for music to be good is, similar as in Aristides, propriety and, at times, the aesthetical demand for an artistically satisfying composition (e.g. the rejection of an *incondita compositio* of rhythm in 975) or performance (as seen above with regards to the band of Greeks). Despite his scholarly ambition, Martianus does not engage in any philosophical

732. This distinction is not fully clear to me; it reads: “*faciunt intentio vel remissio, patiuntur acumen et gravitas*.”

733. “*Secundum morem dicitur, id est κατὰ ἦθος; alium quippe morem acuta significant, alium graviora*.”

734. “*Chromatis tres, quarum prima quae mollis ac soluta, secunda quae hemiolia est, tertia quae est toniaea; διατονικοῦ duae, mollis una, altera robusta. et modos quidem accipit ἐναρμόνιον α τεταρτημορία διέσει, id est toni parte quarta*./There are three chromatic genera, the first of which is soft and loosened, the second is one and a half [steps], the third tonic; diatonic are two, one soft and the other firm. And the enharmonic receives its modes from the *tetartemoria diesis*, that is, a quartertone,” etc.

speculations, and the topic of education through music is not on his horizon either. But the personification of music through Harmony, on the level of allegorically rehashed mythology, actually guarantees the unified functionality of musical principles towards the end of antiquity, like a *deus ex machina* in the drama of so many unsatisfactory attempts to get to the bottom of musical ethos.

Boethius

Boethius brings us back from the lofty realms of divine celebration to the dire strain of philosophical reflection. He is often considered a hinge between antiquity and the Middle Ages; his book *De institutione musica*⁷³⁵ stands fully in the ancient tradition and contains no reference to Christianity.⁷³⁶ From the outset, he leaves no doubt that his interest is entirely academic: the reflection on the nature of sense perception and truth (1.1 179.1–8). Hardly any other music theorist has expressed more bluntly how inferior he considers those “musicians” who either perform (only slaves) or compose actual music (poets), for none of them really understand by reason what music is about (“*nec quicquam afferunt rationis*”) and therefore have nothing to do with real “music;” the real *musicus* is the one who judges rhythms, melodies, and compositions according to science and reason (1.34 225.11–15).⁷³⁷

735. Text: Friedlein 1867 (digitalized in the TML at http://www.chmtl.indiana.edu/tml/6th-8th/BOEMUS1_TEXT.html, accessed on November 22, 2015); Strunk 1998, 137–143 (excerpts from 1.1; 1.2; 1.34); tr.: Bower 1989; comm.: Wille 1967, 656–700; Mathiesen 1999, 629–636; Darmstädter 1996, 122–164; Jeserich 2013, 117–154. I am citing by [book].[chapter] [page number Friedlein].[line number Friedlein]. *De institutione musica* is conserved only down to the fifth book and is unmistakably incomplete; whether Boethius did not finish it or the end is just lost remains undecided (cf. Bower 1989, xxxviii, who suspects a total of seven books and suggests that it had been completed).

736. This and the fact that in content and diction his first book is much closer to classical authors than to Augustine are the reason why I include his work here as the last among “pagan” authors. It is unclear whether or to what degree he depends on Augustine’s much earlier work *De musica*; both works were highly influential on music theory in the Middle Ages (cf. Jeserich 2013, 117–118).

737. “*Isque est musicus, cui adest facultas secundum speculationem rationemve propositam ac musicae convenientem de modis ac rythmis deque generibus cantilenarum ac de permixtionibus ac de omnibus, de quibus posterius explicandum est, ac de poetarum carminibus iudicandi.*” Before (224.6–7) he has already exclaimed: “*Quanto igitur praeclarior est scientia musicae in cognitione rationis quam in opere efficiendi atque actu!*” Therefore, how much more splendid is the science of music in the knowledge of ratios than in the work of performance and in act! Notice that this does not mean a disregard of audible music, for the theory is in the service of “judging” it; Boethius considers just the action of making or composing music inferior.

The interest has certainly shifted from ethos to science if we compare this statement with Plato according to whom the true musical person is someone perfectly tuned in virtue (*Resp.* 412a). The great bulk of *De musica* will be the mathematical foundation of music in ratios to determine tones, intervals, tetrachords, discern consonances and dissonances, etc., drawing especially from the Pythagoreans, Aristoxenus, Nicomachus, and Ptolemy.⁷³⁸

Nevertheless, Boethius admits the special status of music among the sciences, not only pursuing truth but also concerned with ethos.⁷³⁹ Music and its ethical effect are universal as a part of human nature and extending to all ages and endeavors.⁷⁴⁰ The reason for this is again seen in Plato's conception (*Ti.* 35b) of the musically harmonized World Soul: its *convenientia* (harmonical arrangement) makes us be attracted to order in sound that is similar to our own, for likeness is loved, unlikeness hated.⁷⁴¹ This last phrase is an axiom on which much of what follows

738. Bower 1989 indicates many parallels in his notes to the translation but misses some from Iamblichus (e.g. when he states on p. 6 n. 27 that the "account of Empedocles' curative use of music is found in no other source;" it is, in fact, with some slight variation reported in Iambl. *VP* 25.113, see above p. 213) or Aristides Quintilianus (whom he refers to only for minor and highly technical issues).

739. 1.1 179.20–23: "*Unde fit ut, cum sint quattuor matheseos disciplinae, ceterae quidem in investigatione veritatis laborent, musica vero non modo speculationi verum etiam moralitati coniuncta sit.*" The term "*moralitas*" (and later "*mores*") is to be understood according to our definition of "ethos," since Boethius speaks about the conventional characteristics and psychological effects of music and not only about morality in the strict sense of good or bad intentions or actions.

740. 1.1 179.23–180.3: "*Nihil est enim tam proprium humanitatis, quam remitti dulcibus modis, adstringi contrariis, idque non sese in singulis vel studiis vel aetatibus tenet, verum per cuncta diffunditur studia et infantes ac iuvenes nec non etiam senes ita naturaliter affectu quodam spontaneo modis musicis adiunguntur, ut nulla omnino sit aetas, quae a cantilenae dulcis delectatione seiuncta sit.*" For nothing is so much a property of being human than to become relaxed by sweet melodies, tightened by the opposite ones, and this is not limited to particular endeavors or ages, it is truly spread throughout all endeavors, and children and young and even old people are so naturally associated by some spontaneous affection to musical melodies that there is absolutely no age that were excluded from the enjoyment of a sweet song;" see similarly 1.1 186.15–17.

741. 1.1 180.5–10: "*Cum enim eo, quod in nobis est iunctum convenienterque coaptatum, illud excipimus, quod in sonis apte convenienterque coniunctum est, eoque delectamur, nos quoque ipsos eadem similitudine compactos esse cognoscimus. Amica est enim similitudo, dissimilitudo odiosa atque contraria.*" For when in that which is connected and conveniently joined in us, we perceive that which is suitably and conveniently conjoined in sounds, we enjoy it and also recognize that we ourselves are bound together by the same likeness. For likeness is dear, unlikeness is hateful and contrary." In the TML, "*sonis*" is properly read instead of "*senis*" in Friedlein, cf. Bower 1989, 2 n. 6. Boethius does not explain here the relationship between the World

rests. It is explicated by the fact that lasciviousness in music can both attract and create a lascivious soul—musical ethos occurs as an expression, but also as the cause of ethos in the soul, attested by the modal categories according to national characteristics as well (Phrygian, Lydian, etc.) (1.1 180.12–22). That these are not to be considered as neutral in value becomes clear from the confirmation of Plato’s rule that whatever contributes in music to good ethos must not be changed lest it lead to the corruption of morals in the State. Boethius suggests a process of first suffering immodest music, then gradually abandoning until fully losing honesty and rightness in favor of savagery and inhumanity.⁷⁴² But as bad as music’s influence on ethos can be, so propitious it can be for proper instruction (“*ad animum disciplinis via*”). He has no doubt that the style of melody and rhythm affects and shapes the mind accordingly,⁷⁴³ as can be observed comparing the ethos of certain peoples and the music they enjoy. Like the critics almost a millennium earlier, Boethius lashes out at the current lascivious and effeminate “theatrical” style in contrast to the originally modest and moderate music with simpler instruments, while now, full of mixture, variation, and disgrace, almost nothing from the previous *gravitas* and virtue is preserved (1.1 181.8–16). Whether Boethius is just restating Plato’s criticism as part of his survey on traditional ethics of music or describing with authentic concern the *status quo* may find an answer in the strong criticism of pagan musical practices uttered by other Christian authors of his time.⁷⁴⁴ At any rate, he endorses strongly Plato’s stipulation for musical education of children, exposing them only to vigorous/healthy (*valens*) and simple *modi*; he demands for

Soul and the individual human soul (which he synonymously calls “*animus*” or “*mens*”); their correspondence in terms of harmonic structure is taken for evident. Neither does he discuss the souls’ “fall” from perfection into imperfection because of the body as Aristides Quintilianus describes it in Neo-Platonic terms, but he acknowledges the fact of souls with a deformed ethos, as the sequel shows. The axiom of “likeness is loved and enjoyed” is reiterated at 180.21–22.

742. 1.1 180.22–29: “*Unde Plato etiam maxime cavendum existimat, ne de bene morata musica aliquid permutetur. Negat enim esse ullam tantam morum in re publica labem quam paulatim de pudenti ac modesta musica invertere. Statim enim idem quoque audientium animos pati paulatimque discedere nullumque honesti ac recti retinere vestigium, si vel per lasciviores modos inverecundum aliquid, vel per asperiores ferox atque immane mentibus illabatur.*”

743. 1.1 181.2–5: “*Cum ergo per eas rythmi modique ad animum usque descenderint, dubitari non potest, quin aequo modo mentem atque ipsa sunt afficiant atque conforment.*” Cf. again at 181.16–20: the smallest change, sinking through the ears into the mind, may elicit, first unadvertedly, a great difference.

744. On the other hand, Boethius only cites the standard examples from ancient times (e.g. Sparta and her censureship on Timotheus’ extra strings at 1.1 181.23–184.7); Bower 1989, 3 n. 11, leaves the question open whether or not he is commenting directly on actual music.

music *optime morata pudenterque coniuncta* (that it be endowed with the best ethos and honorably composed): “*ut sit modesta ac simplex et masculina nec effeminata nec fera nec varia*/so that it be modest, simple, and masculine and not effeminate, wild, or fluctuating” (1.1 181.22–23). These characteristics are well in line with the ones discerned by Plato and most other authors down to Aristides Quintilianus.

Boethius also repeats the well-known stories about music therapy performed by Pythagoras on a young drunkard, by Terpander, Arion, and Ismenias on illness-stricken cities, by Empedocles on a violently infuriated adolescent, and by the Pythagoreans to relax and purify themselves at night and in the morning, for they knew about the inner connection between body and soul through music (1.1 184.7–186.8).⁷⁴⁵ This brings him back to emphasize that the same ratios compose body, soul, and melodic *modulatio*. Further examples of infants, who react positively to soft tunes but adversely to harsh ones, or of mourners, especially women, who in sorrow turn to song, or of the spontaneous impulse to express something in the mind without any aesthetic pretensions,⁷⁴⁶ or of the use in war to arouse or calm down, are brought fourth to show how music naturally rules our mind and body to such a degree that we are unable to sever that bond.

Having reviewed the power of music on the human person in body and soul, in order to seek an answer for its causes, Boethius now zooms out to the global panorama of music, comprised of the cosmic, human, and instrumental version of it (the notorious classification of *musica mundana, humana, instrumentalis*). He briefly sketches out each of them. In a view not unlike Aristides Quintilianus (but not directly resembling his train of thought), Boethius reduces the coordinated planetary motions, the harmonic union of the four different elements, and the consonance of the four seasons to musical principles where all excesses are avoided for the sake of a harmonious whole.⁷⁴⁷ Human music consists of the

745. 1.1 186.2–4: “*Scientes quod tota nostrae animae corporisque compago musica coaptatione coniuncta sit*,” for the following see also shortly after at 9–13: “*Non potest dubitari, quin nostrae animae et corporis status eisdem quodammodo proportionibus videatur esse compositus, quibus armonicas modulationes posterior disputatio coniungi copularique monstrabit.*”

746. 1.1 187.3–7: “*Cum aliquis cantilenam libentius auribus atque animo capit, ad illud etiam non sponte convertitur, ut motum quoque aliquem similem audita cantilenae corpus effingat; et quod omnino aliquod melos auditum sibi memor animus ipse decerpit.*” Wille 1967, 660, remarks that Boethius here recognizes “*daß nicht nur der musikalische Eindruck, sondern auch der musikalische Ausdruck für die Verbundenheit von Musik und Seele zeugt* / that not only the musical impression but also the musical expression gives witness of the bond between music and the soul.” For the following at 8–10: “*ita nobis musicam naturaliter esse coniunctam, ut ea ne si velimus quidem carere possimus.*” Boethius must never have met a person “deaf” or adverse to music. Psychology is exploring whether there actually are human beings who are entirely indifferent to it.

747. 1.2 188.15–21: “*Et sicut in gravibus chordis is vocis est modus, ut (...) totum sibi sit consentaneum atque conveniens: in mundi musica pervidemus nihil ita esse nimium posse, ut alterum*

harmonious union between incorporeal reason and body and between the parts of the soul and those of the body respectively. Instrumental music is the production of sound through tension, breath, water, or percussion—vocal music, strangely, is not considered.⁷⁴⁸ Wherever harmony is produced, music is at work. Calling all these processes “music,” is a logical consequence from Aristides’ metaphysical theory, even though Boethius, at least in the preserved sections of his work, does not enter into such considerations. Likewise, Boethius only treats the *musica instrumentalis*; contrary to his announcements, we do not hear from him anything further about the other two in what is left to us from his text.

While Aristides sought to show what is “appropriate” in music, Boethius gives the impression that the core concept of his musical theory is *concordantia* or *consonantia*, which we could also translate as “harmony,” and the latter term is also the first word of the chapter beginning the discussion of musical principles. Thus, the technical details laid out in the following books mostly revolve around establishing a balanced proportion between different factors.⁷⁴⁹ In the course of the following

propria nimietate dissolvat.” Notice that the analogy is not drawn between music and cosmos, but between cosmic and instrumental music. The same applies to the *musica humana*: the human being is harmonized not *similar to* music but *as* music.

748. Boethius could have pointed out the possibility of paralleling tension (string instruments) with fire, breath (wind instruments) with air, and percussion (drums, etc.) with earth, to match up, alongside the water (for the organ), with the four elements.

749. Thus his definition: “*Est enim consonantia dissimilium inter se vocum in unum redacta concordia*/Harmony is the concord of tones dissimilar to each other, reduced into one” (1.3 191.3–4; cf. 1.8 195.6–8: “*Consonantia est acuti soni gravisque mixture suaviter uniformiterque auribus accidens*/Harmony is the mixing of high and low sounds which occurs softly and unitedly in the ears.” Similar definitions are found in multiple authors; to quote one who is not usually associated with music theory, Apuleius, in *De mundo* 20: “*Musica, quae de longis et brevibus, acutis et gravioribus sonis constat, tam diversis et dissonis vocibus, harmoniam consonam reddit*/Music, which consists of long and short, high and low sounds, renders such diverse and dissonant voices into a consonant harmony,” based on the cosmic principle “*ut res est, contrariorum per se natura amplectitur et ex dissonis fit unus idemque concentus*/the nature of per se contrary things is embraced and out of dissonances is made one and the same concord” (ibid. 19; cf. on this expression also Seneca as quoted above in n. 587). Commenting on Plato’s description of the World Soul creating harmony, Apuleius finds the following words in *De dog. Pl.* 1.9: “*Sed illam, fontem animarum omnium, caelestem animam, optimam et sapientissimam virtute esse genetricem, subservire etiam fabricatori deo et praesto esse ad omnia inventa eius pronuntiat. Verum substantiam mentis huius numeris et modis confici congeminationis ac multiplicatis augmentis incrementisque per se et extrinsecus partis; et hinc fieri ut musice mundus et canore moveatur*/[Plato] proclaims that this World Soul, the source of all souls, is by virtue the best and wisest mother, serves also the creator god and is at the service to all her created things; that in fact the substance of this mind/soul is made of numbers and modes with redoubled and multiplied increases and developments of themselves and outside of engendered things; and that hence it happens that the

chapters and books, value judgments or ethos appear occasionally, as in Martianus Capella. Since his methodological approach is, like in Ptolemy, based on both reason and empirical data,⁷⁵⁰ consonance and dissonance are not only defined by particular proportion but also as a sonic reality.⁷⁵¹ In the discussion of the genera, for diatonic the characteristics “*durius et naturalius*/rather hard and natural,” for chromatic the description “*ab illa naturali intentione discedens et in mollius decidens*/departing from that natural tension and dropping into a weaker one” and for enharmonic “*optime atque apte coniunctum*/very well and suitably conjoined” are provided (1.21 212.26–213.2). Boethius refers repeatedly to the spheric harmony, so in 1.20 where seven-stringed instruments resemble the seven “planets;”⁷⁵² the lowest string is “*honorabilior*” (206.13). The assignment of two disjunct tetrachords to planets is given in 1.27, comparing the order of Nicomachus with the one of Cicero. That consonant intervals produce a tone that is *suavis*, while dissonant ones lack this quality, is stated in 3.1 302.-5.⁷⁵³ No further references to musical ethos occur.

world is moved in the manner of music and song.” Also here the concept of music seems to apply ontologically, not just metaphorically.

750. See e.g. 5.2 352.4–6: “*Armonica est facultas differentias acutorum et gravium sonorum sensu ac ratione perpendens. Sensus enim ac ratio quasi quaedam facultatis armonicae instrumenta sunt*/ Harmonics is the faculty assessing the differences between high and low sounds by sense and reason. For sense and reason are in a way the instruments of the faculty of harmonics.” Both sense and reason require each other to achieve the full truth (see all of 5.2 and 5.3). At 1.9 195.16–196.15, Boethius attributes this middle ground to the Pythagoreans, which is not fully justified (contrast with 5.3 354.26–355.16; cf. Bower 1989, 17 n. 68 and Wille 1967, 666).

751. For consonance see the citation at 1.8.195.6–8 above in n. 749; for dissonance right after at 8–10: “*Dissonantia vero est duorum sonorum sibimet permixtorum ad aurem veniens aspera atque iniucunda percussio*/Dissonance, however, is the beating, harsh and unpleasant for the ear, of two sounds mixed with each other.” These definitions are found similarly in Nicomachus *Enchiridion* 12 262.1–2 and 5–6, but without the criterion of auditory pleasure or the lack thereof. The importance of similarity for consonances is stated and mathematically demonstrated in 1.29 221.3–10 (“*in his, quae consonantias formant, multa similia sunt, in illis vero minime*/in those which form consonances are many things similar, but in the other ones only to a very small degree”).

752. The previous four-string arrangement had the four elements as example, ensuring perfect harmony: 1.20 206.4–6: “*nihil vero in eis esset inconsonum, ad imitationem scilicet musicae mundanae, quae ex quattuor constat elementis*/indeed, there was nothing discordant in them, namely in imitation of the cosmic music, which consists of the four elements.” Notice that *imitatio* of one part of music ensures *consonantia* of another.

753. Bower 1989, 116 translates with “pleasant,” which is misleading; cf. the same at 5.7 357.13–14; 5.11 361.16. Notice Boethius’ definitions of “ἐμμελής” and “ἐκμελής,” closely following

Early Christian Contributions on Musical Ethos

A survey of ancient authors on musical ethos would not be complete without mentioning six Christian writers who have dedicated important sections to the reflection on music. Patristic literature is generally rich in references to music of different kinds, be they in a direct or an allegorical or symbolic way. In their way, from the Christian perspective, many of them take up the pagan ideas and stories and weave them into a new conception which does not hide the conviction of being superior to the previous tradition—superior above all because music is now put at the service of the “true God.”

Helpful studies on music in Patristics already exist.⁷⁵⁴ The task here is to highlight the most relevant contributions and the general trends existing in the first centuries of early Christianity. Three Greek and three Latin authors stand out in a more significant way; after reviewing them, a systematic synopsis will follow.

Clement of Alexandria

Maybe the first Christian author to take up the topic of music more extensively, within the context of dialogue between classical culture and emerging Christianity, is Clement of Alexandria. His renowned work *Exhortation to the Greeks* (or in Latin *Protrepticus*), the first of what has been considered a “trypitch,”⁷⁵⁵ begins by recalling some of the myths told about the magic power of music as used by Amphion, Arion, and Orpheus.⁷⁵⁶ A fourth story about Eunomus serves him to disprove the others. Eunomus, singing at a gathering at Delphi on occasion of a

Ptolemy, at 5.6 357.8–11 and at 5.11 361.10–18 where he points out that discordant pitches may still join well together for melody.

754. Wille 1967, 367–405, offers a full treatment of early Christian music, in relationship to pagan tradition, with abundant original source material; see also Quasten 1930/1973/1983; McKinnon 1987; Foley 1996 (about the actual musical praxis among the early Christians); Stapert 2007 (with bibliography, much based on McKinnon). Düring 1958 offers a short survey.

755. Text: Marcovich 1995; text and tr.: Butterworth 1919; The Migne text (PG) is available digitalized at http://khazarzar.skeptik.net/pgm/PG_Migne/Clement%20of%20Alexandria_PG%2008-09/Protrepticus.pdf (accessed on April 20, 2013). My paragraph numbering follows Marcovich. Comm.: Stapert 2007, 42–59. The other two works are the *Paedagogus* and the *Stromata* (or *Stromateis*).

756. For Amphion, he hints at the story according to which Amphion gets saved by dolphins attracted by his song, for Arion to the building of the city walls of Thebes, and for Orpheus for his power over plants and animals; see above p. 60f.

snake slain by Apollo, turned out to be challenged by cicadas whose spontaneous song was better than the *nomoi* of Eunomus.⁷⁵⁷ A string breaks from the musician's cithara, and a cicada jumps onto the instrument and chirps from there together with Eunomus to finish the song. The point now is, however, that the bard's music is not what attracted the cicada, rather it joined in on its own account (ἐκῶν) (1.1.2).⁷⁵⁸ The idea that animals should be enchanted ("θέλγεσθαι") by music is an "empty myth" (1.2.1).

The New Song

The pagan religious and dramatic performances of music are, so says Clement, full of error and darkness, which he contrasts with the "new song" ("τὸ ἄσμα τὸ καινόν"), sung neither in the Phrygian, Lydian, or Dorian mode;⁷⁵⁹ rather it is of new harmony ("τῆς καινῆς ἁρμονίας"), bearing the name of God. To it he attributes, in a quote from Homer (*Od.* 4.221), the power to soothe grief and anger and forget all evils (νηπενθής, ἄχολος, "κακῶν ἐπίληθες ἀπάντων")—it is the sweet and truthful medicine of persuasion⁷⁶⁰ (1.2.4). In contrast, the three aforementioned musical eminences were not men but "deceivers" ("ἀπατηλοί"), ruining life under the disguise of music (λυμαίνομαι, διαφθείρω), leading people to idolatry and enslavement (1.3.1). Clement then praises "his minstrel" who has been able to tame the fiercest of all animals, man, through his heavenly song of

757. "ἦδον δὲ ἄρα οὐ τῷ δράκοντι τῷ νεκρῷ, τῷ Πύθικῷ, ἀλλὰ τῷ θεῷ τῷ πανσόφῳ αὐτόνομον ᾠδὴν, τῶν Εὐνόμου βελτίονα νόμων." The judgment of greater valuer might be motivated by the fact that they were singing to the "allwise God" instead of a dead serpent, but the following makes clear that there was also an aesthetic element involved. The context is, of course, the famous Pythian musical competition at Delphi and the standard piece to Apollo and his defeat of a snake (the *Pythicus nomos*, see West 1992, 212).

758. The argument seems to aim in two different directions before revealing that it actually goes for a third: first, the point seems to be the superiority of the music of nature over human artistry—and this may be due to the fact that it reveres the true God; second, it seems to be the skill of the cicada's being able to supply the missing string; but eventually, the previous all serves to show that the cicada acted not in reaction to human music as the Greeks would have it ("οὐκ οὐκ ᾠδῇ τῇ Εὐνόμου ἄγεται ὁ τέττιξ, ὡς ὁ μῦθος βούλεται (...) ὁ δὲ ἐκῶν ἐφίπταται καὶ ἄδει ἐκῶν." Ἐλλησι δ' ἐδόκει ὑποκριτῆς γεγενῆσθαι μουσικῆς.), which becomes clear in the sequel.

759. Clement elsewhere (*Strom.* 6.11.88) cites Aristoxenus that the enharmonic genus fits best the Dorian harmony and the diatonic the Phrygian; he characterizes the Dorian as σεμνός. These considerations seem a bit unmotivated after mentioning David as an example for melodiously (ἐμμελῶς) singing, playing, and prophesizing God.

760. "γλυκύ τι καὶ ἀληθινὸν φάρμακον πεπιθούς ἐγκέκραται τῷ ἄσματος."

truth (“συνῳδὸς ἀληθείας”) and pity (“οἰκτεῖρων”), to become gentle (ἡμερος) and regain life—“how powerful is this new Song!” (1.3.2–1.4.4).⁷⁶¹

Now, this Song has brought about order and harmony within the universe, tuning discordant elements into a “symphony”:⁷⁶² ocean and land are balanced out, fire and air softened, as if blending (κεράννυμι) the Dorian with the Lydian mode; likewise, the temperatures are “mixing in a well-sounding way the extreme notes of the whole.” He even harmonized the entire extension of the universe, contemptuous of the lifeless instruments of lyre and cithara (1.5.2–1.5.3). He is also responsible for the harmony within the “little cosmos,” between human body and soul, to play music before God on this many-voiced instrument.⁷⁶³ Demons flee “true music,” like when David played before King Saul (1 Sm 16.23).⁷⁶⁴ God

761. “Ὅρα τὸ ἄσμα τὸ καινὸν ὅσον ἴσχυσεν.” He cites Ti 3.3–5, which parallels these ideas in biblical language.

762. 1.5.1: “Τοῦτό τοι καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἐκόσμησεν ἐμμελῶς καὶ τῶν στοιχείων τὴν διαφωνίαν εἰς τάξιν ἐνέτεινε συμφωνίας, ἵνα δὴ ὅλος ὁ κόσμος αὐτῷ ἁρμονία γένηται,” for the following citation (1.5.2): “τοὺς νεάτους τῶν ὄλων φθόγγους τούτους κινᾶς ἐμμελῶς.” Another, more symbolic form of “symphony” is the “ecclesiastic” one, made up out of the law, prophets, apostles, and the Gospels, i.e. all of Holy Scripture (*Strom.* 6.11.88).

763. 1.5.3: “καὶ τὸν μικρὸν κόσμον, τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ψυχὴν τε καὶ σῶμα αὐτοῦ, ἀγίῳ πνεύματι ἁρμολογούμενος, ψάλλει τῷ θεῷ διὰ τοῦ πολυφώνου ὀργάνου καὶ προσάδει τῷ ὀργάνῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. ‘Σὺ γὰρ εἶ κιθάρα καὶ αὐλὸς καὶ ναὸς ἐμοί’ κιθάρα διὰ τὴν ἁρμονίαν, αὐλὸς διὰ τὸ πνεῦμα, ναὸς διὰ τὸν λόγον, ἵν’ ἡ μὲν κρέκη, τὸ δὲ ἐμπνέη, ὁ δὲ χωρήσῃ τὸν κύριον.” The citation is not accounted for; Butterworth 1919, 12–13 n. c suggests it to be “a fragment of an early Christian hymn” and refers to similar metaphors in Ps 57 (56).8–9 (singing and playing strings before God) and 1 Cor 6.19 (man as a temple of the Holy Spirit). The idea is taken up again in *Strom.* 6.11.88: “εἴη δ’ ἂν τῷ ψαλμῳδῷ κιθάρα ἀλληγορουμένη κατὰ μὲν τὸ πρῶτον σημαινόμενον ὁ κύριος, κατὰ δὲ τὸ δεύτερον οἱ προσεχῶς κρούοντες τὰς ψυχὰς ὑπὸ μουσηγέτῃ τῷ κυρίῳ. Κἄν ὁ σωζόμενος λέγεται λαὸς κιθάρα κατ’ ἐπίπνοιαν τοῦ λόγου καὶ κατ’ ἐπίγνωσιν τοῦ θεοῦ δοξάζων μουσικῶς ἐξακουέται κρούμενος εἰς πίστιν τῷ λόγῳ./The cithara, according to its first meaning, may be used metaphorically by the psalmist for the Lord, according to the second [meaning] for those who keep strumming the souls under the music guide, the Lord. And when the saved people are called cithara, it may be understood as praising God in a musical way according to the inspiration of the Word and the recognition of God, being strummed by the Word towards faith.” See also almost literally repeated in Euseb. *De laudibus Constantini oratio in eius tricennialibus habita* 14.5.

764. “ἀληθεῖ μουσικῇ,” this music stands in contrast to the “Thracian” music mentioned earlier, which is dedicated to idols; the difference must lie in the intention rather than in the music itself; the demons flee from the true spirit that sounds in the music and not from music’s physical reality as through magic. Such therapy is mentioned again in the context of the “invention” of the Muses at 2.31.2–4.

created man according to his own image as a good/beautiful and spirited instrument, being God himself an all-harmonious, well-tuned, and holy instrument, transcendent wisdom, and heavenly *logos*.⁷⁶⁵ But there is also this new instrument and song, the Word of God, the Lord, who is φιλόανθρωπος, opening the eyes of the blind, the ears of the deaf, bringing those erring back to righteousness, ending perdition, defeating death, reconciling with the Father; this and much more, in one word, salvation (σωτηρία), whose name Clement finally reveals: “ὁ Χριστός, καινὸν ἄσμα μοι κέκληται” (1.6.1–1.7.1). He continues praising the redemptive deeds of Christ, occasionally returning to musical terms, e.g. that his works are of multiple melodic forms (πολύτροπος) and that he shows mercy through lamenting and encourages by making music (“θρηνῶν ἔλεει, ψάλλον παρακαλεῖ”) (1.8.3), but then the imagery fades out. The rest of the work is a sustained contrasting of pagan myth and practices with the Christian truth. Orpheus is mentioned a few more times as a witness for the “shameful pagan mysteries” (e.g. at 2.21.1) and later as if he had perceived the error as such and some notion of the truth (at 7.74.3–5), all of which is based on text only without reference to music. At the end of ch. 9, however, the ultimate goal of human life, the loving union with God, is described again in musical terms. All people, in their “polyphony” and “dispersion,” are called, through good works, to oneness (ἕνωσις) in the divine harmony, following the one chorus-master and teacher, the Word (meaning Christ), so that there be only one “symphony.”⁷⁶⁶

It is evident that Clement is not only well familiar with the cosmic-psychological traditions but can also suppose a particular receptivity of his audience for such a topic, so much so that he chooses it as the hook to draw the reader into the Christian view of the world. His interest does not lie in discussing music itself, but he envisions with great ease a Christian version of a harmonically conceived cosmos, attributing to Christ, the Word (λόγος) of the Father, the function which Martianus (historically later) will assign to the impersonated Harmony, as the great harmonizer of the universe and of human realities. Original is Clement’s fine simile of God as a perfect musical instrument and man, created in his image (εἰκῶν), being a good one, too, on which the divine Word plays for the Father and for whom he, as the New Song, devises harmoniously his salvation. Harmony

765. 1.5.4: “Καλὸν ὁ κύριος ὄργανον ἔμπνουν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐξεργάσατο κατ’ εἰκόνα τὴν ἑαυτοῦ· ἀμέλει καὶ αὐτὸς ὄργανόν ἐστι τοῦ θεοῦ παναρμόνιον, ἔμμελές καὶ ἅγιον, σοφία ὑπερκόσμιος, οὐράνιος λόγος.” The word “ὑπερκόσμιος” unites the concepts of “cosmos,” “order,” and “beauty,” exceedingly present in God’s wisdom.

766. 9.88.3: “Ἡ δὲ ἐκ πολλῶν ἕνωσις ἐκ πολυφωνίας καὶ διασπορᾶς ἀρμονίαν λαβοῦσα θεϊκὴν μία γίνεται συμφωνία, ἐνὶ χορηγῷ καὶ διδασκάλῳ τῷ λόγῳ ἐπομένη, ἐπ’ αὐτὴν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀναπαυομένη.”

consists, again, in the proper balance of contrary elements, exemplified in nature. Human music is met with a tinge of disdain; still, if “true,” it is able to free from evil and sickness. Clement does not have good words for the superstitious pagan festivities but abstains from commenting on the musical part of it. He leaves us with music as a fitting metaphor for the Christian God and the beautiful order he possesses in himself and which he bestows on creation and man in particular.

The importance of these passages should not be underestimated, for they reveal another instance of a “Copernican Revolution” with respect to musical ethos. I believe that Calvin Stapert is right when he states that Clement “went beyond Plato by placing *musica humana* above *musica mundana*.”⁷⁶⁷ He even went beyond all previous thought, because in the Christian view, the *princeps analogatum* within creation is now no longer the planetary cosmos, but the human being who is directly created according to God’s harmonious being, and this image, according to Christian theology, is fully accomplished in the God-man, Jesus Christ.⁷⁶⁸ It is

767. 2007, 58. As we have seen, Boethius was the one who coined the famous Latin tripartition of music.

768. Cf. also Paulinus of Nola, *Carm.* 20.32–50: *‘At nobis ars una fides, et musica Christus, qui docuit miram sibimet concurrere pacem/disparis harmoniae quondam, quam corpus in unum/ contulit assumens hominem, qui miscuit almum/infusa virtute Deum, ut duo conderet in se,/ distantesque procul naturas redderet unum. (...) Ille igitur vere nobis est musicus auctor,/ ille David verus, citharam qui corporis huius/restituit putri dudum compage iacentem,/ et tacitam ruptis antiquo crimine chordis/assumendo suum Dominus reparavit in usum,/ consertisque Deo mortalibus, omnia rerum/in speciem primae fecit revirescere formae,/ ut nova cuncta forent, cunctis abeunte veterino./ But for us, the only art is faith and music Christ who has taught that the wonderful peace of uneven harmony once was arranged in himself, [the harmony] which he conferred on one body taking up man, who mingled [him] with the kind God by infused strength, so that he established two in himself and rendered far distant natures one. (...) He therefore is for us truly the originator of music, that true David who restored the cithara of his body, formerly laying with its rotten structure, and when silent with the strings broken from the ancient sin, the Lord rerstored it by adopting it for his own use, and having conjoined mortals to God, he made all things grow young again into the splendor of the first form, so that all things become new, with the dust vanishing from all.’* Ambrosius *Hexameron* 2.1.1: *“Diem primum, vel potius unum, maneat enim ei prophetici praerogativa sermonis, ut potuimus, absolvimus; in quo conditum caelum, terram creatam, aquarum exundantiam, circumfusum aerem, discretionem factam lucis atque tenebrarum Dei omnipotentis, et Domini Iesu Christi, Spiritus quoque sancti operatione cognovimus. Quis ergo non miretur dissimilibus membris disparem mundum in corpus unum assurgere, et insolubili concordiae caritatisque lege in societatem et connexionem sui tam distantia convenire, ut quae discreta natura sunt, in unitatis et pacis vinculum velut individua compactione nectantur?/ We have released as we could the first day, or rather [day] one, for the preference of the prophetic word may remain; on which, we know, by the holy work of God almighty and the Lord Jesus Christ and also the*

the eternal Word incarnate, whose harmonious perfection is the prototype for the ultimate fulfillment of every redeemed human being, and which has also bestowed on the cosmos through the Holy Spirit a harmony that becomes the New Song, leading fallen humanity to its destination. Thus, the Christian Trinitarian belief transforms the cosmocentric theory of musical harmony into an anthropocentric one.⁷⁶⁹ At the same time, man acquires his harmonic perfection not primarily by *mimēsis* of cosmic processes⁷⁷⁰—wherefore, at least for a while, they become less relevant—but through reaching out to the mediator between divine and human

Spirit heaven was founded, earth created, the overflow of waters and air distributed, and the separation between light and darkness made. Who, therefore, might not wonder that a disparate world rose up from dissimilar parts into one body and such different things would get together according to a law of undissolvable concord and love into a junction and inner connection, that what was separate by nature was tied into a bond of unity and peace as by a single conjunction?"; also 3.1.3–5; 3.4.18; 3.5.21; 6.9.54–55. Nevertheless, other Christian authors still rely on the ancient analogical view to explain especially the harmonic union of diverse components, e.g. Claudianus Mamertus *De statu animae* 1.8 and 1.21 (composition of the human body). Lactant. *De opificio* 16.3, rejects the Aristoxenian comparison between the lyre and the human person.

769. This term could be misunderstood if one did not notice the qualification "within creation" above; strictly speaking, the Christian view is as theocentric as the previous was regarding God or the demiurge as the first creator of harmony. But if God created the world to make it suit to the human beings, and if the principle of reconciled poles is an anthropological constant (e.g. body-spirit/soul) and especially inherent in Jesus Christ (God-man) as the proto-man according to whose image Adam, the first "only human" man, was designed, then cosmic harmony derives from its human-divine creator and not human harmony from a more perfect cosmic one as its shadowy representation. The factual imperfections on the level of human harmony, in the Christian view, are of exclusively moral origin (original sin), not due to an ontological difference or a metaphysical "distance" from the more perfect celestial realm, as the neo-Platonics saw it. No ancient author uses the term "anthropocentric," but the idea just described is implicit in Christian theology from its beginnings.

770. Cf. Stapert 2007, 59, referring to what is quoted above from *Protr.* 9.88.3: "This symphony is a Christian *musica humana*, of which even the music of the spheres is but an echo, and of which the best of our *musica instrumentalis* is also an echo." Similar Darmstädter 1996, 42: "*Musik stellt nicht rnehr zwingend den Anspruch, Spiegel zu sein, urn harrmonische Abläufe und Bewegungen von der kosrnologisch-metaphysischen Ebene auf die Ebene des Lebewesens, dessen Seele und Körper zu reflektieren. Sie ist vielmehr in einer vernittelnden Position zwischen Menschen und dem Wort Gottes, das sie erst verständlich, erklingend macht*/Music no longer claims necessarily to be the mirror reflecting harmonious processes and movements oft he cosmological-meta-physical level onto the level of a living being, its soul and body. It rather takes a mediating position between men and the Word of God which makes it comprehensible, sounding in the first place;" and later 65–75 (she unfortunately goes too far by imposing on Augustine an anachronistic concept of individual autonomy, of free choice of ethos, esp. pp. 70–73).

harmony, which is Christ. Consequently, positive ethos in music is now centered on whatever leads to union with God through Christ and is “in tune” with the New Song, that is, the new life in Christ, as Augustine will explain further. The Christian rejection of certain musical practices, which from the outside may appear to be a primitive sectarian, reactionary, or antagonistic attitude, is deeply rooted in the fundamental dogma of the new faith.

Musical Ethos in Christian Education

Only with this in mind can we properly estimate what Clement writes in the second book of his *Paedagogus*⁷⁷¹ where the contrast between pagan music and Christian culture becomes even more pointed. He dedicates ch. 4 to the description of pagan festivals or banquets in opposition to the Christian way of celebrating. In a manner not too different from Plato’s reasoning, Clement dismisses the *aulos*, except for shepherding purposes, for its intoxicating (μεθυστικός) and effeminating (ἀποθηλύνω) effect, inducing to blind licentiousness and irrational passion (“ἀλόγιστη πάθη”), but especially to idolatry (“εἰς εἰδωλολατρείας σπεύδουσιν”).⁷⁷² In an allegorical way, he applies the instrumental praise of Ps 150,3–5 to the human body, mouth, and tongue, which is a peaceful instrument, not like the real ones used for war;⁷⁷³ those should be left only to the pagans to be aroused (“τὸ

771. Text: PG 8.440–446 (digitalized at http://khazarzar.skeptik.net/pgm/PG_Migne/Clement%20of%20Alexandria_PG%2008-09/Paedagogus.pdf); Marcovich 2002; tr. at <http://news.newadvent.org/fathers/02092.htm> (accessed on April 20, 2013).

772. The description is fairly detailed, referring to *aulos*, psalter, chorus and dancing, “Egyptian” clapping, uncivilized amusement (βαθυμία ἄτακτος), etc. The charming of animals is fine, but humans should not submit to this. There are striking similarities to the fifth century criticism: “broken/effeminate melodies” rhythms of wailing are corrupting minds and morals: “μελῶν γάρ τοι κατεαγόντων καὶ ῥυθμῶν γοερῶν τῆς μουσικῆς τῆς Καρικῆς αἰ ποικίλαι φαρμακεῖαι διαφθεῖρουσιν τοὺς τρόπους ἀκολάστῳ καὶ κακοτέχνῳ -μουσικῇ εἰς πάθος ὑποσύρουσαι” (2.4.41.3–4).

773. E.g. 2.4.41.5: “ὄργανον τὸ σῶμα λέγει τὸ ἡμέτερον καὶ χορδὰς τὰ νεῦρα αὐτοῦ, δι’ ὧν ἐναρμόνιον εἰληφε τὴν τάσιν, καὶ κρουόμενον τῷ πνεύματι τοὺς φθόγγους ἀποδίδωσι τοὺς ἀνθρωπίνους;/[The Spirit] calls our body an instrument and its nerves strings by which it has received harmonic tension and, strummed by the Spirit, it yields human voices.” 2.4.42.1–2: “Εἰρηνικὸν γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄργανον ὁ ἀνθρωπὸς ἐστίν, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα ἦν πολυπραγμονῇ τις, ὄργανα εὐρήσει πολεμικά, ἢ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἐκφλέγοντα ἢ τοὺς ἔρωτας ἐκκαίοντα ἢ ἐξαγριάνοντα τοὺς θυμούς/The truly peaceful instrument is man; the others, if one inquires, he will find to be instruments of war, kindling the passions or stimulating loves or making savage the spirits.” He names for various peoples (Etruscans, Arcadians, Sicilians, Cretans, Spartans, etc.) a specific war instrument, curiously all those mentioned in the psalm.

ἔκλυτον αὐτῶν τοῦ φρονήματος διὰ τῶν τοιούτων ἐπανίστασθαι ῥυθμῶν/what is relaxed in their mind be aroused by their rhythms,” 2.4.42.3). At the same time, Clement does explicitly allow the use of cithara and lyre.⁷⁷⁴ It seems that he also takes up Pythagorean lore when he recommends going to sleep with a song on the lips, even though not for therapeutical but latreutical purposes. Returning to banquets, he describes the custom of singing *skolia*, for which he indicates to substitute the ἐρωτικά ᾠδαί (erotic songs) and all harmonies (songs) that are fluid/languid (ὕγρός), bending (καμπή), badly fabricated (κακοτεχνῶν), chromatic, and leading to weakness (θρύψις), buffoonery (βωμολοχία), revelry (ἀγερωχία), and drunkenness (μέθη), for ὕμνοι τοῦ θεοῦ, of a moderate/sound (σώφρων) and austere character.⁷⁷⁵ With a sleight-of-hand trick Clement employs the ancient criticism of both aesthetic and moral deviations, seen as intrinsically connected, now equating the Platonic educational ideal with the true Christian music and the corruption to pagan customs at large. Once more, music forms part of a systematic pedagogical program.⁷⁷⁶ He admonishes the Greek catechumens not to pass by musical education like the Sirens, not plugging their ears with unlearnedness in

774. 2.4.43.3: “Οὗτος ἡμῶν ὁ κῶμος ὁ εὐχάριστος, κἂν πρὸς κιθάραν ἐβελήσης ἢ λύραν ᾄδῃν τε καὶ ψάλλειν, μῶμος οὐκ ἔστιν, Ἑβραῖον μιμήσῃ δίκαιον βασιλέα εὐχάριστον τῷ θεῷ/This is our revel of thanksgiving, and if you want to sing and play to cithara or lyre, there is no folly, you may imitate the just Hebrew king who gives thanks to God,” referring, of course, to David; all the Psalm verses mentioning these instruments, along with Col 3.16, justify this permission, in addition to the decachord’s corresponding to Christ’s Decalogue. He concludes by attributing to the psalm the characteristics of good music most favored among ancients: “αἱ γὰρ ὁ ψαλμὸς ἐμμελὴς ἔστιν εὐλογία καὶ σώφρων” (2.4.44.1).

775. 2.4.44.5: “Καὶ γὰρ ἀρμονίας παραδεκτέον τὰς σώφρονας, ἀπωτάτω ὅτι μάλιστα ἐλαύνοντας τῆς ἐρρωμένης ἡμῶν διανοίας τὰς ὑγρὰς ὄντως ἀρμονίας, αἱ περὶ τὰς καμπὰς τῶν φθόγγων κακοτεχνούσαι εἰς θρύψιν καὶ βωμολοχίαν ἐκδιαπύονται· τὰ δὲ αὐστηρὰ καὶ σωφρονικὰ μέλη ἀποτάσσεται ταῖς τῆς μέθης ἀγερωχίαις. Καταλειπτέον οὖν τὰς χρωματικὰς ἀρμονίας ταῖς ἀχρώμοις παροινίαις καὶ τῇ ἀνθοφορούσῃ καὶ ἐταιρούσῃ μουσικῇ.” Notice the pun in the concluding expression: the chromatic = colorful “harmony” fits the “colorless (ἄχρωμος) behavior of drunkards;” the “flower-bearing and meretricious music” is more in line with the conventional ethos of the chromatic genus. Similar characteristics of music to be avoided are mentioned in *Strom.* 6.11.90: “περιττή” (“superfluous”), “κατακλῶσα τὰς ψυχὰς” (“enervating the souls”), throwing them to a confusing variety (“ποικιλία”) between mournful (θρηνώδης), licentious (ἀκόλαστος), luxurious (ἡδυπαθής), filled with Bacchic frenzy (ἐκβαδχεύμενος), and mad (μανικός).

776. The chapters before and after deal with eating, drinking, clothing, speaking, etc. as befitting for a Christian, even laughing: for the smile, musical harmony serves as a point of comparison: “Ἡ μὲν γὰρ καθ’ ἀρμονίαν τοῦ προσώπου, καθάπερ ὄργανον, κόσμιος ἀνεσις μειδίαμα κέκληται—διάχυσις οὕτως ἀνακλᾶται κατὰ πρόσωπον—, σωφρονούντων ὁ γέλως” (2.5.46.3).

rhythm and melody, but to use it to strengthen the soul, for setting in order ethos and for moderation, e.g. during banquets to subdue by song the desires and to praise God in gratitude.⁷⁷⁷ To praise God in everything, even musically, is part of the new life of a Christian: during the daily labor, at sea, before and during meals, before going to bed, during the night, and all of this in a cheerful spirit, united to the “divine choir” (“τῷ θείῳ χορῷ”).⁷⁷⁸

Just as previously the ancients realized that “there is something in music that makes it an appropriate metaphor for cosmic order” and, likewise, that “there are certain kinds of music that one does not associate with the ‘melodious order’ and ‘harmonious arrangement’ of the universe,”⁷⁷⁹ Clement now states that there is music that fits to the new life in Christ, and other music that does not. Interestingly, the suitable and unsuitable type of music, in both cases, is essentially the same. Plato’s ethos and Christian ethos appear to be widely compatible. This cannot be explained only by the assumption that Clement simply copied these judgments from older sources. It happens on the grounds that the ideal of Christian virtue, according to the human figure of Christ, demands for a Christian the very same characteristics of harmony and balance that the classical authors had in mind when describing what sort of human ethos should be promoted through musical ethos. This does not mean that all details of Platonic or other classical ideals of human and musical ethos are equivalent to Christian anthropology and morals; there are actually significant differences. The general principles, however, of moderation and balance, the “golden mean,” the harmony between the parts and the whole, the correspondence between form and content, etc., so prominent in the various theoretical designs, are what has attracted Christian thinkers and artists throughout history to draw from ancient ideals and import them into Christianity.

777. *Strom.* 6.11.89–90: “ἀπτέον ἄρα μουσικῆς εἰς κατακόσμησιν ἥθους καὶ καταστονὴν (...) κατεπάδοντες ἡμῶν τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ τὸν θεὸν δοξάζοντες.”

778. Cf. *Stromata* 7.7.35, 49; *Tert. Apol.* 39.16.21 (description of a modest Christian banquet). Id. *De uxore* 2.6.1–2 & 2.8.8: the contrast between what a pagan husband will sing for his wife and what a Christian couple will sing for each other (“*Sonant inter duos psalmi et hymni, et mutuo provocant, quis melius Domino suo cantet/They sing for each other psalms and hymns and challenge each other who sings better for his Lord*”). As we can see, both content and aesthetics are involved.

779. Stapert 2007, 54. Clement asserts in *Strom.* 6.17.149–150 that the Christian philosopher imitates the Lord (Christ) and thus reaches the fullness of truth; he is able to discern the “truth of a painting” in contrast to what is vulgar, and the “dignity of music” in contrast to the licentious one (and similarly true philosophies vs. others, and true beauty vs. a fake one): “αὐτίκα ἔνεστι θεάσασθαι καὶ ζωγραφίας ἀλήθειαν παρὰ τὴν δημῶδη καὶ μουσικῆς σεμνότητα παρὰ τὴν ἀκόλαστον. Καὶ φιλοσοφίας οὖν ἐστὶν ἀλήθειά τις παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους φιλοσόφους, καὶ κάλλος ἀληθινὸν παρὰ τὸ δεδολωμένον.”

Basil of Caesarea

Basil of Caesarea, like Clement not a music scholar but a bishop and theologian, has nevertheless dedicated a major section on music to introduce his *Homilies on the Psalms*.⁷⁸⁰ He does not intend speak about music as such but in a noteworthy way now attributes many of the effects, including the inculcation of ethos, which usually belong to music, to the psalms.

First, he lists some general benefits that the psalms provide, without directly distinguishing whether they flow from the text or the music: healing ancient wounds of souls and relief for new ones, attending sickness, preserving health and providing remedy for whatever ill—but all this by leading the soul in a harmonious and well-resoned (or -measured) way (“μετά τινος ψυχαγωγίας ἐμμελοῦς καὶ ἡδονῆς σόφρονα λογισμὸν ἐμποιούσης”). But because of the human recalcitrancy towards virtue and the proclivity to pleasure, the Holy Spirit has known how to combine truth with the enjoyment of melody,⁷⁸¹ like a good doctor who administers bitter medicine with honey, instilling the benefit almost without notice. This is especially true for the young, in order to educate their souls.⁷⁸² The famous Pythagorean story about calming a rampant youth with a soothing *aulos* tune reappears in a different dress, because now it is the charming force of the psalms which provide remedy against wild passion.⁷⁸³ Thus the psalms generally bestow tranquility on the soul, bring peace, restrain unrest and passions, moderate, foster friendships, union, reconciliation, and especially love, for who can be enemies, he asks, having sung together in one voice before God; then all people are united into one symphonic choir.⁷⁸⁴

780. *Homilia in Psalmum Primum* 1–2. Text: PG 33.209–213; tr.: Strunk 1998, 121–123. A very similar praise of the psalms is found in Ambrosius *In Psalmum primum enarratio* 1–12 (PL 14.963–970) and in Nicetas of Remesiana (cf. below n. 881).

781. “Τὸ ἐκ τῆς μελωδίας τερπνὸν τοῖς δόγμασιν ἐγκατέμειξεν, ἵνα τῷ προσηγεῖ καὶ λείψ τῆς ἀκοῆς τὸ ἐκ τῶν λόγων ὠφέλιμον λανθανόντως ὑποδεξώμεθα.”

782. “(...) ἵνα οἱ παῖδες, ἢ καὶ ὅλως οἱ νεαροὶ τὸ ἥθος, τῷ μὲν δοκεῖν μελωδῶσι, τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ τὰς ψυχὰς ἐκπαιδεύωνται.”

783. “καὶ πού τις τῶν σφόδρα ἐκτεθριωμένων ὑπὸ θυμοῦ, ἐπειδὰν ἄρξηται τῷ ψαλμῷ κατεπάδεσθαι, ἀπῆλθεν εὐθύς, τὸ ἀγριαῖον τῆς ψυχῆς τῇ μελωδίᾳ κατακοιμίσας.”

784. “Τίς γὰρ ἔτι ἐχθρὸν ἡγεῖσθαι δύναται μεθ’ οὗ μίαν ἀφῆκε πρὸς Θεὸν τὴν φωνήν; Ὡστε καὶ τὸ μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὴν ἀγάπην ἢ ψαλμωδία παρέχεται, οἷονεῖ σύνδεσμόν τινα πρὸς τὴν ἔνωσιν τὴν συνψαλίαν ἐπινοήσασα, καὶ εἰς ἐνὸς χοροῦ συμφωνίαν τὸν λαὸν συναρμόζουσα.” Cf. Ignatius of Antioch, *Ad Ephesios*, ch. 4.

The blessings do not yet end here. Psalms drive demons and fear away, provide safety, respite in toil,⁷⁸⁵ consolation, beauty, gladness in feasts, proper grief and tears for hardened hearts. One can learn from them the four cardinal virtues of manliness/courage (“τῆς ἀνδρίας τὸ μεγαλοπρεπές”), justice (“τῆς δικαιοσύνης τὸ ἀκριβές”), moderation (“σωφροσύνης τὸ σεμνόν”), and prudence (“τὸ τῆς φρονήσεως τέλειον”), and in addition conversion (“μετανοίας τρόπον”) and patience (“ὑπονομῆς μέτρα”), not to mention all the fitting spiritual motions in view of the redemption brought by Christ.

Finally, the reason for the choice of the ψαλτήριον as the proper instrument to sing these texts to and to give the collection its name is not arbitrary; we shall review the reason in the context of Augustine (see below n. 828), but Basil adds that it raises up to heaven lest the enjoyment may drag down to the carnal passions.⁷⁸⁶ Basil ends with a note of Platonic taste: a well-tuned soul has an easier path to heaven.⁷⁸⁷ And this tuning, so much is clear now, is best achieved by forming the souls of the young and keeping everyone’s mind virtuous through singing and praying the psalms which now have become the prototype of music’s therapeutic and pedagogical potential.

John Chrysostom

Educated in the thoroughly pagan city of Antioch, John Chrysostom was eventually bishop of Constantinople and became another of the four Great Greek Fathers of the Church. He contributes to our topic a reflection, similar to the one of Basil but not literally depending on him and with some particularities, at the beginning of his exegesis of Ps 41 (1–3).⁷⁸⁸ After a general introduction, John begins with the

785. That psalms were indeed sung by Christian farmers is testified in Hieron. *Ep.* 46.12; for a wider range of use see ps.-Chrysostomus, *De paenitentia et in lectionem de Davide et de uxore Uriae* (PG 64.12): “Ἀλλ’ οὐ μόνον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις οὕτω κατὰ πάντα καιρὸν καὶ κατὰ πάσαν ἡλικίαν ἐκλάμπει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἀγροῖς καὶ ἐν ἐρημίαις καὶ εἰς τὴν ἀοικητόν γῆν μετὰ πλείονος τῆς σπουδῆς χοροστασίας ἱερὰς ἀνεγείρει τῷ Θεῷ./But not only in the cities and churches does [David’s psalm music] shine forth in this way at any time and at any age, but also in the fields and in the solitary places and in the uninhabited land does it raise holy choruses with more zeal to God.

786. “(…) ἵνα καὶ ἡμεῖς τὰ ἄνω ξητεῖν μελετῶμεν, καὶ μὴ τῇ ἡδονῇ τοῦ μέλους ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς σαρκὸς πάθη καταφερώμεθα.” Here, symbolism and psychological effect are unconvincingly connected—how should the physical arrangement of sound production have anything to do with moderating an inappropriate longing for pleasure?

787. “οἱ ἐμμελεῖς καὶ εὐάρμοστοι τὰς ψυχὰς ῥαδίαν ἔχουσι τὴν εἰς τὰ ἄνω πορείαν.”

788. *Expositio in Psalmos*; Text: PG 55.155–159; tr.: Strunk 1998, 123–126; Stapert 2007, 109–130, in his chapter on Chrysostom, only refers briefly to this text but cites many other passages. I shall include some of them as references at the end of the current section.

idea that God responded to human decadence and slowness in spiritual things by combining prophecy with melody, since nothing has so many positive effects than music. First, he describes its ability to lift us up “from the chains of the body” and to reach out to the future life in heaven, giving wings to the mind; for this, melody needs to be modulated and well-structured.⁷⁸⁹ Then he enumerates how chant is able to lull infants to sleep (“κατεπάδουσαι ἄσματα”), lighten the hardships of journey and work (he mentions in particular peasants, sailors, and women—on their own or together: “συμφώνως”), for such enjoyment is “innate in our mind” (“οἰκείως ἡμῖν πρὸς τοῦτο ἔχει τὸ εἶδος τῆς τέρψεως ἢ ψυχῇ”). But there are also lascivious songs, introduced by the demons, which bring about all sorts of evil, softening and weakening the soul (“ἀσθενεστέραν αὐτὴν καὶ μαλακωτέραν ποιοῦσιν”). The psalms, to the contrary, “provide both pleasure and profit” (“καὶ ἡδονὴν τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ ὠφέλειαν εἶναι”), also holiness (ἀγιασμός). Through their words they induce philosophy, purify the soul, and allow the Holy Spirit to fly upon it speedily. For this, the singing has to be with understanding (“μετὰ συνέσεως,” cf. Eph 5.18–19, a passage frequently quoted in such contexts)—not understanding the musical structure, but attending to the meaning of the text.

John Chrysostom in particular deals with the customs at meals. Already Quintilian had complained about the fact that licentiousness at banquets in the home are prone to upset all positive ethical effect in the young people that they may have received through musical education at school (cf. above n. 97). In order to avoid drunkenness, gluttony, immoderation and a lazy mind, psalms and other sacred hymns should be taught to women and children and sung as a protection (ἀσφάλεια): “once psalmody comes in, it will turn away all these unwonted things and depraved counsels.”⁷⁹⁰ David and his cithara in reality represent Christ (in Christian faith, the new David), and where he is, there are peace, charity, and all good things (“εἰρήνη δὲ καὶ ἀγάπη, καὶ πάντα ὥσπερ ἐκ πηγῶν ἤξει τὰ ἀγαθὰ”). Thus, the power of the psalter has its source in the same person from which Clement drew the origin of harmony in creation.

789. “(...) ὁ Θεὸς (...) μελωδίαν ἀνέμιξε τῇ προφητείᾳ, ἵνα τῷ ῥυθμῷ τοῦ μέλους ψυχαγωγούμενοι πάντες, μετὰ πολλῆς τῆς προθυμίας τοὺς ἱεροὺς ἀναπέμπωσιν αὐτῷ ὕμνους. Οὐδὲν γὰρ, οὐδὲν οὕτως ἀνίστησι ψυχὴν, καὶ πτεροῖ, καὶ τῆς ἀπαλλάττει, καὶ τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἀπολύει δεσμῶν, καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν ποιεῖ, καὶ πάντων καταγελᾶν τῶν βιωτικῶν, ὡς μέλος συμφωνίας, καὶ ῥυθμῷ συγκείμενον θεῖον ᾄσμα.” Notice the recurring term of “ψυχαγωγία” in these authors, as used, e.g. in Aristides Quintilianus 2.14 82.3.

790. “(...) τῆς ψαλμωδίας ἐπεισελθούσης, ἀποπηδήσῃ πάντα ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἄτοπα καὶ πονηρὰ βουλεύματα.”

A bit differently from what we shall see in Augustine, John does not seem much concerned about aesthetic beauty in such song; if someone's voice is not quite sonorous due to age or lack of formation in rhythm, what matters is a "sober soul, an alert mind, a contrite heart, sound reasoning, and a purified conscience"⁷⁹¹—thus one can confidently stand beside David. No musical instrument is needed, but we should ourselves become a cithara, "making a full harmony of mind and body."⁷⁹² Such music is possible everywhere, also just in the mind without sound, "for we do not sing for people but to God, who can hear our hearts and enter into the silences of our minds."⁷⁹³ Saint Paul is the main witness for such a practice, having never ceased to praise God through song even in captivity.

We find here, then, another mixture of previous ideas with the new Christian approach to life: the general benefits of music, especially its enjoyment, suggest its use to dispose our mind harmoniously for God and to ward off the dangers of lust and immorality, unworthy for someone who wants to be united to the God of love.

Augustine⁷⁹⁴

Augustine's deep thirst for knowledge and truth is married to a keen sense for beauty and affection.⁷⁹⁵ Throughout antiquity, music is often seen as being particularly apt to branch out into and mediate between both areas. It does not astonish, then, that for Augustine music holds an important, if not privileged place in his life. Intense oratorical training made him a master of language and sound, and in the course of his formation he studied the traditional canon of music theory (cf. *Conf.* 4.16.30).

791. "Τὸ γὰρ ζητούμενον ἐνταῦθα, ψυχὴν νήφουσα, διεγχευμένη διάνοια, καρδιά κατανενυγμένη, λογισμὸς ἐρρωμένος, συνειδὸς ἐκκεκαθαρμένον."

792. "ἀλλ' ἐὰν θέλῃς, οὐ σαυτὸν ἐργάσῃ κιθάραν, νεκρώσας τὰ μέλη τῆς σακρὸς, καὶ πολλὴν τῷ σώματι πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν ποιήσας τὴν συμφωνίαν."

793. "Οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρώποις ψάλλομεν, ἀλλὰ Θεῷ τῷ δυναμένῳ καὶ καρδίας ἀκοῦσαι, καὶ εἰς τὰ ἀπόρρητα τῆς διανοίας ἡμῶν εἰσελθεῖν."

794. Some general works worth consulting about Augustine and music are: Edelstein 1929; Marrou 1938/1981; Wille 1967, 603–623; La Croix 1988; Darmstädter 1996, 40–121 (even though with a number of shortcomings). Many texts in English translation are available in digitalized format at <http://news.newadvent.org/fathers/index.html>.

795. This notion occurs frequently in his *Confessions*; for *De musica* see e.g. 6.11.29: "*Delectatio quippe quasi pondus est animae. Delectatio ergo ordinat animam*/Enjoyment, of course, is somewhat the weight of the soul. Enjoyment, therefore, orders the soul."

Aequalitas—Music as a Path to God

At about the time of his baptism (387 AD), he sets out to elaborate a (never finished) compendium of the liberal arts, of which only *De musica*⁷⁹⁶ is extant, with the last (sixth) book being reworked significantly (before 409 AD). The work is written in the form of a didactic dialogue, between teacher and student, and almost exclusively deals with rhythm and numbers; in book one there are some general considerations on music, and then book six opens up a vision of how to reach through music theory and reason harmony in body and soul, as a path leading ultimately to God. If the study of music, previously a propedeutic discipline leading up to philosophy, now becomes an introduction to theology.

It is not possible here to do justice to the intricate course of argument that Augustine develops in this work; nor will I be able to discuss all passages within the extensive *Corpus Augustinianum* that touch upon music, be they directly or indirectly involving the question of musical ethos; the study by Beatrix Darmstädter provides a more complete treatment. I shall only comment on a few central passages and ideas in order to elucidate Augustine's contribution to the question of musical ethos.

At the beginning of *De musica*, this discipline is still associated with the Muses,⁷⁹⁷ but the definition, as found in other authors (see p. 14), is of a more technical nature: "*scientia bene modulandi*" (1.2.2), which is explained as the proper

796. Text: PL 32.1081–1194 (digitalized in the TML at http://www.chmtl.indiana.edu/tml/3rd-5th/AUGDEM1_TEXT.html); text, tr., comm.: Hentschel 2002 (books 1 & 6, Ger.); Jacobsson 2002 (book six, Eng.); tr.: Taliaferro 1939 (Eng.); comm.: Wille 1967, 603–623; Brennan 1988; Keller 1993; Mathiesen 1999, 619–622; Jeserich 2013, 51–116. I am citing book one from Hentschel's edition, book six from Jacobsson; any other texts from Augustine, except for the *Confessions*, I am citing from the PL. About the problems of the reworking and dating book six see Jacobsson 2002, xv–xxviii.

797. 1.1.1: "*omnipotentiam quamdam canendi Musis solere concedi (...) quae Musica nominatur*," if "*canendi*" is a *genitivus obiectivus*, it simply means that the Muses have full power over song; if it is a *genitivus subiectivus*, it would mean that the Muses are omnipotent through song; however, the context does not suggest a statement on the power of music.

measuring.⁷⁹⁸ Here and elsewhere,⁷⁹⁹ Augustine sees in the rationality of science the true value of music as a discipline. The adverb “*bene*” corresponds roughly to what Plato had called “correctness”: music may elicit enjoyment as soon as there is some order or measure in it, but for being fully good, it also needs to be “*congruens*.”⁸⁰⁰ And for being *scientia*, music is not simply the impulsive uttering of musical sound as in animals, or the thoughtless enjoyment (“*libenter audiunt*”), or music production just to please the crowds (“*congruere plebi*”),⁸⁰¹ or to use music

798. That “*modulatio*” may also have a wider meaning emerges from *De magistro* 1.1: “*Sed nonne attendis id quod te delectat in cantu, modulationem quandam esse soni? Quae quoniam verbis et addi et detrahi potest, aliud est loqui, aliud cantare; nam et tibiis et cithara cantatur, et aves cantant, et nos interdum sine verbis musicum aliquid sonamus, qui sonus cantus dici potest, locutio non potest.*”/But don’t you pay attention to the fact that which pleases you in song, is a certain “modulation” of sound (melody)? Since it can be added or taken away, speaking is one thing, singing another; for one can sing both with pipes and cithara, and the birds sing, and sometimes we make music without words, which can be called sound of song, not speech.” Music is, according to this passage, what adds enjoyment to words; this is further developed in *De ordine* 2.11.33: “*Quod vero ad aures [pertinent], quando rationabilem concentum dicimus, cantumque numerosum rationabiliter esse compositum, suavitatis vocatur proprio iam nomine.*”/However, what [belongs] to the ears, when we talk about a rational concord and a rhythmical song that is composed according to reason; we call sweetness in the proper sense.” The rational part within the *voluptas*, which the senses provide (e.g. “*in aurium suavitatem cum pulsa chorda quasi liquid sonat atque pure*”), is found “*ubi quaedam dimensio est atque modulatio*”). In *Mus.* 6.10.25, a fuller explanation for “*bona modulatio*” is provided: it consists “*in quodam motu libero et ad suae pulchritudinis finem converso*”/of a certain movement that is free and turned towards the objective of its beauty,” with a stronger emphasis on the aesthetic aspect.

799. E.g. *Mus.* 2.1.1 (“*musicae ratio, ad quam dimensio ipsa vocum rationabilis et numerositas pertinent*”).

800. An example is given in 1.3.4: “*si quis suavissime canens et pulchre saltans velit eo ipso lascivire, cum res severitatem desiderat, non bene utique numerosa modulatione utitur; id est ea motione, quae iam bona ex eo, quia numerosa est, dici potest, male ille, id est incongruenter utitur.*”/If someone wants to frisk by singing very sweetly and dancing beautifully, whereas the situation requires seriousness, he is not using the rhythmical arrangement well; in other words, he uses that movement, which in itself can be called good/right, because it is rhythmical, in a bad way, because it is inconvenient.” Brennan 1988, 271–272 argues that “*bene* is meant in an ethical as well as an aesthetic sense”

801. Augustine dedicates quite some space (1.5.10–1.6.12) to discuss the status of the theater musician. First it seems that the musician is improved by the reaction of the audience: “*imperita multitudo explodat saepe tibicinem nugatorios sonos efferentem rursumque plaudat bene canenti et prorsus, quanto suavius canitur, tanto amplius et studiosius moveatur*”/the uneducated crowd rejects often a piper who produces worthless sounds and on the other hand applauds to the one who sounds well and, again, is moved more and more ardently to the degree that

for relaxation and recovery (*“post magnas curas relaxandi ac reparandi animi gratia moderatissime ab iis aliquid voluptatis assumitur”*)—all of these are very much legitimate, as long as one seizes music for it and is not seized by it instead⁸⁰²—, but for science, one needs to understand by reason the underlying principles, while for the practical exercise of the *ars*, the principle of *imitatio* (corresponding to *mimēsis*)⁸⁰³ suffices (1.4.5–7). In what follows, Augustine pursues the principle of proper measurement by means of numeric proportions, applying Pythagorean principles such as that which is measured is preferred to that which is without measure or limit (1.9.15). These considerations center around the first three numbers, which display a particular harmony in their quality of showing unity in multiplicity (1.12.22–23), to which then the number 4 is added as the sum out of the previous three (1.12.23–26). At the end of book one it is made clear that the science is not meant to be detached from the senses; similar to the Aristoxenian tradition, the investigation should be limited to the area which can be meaningfully—even with some enjoyment and pleasure—perceived and confirmed

he sings/sounds softer.” Now, since this judgment comes not from knowledge but from a natural *sensus audiendi* (to which Augustine does not give much credit), the musician who adapts to the feedback simply through *imitatio*, perception, and memory, just as the wild animals, in doing so for the purpose of *“plausus populi,” “praemia,”* or *“alia fortuita commoda,”* he betrays true science if he possessed it. Augustine contrasts “good” music as assumed by the uneducated, and the truly good music, which is inspired by the knowledge of musical science. Another slap against the *turba “adplaudentium strepitu vulgari levitate laetantium”* is given at 6.1.1.

802. 1.4.5: *“Quam interdum sic capere modestissimum est, ab ea vero capi vel interdum turpe atque indecorum est.”* At another place (*Contra Iulianum* 5.5.23), Augustine cites David’s “music therapy” on Saul’s evil spirit, after citing a Ciceronian version of the story on Pythagoras: *“Debuiisti sane homo ecclesiasticus ecclesiastica musica potius quam Pythagorica commoneri, quid Davidica cithara egerit in Saule, quando malo spiritu vexabatur, et tangente citharam sancto ab illa molestia respirabat: ne ideo bonum aliquid existimes concupiscentiam carnis, quia nonnunquam musicis cohibetur sonis.”* You as a man of the Church certainly ought to promote Church music rather than Pythagorean, what David’s cithara did on Saul when he was plagued by an evil spirit, and as the holy one stroke the cithara, he enjoyed respite from that trouble; therefore, you should not consider the concupiscence of the flesh anything good because it is never restrained by musical sounds.” One should notice that Augustine’s “understanding” of music retains always its relationship to judging actual music and does not aim at a theoretical game with numbers and proportions. About the “practical orientation” of Augustine’s approach, see Darmstädter 1996, 46.

803. About the status of this concept in Augustine see Sallman 1990, even though some of his points have been advanced and clarified better by more recent scholarship.

(1.13.27–28).⁸⁰⁴ Also in the following books of mere technical nature, aesthetic criteria of being *congruens*, *concinnus*, or *suavis* continue to confirm the established rules about rhythm and meter.⁸⁰⁵ That his theory is not exclusively designed for music with text becomes clear from passages like the one in the context of rests (silence).⁸⁰⁶ The properly placed silence actually contributes to the beauty of the melody.⁸⁰⁷

804. The scientifically proper movements (of musical rhythm) carry their beauty in themselves (*“in seipsis finem decoris delectationisve conservant”*), but it is more convenient and without error (*“commodius,” “sine ullo errore”*) to regard those temporal dimensions that are suited to please us (*“de his brevibus intervallorum spatiis, quae in cantando saltandoque nos mulcent, quantum ratio nos duxerit, disseramus”*). It would not make sense considering meters that last an hour or two between arsis and thesis; *“congruentia delectari”* and *“aliqua voluptate affici”* are not unimportant and actually help: *“cum procedens quodammodo de secretissimis penetra-bilibus musica in nostris etiam sensibus vel his rebus, quae a nobis sentiuntur, vestigia quaedam posuerit, nonne oportet eadem vestigia prius persequi (...)”*?/when [music], proceeding, as it were, from most secret intimate areas, leaves some traces also in our senses or in the things that are perceived by us, should we not first follow these very traces (...)?”

805. E.g. 2.14.26; 2.9.16 (*“sine aurium offensione”*); 3.7.16; etc. The requirement of aesthetically good music is also emphasized, with a strong moral import, in the *Enarratio II in Ps 32.8*: *“Canta illi [= Deo], sed noli male. Non vult offendi aures suas. Bene canta, frater. Si alicui bono auditori musico, quando tibi dicitur: canta ut placeas ei, sine aliqua instructione musicae artis cantare trepidas, ne displiceas artifice; quia quod in te imperitus non agnoscit, artifex reprehendit; quis offerat Deo bene cantare, sic iudicanti de cantore, sic examinanti omnia, sic audienti? Quando potes afferre tam elegans artificium cantandi, ut tam perfectis auribus in nullo displiceas? Ecce veluti modum cantandi dat tibi; noli quaerere verba, quasi explicare possis unde Deus delectatur./Sing to God, but not in a bad way. He does not want his ears to be offended. Sing well, brother. If you are afraid to displease an artist, singing without any instruction in the art of music for some good musical listener when you are told: sing to please him, because what the unexperienced does not recognize in you, the artist blames, who might present to God good singing who thus judges the singer, thus scrutinizes everything, thus listens? When can you produce such an fine art work of singing, that you might not displease such perfect ears in anything? See, in a way he gives the way of singing to you; do not seek words, as if you were able to explain how to delight God.”*

806. 4.14.24: *“In iis autem numeris qui non verbis fiunt, sed aliquo pulsu vel flatu, vel ipsa etiam lingua, nullum in hac re discrimen est, post quam vocem percussionemve sileatur/But in those rhythms which do not occur with words, but with some beat or air blow or even with the tongue itself, there is regarding this issue no distinction after which sound or impulse of sound there is silence.”*

807. This is said in *De Genesi ad litteram* 25: *“Sicut in cantando interpositiones silentiorum certis moderatisque intervallis, quamvis vocum privationes sint, bene tamen ordinantur ab iis qui cantare sciunt, et suavitati universae cantilenae aliquid conferunt./As in singing the inserting of silences at fixed and regulated intervals, even though they are the withholding of sounds,*

In book six, after finishing his discussion of meter, rhythm, and verse, Augustine strikes a very different tone. He regards his own previous discourse as *nugacitas* and *puerilia*, aimed to lead the young or people of any age through reason (“*duce ratione*”) from carnal senses to love for the unchangeable God (6.1.1). To show this path, Augustine first applies his great talent for psychological introspection to analyze some elements of acoustical perception. Our senses possess the natural capacity to judge musical sounds (“*vis approbandi et improbandi*”), “*aut mulceretur eorum concinnitate aut absurditate offenderetur*/that it is either charmed by their elegance or be offended by their incongruity”, and for this it is necessary that the sense itself have *numerus*⁸⁰⁸ (6.2.3). Sound exists in various ways: in that which sounds, in the sound perception, in the producer of sound, in the sound production, in memory,⁸⁰⁹ and in the ability of the sense to judgment, and this last one is that which makes us enjoy the proper sound—but this enjoyment itself needs to be subject to another judgment through reason (6.9.23–24).⁸¹⁰ Only here we are reaching the level of

are still put in properly by those who know how to sing and contribute also something to the softness of all the melody.”

808. The meaning of this term shifts between “number” (thus more frequently translated by Hentschel (“*Zahl*,” see his introduction p. xxix–xxx), or “rhythm” (thus more frequently translated by Jacobsson, which seems to me more proper in most contexts of book six); the common base for both meanings could be circumscribed perhaps as “a structured/structuring unit.”

The criterion of *convenientia* occurs repeatedly, e.g. again at 6.9.24.

Augustine speaks about a natural capacity to produce (even good) music without understanding in *De ordine* 2.19.49, but reason makes it much better.

809. Augustine reminds elsewhere that the importance of memory for music was conceived by the poets in considering the Muses as daughters of *Memoria* (*De ordine* 2.14.41). The mythological origin of music is rejected in *De doctrina christiana* 2.17.27 (cf. Clem. Al. *Protr.* 2.31.2–4; both Strunk 1998, 144 n. 2, and Halporn 2003, 216 n. 206, commenting on Cassiod. *Inst.* 2.5.1, say that Clement does not link the Muses to music; but this is what the text says: Metgaclo, daughter of King Macar of Lesbos, taught her Mysian maid-servants, whom she called “Μοῖσαι,” to sing and play the cithara in order to heal the king’s wrath; they succeeded so well that they were honored in bronze statues as the Muses). About the role of memory when actually singing, see *Conf.* 11.28.38; Mayer-Baer 1953 shows how the aspect of time is an important factor in conceiving music in a measured way, through numbers.

810. Enjoyment (*voluptas*) was previously explained as the *convenientia* between the action of the soul in the body and the influences that come from outside through the senses (whereby each of the senses is assigned to one of the elements) (6.5.9–10). But since our perception has been designed in proportion to the human place in the universe, it is perishable (6.7.19). Only the interior judgment over any kind of movement, including rhythm, points then at God “*quem certe decet credere auctorem omnis convenientiae atque concordiae*/whom for certain it is proper to believe as the author of all consistency and concord” (6.8.20). The

true science, and reason is now capable of discerning the causes for the enjoyment felt, in the case of rhythm the regularity and equally measured spaced (*“parilitatem quondam et aequaliter dimensa intervalla,”* 6.10.26). Reason then demands true and not “imitated” *aequalitas* (evenness, “symmetry”)⁸¹¹ lest, out of error, something that is *inaequalis* is enjoyed as much as something that is *aequalis*—although even such imitation is somehow beautiful as it is still seeking *aequalitas* (6.10.28). Corporal realities contain *aequalitas* only imperfectly, while perfect *aequalitas* is found in the eternal movements of the celestial bodies.⁸¹² The soul should find its enjoyment in those immutable rational *numera*, the origin of which is ultimately God (6.12.36). The soul’s attitude towards this reality receives now explicitly ethical value: the virtues (e.g. prudence, charity) correspond to striving toward what is eternal and purify the soul, while curiosity and pride lead to remain distracted with the shadows of true *aequalitas* (6.13.39–6.14.44).⁸¹³ It must remain clear, however, that the use of earthly *numera* (and we may say, music in general)⁸¹⁴ can be positive

soul is in many ways distracted from this path to God through exposure to sensual pleasure (6.13.39).

811. The examples, again given from metric theory, show that he means an even proportion between parts. See also 6.13.38: “*Pulchra numero placent, in quo iam ostendimus aequalitatem appeti. (...) quodam aequalitatis iure laetamur, cum occultioribus modis paria paribus tributa esse cognoscimus*/beautiful things please because of the number, in which, as we have already demonstrated, evenness is sought. (...) we rejoice justly in a certain law of evenness, because we recognize that similari s assigned to similar according to hidden patterns.” Augustine emphasizes that it is impossible to love something ugly/bad (*deformis/foedus*); the σαυροφιλοί (“lovers of rotten things”) really love only *minus pulchra*. Augustine gives concrete examples of *aequalitas* in the human body, in sense perception (what is not too bright or shrill, etc.)—again, *convenientia* and *congruentia* determine what the Greeks described in terms of harmony or moderation, the proper mean or measure. The concept of *imitatio* is negative, similar to the Platonic devaluation of the image in contrast to the original.
812. On these movements depends also the proper order on earth, and this order is described musically, in good Pythagorean terms: “*Ita caelestibus terrena subiecta orbes temporum suorum numerosa successione quasi carmine universitatis adsociant*”/Thus, earthly subjects associate the courses of their times in counted succession with heavenly ones as if to a universal song” (6.11.29). Augustine adds that we often miss the order and beauty in these things because we do not possess the vision of the whole, given our limitation due to original sin (6.11.30); but the beauty of the rational *numera* open our eyes to this reality.
813. This idea is taken up again and systematically developed for all the cardinal virtues at 6.15.49–6.16.55.
814. It remains somewhat curious why Augustine reduces this whole discussion to rhythm and says very little about melody, instruments, etc., as other music theorists do; one reason might be the conceptual closeness between rhythm and number (both “*numerus*”) to show the principles of order and *aequalitas*; we might presume, however, that much of what is

and helpful for both body and soul, as long as the soul does not stain itself by an *amor inferioris pulchritudinis*, thinking that it could reach beatitude through the enjoyment of creatures (6.14.45–46 and again in 6.15.49–50). The ideal consists in a mind firmly set on God and clear truth, which allows perceiving and enjoying the corporal *numera* without interior disturbance.⁸¹⁵ The work ends with another reflection on the first four numbers, according to which the world is ordered and has *aequalitas* and proportion in its four physical dimensions and elements, all governed by the heavenly *numera* of God's law (6.17.57–58).⁸¹⁶

From these arguments we can extract for our investigation the following points: While Augustine, like Clement of Alexandria, uses music protreptically as a vehicle to connect pagans with the truth of Christianity, his approach almost completely lacks reference to myth⁸¹⁷ or the alleged power of sonic music, although he does acknowledge the existence and good use of the latter. For Augustine, goodness in music lies in its structural ability to reveal the *aequalitas*, a harmonic balance between parts of a whole, that pervades the world and exercises a natural attraction both on the body (through the senses) and on the soul (through the body, which for Augustine remains problematic, but also from above, from the contemplation of God's truth). As far as I see, he never calls God "*aequalitas*," but God rules everything through this principle, which, at the same time, produces beauty.⁸¹⁸ Apart from merely utilitarian applications of music (e.g. to help relax after work), audible music is good when it aids, and not distracts, the soul to be

said, especially when general principles and effects of perception are discussed, could justly be applied, *mutatis mutandis*, to music at large. There is an indication that he intended to write six further books *De melo* (*Ep.* 101.3). His history as a rhetor may have inclined him to begin with the rhythmical part, even though it is the least "musical" in music; another motivation might have been the intuition that rhythm is the common denominator or unifying factor within the ancient "musical" disciplines of poetry, harmonics, and dance (cf. Lippman 1963, 195–196; Keller 1993, 194–202).

815. 6.15.49: "*quanto ergo tunc magis in unum Deum et perspicuam intenti veritatem, ut dictum est, facie ad faciem numeros, quibus agimus corpora, nulla inquietudine sentiemus, nisi forte credendum est animam, cum de his, quae per ipsam bona sunt, gaudere possit, de his, ex quibus ipsa bona est, non posse gaudere.*"

816. A good analysis of the relationship between number (as a pure synthesis of unity and multiplicity) and beauty in book six offers Schmitt 1990; similar Radice 1992 with a wider philosophical scope.

817. Augustine relates the story of Amphion "*quod citharae suavitate lapides mulserit et adtraxerit*" in *De civ. D.* 18.13 as an example for the tales that circulated in Greece during the time of Judges in the Old Testament.

818. Augustine does call God "beauty" in *Conf.* 3.6.10: "*mi pater summe bone, pulchritudo pulchrorum omnium. O veritas, veritas, (...) pulchra opera tua;*" see also 4.13.20 (notice there and at

virtuous and reach out to God. Much more conducive to achieving this is, however, is the science of music, which provides, through the analysis of the *numera*, an understanding and correct judgment about which music is justly to be enjoyed—a strongly Platonic conception. For our corporal nature might be wrong in judging something as *aequus* and enjoyable what in truth is not. A prototype for the corruption of music is, as in multiple previous authors, the music produced only to please the uneducated crowd, especially in the theaters.⁸¹⁹

The key term for good music, then, in Augustine is *aequalitas* with synonyms such as *congruentia*, etc. The principle of propriety is also important when both body and soul are described as receiving *numera*: the body from the senses, the soul from divine wisdom, which is superior, wherefore the *numera* coming from the body are not fitting for the soul, at least not those “*quibus etiam flagitiosa theatra personant*/of which also the shameful theaters resound” (6.4.7).⁸²⁰ That audible music nevertheless receives acknowledgement and even praise elsewhere, as we have seen, reveals that Augustine is of two minds on the question of whether “real” music should actually be pursued or not. In *De musica* he constantly vacillates between acceptance and denial.

other places, e.g. 4.14.23; 4.15.27, the combination of “*pulchrum et aptum*” (the title of a lost early work of his)—beauty and appropriateness go together; 4.16.27.

819. Augustine contrasts also in his preaching the new Christian liturgical praise with the pagan musical customs, e.g. *Serm.* 34.3.6 (commenting on the phrase “*Cantate, Domino, canticum novum*”, Ps 149.1–2): “*Laudes vultis dicere Deo? Vos estote quod dicatis. Laus ipsius estis, si bene vivatis. Laus enim non est in synagoga Iudaeorum, non est in insania Paganorum, non est in erroribus haereticorum, non est in plausibus theatrorum. Quaeritis ubi sit? Vos attendite, vos estote. Laus eius in Ecclesia sanctorum.*” *Quaeris unde gaudeas quando cantas? Laetetur Israel in eo qui fecit eum.*”/Do you want to say praise to God? Be what you say. You are his praise, if you live well. For praise is neither in the synagogues of the Jews, nor is it in the madnesses of the Pagans, nor in the applauses of the theaters. Do you ask where it is? You listen, you be it. ‘His praise is in the Church of the holy ones.’ Do you want to know whence you rejoice when you sing? ‘May Israel rejoice in him who has made him.’” Cf. also *De doctrina christiana* 2.18.

820. As Augustine develops the relationship between body and soul (6.4.7–6.5.14), neo-Platonic influence can strongly be felt in the relatively low appreciation of the body and in that the soul should turn away from its “servent,” the body, towards its master, God; even the body suffers when the soul sins by preferring *concupiscentia* over God (e.g. 6.5.13). Augustine later sees the need to clarify (*Retract.* 1.11.2), in view of the Christian belief in the resurrection and glorification of the body, that only in the present life the soul ought to avoid bodily incitement (*illecebra*) or bad enjoyment (*delectatio turpis*), which would keep the soul from grasping the *intelligibilia* and from the *contemplatio sapientiae*; this problem will no longer exist in the future life; see also *Retract.* 1.11.3.

Dangers and Benefits From Musical Delights

This ambivalence is even more strikingly illustrated in a passage from the *Confessiones*⁸²¹ (10.33.49–50), written about ten years later. The context is the discussion of the various senses and their tempting power. Augustine admits how much the delights (*voluptates*) of the ears have entangled and subjugated him in the past,⁸²² but God has freed him—not fully, since he still succumbs to the soft and skillful singings of God’s word, albeit he is not attached and able to leave it.⁸²³ They receive a place of dignity and are *congruens* in his heart, but he has scruples about whether he gives them too much honor when moved “*in flammam pietatis*” when God’s word is sung, more than when just spoken, stirred by a mysterious familiarity between the various spiritual affections and their correspondent in voice and song.⁸²⁴ The problem is that the *delectatio carnis* does not always meekly submit to reason but tries to rush ahead and lead it. Then, again, he repents for being too strict in removing the soft/sweet songs of David’s Psalms from his ears and even from the church (Bishop Athanasius of Alexandria had prescribed an austere recitative Psalm performance), as he recalls the great utility of being moved to tears by song when he recovered his faith.⁸²⁵ So he goes back and forth (“*fuctuo inter*

821. Text: Verheijen 1981 (digitalized at http://www.hs-augsburg.de/~Harsch/Chronologia/Lspost05/Augustinus/aug_co00.html); text and tr.: Watts 1912; text and comm.: O’Donnell 1992 (digital at <http://www.stoa.org/hippo/index.html>); tr.: Strunk 1998, 132–133 (only 10.33), a host of translations of the whole work is available. I am citing from the Verheijen text.

822. Also in *Mus.* 1.5.10, the response of the student to whether he had listened to actors in the theater (“*Plus, fortasse, quam vellem*”) is an autobiographical hint (cf. Hentschel 2002, 169 n. 20; *Conf.* 3.2.2).

823. “*Nunc in sonis, quos animant eloquia tua, cum suavi et artificiosa voce cantantur, fateor, aliquantulum adquiesco, non quidem ut haeream, sed ut surgam, cum volo.*”

824. “*Omnes affectus spiritus nostri pro sui diversitate habere proprios modos in voce atque cantu, quorum nescio qua occulta familiaritate excitentur.*”

825. “*Verum tamen cum reminiscor lacrimas meas, quas fudi ad cantus ecclesiae in primordiis recuperatae fidei meae, et nunc ipsum cum moveor non cantu, sed rebus quae cantantur, cum liquida voce et convenientissima modulatione cantantur, magnam instituti huius utilitatem rursus agnosco.*” Notice the aesthetical qualifications necessary for this effect to take place, especially “*convenientissima modulatione*”; a very similar description is given already earlier at 9.6.14: “*Quantum fleui in hymnis et canticis tuis suave sonantis ecclesiae tuae vocibus commotus acriter! Voces illae influebant auribus meis et eliquabatur veritas in cor meum et exaestuabat inde affectus pietatis, et currebant lacrimae, et bene mihi erat cum eis.*”/How much have I wept, fiercely moved, in your hymns and songs, softly sounding by the voices of your church! These voices flooded my ears, and truth washed into my heart and, hence, boiled up the affection of piety, and tears ran, and I was well with them.” The general positive practice of liturgical chant is

periculum voluptatis et experimentum salubritatis"). His conclusion is to allow the musical practice in church, so that through the delight of the ears the weaker mind arise to the affection of piety ("*ut per oblectamenta aurium infirmior animus in affectum pietatis adsurgat*"), while the concern remains that song may move him more than the *res*, that is, God's word, which would be sinful, wherefore he would prefer not to hear song—and ultimately he sees the problem in himself ("*mibi quaestio factus sum*") and his incapacity to come to terms with that question. The beneficial, heart-and-tear-moving capacity of music towards piety is seen as evident; nothing is bad in music itself (as long as it serves the soul to experience more deeply the message of the text⁸²⁶—Plato's ethical triangle); it is the mind that might process

mentioned frequently (e.g. in Milan, *Conf.* 9.7.15: "*Non longe coeperat Mediolanensis ecclesia genus hoc consolationis et exhortationis celebrare, magno studio fratrum concinentium vocibus et cordibus*"/Not long ago, the church of Milan began to celebrate/use that form of comforting and exhorting, with great zeal of the brothers harmonizing in voices and hearts." The chapter further describes how Bishop Ambrose introduced chant "*secundum morem orientalium partium*" so that the people, gathered day and night in the church in the midst of the Arian persecution, "*maeroris taedio contabesceret*"—a custom which spread henceforth throughout the whole world. See also *Enarratio II* in Ps 18.1 "*nos autem qui in ecclesia divina eloquia cantare didicimus, simul etiam instare debemus esse quod scriptum est, 'beatus populus qui intellegit iubilationem* (Ps 88.16)/But we who have learned to sing in the church divine utterances, at the same time must also pursue what is written, "blessed the people who understands the jubilation." There is also much biblical support for this, e.g. Col. 3.16. Augustine even exhorts his church not to be outmatched by heretics: *Ep.* 55.18.34: "*de hac re tam utili ad movendum pie animum et accendendum divinae dilectionis affectum varia consuetudo est et pleraque in Africa ecclesiae membra pigriora sunt, ita ut donatistae nos reprehendant, quod sobrie psallimus in ecclesia divina cantica prophetarum, cum ipsi ebrietates suas ad canticum psalmorum humano ingenio compositorum quasi ad tubas exhortationis inflamment*"/About this useful matter to move in a pious way the mind and to kindle the affection of divine love, there exists various custom, and very many members in the African church are duller, so that the donatists rebuke us, that we sing the divine songs of the prophets in the church soberly, while they inflame their drunkenness to the songs of psalms with the human talent of composers as if to arousing trumpet signals."

826. Cf. *De doctrina christiana* 4.20.41 about the stylistic deficiencies in the Latin Vulgate of Holy Scripture: "*illa musica disciplina, ubi numerus iste plenissime discitur, usque adeo non defuit prophetis nostris, ut vir doctissimus Hieronymus quorundam etiam metra commemoraret, in hebraea dumtaxat lingua; sed ut veritatem servaret in verbis, haec inde non transtulit.*"/This discipline of music, where that rhythm is learned very completely, has not lacked in our prophets to that degree, that the very learned man Jerome recalls even their meters, at any rate in the Hebrew language; but so that the truth be conserved in the words, he did not transfer [the meters] from there [into Latin]."

music in a wrong, idolatrous way—a bad value at the fourth corner of the ethical pyramid (“context”) puts the whole system in danger.

That music in itself is good stems also from Augustine’s conviction that it has been given to the human race by God.⁸²⁷ The ten strings of the *psalterium* may be due to a law or due to the sacred significance of the number (cf. the Ten Commandments; *De doctrina christiana* 2.16.26).⁸²⁸ Despite pagain “superstition” regarding the origin of music (cf. above n. 809), music is good if it seizes us to understand Holy Scripture (“*ad intellegendas sanctas scripturas rapere*”) or spiritual things (*De doctrina christiana* 2.18.28). Music of luxury needs to be distinguished from the music of the wise man (“*ut nos musicam sapientis a musica luxuriantis distinguere commoneret*”, *De doctrina christiana* 4.7.19, commenting on Am 6.5).

827. Cf. *Mus.* 6.17.57: “*Unde, quaeso, ista, nisi ab illo summo atque aeterno principatu numerorum et similitudinis et aequalitatis et ordinis veniunt?*”/Whence, I ask, stem these unless from that supreme and eternal ruler/origin of numbers and of similarity and equality and order?” *Ep.* 166.5.13: “*Unde musica, id est scientia sensusve modulandi ad admonitionem magnae rei etiam mortalibus rationales habentibus animas Dei largitate concessa est. Unde si homo faciendi artifex carminis novit, quas quibus moras vocibus tribuat, ut illud, quod canitur, decedentibus ac succedentibus sonis pulcherrimeque currat et transeat, quanto magis deus, cuius sapientia, per quam fecit omnia, longe omnibus artibus praeferenda est.*”/Wherefore music, that is, the science or the sense of ‘modulating,’ has been granted by the goodness of God also to men who possess rational souls, to encourage them towards that great truth. Whence, if a man knows as the composer of a song, which time duration he should distribute to which voices, so that which is sung, runs and passes most beautifully in descending and successive sounds, how much more is God, whose wisdom, through which he has created everything, to be preferred by much over all the arts.” Seneca the Younger, describing God’s creative work, adds in similar vein (*Ben.* 4.6.5): “*Ille deus est, (...) qui non calamo tantum cantare et agreste atque inconditum carmen ad aliquam tamen observationem modulari docuit, sed tot artes, tot vocum varietates, tot sonos alios spiritu nostro, alios externo cantus edituros commentus est.*”/This is the god (...) who has taught not only to sing to the pipe and to ‘modulate’ a rustic and also crude song still to some rule, but he has devised so many arts, so many varieties of voices, so many tones to produce songs either with our own breath, others with exterior breath [= an instrument].” Even the enjoyment of beauty is “*divina largitate concessa*” (*De civ. D.* 22.24.5).

828. This is a normal association in allegorical exegesis; cf. *Enarratio I* in *Pss* 32.2: “*serviant membra vestra dilectioni Dei et proximi, in quibus tria et septem praecepta servantur*”/your strings may serve the love for God and for neighbor, for which three and seven commandments are preserved” (about the psalm verse that says “*Confitemini Domino in cithara, in psalterio decachordo psallite ei*”). Another example frequently used is the analogy of the difference between *psalterium* and *cithara*, the former having the sound produced at the upper part, the latter at the lower part, signifying heaven and earth, both of which should give praise to God (in *Enarratio II* in *Pss* 32.2.1.5; *Enarrationes in Pss* 42.5, 80.5, 150.6).

The example of enticing extravagant musical performances at pagan festivities (*“ad luxuriam servientia et illicientia”*) serves to encourage following instead the call to the eternal feast, from which sounds a song melodious and sweet for the ears of the heart (*“sonat nescio quid canorum et dulce auribus cordis”*); as one contemplates the miracles of God’s redemptive work for the faithful, the sound of that feast charms the ear (*“mulcet aurem sonus festivitatis illius,” Enarratio in Ps 41.9*). In his commentary on the Psalms, Augustine, naturally, speaks of music often. At one point (*Enarratio in Ps 27.1*) he explains what hymns are: *“laudes sunt Dei cum cantico;”* interesting is what the singing adds to a praise without song: *“qui enim cantat laudem, non solum laudat, sed etiam hilariter laudat/*for he who sings the praise, not only praises, but praises also cheerfully.”⁸²⁹ Cheerfulness, therefore, is one of the effects that song adds to the liturgical celebration. In a similar vein, Augustine says that music expresses what words cannot.⁸³⁰

829. Beautiful is also the continuation: *“qui cantat laudem non solum cantat, sed et amat eum quem cantat. In laude confitentis est praedicatio: in cantico amantis affectio.”* he who sings the praise, not only sings, but also loves the one about whom he sings. In the praise of the believer lies proclaiming: in the song of the lover lies affection.” Cf. *Serm. 34.1.1: Canticum, res est hilaritatis; et si diligentius consideremus, res est amoris/Song is something cheerful; and if we think more carefully, something of love.”* See also Isid. *Etym. 6.19.17* who almost literally repeats Augustine: *“Hymnus est canticum laudantium, quod de Graeco in Latinum laus interpretatur, pro eo quod sit carmen laetitiae et laudis. Proprie autem hymni sunt continentes laudem Dei. Si ergo sit laus et non sit Dei, non est hymnus: si sit et laus et Dei laus, et non cantetur, non est hymnus. Si ergo et in laudem Dei dicitur et cantatur, tunc est hymnus.”* A hymn is a song of those who praise, which is translated from Greek into Latin with “laus,” because it is a song of joy and praise. But hymns rightly contain the praise of God. If, therefore, the praise is not for God, it is not a hymn; if it is praise and the praise of God, and it is not sung, it is not a hymn. If, therefore, both the praise of God is expressed and it is sung, then it is a hymn.”

830. *Enarratio in Ps. 94.3: “Gaudium verbis non posse explicare, et tamen voce testari, quot intus conceptum est et verbis explicari non potest: hoc est iubilare. (...) et videtis quasi inter cantica verbis expressa exundantes laetitiae, cui lingua dicendo non sufficit, quemadmodum iubilent, ut per illam vocem indicetur animi affectus, verbis explicare non valentis quod corde concipitur.”* Not to be able to express joy with words, and yet bear witness with the voice, what is conceived interiorly and cannot be expressed in words: that is to jubilate. (...) and you see them overflowing of a joy as if expressed in words among songs, for which the tongue does not suffice expressing just as they jubilate, so that through that voice the affection of the heart is indicated, since words are not able to explain what is conceived with the heart.” The ultimate point is, however, not so much about feelings or *laetitiae saecularis*, but heaven: *“Si ergo illi de gaudio terreno iubilant, nos de gaudio caelesti iubilare non debemus, quod vere verbis explicare non possumus?/If, therefore, they jubilate over earthly joy, should we not jubilate over heavenly joy, which we truly cannot express with words?”*

The concept of concordance out of diversity, which is not prominent in *De musica*, becomes central in the *Enarratio in Ps 150.7*: the saints in heaven will be one like the union of different string instruments.⁸³¹ The idea returns in one of his sermons where he explains the beauty of the resurrected body and the arrangement (*harmonia*) of its members through the variety of cithara strings that produces a beautiful melody—if all were tuned the same way, this could not happen.⁸³² Lastly, the image of harmony serves to illustrate the well-ordered city, similar to the proportionate and balanced concord of diverse sounds, mystically prefigured in David's music, which he did not pursue out of base desire ("*vulgari voluptate*").⁸³³

Augustine does not present a full-fledged theory of musical metaphysics beyond the idea that *aequalitas* is a principle present in all of creation. The value of music is mostly limited to worship. Augustine does show a greater appreciation for the aesthetical dimension than many other ancient and especially Christian authors, but at the same time he warns of a sinful attachment to it if it obscures the primacy of biblical text and the affection for God. Even though he recognizes the emotional power of music—its reason remains "mysterious"—, he neither identifies special ethical qualities linked to musical features (maybe because he never developed a melodic theory), nor does he suggest character (ethos) formation through music. Both musical theory and practice have their true meaning in discovering God in *aequalitas*. Judgment about the objective value or propriety of music, beyond the natural instinct for what is good or not, pertains to a person trained in musical science.

831. "(...) *ut diversitate concordissima consonent, sicut ordinantur in organo. Habebunt enim etiam tunc sancti Dei differentias suas consonantes, non dissonantes, id est, consentientes, non dissentientes; sicut fit suavissimus concentus ex diversis quidem, sed non inter se adversis sonis.*" He adds the reference to 1 Cor 15.41–42: "*Stella enim a stella differt in claritate; sic et resurrectio mortuorum.*"

832. *Serm.* 243.4.4: "*Si omnes nervi similiter sonent, nulla est cantilena. Diversa distensio diversos edit sonos; sed diversi soni ratione coniuncti, pariunt, non videntibus pulchritudinem, sed audientibus suavitatem.*"

833. *De civ. D.* 17.14: "*Diversorum enim sonorum rationabilis moderatusque concentus concordi varietate compactam bene ordinatae civitatis insinuate unitatem.*" The musical image morphs into a quite different one, the unity of the book of Psalms, arranged by David from a great diversity into a meaningful whole.

Cassiodorus

A Compendium of Musical Lore

In the attempt to preserve the treasures of antiquity from the waves of destruction occurring in the course of the barbarian invasions in Italy, Cassiodorus synthesizes in his *Institutiones*⁸³⁴ important chapters of ancient knowledge for the purpose of education in his monastery school, the *Vivarium*. The second book therein, dedicated to the liberal arts, contains as its fifth chapter a short treatise on music. As sources he mentions and recommends for further study explicitly Censorinus, Alypius, Euclid, Ptolemy, Albinus, Gaudentius, Apuleius, and Augustine, but the influence of Aristides Quintilianus can also be noticed. His own text combines technical material (definitions and types of instruments, consonances, and modes) with general reflections on music and its power.

He states that music pervades all human life through our actions if we fulfill the Creator's commandments, precepts, and rules, insofar as our words or interior impulses are associated in musical rhythms to the powers of harmony.⁸³⁵ Virtuous actions are musical because music is *scientia bene modulandi*; if we act wrongly, we do not have music in us. Cassiodorus supports Pythagoras' idea: "*hunc mundum per musicam conditum et gubernari*," both heaven and earth and all that happens in them by divine dispensation (2). This sounds more Augustinian than Pythagorean, and this becomes even more evident from the next paragraph with the analogy between ten strings and the Decalogue or the *psalterium* and the book of Psalms, which both contain "*caelestium virtutum suavis nimis et grata modulatio*."⁸³⁶ Virtue and vice are not arranged according to good or bad music, but according to music and not music, and this is because music intrinsically carries the order and harmony of the well-created cosmos (3). Nevertheless, within musical science, it is

834. Text: PL 70.1208–121; Mynors 1937, 142–150 (available digitalized at http://www.hs-augsburg.de/~Harsch/Chronologia/Lspost06/Cassiodorus/cas_v000.html; tr.: Strunk 1998, 143–148; Halporn 2003, 216–223; comm.: Wille 1967, 704–708; Mathiesen 1990, 49; 1999, 636–640. On Cassiodorus in general see e.g. O'Donnell 1979 (updated "postprint" online since 1995 at <http://web.archive.org/web/20060814230416/http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/jod/texts/cassbook/toc.html>).

835. Literally "*intrinsecus venarum pulsibus*," the common idea that the soul rules the body through the blood veins and that the pulse rhythm is related to our general ethical and medical condition is also present in AQ 2.15 82.25.27 and 2.17 89.10–22, see Barker's notes in GMW 2.485 n. 162 and 2.492 n. 199.

836. Cf. August. *De doctrina christiana* 2.16.26 and above n. 828. I wonder why Halporn 2002, 222 n. 226, says that "Cassiodorus never used this treatise" (referring to August. *Mus.*) since there seems to be quite some evidence for an influence.

investigated whether rhythm or meters is used well or badly: “*utrum bene sonus an male cohaereat*,” or “*probabili ratione*” (5) On the other hand, only positive effects are assumed for instruments: metallic percussion produces “*cum suavitate tinnitum*,” and the string instruments “*mulcent aurium delectabiliter sensum*” (6). Cassiodorus only treats consonances (*symphoniae*, defined as “*temperamentum sonitus gravis ad acutum vel acuti ad gravem*”), no dissonances (7). For the modes, finally, he does not indicate particular *ēthē*, but only in general repeats the traditional assertion (with reference to Varro) that they are extremely useful to calm stirred minds and to attract wild animals, snakes, birds, and dolphins to hear their melody (8).⁸³⁷ He brushes aside the *fabulosa* about Orpheus and the Sirens and talks instead about David’s healing of Saul’s possession; a similar case of psychological healing is ascribed to Asclepiades, and he reports many other miracles due to music.⁸³⁸ Cassiodorus then returns to the initial idea of the harmonic movements of heaven and that nothing in heaven and on earth occurring *convenienter* is without the discipline of music, i.e., of its rational-harmonic arrangement (9).⁸³⁹ He summarizes the advantages for the knowledge (*cognitio*) of music, both practical and theoretical, in that they lift our senses upward and charm our ears with soft melody (10).⁸⁴⁰ Ethical, practical, spiritual, and aesthetical benefits of music are considered; the only major aspects missing from older tradition in this context, as already seen in Augustine, are character formation and the discernment of intrinsically good or bad music. The fact that he hardly distinguishes between “real” music and what we would call metaphorical might suggest that he operates from a metaphysical understanding of music similar to the one of Aristides Quintilianus, but he does not elaborate on these questions at all.

837. “*Tantae utilitatis virtus ostensa est ut excitatos animos sedaret, ipsas quoque bestias, necnon et serpentes, volucres atque delfinas ad auditum suae modulationis attraheret.*”

838. “*Quid de David dicimus, qui ab spiritibus immundis Saulem disciplina saluberrimae modulationis eripuit, novoque modo per auditum sanitatem contulit regi, quam medici non poterant herbarum potestatibus operari? Asclepiades quoque, medicus maiorum attestatione doctissimus, freneticum quendam per symphoniam naturae suae reddidisse memoratur. Multa sunt autem, quae in aegris hominibus per hanc disciplinam leguntur facta miracula.*”

839. “*Caelum ipsum, sicut supra memoravimus, dicitur sub armoniae dulcedine revolvī; et ut breviter cuncta complectar, quicquid in supernis sive terrenis rebus convenienter secundum Auctoris sui dispositionem geritur, ab hac disciplina non refertur exceptum.*”

840. “*Gratisissima ergo nimis utilisque cognitio, quae et sensum nostrum ad superna erigit et aures suavi modulatione permulcet.*”

The Blessings of Music

From an earlier period in Cassiodorus' life as a public official at the times of the Ostrogoth King Theodoric, a letter to Boethius in Theodoric's name is preserved (in *Variarum libri* 2.40) in which he asks the great music scholar to dispatch a citharede for the court of the Franks.⁸⁴¹ This context appears to be an excuse to engage in a general praise of music.⁸⁴² Cassiodorus begins with a fairly complete list of ethical benefits that music can possibly have, though without giving examples:⁸⁴³ through music, harmony reigns in the heavenly spheres, in nature, in human thought, speech, and movement (2); it changes the mind/heart and expels all other thoughts—a conception very close to modern aesthetic feeling: “*ut ipsam [sensuum reginam] solummodo delectet audiri*”—, inverts harmful emotions to the opposite, arouses or calms, renews chastity, overcomes tediousness and the *passiones animi* (3); she charms and leads the soul where the word cannot hold it, exercising dominion over the other senses. A precise assignment of ethos to each of the (here five) *tonoi* follows: Dorian promotes *pudicitia* and *castitas*, Phrygian *pugnas* and *furor*, Aeolian tranquilizes, Iastian sharpens the spirit and quenches longing for heavenly things, and Lydian restores and refreshes weary spirits (4). Each *tonos* has three types, so there are a total of fifteen (5), and the Octave is praised as the wisest human achievement, containing all other music (“*ut virtutes, quas universum*

841. Text: PL 69.576–573; tr. Barnish 1992, 38–43.

842. O'Donnell 1979, 90 however, holds that the content of the letter perfectly matches its intention: “At the end, Cassiodorus calls this little treatise a *voluptuosa digressio*, then gives Boethius his instructions: “Please name the *citharoedus* we have requested from you; he will be another Orpheus, taming the hard hearts of these foreigners [*gentiles*] with sweet music” (*Var.* 2.40.17). But this precisely calls into question the digressiveness of the whole letter. For the theme of the discussion of music has been its capacity to impart peace to the soul, to represent the peace of celestial harmony; and it is precisely peace that is the goal of the gift itself. In fact, no more competent and learned case could have been made for the suitability of just such a gift at just such a time.”

843. I am citing here only the introduction (the examples are included in the tables in the appendix): “*Quid enim illa praestantius, quae caeli machinam sonora dulcedine modulatur et naturae convenientiam ubique dispersam virtutis suae gratia comprehendit? Quicquid enim in conceptum alicuius modificationis existit, ab harmoniae concinentia non recedit.*”/For what is more excellent than she who modulates the system of the sky with sonorous sweetness and embraces the arrangement of nature dispersed everywhere with the grace of her virtue? For whatever idea of some change appears, it does not withdraw from the concord of harmony” (I follow the decision of Barnish 1992, 38 n. 22, to accept the reading “*concinentia*” instead of “*continentia*”). For the following summary, I translate with “she;” the subject is “*artifex auditus/sensuum regina*,” certainly a female personification and not male, as Barnish renders it.

melos habere posuisset, haec adunatio mirabilis contineret"). Cassiodorus adds, first without the usual Christian reservations, the power music gave to Orpheus over animals, preferring his song over their natural action or habitat and reconciling enemies (6); and to Amphion (Thebes' walls) and Musaeus (in Elysium, cf. Verg. *Aen.* 6.667)⁸⁴⁴ (7). He then mentions examples of how rhythmical, metrical speech can have an impact on people's souls as well (8–9). Next comes the story of the Sirens whose *noxa dulcedo* only Odysseus avoided (10). In order to escape like him, Cassiodorus presents the Psalter,⁸⁴⁵ *lapso caelo*, composed by David for the welfare of the soul, to heal the wounds of the mind and to receive divine grace, just as he freed Saul from the Devil and commanded the spirits with his cithara (11).⁸⁴⁶ This instrument receives praise for being the most efficient "*ad permovendos animos*," and in a truly Isidorian way, Cassiodorus explains the name "*chorda*" with "*quod facile corda moveat*/what may easily move the hearts."⁸⁴⁷ The reason for this lies in "*sub diversitate concordia*" and the "sympathetic resonance" between the chords translates into a *vis convenientiae* that also makes a *res insensualis* (the soul) ring along with the music (12). Cassiodorus here arrives close to what Aristides Quintilianus had developed, but without mounting a detailed theory about how exactly this connection could be explained. He simply states that human beings in their social life are unable to reach the same unity as the balanced interplay between the chords. In an almost Plotinian image, Cassiodorus describes the combination between diversities that with "*rauce*" seem even to include an in itself not so enjoyable element (13).⁸⁴⁸ The cithara, so beneficial, should be of heavenly origin,

844. Hence, the musician receives the greatest reward in the afterlife: "*significans summo praemio perfrui, cui disciplinae huius contigerit suavitatibus epulari.*"

845. The Latin "*psalterium*" can mean both the biblical book of Psalms and the instrument—Cassiodorus plays here with this double meaning.

846. Elsewhere, Cassiodorus says that also the good spirits (angels) enjoy music: *Expositio in Psalterium* Ps 145 *praef.*: "*musica ista salutaris non solum mortalium permulcet auditum, sed etiam intellectum delectat angelicum.*"

847. And indeed, Isidore does not fall short on going that way, even though less spiritually: "*Chordas autem dictas a corde, quia sicut pulsus est cordis in pectore, ita pulsus chordae in cithara*/The strings have the name from the heart, because like the heartbeat in the chest, so is the strike of chords on the cithara" (*Etym.* 3.22.6).

848. "*Ibi enim quicquid excellenter, quicquid ponderatim, quicquid rauce, quicquid purissime aliasque distantias sonat, quasi in unum ornatum constat esse collectum, et ut diadema oculis varia luce gemmarum, sic cithara diversitate soni blanditur auditui.*/For it is clear that whatever sounds distinguished, whatever heavy, whatever hoarse, whatever most clear, and the other differences are here gathered as if in one garnish, and like a diadem [flatters] the eyes through the varied light of the gems, so the flatters the cithara the hearing with the diversity of sound."

having its own star constellation (14),⁸⁴⁹ but the *harmonia caeli* cannot be expressed properly by human speech, only accessible to reason, not to the ears. The ancients held that blessedness in heaven consists in an unceasing enjoyment of that same music (“*beatitudo caelestis illis oblectationibus perfruatur*”—“*ipsis deliciis caelestia perfrui*”) (15); however, Cassiodorus here makes clear that the true beatitude consists not in sounds but in the beatific vision of God (16). He concludes the letter by hoping that the citharede, whom he expects Boethius to send, will, similar to what Orpheus did, tame the wild hearts of the barbarians (“*cum dulci sono gentilium fera corda domuerit*”) (17).

Cassiodorus undertakes in literary language a masterful blend between the traditional conception of the power of music and Christian dogma, substituting, like Augustine, the neo-Platonic harmonic first principle by God who created the world in a congruous way. That the predominantly positive value of music is not just rhetorically induced by the purpose of the letter emerges from the tone in his theoretical work, which we have already discussed. The only negative remark on music comes at the beginning of the fifth paragraph where Cassiodorus, while discussing the Lydian *tonus*, interjects a brief complaint about the bad musical practice of his time: “*Hoc ad saltationes corruptibile saeculum flectens honestum remedium turpe fecit esse commentum*”/A corrupt age has bent/lowered this [mode] to [theater] dances and converted a decent remedy into a disgraceful fabrication.” The remark is somewhat unmotivated and seems out of place. But it confirms that it is more the usage that creates the negative effect than the music itself. Other passages in Cassiodorus’ correspondence on behalf of Theodoric reveal his knowledge about pagan musical performances (e.g. *Var.* 1.31.4 & 4.51.6–11: singing, instruments, and dancing in the theater; 5.42.1: organ), always with positive characterizations as *dulcis*, *delecto*, *mellifluus*, etc.

In his commentary on the Psalms, like in Augustine, music is treated frequently, but more in a symbolic and catechetical manner; ethically relevant sections

849. Cf. Gregorius Nazianzenus *Oratio* 14 *De pauperum amore*, 23: “Ἡ, ἵνα τὰ μικρὰ λέγω καὶ τὰ ὁρώμενα, τίς ἔδωκε σοι κάλλος οὐρανοῦ βλέπειν, ἡλίου δρόμον, σελήνης κύκλον, ἀστέρων πλῆθος, καὶ τὴν ἐν τούτοις πᾶσιν, ὥσπερ ἐν λύρᾳ, εὐαρμοσίαν καὶ τάξιν ὥσαύτως ἔχουσαν, ὥρων ἀλλαγὰς, μεταβολὰς καιρῶν, ἐνιαυτῶν περιόδους, ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτὸς ἰσομοιρίαν, γῆς ἐκφύσεις, ἀέρος χύσιν, πλάτῃ θαλάττης λελυμένης καὶ ἰσταμένης, βάθῃ ποταμῶν, ἀνέμων ρεύματα;/Or, that I speak of small things, that is, the visible ones, who has taught you to see the beauty of heaven, the course of the sun, the circle of the moon, the multitude of stars, and in all of these, as in a lyre, they have likewise good harmony and order, the change of the hours, the exchange of seasons, the course of the years, the equal share of day and night, germination of the earth, the diffusion of air, the width of the ocean loosened and stalled, the depth of the rivers, the flow of the winds?”

receive their meaning only through symbolism.⁸⁵⁰ As in Augustine, the *iubilis* of the voice expresses a degree of joy that words are unable to articulate.⁸⁵¹

Isidore

The last individual Christian author, and the last author of antiquity who writes about music, is Isidore, Bishop of Seville. He dedicates a number of chapters of book three in his *Etymologiae*⁸⁵² to the subject. His definitions of music are more

850. E.g. *Expositio in Psalterium* Ps 80, versiculus 2: "Tympanum est, quod tenso corio quasi supra duas (...) metas sibi ab acuta parte copulates solet resonare percussum; sic hominum corpus, dum pro Domino tribulatione quatitur, ad superna mandata dulcius temperatur. (...) Quia tunc Deo bene damus tympanum dum eleemosynas facimus, cum ieiuniis corpus affigimus, cum vitia saeculi cum suo nihilominus auctore despiciamus. Addidit, psalterium iucundum cum cithara. Admonet etiam et haec duo iucundissime copulari: ut et verba Dei quae in psalterio continentur, et cithara quae humanos actus significare cognoscitur, in unam societatem debeant convenire: quia utrumque melos sibimet copulatum Domino probatur acceptum." The 'tympanum,' with a leather [skin] extended as if over two cone-shaped elements joined at the sharpened part, usually sounds when struck; thus the body of men, when shaken by tribulation for the Lord, blends more sweetly with the heavenly mandates. (...) Because we 'give the tympanum' to God well then when we give alms, when we confine our body with fasting, when we despise the vices of the world along with their author. [The psalmist] adds: 'a pleasant psalter with cithara.' He admonishes also that these two are most pleasantly conjoined as well: that both the words of God which are contained in the psalter and the cithara which is acknowledged to stand for the human actions, should converge in one association: because the melody combined out of both together is shown to be acceptable to God." See similar to Ps 150, verse 4. Notice that here, different from Augustine (*ad loc.*), the *organum* is interpreted as the organ (and not as another string instrument), and that the organ, elsewhere despised as a pagan theater instrument, receives here a very positive treatment: "(...) quibus flatu folium vox copiosissima destinatur; et ut eam modulatio decora componat, linguis quibusdam ligneis ab interiore parte construitur, quas disciplinabiliter magistrorum digiti reprimentes, grandisonam efficiunt et suavissimam cantilenam/with which a very full sound is sent out by the air stream from bellows; and to arrange it with a graceful 'modulation', in its interior part it is made out of certain wooden 'tongues' which, as the fingers of the master press them in an educated way, produce a grandious and very soft melody."

851. *Expositio in Psalterium* Ps 46, versus 5: "Iubilationem vero diximus nimiam quidem esse laetitiam, sed non quae sermonibus explicatur/We call jubilation some very great joy, but not the one that is expressed by words." Cf. Isid. *Etym.* 6.19.10: "Canticum est vox cantantis in laetitiam/A song is the voice of someone who sings with joy."

852. Text.: PL 82.163–169; Lindsay 1911 (I am quoting from this edition); Martín 2006; tr.: Strunk 1998, 149–155; comm.: Wille 1967, 709–715; Mathiesen 1999, 640–641.

original,⁸⁵³ but for the rest his introductory chapter is basically a conflation of Cassiod. *Mus.* 1 and August. *De ordine* 2.14. Interesting is his emphasis on memory as an essential ingredient for music (15.1–2). After some remarks regarding the origin of music,⁸⁵⁴ he describes the uses of music as a sign of education, in sacred rites, festivals, “*omnibusque laetis vel tristioribus rebus*”: worship, weddings, funerals, and banquets (16.1–3). Music is the necessary perfection of every discipline because of the harmonious composition and movement of the universe, its moving and changing influence on affections and emotions, its stimulating and encouraging power in war and work (rowing), its soothing effect in toils, and the healing of the spirit is illustrated again with David and Saul. The attraction to animals, snakes, birds, and dolphins and the rhythm of the pulse are taken up again from previous authors as well (17.1–3).

The division of music is identical to Cassiodorus, mentioning also for rhythm the task to discern “*utrum bene sonus an male cohaereat*/whether sound is adjoined well or badly” (18.1). It is interesting that he attributes the proper meaning of the word “*vox*” only to the human voice; its attribution to non-human realities (animals, instruments, nature) is *abusivus* (20.1–2). Harmony he describes as “*modulatio vocis et concordantia plurimorum sonorum, vel coaptatio*/modulation of voice and the harmonizing of various sounds, or an accurate joining together,” whereas “*symphonia est modulationis temperamentum ex gravi et acuto concordantibus sonis, sive in voce, sive in flatu, sive in pulsus*”/‘symphony’ is the moderation of modulation from deep and high tones sounding together be it from the voice, from a wind [instrument], or from a percussion.” More explicitly than Augustine and Cassiodorus, he addresses dissonant sound as offensive to hearing, and “diaphony,”⁸⁵⁵ in contrast to which “euphony” is “*suavitas vocis*.” (20.2–4)⁸⁵⁶

853. “*Musica est disciplina quae de numeris loquitur, qui inveniuntur in sonis*.” (*Praefatio* to book three); “*Musica est peritia modulationis sono cantuque consistens*” (15.1). His etymological explanation for the Muses is also different; Cassiodorus derives from “μαστεύειν” (*Mus.* 1), Isidore from “μῶσθαι” (depending on the reading; Lindsay has “μάσαι”), both verbs with basically the same meaning “to seek after,” so as to search for the power of song—not a very probable etymology, but the true one is at any rate uncertain (cf. OCD 1002).

854. He is the first “theorist,” from what I can see, who explicitly refers to Gen 4.21 where Jubal is mentioned, if not as the *repertor musicae artis*, as Isidore claims, but as “*pater omnium canentium cithara et organo*” (Vulgate). Isidore says later in 22.2: “*Citharae ac psalterii repertor Tubal, ut praedictum est, perhibetur*”/Tubal, as said before, is regarded to be the inventor of the cithara and the psalterium.”

855. “(…) *quisquis ab ea [= symphonia] dissonuerit, sensum auditus offendat. Cuius contraria est diaphonia, id est voces discrepantes vel dissonae*.”

856. Here he attempts to give the etymology for “*melos*”: “*Haec et melos a suavitate et melle dicta*.”

New in comparison to previous authors is a clear ethical characterization of various “voices” (though mixing here human and non-human sounds), and the first one is a bit surprising: *“suaves voces sunt subtiles et spissae, clarae atque acutae,”* one would not have expected “dense,” “clear,” and “sharp” as definitions for “soft.” The remaining classifications resemble loosely those of the Aristotelian *De audibilibus* and the ones by Cicero and Quintilian in their works on oratory,⁸⁵⁷ such as the *vox subtilis*, which belongs to children, women, the sick, and chord instruments; another category are *“pinguis”* for men; others are *“dura/violens,” “aspera/rauca,”* and even *“caeca/suffocata”*—these do not seem to have positive connotations; more pleasing seem to be *“vinnola/mollis/flexibilis”* and especially the *“perfecta/alta/suavis/clara”*⁸⁵⁸ (20.10–14). We notice that some male–female distinction is latent here.

For the various instruments, Isidore adds the occasions when they are used, e.g. the trumpet (*tuba*) for war and festivals (*“propter laudis vel gaudii claritatem”*), the *aulos* (*tibia*) originally only for funerals, then also for sacred rites (21.3–4). In addition to some fanciful etymologies,⁸⁵⁹ he gives the seven cithara strings a cosmical explanation.⁸⁶⁰ The lyre he deduces from *“ληρεῖν,”* “to speak/act foolishly,” for its diverse tones; its use by Orpheus is occasion to recall its magic power over animals, rocks, and forests, and it received the honor to be raised to the stars *“propter studii amorem et carminis laudem/because of the love for study and the praise of song”* (22.2–9). The *sistrum* (a rattle) is considered a women’s instrument, not because of some hidden “nature,” but because a woman invented it (22.12). The *symphonia* (a sort of drum) receives particular praise: *“fitque in ea ex concordia gravis*

857. For a review of the latter see Wille 1967, 474–487.

858. To this he specifies: *“alta, ut in sublime sufficiat; clara, ut aures adimpleat; suavis, ut animos audientium blandiat. Si ex his aliquid defuerit, vox perfecta non est.”*

859. E.g.: *“Veteres autem citharam fidiculam vel fidicem nominaverunt, quia tam concinunt inter se chordae eius, quam bene conveniat inter quos fides sit/But the ancients called the cithara ‘fidicula’ or ‘fidicen’ because its strings sound well together among each other, which is well convenient for those among whom there is trust”* (22.4).

860. 22.5: *“Sed ideo septem chordae, vel quia totam vocem implent, vel quia septem motibus sonat caelum/But there are seven strings for the reason that either they fill the full [range of the] voice, or that the sky sounds in seven movements.”* Similarly, at 22.7 he relates the ten-stringed Hebrew *psalterium* to the Ten Commandments, just as Augustine already did (cf. n. 828). A particularly Christian explanation for *“chorus”* is offered in *Etym.* 6.19.5: *“Chorus est multitudo in sacris collecta; et dictus chorus quod initio in modum coronae circum aras starent et ita psallerent. Alii chorum dixerunt a concordia, quae in caritate consistit; quia, si caritatem non habeat, respondere convenienter non potest.”* The chorus is a multitude assembled in holy things; and it is called ‘chorus’ because at the beginning it stood in form of a crown around the altar and thus sang psalms. Others name it ‘chorus’ from ‘concord’ which consists of charity; for if one does not have charity, one cannot respond in conformity.”

et acuti suavissimus cantus/with it a most sweet/soft music comes to be from the concurrence of low and high [tones] (22.14). The chapter finishes with a (somewhat faulty) explanation of musical numbers and the calculation of the harmonic mean,⁸⁶¹ followed by the general statement that “this ratio” also exists (somehow) in the celestial rotation, wherefore, without this perfection and without concord in the microcosmos, the human being cannot exist (23.1–2).⁸⁶²

Isidore provides sketchy fragments from previous authors, a mosaic of earlier ideas and stories with little more originality than Cassiodorus, but apparently drawing from a wider range of sources. Music, again, is mostly defined by the purposes connected to it, but when it is described as possessing ethos, this ethos is not put to service of anything in particular—moral exhortation is more based on symbolism. The lack of criticism against pagan musical customs might indicate that they had widely ceased to exist by his time; for the rest, ancient and Christian applications are juxtaposed with much ease. For Isidore, the only “bad” music seems to appertain to the aesthetical level, to be the result of not following the norms to achieve a harmonious melody or a well-formed rhythm.

Christian Music Practice and Criticism

In the six authors discussed individually, the advanced theoretical-ethical conceptions of non-Christian writers echo evermore faintly and become reduced to stereotypes that, at a first glance, seem to bear neither much practical experience nor relevance. The earlier treatises do not separate clearly either musical science from musical practice, or sonic from “rational” music in terms of harmonic proportions present in non-sonic realities. Since the long tradition of music philosophy has employed so much effort in linking them together, they continue to be treated as one, almost without reflection on the underlying problems.

For the judgment of musical practice, it has been said that

To a Church Father, everyday musical reality was two things: the pagan musical practice that surrounded the Christian population on every side and the singing of psalms and hymns in church. The former was the subject of scathing denunciation because of its immoral associations, and the latter was generally approved as a beneficial, if sometimes suspect, practice.⁸⁶³

861. See Strunk 1998, 155 n. 17 and Boethius *Mus.* 2.17.

862. “*Sed haec ratio quemadmodum in mundo est ex volubilitate circularum, ita et in microcosmo in tantum praeter vocem valet, ut sine ipsius perfectione etiam homo symphoniis carens non constet. Eiusdem musicae perfectione etiam metra consistunt in arsi et thesi, id est elevatione et positione.*”

863. James McKinnon in Strunk 1998, 114.

I believe, some further differentiation should be made. First, it is striking that our texts have presented little that is negative about music as such. Clement, in view of his pedagogical purposes, is most outspoken in adopting the ancient concept that enervating and confused musical style leads to lasciviousness and bad ethos; this type is also criticized by other authors. For the rest, however, the traditional benefits of music are repeated again and again and are not questioned, except for the credibility of myths and stories about magical power. Augustine's wavering attitude towards exposing himself (and others) to the emotional impact of music is solely motivated by the concern that it could detract from the importance of God's word (the text sung in liturgy). The existence of aesthetic appreciation and the perception of music as essentially harmonious⁸⁶⁴ and positive finds further confirmation through the fact that music, in its positive value, readily serves for parenetic purposes, through allegories and symbolisms, in homilies and commentaries. It is not accidental that Augustine's conversion takes place under no little influence of Ambrose, bishop of Milan (ca. 340–397 AD), who consciously used the power of music to promote and celebrate the faith.⁸⁶⁵ Multiple passages from the fathers of the Church reflect the belief in the influence of music to move stony hearts and lead to conversion.⁸⁶⁶ Song is seen as an instrument to foster unity across the social strata; even the chant of girls and women is welcome—something not approved by everyone.⁸⁶⁷ As seen before,

864. For an interesting study on the idea of harmony in pagan and Christian antiquity and its ramifications into the Renaissance, see Spitzer 1963.

865. Cf. Ambrosius *Sermo contra Auxentium de basilicis tradendis* 34: "*Hymnorum quoque meorum carminibus deceptum populum ferunt. Plane nec hoc abnuo. Grande carmen istud est, quo nihil potentius. Quid enim potentius quam confessio Trinitatis, quae quotidie totius populi ore celebratur?*" They also say that the people has been deceived by the songs of my hymns. I certainly do not deny that. It is a great song, nothing more powerful than it. For what is more powerful than the confession of the Trinity, which is celebrated every day by the mouth of the whole people?" This quote suggests the thought that music is even more powerful when its content is related to God.

866. E.g. Ambrosius *Explanatio psalmorum* 1.9.6: "*Psalmus canitur et ipsa etiam saxosa pectora molliuntur; videmus flere praeduros, flecti in misericordes*" A psalm is sung, and even stony hearts are softened; we see very hard people weep, the unmerciful persuaded." Cassian *Conlationes* 1.17.2: "*decantatio crebra psalmorum, ut adsidua nobis exinde compunctio ministratur*" a frequent singing of psalms, so that it provide us then an unremitting compunction." Cf. Isid. *De ecclesiasticis officiis* 1.5.1: "*(...) facilius animi ad compunctionem flectantur*" the minds are turned more easily to compunction;" id. *Etym.* 7.12.24: "*Psalmistae (...) canunt ut excitent ad compunctionem animos audientium*" the psalmists sing so that they stir the minds of the listeners towards compunction."

867. Cf. Ambrosius *Explanatio psalmorum* 1.9.3–5; at the end: "*Psalmus cantatur ab imperatoribus, iubilatur a populis, certantur clamare singuli quod omnibus proficit. (...) magnum plane*

Christian chant is not restricted to liturgical celebrations but recommended in all sorts of circumstances.⁸⁶⁸ The enjoyment of music is seen as an aid for education, disposing the student to assimilate more easily their lessons, an effect which, as we have seen, is particularly well achieved in the case of the psalms.⁸⁶⁹

Secondly, regarding musical context, criticism mainly address those situations that are problematic because they are connected with pagan faith or behavior incompatible with Christian beliefs.⁸⁷⁰ Augustine, as we have seen, rejects musical elements at pagan festivities inasfar as they lead to immorality (*"ad luxuriam servientia et illicentia," Enarratio in Ps 41.9*).⁸⁷¹ Certainly, other authors have also noticed

unitatis vinculum, in unum chorum totius numerum plebis coire./Emperors sing psalms, peoples jubilate, individuals strive to call out what is of profit for all. (...) It is certainly a great bond of unity to get together in one choir of the whole number of the people." Against women singing: Hieron. *Dialogus contra Pelagianos* 1.25.

868. E.g. Cyprian *Ad Donatum* 16 (meals); Tert. *Apol.* 39.18 (after meals at nightfall); August. *Enarratio in Ps* 123.2 (in love, desire, tribulation, hope); Clement above n. 778.

869. In addition to what Basil and others have said about this, see also e.g. Ambrosius *Explanatio psalmorum* 1.10.1: "*Certat in psalmo doctrina cum gratia; simul cantatur ad delectationem, discitur ad eruditionem*/In the psalm, doctrine competes with grace; at once it is sung for enjoyment, it is learned for instruction." For a positive appreciation of musical enjoyment see also August. *De civ. D.* 22.24.3: "*ad delectandos animos quos elocutionis ornatus, quam diversorum carminum copiam; ad mulcendas aures quot organa musica, quos cantilenae modos excogitaverit*/how much ornament of eloquence [has human effort produced] to delight the minds, what a wealth of various songs; how many musical instruments to charm the ears, what types of melody has it contrived;" id. *Ep.* 26.2: "*habet suam hilaritatem ipsa cantantio, etiam cum ad eam membra non movet, cui plena caritatis modulatione cantatur*/singing itself has its own delight, even if it does not move the members to it for whom it is sung in full 'modulation' of charity" (i.e., singing delights the one who sings even if the one who hears it is not moved by it).

870. Stapert 2007, 132–136, gives a brief overview of the functions of music in pagan ritual during the first centuries of Christianity. The rituals attacked by Christian authors were for the most part the ecstatic rites of the Eastern mystery religions that had found much popularity. Stapert continues (137–148) illustrating the use of music for entertainment (at theaters, arenas, baths, streets, and houses) and the reaction of both non-Christian and Christian authors.

871. He adds: "*Natalitia, inquit, celebrant, nuptiae hic sunt: ut non videantur inepta illa cantica, sed excusetur festivitate luxuria*/They celebrate a birthday, one says, there is a wedding feast; so that these songs do not appear unfitting, but rather that the extravagance be excused by the festivity." See also the detailed critical description of a musical performance in Arn. *Adv. nat.* 2.42.2–3: "*Idcirco animas misit, ut res sancti atque augustissimi nominis symphonicas agerent et fistulatorias hic artes, ut inflandis bucculas distenderent tibiis, cantionibus ut praeirent obscenis, numerositer et <cierent> scabillorum concrepationibus sonores, quibus animarum alia lascivientis multitudo incompósitos corporum dissolveretur in motus, saltitaret cantaret, orbes saltatorios*

disturbing musical effects along the lines of earlier ethical judgment, but the main point here is again that such music might dispose one to pagan cult or morals.⁸⁷² Here, the aspect of enjoyment or pleasure appears rather negative. Tertullian (ca. 160–ca. 240 AD) wrote a treatise *De spectaculis* in which he denounces permissive attitudes in this regard,⁸⁷³ similar Cyprian of Carthage (ca. 200–258 AD).⁸⁷⁴

verteret et ad ultimum clunibus et coxendicibus sublevatis lumborum crispitudine fluctuaret? Idcirco animas misit, ut in maribus exsoleti, in feminis fierent meretrices sambucistriae psaltria, venalia ut prosternerent corpora (...)? Did [the Ruler of the World] send souls for this that they, beings of a holy and most dignified name, perform here symphonic and piping skills, that they extend distend their cheeks by blowing tibias, that they should walk ahead with indecent songs, raise plenty of sounds with the rattling of scabillum, by which another frisking multitude of souls is loosened into movements of bodies, to dance around and sing, circle rings of dancers and, finally, bounce up and down with raised haunches and hips to the trembling of the loins? Did he send souls for this that they should become male and female prostitutes of the sambuca and the psalter, that they prostrate the bodies for sale (...)? That this repudiation is not directed so much at music as such but at the immoral context can be deduced from more positive passages such as id. 2.23.2 where cithara and tibia appear in a list of positive human achievements. See also John Chrysostom *Homilia XII in 1 Cor* 10–11 (towards the end, he addresses the immoral songs themselves, both text and the “devilish harmony”—but unfortunately he does not tell us what makes a particular harmony evil. Many other authors could be cited, e.g. Ambr. *De Helia et ieiunio* 15.55.

872. E.g. Lactant. *Epitome* 62.6: “*De cantibus qui sensus intimos ita saepe deleniunt, ut etiam statum mentis furore perturbent, compositis certe orationibus numerosisque carminibus aut argutis disputationibus ad impios cultus facile traducitur*”/About the songs which mollify the inner senses often so much that they even disturb the state of mind with rage, one is for certain easily led to impious worship through sophisticated speeches and rhythmical songs or eloquent debates.” Wille 1967, 371–372, points out that there was also some reservation among pagan authors against their cultic music, cf. Apul. *De deo Soc.* 14.148–149. For a full treatment of Christian contention against pagan music, see Wille 1967, 388–397, and, from a different angle and in a more simplified presentation, Stapert 2007, 84–91 & 131–148.

873. Stapert 2007, 66–71, comments on the main points. Pleasure-seeking overlooks the corruptive elements in the world despite being created well by God (2.7: “*multum interest inter corruptelam et integritatem, quia multum est inter institutorem et interpolatorem*”); it weakens the ability to defend the faith up to martyrdom (1.5–6) and it makes even more people turn away from Christianity than the threat of death (2.3). Pagan spectacles, “*inter effeminati tibicinis*,” do not leave room to think of God (25.3). The primary concern, of course, is also here avoiding idolatry (*passim*) and immorality (e.g. 10.3–9, with explicit reference to music). At the end, Tertullian points out that Christians have enough to offer in terms of doctrine, erudition, songs, true stories rather than legends, characterized by *simplicitates* (29.4).

874. The text in question might not be authentic: *De spectaculis* (the text is mostly directed against the argument that also David danced—he did not dance in an indecent way—and

Thirdly, the stipulations for music in worship are strongly motivated by the ethos appropriate to express the Christian faith, wherein Bacchic orgies have no place.⁸⁷⁵ Since salvation has already arrived through Christ, there is no need to placate or magically persuade a divinity. Here, Christian criticism approaches and even surpasses sceptic reservations (especially of Philodemus), as can be seen especially in Arnobius (ca. 300 AD).⁸⁷⁶ Isidore describes the aesthetic qualities expected of Christian liturgical chant: clear, soft, melodious, fluent, high-pitched, simple, not rough, hoarse, dissonant, or theatrical—all in all, qualities suited to the holy religion so as to arouse the minds and facilitate compunction.⁸⁷⁷ Jerome (ca. 347–420 AD) takes here a rather extreme stand. He is aware of the ethical (here understood as moral) power of music, which is effective on the body.⁸⁷⁸ But then

eccentric musical performances; the human voice is considered superior to the instruments); see also *De zelo et livore* 2: “*Aures per canora musica tentat, ut soni dulcioris auditu solvat et molliat christianum vigorem*/[The enemy/devil] tempts the ears through melodious music in order to loosen [them] with the hearing of more sweet sound and to enfeeble the Christian strength.”

875. Cf. Ioannes Chrysostomus *Homilia XLII in Acta Apostolorum* 3, with reference to marriage feasts.

876. Cf. *Adv. nat.* 7.32.1.4; 7.36.5–6: “*Vos aeris tinnitibus et tibiaram sonis, vos equorum curriculis et theatralibus ludis persuasum habetis deos et delectari et adfici irasque aliquando conceptas eorum satisfactione molliri: nos inconveniens ducimus, quinimmo incredibile iudicamus, eos qui gradibus mille genus omne virtutum perfectionis transierint summitate in voluptatibus habere atque in deliciis [esse] res eas quas homo sapiens rideat et quae non aliis videantur continere aliquid gratiae quam infantibus parvulis et trivialiter et populariter institutis.*/You are convinced that the gods, by the clangings of a cymbal and the sounds of *tibias*, by horse races and theater plays, are delighted and moved, and that by the satisfaction from these things they are tamed in their furies that they had conceived some time; we regard it unfitting, moreover, we judge it incredible that they, who by a thousand degrees have surpassed any type of virtues in the apex of [their] perfection, should find pleasure and delight in those things at which a wise man laughs and which do not seem to contain any grace but for little infants, both [only] meanly and vulgarly instructed.” On the other hand, Ambrose says at some point (*Explanatio psalmorum* 1.5.1) that God is reconciled by song: “*delectatur igitur cantico Deus non solum laudari, set etiam reconciliari.*”

877. Isid. *De ecclesiasticis officiis* 2.12.2: “*Psalmistam autem et voce et arte praeclarum illustremque esse oportet, ita ut oblectamento dulcedinis animos incitet auditorum. Vox enim eius non aspera, vel rauca, vel dissonans, sed canora erit, suavis, liquida, atque acuta, habens sonum, et melodiam sanctae religioni congruentem, non quae tragica exclamet arte, sed quae christianam simplicitatem et in ipsa modulatione demonstret, nec quae musico gestu vel theatriali arte redoleat, sed quae compunctionem magis audientibus faciat.*”

878. Hieron. *Commentarii in epistolam ad Ephesios* 3.5 (versiculum 19): “*psalmi autem proprie ad ethicum locum pertinent, ut per organum corporis, quid faciendum, et quid vitandum sit,*

he says that the one who contemplates the cosmic harmony and order, he sings a spiritual song.⁸⁷⁹ He allows no doubt that he interprets “*canticis spiritualibus*” and “*in cordibus*” (from Eph 5.19) in the narrow sense, that is, without voice.⁸⁸⁰ Nicetas, bishop of Remesiana (ca. 400 AD), responds sharply against Jerome’s position, which, according to him, has “some” (*nonnulli*) or even “many” (*multi*) supporters. In his pamphlet *De psalmodiae bono*, he argues that the Pauline passages do mean “real” song, and thus he strongly endorses singing.⁸⁸¹ There was, then, a strong

noverimus;” Lactant. *Div. inst.* 6.21.9: “*Itaque si voluptas est audire cantus et carmina, Dei laudes canere et audire iucundum sit*/Therefore, if there is delight in listening to chants and songs, be it [also] pleasing to sing and listen to praises of God.” See also Isid. *De ecclesiasticis officiis* 1.5.2.

879. “*Qui vero de superioribus disputat et concentum mundi omniumque creaturarum ordinem atque concordiam subtilis disputator edisserit, iste spirituale canticum canit.*/Truly, he who discuss heavenly things and emerges a fine examiner of the world’s harmony and of the order and concord of all created things, he sings a spiritual song.” This sounds as if Jerome were promoting a spiritual contemplation of what the (neo-)Platonic tradition suggested as *praeambulum* for philosophy, the rational penetration of harmonic reality, leading to the higher realm of truth; now it leads to a higher way of musical worship. Jerome does not specify whether he means a study of harmonic theory along the lines of Augustine’s *De musica*.

880. “(...) *laudare Dominum magis in animo quam voce debemus*/we should praise God more in the mind than with the voice.” In the following, Jerome wants to assure that no “theatrical” style of music enters the church: “*nec in tragoedorum modum (...) ut in ecclesia theatrales moduli audiantur et cantica, sed in timore, in opera, in scientia Scripturarum.*” For Jerome, there seems to exist no “good” liturgical music: since there should be no pagan music, better only silent prayer from the heart. And if the latter is assured, no matter if someone might be a “*κακόφωνος, si bona opera habuerit, dulcis apud Deum cantor est*/if he has good works, he is a sweet singer before God.” Even a reference to Saul’s healing is now completely deprived of music: “*Sic cantet servus Christi, ut non vox canentis, sed verba placeant quae leguntur: ut spiritus malus qui erat in Saule eiiciatur ab his qui similiter ab eo possidentur, et non introducatur in eos qui de Dei domo scenam fecere populorum*/If a servant of Christ sings, may not the voice of a singer, but may the words please which are read, so that the evil spirit which dwelled in Saul be expelled from those who are possessed by him in a similar way, and may not enter those who convert the house of God into a theater stage of the gentiles.” Jerome declares his negative opinion of music also in *Ep.* 54.13.1: “*Cantor pellatur ut noxius; fidicinas et psaltrias et istius modi chorum diaboli quasi mortifera Sirenarum carmina proturba ex aedibus tuis*/The singer be driven out for being harmful; push out of your house the women playing strings and psalterium and the choir of the strains of the devil’s kind like the death-bearing songs of the Sirens;” *Ep.* 79.9: “*cantoris diabolici venenata dulcedo*/the poisonous sweetness of a diabolical singer.”

881. Text: Burn 1905; Turner 1923 (who proposes to name the work more properly *De utilitate hymnorum*; when citing, I add words in brackets that Burn has and Turner omits or puts differently and underline words that Turner has and Burn has not); tr.: Strunk 1998, 128–131

reaction against outlawing and completely spiritualizing or allegorizing song. This does not go, however, without insisting that chant has to be “befitting,” simple, conscious, concordant, not dissonant or distracting through “tragic eccentricities;” for the active promoters of liturgical chant, aesthetic beauty matters as well.⁸⁸² One

(excerpts). Nicetas never mentions Jerome by name. As we have seen, Augustine fluctuates between both positions, e.g. *Ep.* 140.44; *Enarratio in Ps* 147.5: “*voce cantamus, ut nos excitemus, corde cantamus, ut illi [Deo] placeamus*”/We sing with the voice to stir up ourselves; we sing with the heart to please God.”

We do not need to review in detail Nicetas’ arguments, which are, at least concerning Eph 5.19, not exceedingly strong (e.g. since Saint Paul uses the term “*canticum*” he must mean no silent singing because of the etymology “*cantare*”). Most of his argument consists of citing biblical personalities who supposedly made use of song: Moses, Abraham, Deborah, David (with the surprising comment: “*non quo citharae illius tanta virtus erat, sed quo [quia] figura crucis Christi quae in ligno et extensione nervorum mystice gerebatur, ipsaque passio quae cantabatur, iam tum [tunc] spiritum demonis opprimebat*”/not because there was such power in his cithara but because the image of Christ’s cross, which was represented mystically in the wood and in the extension of the strings, and the very passion which was sung overwhelmed then already the spirit of the demon”), Zachariah, Elizabeth (in an embarrassing confusion with Mary), the angels at Christ’s birth, the boys singing “Hosanna” on Palm Sunday, and eventually the Lord Jesus himself (Mt 26.30, Mk 14.26). Not in all of these cases does the biblical text compel to assume actual singing. In a section not translated in Strunk (5–8), Nicetas provides a long list of useful positive effects that the psalms should have, very similar to what we have seen in Basil, but even more elaborate with more examples; many of the benefits, of course, are again due to the text rather than the music, but others are clearly musical, e.g.: God provides man with a medicine “*quae dulcis esset gustu per cantionem et efficax ad curanda vulnera [peccatorum] per [suam] virtutem. Suaviter enim [psalmus] auditur dum canitur, penetrat animum dum delectat, facile retinetur dum frequentius psallitur, et quod legis austeritas ab humanis mentibus extorquere non poterat, haec per dulcedinem cantionis excludit [expromit]*”/that it be sweet in taste through singing and efficient to heal wounds [of sins] through [his] strength/virtue. For a psalm is listened to softly if it is sung, it penetrates the mind while it gives delight, it is retained easily when frequently sung, and what austerity of law was not able to wrench out from the human minds, that [the psalm] has brought forth through the sweetness of singing” (5).

882. 13: “*Sonus etiam vel melodia condecens [consentiens] sanctae religioni canatur [psallatur]; non quae tragicas difficultates exclamet, sed quae [in nobis] christianam simplicitatem in ipsa etiam modulatione [veram Christianitatem] demonstret; non quae aliquid theatrale redeoleat, sed quae compunctionem magis audientibus [peccatorum] faciat. Sed et vox nostra [omnium vestrum] non dissona debet esse, sed consona: (...) unusquisque vocem suam intra sonum chori continentis includere.*” Out of the ordinary is that Nicetas considers the cithara here in a negative way: “*non in citharae modum extrinsecus [extollentes aut] protrahen[te]s quasi ad [stultam] ostentationem indecenter efferre, neque hominibus placere velle*”./not to [raise or] project [the voice] outward in the way of the cithara as if they wanted to bring it out to a foolish display [and

principle needs to be kept in mind, that “it must all be done as if in the sight of God, not man, and not to please oneself” (*“Totum enim tamquam in conspectu Dei, non hominibus aut sibi placendi studio, celebrari debet”*). If the faithful sing well and please themselves and those who hear them, *“et Deo suavis erit tota laudatio”*/all the praise will also be sweet for God.”⁸⁸³

From this overview it can be clearly seen that Christianity has not brought about a general demise of musical culture.⁸⁸⁴ Condemning the extravagances of overly arousing and immorally provocative performances is as old as these very practices, and we have encountered many pre-Christian authors speaking in similar terms. There is a range between a sort of musical “puritanism,” in which there is the suggestion that music be discontinued altogether because of possible abuse, and the general exhortation to employ (good) music fairly much everywhere. Most authors stand somewhere in the middle and acknowledge its usefulness for education,⁸⁸⁵ relaxation, work, healing, and worship. The value of pleasure and the excitement of the passions are seen ambivalently, and judgments are often dependent upon the situation and purpose.⁸⁸⁶ But all of the authors share the conviction that music *does* have affective power and induces ethos in the human soul. The intense and frequent reaction to this fact cannot have been prompted only by the classical education of most of the prominent Christian writers and their familiarity with earlier criticism; even if it did inspire them, their texts are much more original than many of the musical handbooks of Hellenistic times, which often limit themselves to the copying or paraphrasing of previous authors. Christian pastors make their own observations—and at least in the case of Augustine also experiences—and respond to concrete needs as they notice how the use of pagan

not even to please men].” The reason might be that the cithara was at times associated to prostitution, cf. Stapert 2007, 102. The positive ideal is unified chant, “as if of one mouth” (*“veluti ex uno ore”*), of the three young men, glorifying God in the furnace (Dan 3.51–52). Their hymn is still used in the *Liturgia Horarum* of the Catholic Church during the *Laudes* for every other Sunday and on all feasts and solemnities.

883. Contrary practice is exposed to reproach, e.g. August. *De ordine* 1.8.22.

884. Abert’s negative judgment about the Christian view of music is justly corrected by Wille 1967, 386 n. 185, and Darmstädter 1996, 28–29. None of them, however, has penetrated sufficiently the theological foundation for the Christian view on music.

885. This usefulness might be exterior, such as to foster discipline, unity, motivate through enjoyment, or help with memorization; or interior, by disposing the soul by means of a favorable ethos.

886. Stapert 2007, 86–91, analyzes well how the perspective changes between rejecting harmful arousal and provoking beneficial emotion without which love is not possible; in this way, the ideal Christian ethos differs from the Stoic ideal of apathy (cf. August. *De civ. D.* 14.9.6).

customs, incompatible with Christian faith and life, have a negative impact on their flock.

What the Christian authors do not provide is a systematic theory of musical ethos, especially in terms of its precise psychological functioning. Augustine is reaching the closest, given his talent for deep introspection, but in the end he too does not go further than to elucidate the perceptive process. Consequently, the criteria for discerning good from bad music remain mostly based on the accompanying text or context, whether they are “pagan” or “Christian.” Few texts endorse particular modes, genera, rhythms, or instruments as such, and if they do, the “good” ones mainly coincide with the judgment of previous authors. Since most instruments used by pagan rites are accounted for in Scripture and in the psalms, they cannot be outrightly rejected, unless to the price of allegorizing the corresponding passages.⁸⁸⁷ Music without text is hardly considered. If there is an intrinsically bad ethos, then it is the soft, weak, “effeminate” one, leading to distraction, corruption and liscentiousness. The parallelism between pre-Christian and Christian *ēthē* is striking; the patristic writers sing with (neo-)Platonic and Stoic moralists in the same choir manly and virtuous tunes to cithara or lyre, filled with disgust over the excesses of passion and obscenity in decadent parties or festival music. But taking their ethos descriptions out of context soon leads to a conundrum, since terms such as “*dulcis*” or “*voluptas*,” “*mulceo*” (and their Greek equivalents) are found both in texts describing positive and negative effects of music.⁸⁸⁸ This difficulty has already been noticeable in the different evaluation by classical poetic writers and music theorists. The concept of “*dulcis*,” etc., changes connotation with

887. Since most criticism addresses pagan rituals, banquets, or feasts like weddings, the instruments involved and rejected are primarily percussion and the *aulos/tibia* (e.g. Arn. *Adv. nat.* 6.26.1–2). For greater musical pomp the Christians had not much use anyway as long as they were outlawed, and it was certainly not contemplated for liturgy. McKinnon 1987, 3–4, states that the omission of instruments for Christian music was not based on an explicit doctrine.

888. For this, e.g. compare our citations above from Augustine’s *Confessions* with Valerius Cemenelensis (or Valerianus of Cimiez, bishop, ca. 460 AD) *Homilia* 6.5: “*Invenimus igitur frequenter, ita impudicitiae viam muniri, atque ex hoc fomenta adulteriis ministrari: cum hic agili plectro tinnientis citharae sonos expedit, ille docile digito laborantis organi blandimenta componit. (...) Nam quotiescumque dulci voce mulcetur auditus, ad turpe facinus invitatur aspectus.*” We often find, therefore, that in this way the path to impurity is built and also from this the kindling of adulteries is furnished; when this [musician] sends forth the sounds of the clanging cithara with a swift pick, the other arranges the charms of the laborious organ with a well-taught finger. (...) For as often as the hearing is charmed by a sweet voice, the sight is incited to a disgraceful deed.”

the situation it is applied to.⁸⁸⁹ For positive ethos, the general rule is that music should convey harmony, peace, healing, and balance. In the context of worship, music must be capable of lifting the soul up to God in prayer. But since for a true Christian his or her whole life should be like music played harmoniously before God, often no real distinction between sacred and non-sacred music is made, as we saw in the suggestions to sing psalms even at dinner table.

Thus, a Christ-centered, incarnational theology maintains the dignity of music, by which the image of God praises the Creator through the very harmony which the Creator, flowing from his own being, instilled into the world; and the double nature of Christ, human and divine, accounts for the duality of sonic and spiritual music, which for a Christian musician are but like two different registers on the same organ.

Conclusion

After completing this historical journey, in order to gain a complete picture of what is considered good and bad in music by ancient authors, it would be desirable to add, in a next step, a systematic review organized by musical parameters: tone, pitch, melody, scales, modes/*harmoniai/tonoi*, harmony, rhythm, instruments/timbre, tempo, volume, form, the relationship between music and text, and perhaps also dance. Such an analysis would provide a sort of cross-section; much of the previous would be repeated in a different order, but some helpful aspects would also be added (e.g. a complete table of comparing the ethos of each of these parameters according to the various authors). However, given the size of the present work as it is, I shall need to renounce, at least for now, the development of musical ethos by parameters. A good part of it will already be accessible in schematic form through the synoptic tables that are compiled in the appendix. At any rate, at this point we should be in sufficient condition to move on to address systematically the main questions that remain to be seen regarding the effect and ethos of music.

889. See e.g. Ambrosius *Hexameron* 3.1.5: "(...) *quos non mortiferi cantus, et acroamata scenorum quae mentem emolliant ad amores, sed concentus Ecclesiae, et consona circa Dei laudes populi vox et pia vita delectet*/(...) whom do not give delight the death-bearing songs and the entertainments of the theater who enervate the minds for loves, but the tunes of the Church and the voice of the people, sounding together with the praises of God, and a pious life."

The Value of Music in Systematic Analysis

In Western civilization, a passion, and to some degree an obsession, with music has grown up and gotten ever stronger since the 1960s. As Allan Bloom describes it:

Nothing is more singular about this generation than its addiction to music. This is the age of music and the states of soul that accompany it. (...) Today, a very large proportion of young people between the ages of ten and twenty live for music. It is their passion; nothing else excites them as it does (...). When they are in school and with their families, they are longing to plug themselves back into their music. (...) [Music] is available twenty-four hours a day, everywhere. There is the stereo in the home, in the car; there are concerts; there are music videos, with special channels exclusively devoted to them, on the air nonstop; there are the Walkmans so that no place—not public transportation, not the library—prevents students from communing with the Muse, even while studying.¹

Our review of music in antiquity makes it no surprise that Seneca the Younger attests that during the first century AD there existed “musomaniacs” who listened

1. Bloom 1987, 68. Of course the phenomenon is even more pronounced at present with streaming services, making the quantity and consumption of music even greater.

to or made music all day long.² These and other testimonies cited earlier suggest that the omnipresence of music in our present society, even though objectively on a much more intense level, is felt and judged by observers in a way comparable to those living in Greco-Roman culture. Frequent and extended exposure to music means to allow music to exert its effect on a larger scale and thus incrementing its portion in the shaping of human ethos, that of the individual and, if a specific musical style acquires great expansive force, that of a whole cultural environment. Aristophanes, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, and others had their ways of describing this influence of music, and so does Bloom and other contemporary critics for today, all distinguishing wholesome from harmful effects. But each of the positions reviewed has left numerous questions unanswered. And so, in order to gain a more complete understanding of the music's impact on the human person and at the same time gauge the accuracy of the ancient theories about musical ethos, we do well now to undertake a systematic approach.

Here we can certainly profit from a wealth of research that has been carried out in the areas of music philosophy, psychology, and therapy. At the same time, it seems to me that even modern-day scholarship, despite of much advance into specific questions, in these areas suffers at times from the lack of a unified vision of the multiple factors involved. Much of the disagreement between certain positions or proposed solutions can be explained by the want of an integrated view of the whole, pulling the various strings together and combining the strong points of each theory into one. In this chapter, I intend to undertake an organic synthesis, drawing from the insights of the ancients especially the discoveries of modern sciences regarding the connection between music and human ethos, so as in turn to be able to consider some criteria for judging what the role of music can and should be in education or therapy.

Philosophical and Psychological Considerations

Basic Questions

Before entering into the concrete analysis of the psychological effect that music can have on people, it will help first to revisit once more our understanding of the terms “music” and “ethos” in order to gain a precise notion of the various levels on which they occur and what they mean in each case.

2. *Dial.* 10.12.4. Wille 1967, 350–351 paints a more detailed picture of the musical culture of the time.

Music

Some problems arise from an unclear idea about the *locus* (“seat”) of music, ontologically speaking. We have encountered (1) actually sounding music, (2) music resounding (or remembered) in the mind/soul, (3) the “abstract” music of mathematical proportions, and (4) “cosmic music.” According to our earlier definitions of music,³ music (a) applies clearly to case (1), music (b) to (4), but the status of (2) and (3) seems unclear. It is important to notice that music, at any rate, only exists in the mind of a rational-sensitive being, usually the human person. Only when the mind organizes the perceived sound stimuli by identifying them as “tones” and combining them with the help of memory into a particularly defined structure (melody/harmony), do we have music.⁴ There is an exclusive group of sounds with particular physical characteristics that has traditionally been considered constitutive of music.⁵ But it is the mind that converts sound to music or interprets it as such. In this sense, there is no essential difference between actually perceived and remembered or even only imagined music. The flip side of this is that the effect of music is not restricted to the moment when something is being played or sung.⁶ Also the intensity of the effect depends on many other factors besides the physical instance of hearing musical sound.⁷ As a result, music (2) as of above belongs clearly to the definition of music (a), while (3) should belong to

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3. See p. 17; to recall: music (a) is organized vocal or instrumental sound as consciously composed and perceived by rational beings; music (b), in an analogous sense, is non-human sound that resembles music (a), and/or it is a structure composed of the same or similar organizing principles as music (a).
 4. See e.g. Scruton 2009, 4–7 and later in his book.
 5. For a further description of these we refer to the theory of physical acoustics and music perception. The question of why these and not other sound patterns have been “chosen” to become music, is interesting but exceeds the scope of this study. Also, there is the need for explaining why certain intervals are considered harmonious and others not. We know that the ratios between their frequencies are simple integers, but we would like to know why that matters. A recent attempt to define consonance vs. dissonance scientifically is Bellinghausen 2012.
 6. For this reason, it is confusing when Darmstädter 1996, 12–15, speaks of “unreal” effects of not perceived music.
 7. Some examples may illustrate this: when we are not consciously attentive to music we hear, that music might have a lesser impact on us than a strong musically colored dream. That means that directly perceived exterior music is not even necessarily the most psychologically influential type. Furthermore, we know that geniuses such as Mozart or Beethoven (evident through his deafness) were able to imagine whole compositions and write them down without previously trying them out or hearing them (cf. Wigram/Pedersen/Bonde 2002, 53–54). Actually, any creative music production (improvisation, composition) begins

music (b) because here we are on a purely rational level which does not involve any acoustical reality, neither heard nor remembered, nor imagined. Of course, it is still meaningful to say that we make music or listen to music with reference to the exterior activity that produces the sound patterns which are going to be processed as such, but for understanding properly the relationship between music and ethos we need to be aware that music, strictly speaking, is always a mental (or spiritual) reality.⁸

Ethos

The consideration of the “seat” of musical ethos, though, leads to a slightly different conclusion. We defined ethos earlier⁹ as the character or nature of a person or group of persons, related to “patterns of being or behavior, including, but not limited to, the moral dimension.” Being and behavior, however, are certainly not restricted to the mind alone. They reside in the whole of the human person, involving all the areas of body, emotions, intellect, and will. Even if “ethos,” therefore, is recognized as such only by a rational interpretation of being and behavior, its reality is not “produced” by this interpretation (as is the case of music by “defining” certain sounds as music). It exists independently from it and has its effects even without conscious recognition. For instance, if someone is ambitious, his attitude and actions can become relevant for his surroundings regardless of whether or not anyone, even he himself, thinks about him being ambitious. On the other hand, describing, classifying, identifying, and ultimately evaluating (judging) ethos is a product of the human mind.

Human and Non-Human Ethos. It seems that there are definitely two dimensions to the concept of ethos, the moral dimension and the non-moral or sub-moral aspect. At least the moral side of ethos forms a precondition for human behavior which implies understanding and free will. A human action is different from the instinct-driven impulse or reaction of an animal. On the other side, animals do show “characteristics” and “patterns of being and behavior,” as any dog owner will confirm; and even plants, for their color, scent, or other qualities, are also sometimes attributed with “characteristics” analogous to human ethos (e.g. “tender,” “strong/

with imagined music which then is made “real.” The factors for the intensity of the effect of music will be discussed in the next section.

8. This is not to deny that a human being probably has first physically to hear something and learn the process of structuring the acoustical “raw material” in a musical way as Augustine elucidates in his analysis of perception in *Mus.* 6. But music as such resides in the mind and cannot exist without it.
9. See p. 26.

dominating,” etc.). The attribution in this sense of non-moral ethos (“character”) to non-rational beings seems to make some sense, in order to cover characteristics of non-human beings, among them musical sound that, in a way still to be defined, resembles human ethos.¹⁰

Ethos Formation. The general (and always somewhat generalizing) ethos of a person consists in the individual mixture of what traditionally has been called virtues (e.g. fortitude, patience), vices (sloth, gluttony), and other character traits or habits (e.g. cheerfulness, vigorousness) that can, depending on the situation, turn out positive or negative or remain neutral.¹¹ Since ethos involves the whole person, a complex combination of intellect, emotivity, physical conditions, actions, etc. takes place upon shaping ethos. Psychology helps to shed light on the exact processes of ethos formation and what role music can play in this process.

In particular, ethos can also mean the nature or characteristic of a temporary state of mind or soul, not necessarily corresponding to someone’s ordinary or habitual disposition (such as being downcast or cheerful in a particular moment). The part of music in such a case is easier to see, as we all somehow experience how music can reinforce or change a temporary interior state. Since virtues and vices are formed for a good part through the repetition of specific actions, habitual human ethos might be shaped through the frequent and intense exposure to music that possesses equivalent characteristics (“musical ethos”). This is the background for Plato’s and Aristotle’s conception of *paideia* through proper music.

Ethos and Ethics. It is the task of philosophical ethics to study how value judgments on ethos are built. Ethos is an interior disposition which the individual who possesses the ethos can know about through feelings and self-observation; other people get to know someone’s ethos through the way he or she expresses it by means of signs (e.g. facial expressions, posture), behavior (e.g. manners, way of walking, speaking), or concrete actions (e.g. yelling at someone, engaging in war, reconciling). The value of ethos is usually measured by the positive or negative effects and consequences that these expressions have on the individual or on other

10. Of course, the type of characteristic should be reasonably applicable; e.g. it would indeed be only metaphorical to speak of a “courageous” stone, but a stone can be hard, motionless, etc. We can see that not any random quality would fall under ethos (e.g. not the measurable size or chemical composition), but those that a human being discovers as equivalent to his or her own ethos.

11. This is what we mean when saying that x has a “relaxed” or “tense” personality, for instance. This is, of course, the description of a general tendency and by no means an exhaustive characterization of a person.

human beings. This is where the psychological effect of music becomes socially relevant.

Musical Ethos. From what we have said, music can possess ethos in the sense that the human mind seems to be able to establish a relationship (or acknowledge a similarity) between the characteristics found in the sound patterns interpreted as music and the characteristics observed in the expression of human ethos. The evolving methods of music therapy already provide evidence that interior dispositions and, as a consequence, their expressions can be influenced by music, and that the musical characteristics are directly relevant for a particular change. Still, we need to understand better what this relationship consists of and how it works. It should remain clear that the primary use of ethos is applied to human characteristics, wherefore only those characteristics of music that are equivalent to some notion of human ethos should be called “musical ethos.” Technical data on music such as indicating a pitch frequency or the tempo in terms of Mälzel’s Metronome (beats per minute) indicate in themselves no ethos; but if an element or piece of music is described as “energetic,” that means that the mind interprets certain musical sound as equivalent to energetic human behavior. The study of this equivalency is the task of music psychology, and the theory and practice of music therapy also provides valuable information. We shall consider some relevant data from these fields a bit later on.

Collective Ethos. One more aspect of ethos needs to be addressed: can a group of people possess ethos? We have seen how the Greeks defined the characteristics of modes based on ethnic groups (Dorian, Phrygian, Lydian, etc.), not just in a historical, but in an ethical way. Sometimes the characteristics assumed to be prevalent in certain tribes or peoples simply indicate these peoples’ choice of music (e.g. Heraclides of Pontus),¹² and sometimes the music they exercised (or also their lack of musical exercise) is seen as the (or one) cause for their ethos (e.g. in Polybius). It seems that human ethos may indeed shape the ethos of music, and that musical ethos may shape human ethos, both on the level of an individual and of a social group, when practicing the same sort of music together.¹³ In view of the growing sensitivity and awareness of how groups and nations actually function, the idea of a national or tribal ethos appears problematic, especially due to

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12. In Ath. 624b–625f. About the characteristics of the Greek modes in general see Winnington-Ingram 1936. Claude Victor Palisca (in Cochrane/Fantini/Scherer 2013, ch. 8) reviews the ethos of the Greek modes and their reception during the Renaissance period.
 13. See about studies about social identity through the common sharing of the same musical style: Clayton in OHMP, ch. 4; Garofalo in OHME 734–747.

the factors of simplification and generalization (no individual will ever perfectly blend with an assumed group ethos).¹⁴ Still, if it is correct to speak of a culture in terms of a system of values, beliefs, social standards, customs, etc., shared by a specific group of people, such a culture is caused by a closer familiarity due to a genetic pool, common educational traditions, etc., and result in the expression of traits that are found in this group more markedly or frequently than in others. With all caution against prejudice and stigmatizing,¹⁵ there might be some truth in distinguishing a general sort of ethos that distinguishes Germans from Mexicans or inhabitants of Texas from those of New England—always allowing individuals the possibility and right to develop their own ethos, within or without the culture from which they have emerged. All of this is subject to the study of the sociological and anthropological sciences. It is important for us here because if ethos is, at least in part, a social reality and socially relevant, then music, as far as it has to do with ethos, shares this relevance. This is part of the reason why Plato, Cicero, and other philosophers have dedicated entire chapters of their political vision to discuss music.

Factors Modifying the Impact of Music

Something which leaves me deeply dissatisfied when reading about the value of music in many ancient and even modern texts is abstract generalizations and the focus on one or two factors, as if the effect of music on a human being occurred in a vacuum or were a one-dimensional phenomenon. For instance, questions are raised such as: what effect does the cithara have in contrast to an *aulos*? Or: how does one feel listening to a piece in the Phrygian mode or in E-flat minor, or to the first movement of Beethoven's fifth symphony? If the response goes: the cithara soothes, while the *aulos* arouses, etc., we shall not get very far and hardly come to any agreement about whether this is true or not. There are mainly two reasons for this: the musical event in itself is a quite complex reality, and it can affect the

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14. We shall see that determining musical ethos mirrors the problems of determining human ethos: the passage from a singular element (human gesture vs. interval) to an instant of a complex experience (gesture & facial expression & posture & ... vs. pitch & timbre & volume & resonance & harmony...) to a sequence of instances (specific behavior/movement vs. segments within a musical piece) to a whole individual (personality vs. all of a musical piece) and finally to a whole group (social group vs. musical style/trend) requires an ever more generalizing description of ethos, neglecting variances in the detail.
 15. Of course, belonging to a group of people, nation, etc. may not only be of disadvantage (as in the case of racism) but may indeed be advantageous (in the case of national pride or esteem by others for positive qualities).

human person in many different ways, in the short term as well as long-term. Before attempting any answer with regard to the *intrinsic* ethical value of music, I shall dedicate this and the following section to analyze, at least in general traits, these two points.

The following factors, in one way or another, modify the impact of music in a given moment (both in intensity and quality). There are three general dimensions: the musical event itself, the recipient (i.e. the person exposed to music, either listening or performing), and the environment.¹⁶ Figure 4–1 illustrates the logical organization of these factors as laid out in the current section.

Musical Event

Here we first need to consider the *performance*: its quality on the side of the musician(s) (i.e. the aesthetic value that the performance possesses), the medium (as the impact is different in a live concert, a recording—CD, tape, in good or bad conditions, etc.—, or just mentally remembered or imagined), and the setting: e.g. whether it is background music in a restaurant or the main focus of attention. Then, on the level of the *music piece*, ancient theorists have offered a lot of characterizations for individual parameters (rhythm, intervals, modes, genera, instruments) and attribute ethos to them—we shall still discuss this further below. But *if* there is such an ethos, it is part of the exterior musical event. We have also seen, especially in Aristoxenus, Ptolemy, and Aristides Quintilianus, that it is not enough to talk about these parameters in an isolated way, but that the ethos of a piece is the result of a combination of all these together as a whole. Lastly, the musical event is always characterized by an *acoustical environment* that provides a certain amount of volume, resonance, reverberation, etc.; part of this is also whether the musicians are close or far from the listener (or identical with him or her). All these elements—and there may be more—constitute the “material” that is processed by the recipient as music and filtered through his or her own disposition, which we need to consider next.

Recipient

Here it helps to distinguish above all the degrees of personal involvement of the recipient and subjective circumstances that add to it. On the physical level of the

16. The general tripartition is also used by Juslin in OHMP ch. 12 pp. 134–135 (there called musical, individual, and situational factors), quoting studies for some of the subpoints. A review of influencing factors is also given in ch. 4 of the OHME, esp. pp. 86–91; see also ch. 20 (pp. 547–574 on strong experiences with music), ch. 22 (pp. 611–612, with statistics), and Scherer in Cochrane/Fantini/Scherer 2013, 128–131.




Figure 4–1. Factors modifying the impact of music.

body, it matters, of course, whether a person is fully capacitated in its perceptive processing, or actively performing (or listening in a very engaged way) or in a rather passive state. Dancing, either as part of performing or as following along with what one listens to, has its place here as well, for the bodily “swinging along” with the

music adds intensity to the experience. As we have seen, the early Greek generations considered dance as an integral part of a complete musical event. On the level of *emotion*, music will work differently according to the initial state of the individual: being awake or tired, happy or sad alters the reaction to specific musical input. The general sensitivity to music varies among humans and will influence the degree to which music will impress. Previous experiences, both musical and non-musical, are stored in the “emotional memory” of a person and provide an emotional resonance chamber that will ring with some music in one way and with other music in another—this level can hardly ever be deciphered completely, but it still exists.¹⁷

On the level of the *intellect*, it is significant whether a person is listening to music consciously or not; this depends, in part, on the attention which the musical event itself calls for, but also on the effort one makes to be attentive; often times, music is not intended to be in the foreground. In movies or advertisement videos, but also in dramatic stage works with musical accompaniment (e.g. in operas; the balance between the dominance of music and dramatic action/text varies). Even if someone is just “dreaming” with music, the intellect is involved, although not subject to voluntary control.

On the level of intellect, there is the very important factor of lyrics or text (or another form of “message” not conveyed by language): whether there is any at all or not, whether it is an engaging, exciting, depressing “story” or message, whether it has a religious or social import, and to what degree the music relates to this extra-musical content. In general, we can observe that the stronger the relation and agreement between music and content is, the greater the impact.¹⁸ This is the point of the ethical triangle that we have observed in the Greek theories since Plato. To this can be added the factor of whether the individual is aware of and understands this agreement or not. Understanding may also involve the structure and texture of the musical piece; for example, those knowledgeable in music theory claim to enjoy music more because of their appreciation of the compository or performatory intricacies.

The intellect is involved further as one responds to the newness of a piece. This variable can be filled quite differently: for some, as the ancients have pointed out, newness is particularly attractive, and surprise-effects usually work only for the first time;¹⁹ for some, repetition of the same becomes boring quickly; but it

17. Notice that these are only the emotional dispositions which music encounters at the point of acting upon a human being; the general relationship between music and emotion is a different issue to be discussed in the next section.

18. Cf. Elliott/Silverman in the OHPME 55–56.

19. Of course, one can forget what had been a surprise at least try to forget it so as to experience it again like the first time; that certainly will not work very often. Another factor, then, will be the time elapsing between repetitions of the same piece.

is also common that certain pieces are so enthralling that one does not get tired of listening to them over and over again without losing much of the emotional impact. Whether newness is relevant or not depends apparently on many other factors as well.²⁰ Finally, there are also certain expectations that the recipient may have about the effect of music, as varied as the functions music can possibly have; the more they will be fulfilled and an intended purpose is achieved, especially on the emotional level, the greater satisfaction music will provide.

The last area to review, the *will*, is rather little considered in this context, but it is of no small importance. On the one hand, the will has the chance to accept or reject the exposure to music, at least under normal circumstances;²¹ on the other hand, the will is for a good part free, regardless of the situation, to consent or not to the emotional impact a music piece may have: one can force oneself to neutralize arousal or oppose a soothing relaxation. Voluntary withstanding may reduce significantly the effect that music would otherwise have if one submitted to it without resistance.

The impression of music on the recipient also depends on circumstances linked to each individual history, both in the realm of ethos in general and music in itself, due to education and other social factors. The particular life situation or context, and the social setting where the music event will certainly affect the way the music works its effect.²²

All these factors on the side of the recipient are interacting in a complex framework that is different from person to person and will even change in many ways throughout one's life. Certain elements are not subject to frequent or strong variation, such as previous conditioning or an innate receptivity to certain content, while other elements can vary widely, even in the same individual, making the effect of music in a given situation quite unpredictable.

20. Tanner 1985, 230–231, presents theories that describe the need for a piece to be successful among those widely knowledgeable in music theory and history, to find a balance between fulfilling and not fulfilling expectations of a particular musical idiom (depending on the period, composer, etc.).

21. There is, of course, the case that someone unwillingly is submitted to exposure to music, be it due to a neighbor's feast that one is not invited to, or the famous "elevator music" (which in some places is even played in the staircases, thus eliminating an escape), or even as a means of torture (see below n. 25).

22. See, e.g., the summary of studies on the significance of the non-musical context in everyday music experiences by Sloboda in the OHME 500–502, and 508–510 about the involvement of goal-achievement.

Environment

Apart from the musical event as such and the disposition on the side of the recipient, there are external factors which I am calling “environment,” of a more general nature, which may or may not influence a given musical experience. There is the culture in which the individual is located, with its value system and moral code, religious beliefs and other customs (ἔθος), and then there is the social aspect, the fact of being together and the reason for it (music itself: a concert, or another sort of celebration, or funeral, etc.). Listening to the same song privately or at a philharmonic concert hall, in a church, or at a rock concert will provide very different experiences, not only through the ambience, which would refer more to the “acoustical environment” of the musical event), but especially through the added feeling of being in company of others who, by means of their feedback (applause, weeping, cheering, booing, or even rioting), will provoke or reinforce emotional reactions which otherwise might not be so strong or, in some cases, even not be there at all or very different.

The Impact of Music on the Human Person

We are now in a position to discuss the second aspect important for judging music, which is the descriptions of the various ways or levels of impact that music *may* have on a human being, within the conditions provided by the factors just explained, as far as music itself is concerned (its “nature”). Music can exert an impact on the body, the intellect, and the emotions.²³ Given that the human person is an organized unity with these three main areas intimately interlocking, the following somewhat artificial dissection is done for analytic purposes but should not obscure the fact that all listed items may relate to and influence each other. It is also clear that not each musical event will activate every possible dimension, which for their part will not all be equally strong. But it helps to gain an approximately complete picture of *possible* aspects that may apply to a given musical experience on the level of the individual. Figure 5–2 might be helpful to understand the structure of the following argument.

23. In more technical language, the following description is somewhat contained in the following definition offered in the context of music therapy (Thaut/Wheeler in the OHME 832): “Music may be described as an aesthetic, sensory-based language consisting of spectrally and temporally highly complex auditory patterns that perceptually engages cognitive, emotional, and motor functions in the brain.”




Figure 4-2. The impact of music on the human person.

Music and the Body

On the level of the body, here the perception-material for “music” itself is provided and there is certainly a bodily element on the neurophysiological level underlying intellectual or emotional activity.²⁴ The occurrence of a direct impact through a musical event on the body which has lasting consequences is rather rare. At times, of course, there may be physiological effects such as a direct damage of the hearing organ or the brain, caused by excessive volume.²⁵ These fall entirely into the area of biology and medicine, and their ethical relevance is limited to points like the moral responsibility of avoiding injury. More significant for us, therefore, is the influence of music on the intellect and on the emotions.

Music and Intellect

Musical sound engages the intellect principally in three ways (and in roughly the following order): by requiring it, first, to *analyze* the sound presented by the senses in order to identify it as *music*, to understand its form and structure (depending on the degree of corresponding knowledge that the individual possesses),²⁶ to recognize characteristics in it that resemble human behavior (ethos),²⁷ and to register the bodily or emotional responses spontaneously evoked by the music.

24. About bodily responses to music as a result of cognitive-emotional processing, see the Hodges in the OHMP, ch. 11. Very interesting is the Chinese view of music’s direct influence on the body, which is supposed to come in various ways from the five basic tones and modes of Chinese music, as outlined in the *Yue Shu* (Book of Music) during the last two centuries BC (see Wang in the OHPME 272). It would be necessary to see, however, if psychological studies were to corroborate the positive bodily reaction that is alleged in the Chinese tradition.

25. No such harm is reported under normal circumstances from other musical elements (melody, harmony, rhythm, instruments, etc.); of course, the psychological consequences from extremely long exposure to a dissonant chord, a long piercing tone, a never-ending repeated *ostinato*, etc. could eventually result in physiological damage as well, just as a nervous breakdown, etc. This would belong into the category of “musical torture” (cf. on the latter Garofalo in the OHME 747–749). Other bodily reactions such as a change of the heartbeat, blood pressure, sweat, etc., and, at any rate, the stimulation of the brain are owed to psychosomatic connections.

26. See the essays by Tanner 1985 and Budd 1985, 2008, 2009, and Scruton 2009 (among others).

27. We shall see what that means in the next segment on “music and emotions.” Just to give one example here: a tone can be described technically by indicating the physical data (frequency, overtone series, etc.) or ethically as “mellow.”

Secondly, music arouses the intellect to *relate* the music perceived to extra-musical elements, that is to the lyrics or any other “message” linked to the music (title, a theme, symbolism, etc.), to the context in which it occurs, and to associations and memories; it may also relate the music to a specific function (purpose) that the music is expected to fulfill. Here we need to keep in mind the whole range of possible functions that music can have (cf. Table 2–1), an important one of which is the arousal of emotions.

Thirdly, the intellect comes to *judge* the music according to the three levels of evaluation that we have established earlier on (p. 19 and Figure 1–1) and to see whether the expectations of the art (aesthetics), the purpose, or the moral ideals are fulfilled or not. To the first level belongs whether the perceived music suits the related content or not,²⁸ to the second, whether the emotions are aroused as expected and/or desired, and to the third, how appropriate the music appears to be in view of the human ethos that it might be influencing. In a way, the intellect establishes musical value in terms of *appropriateness* on all levels. The ancient writers frequently employed this term. This judgment, in addition to the emotional valence, contributes to experiencing music in a positive or negative way. The intellect, for its part, submits the result of its processing to the memory and (back) to the sphere of the emotions, thus modifying the emotional response itself.

Music and Emotions

Emotions. The most complex and difficult field is the relationship between music and emotions. Much research has been dedicated to this field in the past decades.²⁹ It is neither possible nor necessary to exhaust the topic here and to

28. Tanner 1985, 225, gives examples of compositions that he considers a “failure” because the music does not seem to fit the text.

29. For the most recent and probably most complete general overview see the OHME. A useful schematic presentation of the various schools of thought about the relationship between music and emotion can be found in Hodges/Sebald 2011, 19–21, a summaric discussion in Patel 2008, 305–319, and Sloboda/Juslin in the OHME 79–91. The introduction to the volume includes some useful working definitions (p. 10); “musical emotions” are listed separate from “emotion;” further important distinctions: affect (a most general term), feeling (subjective experience of emotion), and mood (lasting affective state, without a clear object); see also p. 23 in the same volume. Ball 2010, 254–321, offers a good discussion for a wider audience. Hiller 2015 offers a brief summary of the theories most relevant for music therapy, with focus on music as a means to express emotions rather than to influence them. Eerola/Vuoskoski 2013 present and discuss 251 psychological studies on music and emotion. Cochrane/Fantini/Scherer 2013 advance beyond what the OHME has presented, especially with the analysis of testimonies from actual musicians and musical pieces.

discuss the various theories, but we do need to go a bit deeper because most of the contentious issues of the present and the ethos-related questions of antiquity fall into this area.

As a working definition of “emotion” for our needs it may be sufficient to say that they are transient neurophysiological states (with specific brain activity which may be accompanied by the effusion of hormones and other bodily processes) that arise in response to a conscious or sub-conscious, real or imaginary stimulus (“object”) provided by the senses (and interpreted through the mind) or by the mind only.³⁰ There are many interior sources for emotions: memories, beliefs, dreams, processes in our subconscious, bodily states (e.g. illness), hormone imbalances, etc. Most of these are unpredictable and hard to control. In the context of music, I shall refer mainly to those emotions that arise from perception or thoughts, since the causality here can be more easily established, and the emotions produced are more stable. Usually our intellect issues a judgment about a perceived object and of how that object might affect the individual, thus stimulating an emotional reaction. Emotions can be clear or confused, deep and intense or shallow, simple or complex, basic or mixed, conscious or sub-conscious.

Musically Induced Emotions. One common way of speaking about emotions connected to music is that the relationship between both can occur in two directions: emotion may be put *into* music, and emotion may emanate *out of* music;³¹

30. The OHME 10 offers this definition: “a quite brief but intense affective reaction that usually involves a number of sub-components—subjective feeling, physiological arousal, expression, action tendency, and regulation—that are more or less ‘synchronized’. Emotions focus on specific ‘objects’ and last minutes to a few hours.” The definition given by Scherer (in Cochrane/Fantini/Scherer 2013, 122) is much more complex and adds to the previous “preparing adaptive action tendencies to relevant events as defined by their behavioral meaning (...) and thus having a powerful impact on behavior and experience.” It might be questioned whether the preparation for action or a “powerful impact on behavior” are necessary conditions to speak of an emotion. Scherer himself broadens the definition later (p. 124). The question of whether emotions need an “object” will be discussed in the following.

31. I am writing “may” because it is certainly possible to compose, perform, or listen to music without the least trace emotion, depending on the factors laid out above. On the side of the listener, the distinction mentioned translates into the one between a perceived emotion and an induced (or felt) emotion; in the first case, the music is expressive of an emotion which is recognized by the listener (who might himself remain indifferent to it), while in the second case the recipient actually feels an emotion caused by music. Studies show that, unless episodic memory or musical expectancy elicit contrary effects, there is not much discrepancy between perceived and felt emotions (see e.g. OHME 633), wherefore we can neglect this

music may be expressive of emotion, and many people report that they enter into some emotional state when being exposed to music.³² Particular sonic features, interpreted by the human mind as music, are “resonating” in what the ancients called the soul, nowadays the emotional center or psyche,³³ inducing an emotional response.³⁴

It has been claimed by some that music does not arouse emotions at all and that the common perception that it does is due to a fallacious attribution.³⁵ It is true that the phrase “this music is sad” is improper in various ways: the perceived sound waves cannot be the subject of sadness because they have no feelings; not even their interpretation in our mind is sad because conceptual musical features possess no feelings either. It further cannot mean that the one who hears this music is saddened for the sole reason of this perception, because there is no proper stimulus (object) and hence no reason for sadness (there is no loss or disappointed

distinction in our context (it might matter in other regard, see OHME 83). The effect that emotional arousal occurs as a response to perceived emotions is at times called “emotional contagion.” This mechanism will play an important role in our subsequent discussion.

32. Juslin in OHMP 113 cites studies according to which between 55 and 64 per cent of test participants reported an emotional impact of music randomly perceived.
33. In our context, I continue using the term “soul” for simplicity’s sake; to denote soul and intellect together, I am using the term “mind.” Besides, the neurophysiologist John C. Eccles (e.g. in 1984) held that the intellectual and emotional capacities of the human person cannot be reduced to the physiological dimension (brain, nervous system, etc.) and that there must be a spiritual component for these as well.
34. Levinson 2006, 197, describes this process as a “disposition to *hear* that emotion—rather than another, or none at all—in the music, that is, by appeal to our disposition to aurally construe the music as an instance of personal expression, perceiving the human appearances in the musical ones, in effect animating the sounds in a certain manner.” We shall see later how “human appearances” can be perceived in musical ones.
35. For instance, Peter Kivy 1989, 1990, and 1999 argues at length that music does not arouse emotions, but that it can be expressive of them, i.e. that we hear them in the music and that we are moved not by these but by the formal beauty of the music (musical cognitivism). In 1999, 5, he describes that “I am deeply moved, emotionally stimulated to a very high degree by the beauty of music; by, in other words, how wonderful the music is. The beauty of great music, then, is the intentional object of my emotion.” He continues by saying that it is basically one of the many nameless emotions, and that the many different ways of music being beautiful accounts for the different “nameless” emotions felt. This last description approximates the concept of musical emotions that Kivy otherwise does not endorse. The weakness of his conception is the claim that the intentional object can only the beauty of music (for evidence, see OHME 610). I shall argue that, in addition to the appreciation of structure as structure, emotions respond to specific characteristics and even ethical content (according to our definition of ethos above).

hope, or the like),³⁶ and usually there are no direct or tangible consequences that would affect the life of the listener.³⁷ But it remains a fact that people often still report emotional arousal through music.

There are many attempts to resolve this perplexing conundrum, but most seem to fall short in one way or another.³⁸ The majority of scholars still supports the popular notion that music stirs up ordinary emotions (or the “garden-variety,” as Kivy calls them), i.e. anger, fear, love, joy, etc., and there are certainly instances where this is clearly the case, for music, as we shall see, may point beyond itself to objects that are proper to these emotions; however, the reasons just given above suggest that, lacking such a proper object, a sufficient reason to feel “sad,” etc. is not accounted for. Other scholars (especially Kivy) allow only for a general aesthetic “being moved” by the beauty of music which, for its part, does express but not arouse ordinary emotions. While it does seem there are indeed “aesthetic emotions,”³⁹ I doubt that this phenomenon explains adequately the richness and

36. This is agreed upon by most scholars. On the issue see Davies in OHME 35. A study by Krumhansl (reported in Patel 2008, 316) appears to indicate the opposite, i.e. that “ordinary” feelings such as sadness *are* aroused by music in a (mostly) consistent and measurable fashion, but one might criticize that the bodily reactions taken as indicators are too generic for allowing a differentiation of emotion as suggested by Krumhansl and by Scherer 2004. See now also Scherer in Cochrane/Fantini/Scherer 2013, 124–128.

37. That there are no direct consequences to music might be one of the reasons why music is particularly suited to provide pleasure and enjoyment. One can certainly construe situations in which some threat or the like may emanate from music, but then it is the situation and not the (ethos of) music that triggers the emotion. Sudden volume changes in music may elicit a shock—but the judgment here comes from the fact that the unexpected loud noise is instinctively associated with previous experiences of noises that could mean a threat; so the shock comes from the suddenness of something loud with its extra-musical connotation (see below mechanism 1).

Notice, however, that “no consequences” means here that our intellect does not see any when processing music (and nothing else). That does not mean that music, objectively speaking, does not have consequences; it certainly does, through all the effects it may have on the different levels, but they are extrinsic to the immediate musical experience and therefore rarely affect it.

38. A good overview and assessment of the most relevant theories offer Davies in OHME 15–43 and Budd 1985 (who discusses and criticizes in depth Eduard Hanslick, Carroll Pratt, Edmund Gurney, Arthur Schopenhauer, Susanne Langer, Deryck Cooke, and Leonard Meyer).

39. See on this factor especially OHME ch. 19. At OHME 610, it is dismissed as rarely occurring, but I would venture to raise some doubts about whether the studies suggesting its uncommonness were taking a proper aim. For instance, the aesthetic experience does not exclude the coexistence of other emotions.

complexity of what is actually felt. Furthermore, psychological studies have also proven “quite conclusively that music does evoke emotions, and that the strong version of cognitivism is thus untenable.”⁴⁰

There are also those who, backed up by certain psychological studies, suggest that music is able to stimulate in us emotions *sui generis* which sometimes are similar to, but not identical with the ordinary ones.⁴¹ What one feels listening to a concerto grosso by Handel escapes the commonly used categories of description, as long as no additional factors apply.⁴² The difference applies particularly to the phenomenon of “peak” experiences⁴³ but is not limited to these.

That all these kinds of emotions (ordinary and aesthetical/musical) form part of what music works in the human soul will become more evident once we examine the mechanisms by which music induces emotions.

Juslin *et al.*, in the OHME 635–637 introduce the difference between emotion, liking, and aesthetic experience. While it is certainly true that these are different and may occur independently of each other, for our context it is enough that “we may respond with an emotion because of how highly we value the music (e.g. its beauty) aesthetically” (*ibid.*).

40. Sloboda/Juslin in the OHME 83.

41. Patel 2008, 317, cites for this proposal Herbert Spencer, Susanne Langer, Diana Raffman, and Klaus Scherer. The objection that artistic or aesthetic experiences other than music may arouse the same kind is secondary here. For a review of empirical groundwork undertaken in this field see Juslin in OHMP 131–140 or, more extensive and slightly updated, Juslin *et al.* in OHME 605–642.

Kivy 1999 criticises various suggestions to explain this difference (Davies, Levinson), but at the same time he admits that his own theory, that of only *hearing* (ordinary) emotions *in* the music, does not completely satisfy and contrasts with the persistent assertion of many people that the *do* feel what they hear and not just feel the pleasure of hearing something expressive of (ordinary) emotions (similar already *id.* 1989). All the discussion is due to the assumption that music deals with *ordinary* emotions. The proposal of *specifically musical emotions* might to provide a way out of this dilemma.

42. By “additional factors” I mean two things: first, we need to keep in mind that we are speaking here of music without external “content;” everything changes when lyrics with stories or other “messages” transport emotionally charged content to which music adds its own emotional force; the composer usually chooses those musical features whose emotive code is the most familiar to the characteristics of the extra-musical content. The same applies, secondly, to still other additional sources of emotion such as extrinsic associations; see about this the next section.

43. See about this phenomenon in detail Gabrielsson in OHME, ch. 20; Patel 2008, 317–319; Salimpoor *et al.* 2011. These might, however, in part be due to an experience of musical beauty, on the aesthetic level.

Mechanisms to Induce Emotion. Patrik Juslin *et al.* propose various psychological mechanisms that, individually or combined, seem to account for the arousal of emotions through music when the emotions have music (and not other realities) as their object.⁴⁴ There are eight main mechanisms commonly listed:

- 1) *brain stem reflexes* (responding to potentially important or urgent acoustical signals, which applies to sudden, loud, dissonant, or fast temporal patterns);
- 2) *rhythmic entrainment* (powerful external rhythm synchronizing bodily rhythms such as heart rate or respiration);
- 3) *evaluative conditioning* (frequently pairing a musical piece with other positive or negative stimuli);
- 4) *emotional contagion* (interior mimicking of a perceived emotional expression);
- 5) *visual imagery* (conjuring up a visual image while listening to music);
- 6) *episodic memory* (evoking specific emotionally charged events of the past linked to music);
- 7) *musical expectancy* (responding to music violating, delaying, or confirming the listener's expectation about the continuation of the music);
- 8) *cognitive appraisal* (responding to music fulfilling or not an expected function).

To these I add a ninth category, that of *aesthetic experience* (being moved or thrilled by the musical beauty), to which some of the aforementioned peak experiences

44. They are listed in this order and summarized in the OHME 619–623 with reference to the underlying studies and the frequency with which these mechanisms seem to occur, which depends in part on whether the music listened to was freely chosen or not (pp. 614–618). The authors admit that “exploring how various musical emotions come about through the interaction of multiple psychological mechanisms is an exciting endeavour that has just begun” (638). Elliott/Silverman in the OHPME 52–57, suggest, based on Juslin *et al.*, a total of 11 mechanisms. Their mechanism 9) (corporeality) seems to describe merely the fact of the bodily involvement in the processing of music but not to add a truly new source of emotion (see above); mechanism 10) (musical personas) seems already to be covered by what I shall develop for mechanism 4), and mechanism 11) (social attachment – creating emotional bonds) could fall under 8) as a specific function that music is seen as fulfilling and thus providing positive emotional feedback (the authors admit that this function may also involve various of the other mechanisms). Scherer in Cochrane/Fantini/Scherer 2013, ch. 10, offers again another taxonomy, now called “routes.” At the end, there might be multiple valid ways of how to divide up the various mechanisms. I shall subordinate various aspects under 4) that one could also argue to treat separately.

might also belong (if they are not motivated by other factors such as content, intensity of the musical event, etc.), because the aesthetic response seems not to be adequately covered by the other mechanisms.⁴⁵

We can distinguish mechanisms in which the nature of the music itself is responsible for the emotion (1, 2, 4, 7, 8, and 9) from those where it seems more accidental that music is the primary trigger (3, 5, and 6). At a closer look, even 1) and 2) could fall rather into the second category, because 1) seems to be perceived similar to other “signal sounds” and less as music, and 2) appears mostly to consist of the pleasure stemming from the synchronization itself rather than from the music. And if we consider that 3), 5), and 6) receive the emotional coloring from stimuli, images, or memories that are extrinsic to music, it might be more precise to regard none of these (including 1) and 2)) as having music as the object of the emotion; but attributing the emotion to music for being the cause for the emotion’s (extrinsic) object might suffice to include mechanisms 1), 2), 3), 5), and 6) in our context.⁴⁶

We can further group these mechanisms according to the kind of emotions that are stirred through music. Mechanisms 1), 2), 3), 5), and 6), for depending on an object extrinsic to music, elicit ordinary emotions, and so does mechanism 8) because of the relevance it has for life.⁴⁷ Under 7) I propose to include not only expectations on the formal or structural level, the technical “understanding” of music (style, composition, rules, etc.) but also expectations on the ethical level (e.g. hoping for musical correspondence to a desired or preconceived feeling or idea). The fulfillment or disappointment of expectations of any kind could then establish with 7) and 8) a second group of mechanisms that, even though depending on the

45. It might be argued that “cognitive appraisal” covers also the aesthetic experience (so it is suggested by Juslin/Timmers in the OHME 477) and there may be instances where both overlap. However, I prefer listing the two separately because cognitive appraisal does not need to lead to an emotion, and an aesthetic experience may include very little or perhaps even no cognitive judgment.

46. Regarding 8), the disappointment or satisfaction about music fulfilling or not fulfilling an expected function or other emotional responses to what Juslin *et al.* call music having “implications for goals in life” (OHME 616) seem extrinsic to music as well because it is directed more to the function than to the music, but since the function and the kind of music that it requires are intimately related and since the purpose might also be an *emotion*, I shall leave this mechanism within the first group.

47. From 1) would stem a surprise or shock effect like from other acoustic signals; 2) seems to elicit the emotions that simply come from the reinforced bodily reactions; the remaining ones retrieve their emotional charge already by their definition from outside of music.

nature of the music, evoke ordinary emotions, mainly the pleasure of seeing the expectation met (or pain in the opposite case).

This leaves us with mechanisms 4) and 9), which seem to be the only ones that might produce “musical” emotions different from ordinary emotions.⁴⁸ At the same time, here is where fits in most of what the ancients had to say about the *intrinsic* effect of music because it is based on its ethos. This is the place, then, to home in deeper on the relationship between music and ethos and how musical ethos and musical emotions can actually be established.

As we have seen (p. 26), by “ethos” we mean characteristics that are not music-specific but applicable likewise to human ethos.⁴⁹ Musical ethos consists of the characteristics that musical parameters and pieces possess in a given musical event, both on the level of (rationally analyzable) form and of emotional charge. The ancient authors, with few exceptions, mostly limited themselves to asserting the connection between music and ethos as a fact. We have seen that Plato and some others considered it something “nature-given” (“φύσει”),⁵⁰ and the Pythagorean tradition sought to elucidate this nature by exploring mathematical proportions. The mediating element was seen either in *mimēsis*, especially of movement, or in the assumption that music and ethos are inherent in all cosmic realities (Aristides Quintilianus). I shall first enter deeper into the former concept, thus exploring the force of mechanism 4), emotional contagion; in the last section of this chapter, I shall address the latter concept as a further development of mechanism 9).

Conditions for Creating Musical Ethos. Anderson wrote in 1966 that “the great majority of musicologists would reject out of hand the very existence of such likenesses—so far are we from understanding Hellenic views on ethos.”⁵¹ The Epicurean skeptics already pointed at what they interpreted as contradictory ethos attributions in order to prove such connections fictitious. While there are possible explanations for such discrepancies,⁵² especially the psychologically substantiated

48. “Emotional contagion” is primarily understood as one person transmitting an emotional state to another and is used in an analogous way for music-to-person “contagion” insofar as music resembles something that is found in persons (see Davis in Cochrane/Fantini/Scherer 2013, ch. 13).

49. As a rule of thumb, any description that can be used both to describe the characteristic of a musical parameter or piece and human behavior or dispositions is describing “ethos.”

50. See above ch. 3 n. 246.

51. Anderson 1966, 128.

52. Cf. Wilkinson 1938, 177–178, who cites various modern musicologists with conflicting descriptions e.g. of D flat major (“soft, veiled, harmonious” vs. “fullness of tone, sonority, euphony”)—but under closer scrutiny, these do not have to be interpreted as contradictory. In addition, as Wilkinson himself mentions, the Greeks themselves applied the labels for

contagion effect (4) indicates that there might be more truth in the concept of *mimēsis* than what could appear to be vague speculations of the ancients would suggest. It is interesting that 4) seems to be also the most frequently experienced mechanism.⁵³ Is there a reasonable way to explain why and how the human mind naturally processes specific musical features and translates them via the likeness of *ethos* into the emotional sphere? I shall now attempt such an explanation, beginning with some underlying basic dispositions (some universal, others individual) and then leading up to certain conditioning experiences through associations. This explanation tries to isolate first mechanism 4) and later 9). For this, we should envision an experience of absolute music⁵⁴ without interference of other mechanisms, especially of those that associate with objects extrinsic to music: no text, message, images or other emotionally relevant add-ons. This may appear artificial and maybe not fully possible, but perhaps we can at least approximate it by imagining a closed environment and a relaxed, stable emotional state when listening for the first time to a specific fugue by Bach. Since mechanism 4) has not been explored much by studies,⁵⁵ we need to rely mostly to introspection to arrive at a proposal of how this mechanism actually works—whereby I allow myself to adapt its definition from a mere mirroring of *human* behavior (and the related emotions) to the mirroring of *ethos*, which is based on, but not exclusive to human beings.

First, we need to take note of some underlying universal basic dispositions, probably innate or at least universally acquired through fundamental human patterns of development, which include the capacity to sort musical from non-musical sound, to feel musical emotions at all, to perceive and remember contrasts such as high-low pitch, volume changes, etc., the preference for consonance over

specific genera and *harmoniai* to different realities; thus changing descriptions do not necessarily prove different perceptions but may just reflect the very changes that have occurred. The famous conflict between Plato's and Aristotle's description of the Phrygian *harmonia* is not conclusive either, for various solutions have been suggested which would not require renouncing the concept of musical *ethos* as experienced on a socially relevant level. About the distinction between what is "intrinsic" in music according to the physical reality and according to the result of human (psychological) processing, see also Wille 2001, 14.

53. See OHME 616.

54. Or "music alone," i.e. music without any reference to non-musical realities, without a direct or indirect "message" or topic; see a concerto or symphony as opposed to a symphonic poem, a song, opera, or a movie soundtrack (which could be called "program music"). For a deeper discussion of the concept, its history and problems see Bonds 2014 who traces Brahms as the originator of the term "program music" (p. 12). See also above p. 12 n. 31.

55. Cf. OHME 622.

dissonance and of regular rhythm over irregular timing, and a desire for a harmonious final state of satisfaction.⁵⁶ In general, it is difficult to separate sharply that which is learned or acquired from what is natural, and that which is universal from what is individual, but the identification of common patterns allows for *intrinsic* musical ethos, identified naturally across individuals or even cultures. Individual dispositions include personal character traits and those ontogenetically shaped preferences which lead to specific responses towards particular kinds of musical ethos. All of the above are only pre-conditions to musical ethos.

Creating Musical Ethos. As we have said, musical ethos is conceived as a similarity, *mimēsis*, between musical and human behavior or expression (or also other ethically relevant experiences). This can take place on various levels. The direct imitation (or representation) of human (or other) sound is rather rare but does occur at times.⁵⁷ This might appear to be what Plato has in mind when he speaks of the Dorian *harmonia*, for instance, as being a *mimēsis* of the utterances of someone who is manly and experiences warfare, failure, death, and the like, but remains steadfast.⁵⁸ We could also think of musical imitating sighs or screams, etc. But the complicated way of Plato describing the manly ethos of that *harmonia* makes it hard to think of a specific imitated sound (and even harder to imagine how

56. Cf. Trehub *et al.* in the OHME 655–656, drawing from experiments with infants cross-cultural comparisons. Other elements, not directly related to mechanisms 4) or 9), appear to be universal as well, such as mechanism 1) or certain aspects of mechanism 7): for instance, music psychologists are investigating whether musical principles such as voice-leading rules “are universal aspects of human auditory perception or whether they arise from culture-specific conditioning” (Huron 2001, 55). The author points out for this particular case that the relevance of these rules is relative to the goals pursued by the composer (id. 56). Other examples could be pitch proximity and reversal (after high should follow lower) and the interplay of tension and relaxation (see Stevens/Byron in OHMP 19–20 and Cross/Tolbert in OHMP 31).

57. We discussed this already in the context of Plato (cf. ch. 3 n. 231). Most music theorists nowadays agree that music does not *directly* imitate or represent any non-musical movements, actions, or sounds, except in special cases (i.e. when program music strives to imitate a railroad, birds, rushing waters, etc.). Most music does not rely on such imitation and does not need to. Arnold Schönberg describes in somewhat mysterious terms the difference between simple imitation and a deeper understanding of *mimēsis*, as quoted in MGG “Music,” 1.4: “Music is at its lowest stage simply imitation of nature. But soon it becomes mimesis of nature in a broader sense, not just imitation of the surface of nature but also of its inner essence.”

58. *Resp.* 399a: what is imitated (“μιμήσαιο”) are “φθόγγους τε καὶ προσφθίας,” which could be elements of speech but, in the case of the first word, also other sounds. The second term suggests a similarity to language, see further below.

it might then sound in music). It seems, rather, that Plato envisioned a more subtle form of *mimēsis* in which musical features carry in themselves ethical (and thus emotional) “codes,” acquired through some process of conditioning or association.⁵⁹

This process could be imagined as follows. In its early stages of development, a human being registers basic dual patterns governing the world: on the physical level being asleep-awake, hungry/thirsty-satisfied, cold-hot, healthy-sick, alive-dead, etc.; on the psychological level: happy-sad,⁶⁰ tense-relaxed (or high vs. low arousal), etc.; on the intellectual level: focused-distracted, credulous-skeptical, free-constrained, etc.⁶¹ It is within the spectrum of psychological polarities that the emotions are usually tabulated as fanned out, whereby their labeling can vary.⁶² Certain polar realities occur both in the outside world, in human life, and in music (great-small, up-down, fast-slow, loud-soft, long-short, open-closed, smooth-rough, etc.),⁶³ others not. When an individual repeatedly encounters these opposites and their intermediate shadings, the characteristics (ethos) of these patterns

59. What follows is in many ways similar to Peter Kivy’s “contour theory” as developed in Kivy 1989 (originally published in 1980; supported also by Davies in the OHME 31–33), and his explanation is much more detailed than what I can offer here. There are two important differences: first, Kivy is trying to explain what he says music is “expressive of,” while I find it more accurate to see in these processes the way how musical ethos is created in order to engage the psychological mechanism of emotional contagion (4); secondly, Kivy draws a direct line from musical features to ordinary emotions, while I believe that we need to first pass through specifically musical emotions, as expounded on soon. In addition, the term “contour theory” does not seem felicitous if we consider that it is not just the melodic “contour” but many other musical elements that contribute to ethos and emotion in music.

60. In psychology, this distinction is usually called “valence;” see e.g. OHME 614.

61. I am purposefully using examples of different kinds on each level to indicate that a full taxonomy would need to consider a complex network of layers and categories, and also overlapping between the levels and gradual shadings between the poles.

62. On the question of how to map the emotions see e.g. the OHME 74–79 and 202–208 (here also an attempt for music). We do not need to decide on how to describe these poles precisely. Multiple ways of categorizing emotions can be found in the psychological literature. Among the ancients, as we have seen, Aristides Quintilianus has gone the furthest in an attempt to give a unified explanation. His “male-female” classification is certainly prone to misunderstandings; “tense-relaxed” would be more promising. For the moment, the intuition that our emotions might be able to be grouped by poles and intermediates is sufficient.

63. Again, male-female could be added here, but the ethical import of this distinction is nowadays quite disputed, and so I am abstaining from using examples of this kind myself. There seems to be, however, some substance to identify music as male or female, cf. Gabrielsson in the OHMP 146.

become “colored” within the emotional spectrum and are retained as such in the memory, especially when associated with patterns of human behavior or other experiences that possess a positive or negative valence.⁶⁴ Through a process that could be described as conditioning or as lasting association, those polarities that have an equivalent in music transfer then the acquired ethical meaning together with the emotional charge from the non-musical experiences onto musical parameters.⁶⁵ One particularly important source of emotional inference to music is language. To a certain extent, the similarity between musical features and speech patterns (rhythm, melody, volume, etc.) seems to provide cues for the emotional coloring of music.⁶⁶

These experiences could predispose the individual to feel certain emotions in contexts similar to previous ones, but also to tastes or preferences which include a value judgment. The latter cover only a limited amount of musical elements, as few people would have preferences of key (e.g. D major over F major), but many do prefer one instrument over another, due to individual dispositions and emotive associations.⁶⁷

Associations can be created by repeated similar experiences or through textual or visual ethos which either reinforces a preconceived musical ethos or creates it

64. The contour theory cited above (n. 59) considers only *human* behavior or comportments; as said before, it seems that musical ethos also draw from other realities (e.g. “majestic” could refer to a royal procession or to a mountain), and the emotional occupation of musical features may also derive from nature or other non-human experiences. The example of a “majestic” mountain does not need to amount to mechanism 5) because the experience of a mountain might underlie an individual’s notion of “majestic” and subconsciously contribute to the emotional experience of the “majestic” ethos of a musical piece, without necessarily conjuring up the image of a mountain.

65. About this process in general, see also Patel 2008, 309–315. Notice that this is different from “evaluative conditioning” (mechanism 3) where musical pieces are directly associated with events of positive or negative valence (see OHME 622). Trehub *et al.* in the OHME 656–658 summarize studies on how children learn to label musical emotions and how they attribute positive or negative value to specific features.

66. Experiments made on lullabies (Patel 2008, 344) show the use of “descending pitch contours to soothe infants” whereas “ascending contours dominate in infant-directed speech used to arouse infants.” It is interesting that these contours seem to work even cross-culturally which could suggest a nature-given correlation rather than conditioning. See further *id.* pp. 344–350, especially the table on p. 346 which lays out “shared acoustic cues for emotions in speech and music,” and *ibid.* referencing Juslin/Laukka on the theory that instruments might be processed by the brain as “superexpressive voices” because they contain enough speech-like acoustic features to trigger emotion perception modules. The language example in table 4–1 is extracted from Patel’s table.

67. See e.g. Wigram/Pedersen/Bonde 2002, 57–58.

by means of combining specific music with text or images that carry ethos. All these processes may take place on the level of an individual but also across individuals in form of convention (social conditioning, education, etc.).⁶⁸ Here, the conceptualization of musical patterns as ethos may occur in different ways; Greek music provides a good example in that pitch levels were perceived mostly in terms of “sharp” and “dull” rather than “high” and “low” as it is done today. As with the pre-conditions to ethos, some associations between music, ethos, and emotion are quite universal and conventional now, but even conventional associations must have been suggested once and since has prevailed for some reason. It seems that the more basic the concepts are, the more universal between humans (or even cultures) is the emotional coding; with an increment of concreteness or complexity, the individual experiences weigh in more.

The following table gives some examples to illustrate in a simplified way the transition from the physical phenomenon to the ethical valuation and then emotional reaction.⁶⁹

Table 4–1. Creating ethos and emotion in musical elements.

Physical phenomenon	Ethos of the experience	Emotion	Musical equivalent	Musical emotion
being raised up	uplifting	soaring	ascending melody	?
big jump	daring	excited	big interval	?
limping	broken	downcast	slow trochaic rhythm, minor key	?
heartbeat while expecting something good	excited	excited	fast, steady rhythm and tempo	?

68. Attributing ethos and emotion to certain realities and to musical ones through convention can also happen without that the “nature” of music would have to show any similarity to the outside realities; cf. the examples in Kivy 1989, 71–83, even though he develops this under the concept of “musical expression.” And I would also still argue that one cannot “decree” or “agree on” that a certain musical element or piece sound “sad” in terms of an emotion but only in terms of ethos. A conventional attribution independent from the nature of music would actually rather be leading to mechanism 3) (evaluative conditioning).

69. For a more complete overview of how particular musical elements are related to ethos and emotion, see Gabrielsson/Lindström in OHME, ch. 14, especially table 14.2 on pp., 384–387. Interesting is also the summary of cues correlated with specific (ordinary) emotions in musical expression as used by performers by Juslin in the OHMP 382 and in the OHME 460–464.

Physical phenomenon	Ethos of the experience	Emotion	Musical equivalent	Musical emotion
bouncing	joyous	joyful	jambic rhythm, major key, greater intervals	?
speaking fast with high, energetic voice	agitated	angry	fast tempo, high pitch and intensity, rising pitch contour, microstructural irregularity	?
abrupt stop	violent	alarmed	strong buildup and sudden pause	?
slow movement	relaxed <i>or</i> : majestic	calm <i>or</i> : solemn	slow tempo, Phrygian <i>harmonia or</i> : slow marching rhythm, full orchestra	?

Of course, the physical phenomena, depending on the context of the experience, can allow for different ethical interpretations (an example is given for “slow movement”). Also, the ethos description may be close or even identical to the emotion as one is a natural response to the other. The main point is that the musical equivalent may adopt by “contagion” the same ethos from the physical phenomenon. For the musical equivalent, I have given examples for a simple element and for combined features because the discussion of musical ethos is not exhausted by defining isolated characteristics of specific parameters such as tempo, pitch, mode, melody and harmony (in the modern understanding). Aristoxenus is certainly right in that all musical elements together constitute the ethos of music, be it synchronically in a given moment, or diachronically. As a musical piece develops, the interplay of all parameters through the extension of time establishes a complex texture of ethos with its related emotion(s), which may, however, change from moment to moment.

Musical Emotions. Through their similarity to non-musical experiences, basic musical parameters and combinations of them are coded with ethos and become emotionally charged.⁷⁰ But since music occurs on a certain level of abstraction, removed from the objects that evoked the emotions in ordinary life experiences, and because musical elements by themselves do not evoke the ordinary emo-

70. Kivy 1989, 52, speaks in terms of that “music, in many respects, resembles our expressive behavior” and emotional speech. Studies show that humans, from a quite early age onward, are receptive to different musical styles and are able to distinguish them, see Trehub *et al.* in OHME, ch. 23, also on the influence of speech melody.

tions as in other life circumstances, it could be that these musical patterns retain the emotional cues through their ethos (or the traces of various ethos-providing experiences), and what they do produce are *musical emotions*.⁷¹ We are now in condition to provide a more precise definition for them: musical emotions in a strict sense⁷² are feelings aroused by individual or combined musical features as a response to an ethos encoded in them by force of their similarity (*mimēsis*) to “outside-world” patterns and the ethical-emotional charge of these patterns.⁷³ If we had words for these emotions, we could add them into the column to the far right of the table above, but even though they derive genetically (through ethos) from ordinary emotions, because of their different nature, it is preferable not to label them indistinctly.

Musical and Ordinary Emotions. In order to understand better this difference and the relationship or interaction between musical and ordinary emotions, I suggest the image of layers. We could envision the ordinary emotions as spread in two or more dimensions over one layer.⁷⁴ Musical emotions, once formed in the way

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71. Davies in the OHME 36–37 takes recourse to the difference between “feelings” instead of “emotions” by describing what might better be called “musical emotions.” But while he is saying: “the response feels like sadness or pity, and this makes it true that the music expresses sadness, but the response is not an object-directed, cognitively founded emotion,” I propose that “feels like” indicates precisely that this feeling and the ordinary emotion of “sadness” are precisely *not* the same.
 72. In a wider sense, as said earlier, “musical emotions” could mean any emotion “somehow induced by music” (see above n. 29, especially OHME 10). I shall propose later a slightly wider sense.
 73. We owe an explanation for why musical similarity has an emotionally privileged status over other possible similarities. Kivy 1989, 57–70, addresses this with the concept of “animated perception” (the evolutionarily or otherwise induced or innate tendency to identify a *specific* similarity); Davies in OHME 33 seems to suggest that “music is intentionally and ingeniously designed to be as it is” (i.e. to be deeply emotional). I shall add to these possible explanations mechanism 9), still to be discussed.
 74. One could think of something like a combination between the “Conceptual Act Model” by Barrett, represented in the OHME 201, and Hevner’s “Mood Wheel” as described in Wigram/Pedersen/Bonde 2002, 58–59. When the authors at the latter reference affirm that “contrary to popular belief, music cannot express emotions with any degree of success, but rather creates moods to which we respond at an emotional level,” I believe the term “mood” approximates what I have described as musical emotions, even though the “Mood Wheel” still uses terminology of “ordinary” emotions—on the level of practical therapy, recourse to these seems to be unavoidable in order to somehow communicate about the different general categories of musical emotions. About why “mood” is not a proper term for describing listeners’ emotional responses to music, see the OHME 619, n. 7.

described above,⁷⁵ are spread out on one or more layers that extend over the ordinary ones. Musical emotions possess a similar range of possible emotional “colors,” but use different hues or shades than the others. The different layers are related to each other through the same basic color (or general position within the spectrum). Thus, some musical emotions could be identified in the same general area of the emotional spectrum of, say, “sad” or “happy,” without being identical with them.⁷⁶ At times, their ethical-emotional import might still be identified by the mind as similar to those in other life contexts (e.g. slow = sad); nevertheless, such a conscious or sub-conscious connection to concrete extra-musical content is not necessary and will often times not take place. The relation in origin and actual feeling between musical and ordinary emotion accounts for the fact that many neglect this distinction altogether when trying to describe a musical emotion.

There might still be musical emotions that do not originate at all from ordinary emotions; I consider these as those produced by mechanism 9) (see below). But insofar as musical emotions stem from other emotions, they can be seen as echoing them in a tempered or else modified way. This does not mean that musical emotions cannot be very strong or intense; the intensity depends on the factors for musical effect as laid down in the previous section. It does mean that the relationship to “real life” is often very remote, and therefore the conditioning experiences are no longer the immediate source, even if the origin, of the emotional experience in music. And if we can say that music is capable of producing its own level of emotions, we are avoiding the objections raised against “emotivism.”⁷⁷ Moreover, I

75. Of course, they continue being adjusted and enriched throughout one’s life, but it seems that much of the conditioning and associations, especially the basic ones, takes place during early childhood and will stay with the individual from then on; cf. Juslin in OHMP 385.

76. One could object that “sad” or “happy” can also have different shades in themselves, which is true. The difference is that these “variations” within the same category of basic ordinary emotions still stem from their proper exterior object, whereas musical emotions are musically induced echoes of abstracted ordinary emotions that now form their own emotional horizon, which through the common ethos can still be related to ordinary emotions.

77. These objections are summarized in Kivy 1989, 155–157: (1) Why should we voluntarily submit to music that, supposedly, instills unpleasant emotion such as anguish or melancholy? Response: we do not submit to exactly these emotions when musical emotions are different and, even if related to these, they are softer; whether we feel pleasure or not with regard to musical emotions depends on other factors that we still need to discuss. (2) Music does not trigger the exterior or interior reactions that we would expect from ordinary emotions. Response: indeed, and therefore we react to musical emotions not like to those resulting from other objects perceived in their positive or negative consequences. (3) Emotions are directed towards objects, while music does not provide such.

believe that the musical “cognitivists” misrepresent reality somewhat when saying that music in itself is “expressive of” ordinary emotions.⁷⁸ To me it seems rather that it is expressive of ethos, and musical ethos may, depending on multiple factors, trigger musical emotions and, depending on still more factors now to be considered, at times also ordinary emotions.

Emotional Contagion or Attraction. The reader will have noticed that the process described so far does not coincide with the definition given above for mechanism 4). “Emotional contagion” usually signifies the arousal of *ordinary* emotions. By means of “empathy or sociality, we ‘catch’ the mood prevailing around us,” in the case of music the “powerfully expressive appearances that are not connected to occurrent emotions” in the perceiving individual.⁷⁹ In the model proposed here, there is a “contagion” between a physical phenomenon/pattern and a musical pattern, both of which receive the same ethos and hence a similar emotional “color,” but this “contagion” explains the origin of the emotional charge of musical elements and does not usually occur in a musical event. Still, the fact that we “sympathize” with the musical ethos perceived in the musical event by means of a musical emotion might allow us to opt for “emotional contagion” as a proper term.

On the other hand, I propose that there is yet another kind of contagion, which we could also call attraction: the location of a given musical emotion within the general emotional spectrum may dispose a person to involve a related ordinary emotion or also other mechanisms which would attach *other* elements with similar *ordinary* emotional load to the musical experience. When, for example, a melody rises *crescendo* to high pitch and accelerates with a strongly marked rhythm towards a highly dissonant climax, the ethos of tension and threatening approximation already has its own emotional effect on the level of music, but

Response: music itself and its ethos are the object to stir up the corresponding *musical* emotion. (4) Mere emotional associations to music are only accidental. Response: these are different mechanisms and hence not an argument against the validity of mechanisms 4) and 9).

78. The famous but nevertheless astonishing phrase by Igor Stravinsky (quoted from MGG “Music,” 1.4): “Music is essentially unable to ‘express’ anything, whether it be feeling, attitude, psychic state, a phenomenon of nature, etc. ‘Expression’ has never been an intrinsic trait of music” seems to be going too far. I believe that music does possess expressivity, but usually not for ordinary emotions. That musical expression remains often ambiguous, both in terms of the “program” (message) and (to a lesser degree) of emotion, has been shown, cf. Gabrielsson in the OHMP 146.

79. Davies in the OHME 37.

it can also get to the point of engaging ordinary emotions of fear or anxiety through one or more of mechanisms 1), 3), 5), and 6). This effect may be strengthened further by means of mechanisms 7) (expectancies) and 8) (especially if it imports external meaning) as long as they point in the same emotional direction as the other ones. In all such cases, a musical emotion forms the substratum that attracts a related ordinary emotion which “resonates” with it. Thus, ordinary emotions, which are at the origin of musical emotions, can be also receive feedback from them. However, under normal circumstances, the awareness of the listener that he or she is “just” experiencing music, usually numbs the ordinary emotion that might be triggered in accordance with the related musical emotion and therefore keeps the experience on the level of a pleasurable valence even in the case of negative ethos (e.g. “agitated”). So, if we feel happy simply because we are listening to specific music, it will often be the case either that positive ethical qualities in the music and their musical emotion evoke by contagion the ordinary emotion of happiness, or some of the other mechanisms get attracted to and activated by it.

Aesthetic Experience as a Musical Emotion Beyond Ethos. Musical emotions, as seen so far, derive from ethical codings drawn from non-musical perceptions and their ethical-emotional import, which are now anchored to musical features on account of similarity, and the connection is usually not conscious. It is doubtful, however, that *all* musical elements (melody, volume, etc.) with their possible values (high-low, loud-soft, etc.) receive their emotional import from extra-musical experiences. With mechanism 9), the emotional response to musical beauty and harmony, we might have a way to explain musical emotions that seem aloof from emotional contagion, because this mechanism does not seem to be conditioned or trained in the same way as the concrete musical patterns.⁸⁰ When the emotional impact of music alone is based on aesthetic properties “such aspects as the beauty, balance, sublimity, power, wittiness or expressivity,”⁸¹ it may be different from the ethos-induced emotions and still further removed from ordinary emotions. Admittedly, if described in the terms of the preceding sentence, they might seem not to be exclusive to music and not even to art, because other realities could evoke similar effects. At a closer look, however, one might want to claim that a musical piece provides a different aesthetic experience than a painting, and this is at least in part because this experience will hardly be without the admixture of genuine musical emotions that derive from ethos, but especially because music is

80. See above at nn. 70 and 73.

81. Juslin *et al.* in the OHME 635; in what follows, I am referring to all of ch. 22.6 in the OHME.

the *princeps analogatum* for the concept of harmony. What strikes our soul when listening to just a single musical tone as opposed to “noise”? What “dwells” for us in a clear interval, or what does the sound of a violin or an oboe do to us? Even though “beautiful” or “harmonious” can also at times be understood as ethical qualities on the same level as others (and thus covered by mechanism 4) or as a description of certain musical expectations (mechanism 7), or as something that satisfies an ideal or yearning for a harmonious condition (mechanism 8), there seems to be something underlying *every* musical experience (at least every one with a positive value) that in and of itself already puts the listener into a special emotional state. It seems to be something other than an *ordinary* emotion and, understandably, many who would be expecting something like that might not be able to identify it. A basic emotional charge stems from that there is “beauty and harmony”⁸² in music *qua* music, which is like an undercurrent, sometimes more subtle and remote, sometimes rather strong, to everything else that emotionally may be going on in a musical experience. This emotional phenomenon may certainly further be *reinforced* by expectations or rational validations from a deeper understanding of music and its structure (such as the recognition of motives, themes, and other compositional elements: mechanism 7) and be complemented by mechanism 8), the emotional response to the rational apprehension of non-musical rules, values, beliefs, etc. which agree with the ethos presented by a given music in view of a purpose or goal.

The Whole of Emotion in Music. In the same way as the Aristoxenian tradition spoke of the need to combine all musical elements (with their individual *ēthē*) in order to define the ethos of a whole musical piece, it is necessary to combine all mechanisms responsible for an emotional arousal in a given musical event, both synchronically and diachronically. On top of a general aesthetic current, the mind identifies form, ethos, and other emotionally relevant features in music, thus eliciting musical emotions and, depending on the presence of other mechanisms, also ordinary emotions, blending these into a complex mixture. While listening or performing the piece, the changing characteristics will make the emotions fluctuate and oscillate throughout a multidimensional spectrum. The

82. Maybe this could be called something like a “musical transcendental.” In the tradition of classical and scholastic philosophy, being has transcendentals such as the good, the true, and (according to some) the beautiful. For a thoughtful theory of spelling out the beautiful, see Maurer 1983. For music, “beauty and harmony” (or “harmony” alone) could be seen as the most general and universally applicable source of emotion for a musical experience—at least for a positive one. This restriction might point at a reason why people, when listening to what they consider “bad” music, are inclined to say that it is not music at all.

general emotional impression that a musical piece leaves in us after hearing or performing it, with all the particularities melted into one “confused” emotion, will still be located somewhere within the emotional spectrum of the soul and could be called a “musical emotion” in a wider sense.

We shall probably never be able to spell out and analyze precisely all the factors that compose the emotional coloring even of singular musical elements or, much less, of more complex structures, because it is impossible to trace all the history of forming emotional and rational associations. In addition, since our cognitive-emotional disposition is constantly changing, we shall never make an identical music experience even when listening to or performing the same piece.⁸³ This makes it even more understandable that we cannot have words to describe these musical emotions:⁸⁴ first, because we really do not *know* what exactly composes them in every instance, and second because there so many mechanisms which work together to produce them.

At the same time, as the various contributing mechanisms and musical parameters, especially those contributing to ethos, may converge towards some general dominating emotional “color” which, within the general emotional landscape of the soul, is close to an “ordinary” emotion for which we *do* have words, people may well label a piece, even if only superficially, with one emotional description (e.g. “sad”). One reason for this may be that this is the only label available to describe something similar but not identical with an ordinary emotion felt in its proper context.⁸⁵ As we have seen in the analysis of the vocabulary for characterizing

83. Cf. Wigram/Pedersen/Bonde 2002, 57.

84. Scherer 2004 suggests a promising new measurement method to overcome difficulties that derive from applying what he calls “utilitarian emotions” (the ones I am calling “ordinary”) to music as done traditionally instead of considering, in his terms, “aesthetic emotions” (the ones I am calling “musical”).

85. The problem of most studies on musically induced emotions lies in the fact that the test persons are asked to identify music with labels for ordinary emotions, and even descriptions freely chosen by the test persons will naturally tend to neglect the difference as it is hard to describe. This is also suggested by Trehub *et al.* in OHME 660–661: “There is no compelling evidence that they are moved to discrete states of happiness, sadness, anger, or fear. Instead, being moved or touched by music may involve changes in affect arising, in part, from unlearned responses to acoustic cues, which would generate convergence across listeners and, in part, from listeners’ personal and musical history, which should generate divergence. (...) Categorical labelling may result primarily from the demand characteristics of experiments on musical emotions. For situations in which listeners are genuinely moved by music, their feelings may be difficult, perhaps impossible, to describe in words. The default option is to use labels that are pervasive in everyday discourse about emotion.”

music, most descriptions rely on metaphorical terms borrowed from other sense perceptions.⁸⁶ Another reason lies in that listeners often do not distinguish the various sources for the emotions felt in music but only pick out that emotional trait that which seems to prevail or stick out the most, even if it is just due to an association and not directly to the nature of the music itself.

Human Ethos Through Musical Emotion. We now take a brief look at how musical emotion can create human ethos, which is the basis for a moral judgment of music. When listening or performing a piece, music plays on the range of musical emotions which may in turn resonate into the layers of the ordinary emotions. As Plato, Aristotle, Ptolemy, Aristides Quintilianus, and others have intuited, this has an impact on the general emotional state (or mood) in which a person is found when making the musical experience. The musical emotions, by either agreeing or diverting from a current state, are able to confirm or modify (“tune”) the individual’s emotional constellation in a given moment.⁸⁷ Frequently felt emotions can lead to a habitual emotional state or mood (e.g.: feeling sad often may create a “sad person”), as well as specific habitual dispositions of the intellect (e.g. the tendency to see things in a negative light) may provoke habitually a certain set of emotions (anger, frustration, etc.) and thus shape the character of a person. In the same way, it can be expected that the frequent arousal of specific emotions through music may leave a lasting imprint on the soul, which is significant for education and also for music therapy. A deeper understanding of the process of creating emotion through music and the factors contributing to the effectiveness of such emotions will be beneficial in both disciplines. If music leaves traces in human character, this is socially relevant and constitutes the basis for the community or society being able to judge if certain music is “appropriate” or not.

86. Cf. also Kivy 1989, 58 and his observation that “literature and musical criticism are rife with such descriptions.”

87. In psychological literature, this effect is also referred to as “mood management,” cf. OHMP 435. Psychology also confirms that music usually has the effect of rather “shifting mild emotion by small steps” as opposed to “pushing people to strong extremes” (Sloboda in OHME 495).

Summary. We have seen that the *locus* for music and ethos is the mind which generates the translation from specific sound into what we call music, and we have gathered a detailed understanding of how the mind attributes ethos to music according to a code has been formed through associations of different kinds. We have also looked at how emotions are evoked from this ethos as well as from other factors such as ideas or impressions or other objects extrinsic to but triggered by music. The musician or listener draws from a mostly sub-conscious store of emotional and other experiences what applies to a particular musical event and blends everything into a musical experience which, if the elements converge in the same direction, may indicate a particular ethos and emotional color.⁸⁸ If this hypothesis could further be substantiated, it could perhaps be called a “material theory of musical ethos and emotion,” holding that human beings naturally attribute meaning⁸⁹ and value to music and its components, in contrast to a “formal theory” such as the one proposed by Kivy who accepts an emotional response only for the formal beauty of a musical piece. This theory, then, would also positively confirm the intuition which most ancient music theorists had without being able to explain how, that music, by its own nature, is able to convey ethos.

Music and Pleasure

Before we turn to the evaluation of music, we need to look at least briefly into the relationship between emotion and pleasure. Nobody seems to deny that music has the capacity to cause pleasure (ἡδονή/τέρψις, *voluptas/delectatio*). But what does that mean in view of the emotions? Ordinary basic human emotions are usually

88. When we say that a composer or performer puts “emotion” into his music, we may mean two things: either this “emotion” is just musical and then will simply pass as such from the source to the listener; or the composer or performer does feel “ordinary” emotions, translates them into the “language” of musical expressivity by choosing those musical features that, through their ethos, arouse musical emotions within the same area of the emotional spectrum where the desired “ordinary” emotions are located. Since musical emotion does not *need* to connect with “ordinary” emotion, the listener will perceive and (possibly, depending on the various factors modifying the impact of music as laid out above) feel the musical emotions contained in that piece, and then he may or may not re-convert them into the form of “ordinary” emotions in himself. For models and illustrations for musical “communication” of emotion between the composer, performer, and listener, see the OHME 471–479.

89. I am saying here “meaning” because music may have more “meaning” than what is covered by ethos. “Music and meaning” opens many more questions than can be dealt with here, cf. ch. 1 n. 48.

classified as extending between pleasant or unpleasant (e.g.: feeling “happy” is pleasant, feeling “sad” is unpleasant). Things are obviously a bit more complex than this. In some situations sadness might actually bring about a certain pleasure, for example, when it arises out of compassion for another. There is the “tragic pleasure” experienced in drama, as well as the pleasure felt because we see that it is “good” to be sad in a given moment. Inversely, we would not feel pleasure in being “cheerful” during a funeral, for instance, because it would not be appropriate. In the case that an emotion does not comply with a specific expectation or moral obligation the pleasureable emotion can produce distress or the negative emotion can produce internal pleasure, simply because it indicates that my responses to my situation are healthy and proper.⁹⁰ Having said this, the emotions still continue being the ontological “seat” for pleasure and enjoyment as something felt.

Musical emotions, in addition, seem to involve aspects feelings that cannot always be categorized according to pleasure or pain.⁹¹ Apart from a general feel of pleasure or enjoyment in music (which might be due to the aesthetic experience), pleasure ordinarily requires a favorable constellation of the multiple factors which precede or accompany a musical experience, but is especially produced by music that is perceived to be “good” on all levels (art, purpose, morals).⁹² If different mechanisms provoke conflicting emotions, the general “feel” might turn out awkward or even unpleasurable. Any deficiency will result in less pleasure or even displeasure when the perceived music shifts to “bad.” On the other hand, it does not follow that feeling pleasure in music means that the music is “good” (or, in the case of displeasure, that it is “bad”). This is because pleasure is subjective while a value judgment should include objective factors, and one of the most prominent ones is ethos.

90. For studies on “negative” musical emotions as a response to lack of appropriateness, see Sloboda in the OHME 498–499.

91. Budd 1985, 1–15, mostly proceeds by mapping human emotions through pleasure or pain and, in some cases, an additional “thought.” Despite Budd’s sharp analysis, his concept of “thought” in the context of musical emotions remains unclear, and the pleasure–pain-dichotomy seems to not shed enough light on what is actually felt when listening to music alone.

92. For instance, Huron 2001, 56–57, shows that successful parsing of the musical texture can be a condition for music enjoyment, which applies especially to polyphony for being more complex—“those don’t like it who don’t get it.”

Value Judgments on Musical Ethos

Good and Bad Emotions

We already hinted at that the value of the emotions (because of their influence on human ethos) is responsible for the value of musical ethos. Therefore, we need to ask first whether emotions can be good or bad. In themselves, emotions are mostly spontaneous interior reactions to an object and its possible consequences for the individual as presented by the senses or the intellect, and as such they have at least no moral value because they do not have “will” or “choice.” But we can speak of wanted or unwanted emotions, enjoyable and painful ones, those that support the judgment of the intellect and those that do not. The most meaningful way of defining the value of emotions seems to be making it depend on the situation and on their relationship to what the intellect has established as good or bad. Since emotions arise spontaneously and often in an uncontrolled way, bad emotions would be those which are at odds with the intellect (convictions, goals, values, moral imperatives, etc.), while good ones are in line with it. Even though emotions may possess ethos without a direct moral implication, they receive moral relevance when they move the human person to interior dispositions or exterior actions (the latter under the condition of willful consent, unless we are dealing with compulsive actions). For musical emotions (both in the strict and wider sense) the same holds true. In themselves they have ethos, but not yet morally defined. Their moral relevance arises according to the effects that they will bring about in the human person. I shall call “positive emotions” those which the intellect judges as inducing positive human ethos or action, and “negative emotions” are those which move towards negative human ethos or action.⁹³

Judging Musical Ethos

At this point, then, we need to address the question of how we can distinguish good and bad musical ethos. As we have seen, the intellect judges music according to the degree to which music fulfills the functions expected of it. We have also seen that music can arouse emotions which may “resonate” and either awaken other related parts of the emotional spectrum or intensify those already active for other reasons. By doing so, it might also mitigate emotions opposite to

93. Davies in OHME 38–40 uses the term “negative emotion” for unpleasant emotions felt as a response to music. In addition to my brief comment above about these (at n. 77), I believe that the concept of harmony as explained below will resolve further the question why we still enjoy music that evokes musical emotions similar to unpleasant “ordinary” emotions.

the ones strengthened. Since emotions are involved in creating human ethos, the musical parameters interpreted by the mind as analogous to a given human ethos will then, as musical emotions, have their effect on this ethos. Consequently, the judgment about musical ethos will depend on the the judgment about the corresponding human ethos. That is why many ancient authors ascribed to music “qualities” of human ethos and expressed their preference for some over others according to their preferences for specific forms of human ethos (e.g. simplicity, manliness, or nobility over complexity, laxity, or vulgarity). These preferences are prompted by ideas about how a human person should be for his or her own fulfillment (perfection) and within society.⁹⁴ Emotions that support a desired ethos are welcome, those that go contrary to it, are to be overcome. Thus, musical emotions that relate to other emotions supportive of a desired ethos establish ethically good music, while those that go contrary to that ethos, constitute bad music.⁹⁵

Here we are facing again the problem that a piece of music, as we have seen, is a very complex entity with regard to emotions. Attributing a clearly defined ethos to a whole piece will be impossible in many cases, not only because we have in general no adequate vocabulary for specifically musical emotions, but also because even short and simple pieces contain a great complexity and alternation of musical features. However, as soon as the prevalence of certain musical emotions awakens or strengthens “ordinary” emotions with the effect they have on the interior “tuning” of the human soul and hence on human ethos, they can be identified as helpful or harmful with respect to that ethos.

Intrinsically Good or Bad Music?

This brings us to address the final but central question in this section: whether it makes sense to speak of intrinsically good or bad music. “Intrinsic” here means that a particular piece or parameter or style, regardless of the context or

94. An example could be the belligerent mentality of the Spartan people which prompted the positive valuation of specific types of ethos and the music expressing these. A particularly explicit description for the Chinese tradition, based on the *Yue Ji* text, is given by Wang in the OHPME 266: “On the individual level, good music regulates one’s emotions and cultivates virtue, and is thereby a powerful influence in ethical education and character shaping. On the societal level, good and proper music is recommended for rulers to achieve successful state governance through cultivating virtuous social customs and manners. These aims are based on the understanding that music has a strong influence on human disposition, character, and behavior.”

95. Again, this is very generically spoken. With Aristides Quintilianus we must assume many shadings between good and bad as the distinction is not always clear-cut.

content possibly attached to them, possesses positive or negative ethos and thus by its nature exercises always a positive or negative impact on the soul, leading it to a positive or negative interior disposition (emotions, mood, or ethos) or even beneficial or harmful exterior actions.⁹⁶ We have already pointed out that “positive” or “negative” depends on a given value system within a particular culture, even though some values may also be trans-culturally valid. At any rate, the ideal held towards which human beings should strive through education and which they would want to maintain later on defines the influences a human being should be exposed to. Hence, any music that *necessarily* fosters or obstructs development towards the ideal and its cultivation would be considered intrinsically good or bad, as well as music that *necessarily* instigates actions considered morally bad.

Conditions for Intrinsic Value. This opens various sub-questions: Is there anything universal in the way our mind processes sound as music and attributes ethos to it? Is there any evidence that specific instances of musical ethos must produce the equivalent human ethos? And is there at all anything universal in judging certain human dispositions or actions as “good” or “bad”? To begin with the last question: it shifts the problem of universal musical value towards the universality of certain moral judgments; this we cannot resolve here, as the debate in ethics whether intrinsically evil actions exist is ongoing and lies beyond our scope.⁹⁷ If there exists an intrinsically bad human disposition or action (many people would consider directly killing an innocent person such an action), conditions or steps inducing it (such as teaching that this is a right thing to do) could be intrinsically bad as well. It is hard to imagine music that would invite (still independent

96. The case of badness for artistic reasons was discussed earlier (p. 19): music is artistically bad if it does not sufficiently comply with the established rules. Intrinsically bad music on that level would be music that will never comply with any possible artistic rule for music. It seems impossible to establish such a thing, since these rules are in flux and I do not see how we can preclude that something unacceptable here and today will never be acceptable elsewhere and in the future. At the most, one could think of a piece that violates the most basic universal preferences for music; many “ordinary” people might agree that is the case with atonal music, but many professional contemporary musicians would disagree.

97. For the most part it is the debate between deontological and teleological (or consequential) ethical systems. If there are no actions that are always evil, then no musical emotion could be intrinsically bad because there can always be a circumstance under which the action it supports is not evil. But even if one accepts the existence of intrinsically evil actions, we still have not proven that intrinsically bad music exists, because of the first two questions that need to be resolved.

of text) to homicide, but the case might be made for different examples;⁹⁸ antiquity, as we have seen, has some to contribute in the form of Dionysian frenzy or Sirenan seduction.⁹⁹

About the second question, we already mentioned that the will may suspend the effect of music on the person, and many other factors may mitigate (if not change) the impact as well. I believe, no human being can ever be fully coerced to an emotional state or exterior behavior or action as long as he or she has free will. But even if the will does not get involved, other factors influencing the effect of music may block the ultimate impact on human ethos as well; one could talk about “intrinsic” only within a series of parameters that would keep music’s impact on the human soul open and effective.

That leaves us with the first question which we have already partially addressed above (p. 425). Ethnomusicologists are investigating whether there exist musical “universals,” features and standards that are common to the musical traditions of all known cultures. As to be expected, what appears to be universal are mostly general parameters or “ingredients” for music, and little is said in the existing studies about the attribution of musical ethos.¹⁰⁰ At least as far as the Chinese and Indian reflection on musical ethos is concerned, there seems to be a lot of similarity with Greek-Roman antiquity, and we have seen that the Christian tradition follows closely along these lines.¹⁰¹ On the psychological

98. Homicides have occurred in the context of musical concerts, but the factors leading to them did not lie in music only (see e.g. Jones 2002, 177–180). Another area of concern could be arousal to sexual actions considered intrinsically immoral.

99. For the first, see Apollod. *Bibl.* 1.3.2; Verg. *Georg.* 4.520–527; Ov. *Met.* 11.1–53; for the second: Hom. *Od.* 12.39–54, 183–198; Ov. *Ars Am.* 3.311–314; Sil. 12.33–6. On the other hand, Dionysian frenzy was not always seen in a negative light. For instance, in Euripides’ *Bacchae* we can observe a strange ambivalence.

100. E.g. Cross in OHMP, 4–12; Stevens/Byron in the OHMP, 14–20, and Clayton in the OHMP, 35–42. Stevens/Byron (p. 18–20) point out especially the importance of expectancies and the interplay between tension and relaxation. See Patel 2008, 91–93, summarizing some (but not fully conclusive) evidence for the particular function of the fifth interval.

101. Patel 2008, 313–315, reports that also non-Western musical traditions, such as India, and Java, are familiar with ethical qualities within music, and even cross-cultural identification of ethos, at least in common affective or expressive categories, seems to be possible. A summary of existing cross-cultural studies on music and emotion can be found in ch. 27 of the OHME; there is a tendency that emotional cues in Western music are easierly detected by members of non-Western cultures than those in non-Western music by members of the Western cultural tradition. See also Peretz in OHME:101: “These findings point to the existence of some invariance in expressing basic emotions across musical cultures.” It is

level, we would first need to understand why and how exactly the mind associates a specific musical phenomenon to a specific ethos, whether this happens in all humans in the same way, and to what degree the ethical coloring of sound is innate or acquired through conditioning or convention. Studies on human beings still in the mother's womb or newly born could be of high value—analyzing spontaneous reactions to different kinds of music without any previous conditioning—, but it is always difficult to perform experiments that are not exposed to a challenge of the method.¹⁰² Some theories complicate things by seeing the need to provide an explanation within the framework of human evolution, that is, to discover an evolutionary advantage that the emotional charge of music should have implicated.¹⁰³ It seems that we are not yet in conditions to clarify the point in a conclusive fashion.¹⁰⁴

further “remarkable how quickly cues to musical emotions, such as mode, which appear to be so culture-specific, can be internalized by listeners of a different culture. This flexibility is suggestive of an underlying universal bias on which listeners build their own cultural variants and assimilate those of distant cultures.” A brief account of similar ethical judgments is offered by Garofalo in OHME 727; much material is gathered in Sachs 1943 and Tame 1984.

102. Ps.-Aristotle already mentioned the newly born (see ch. 3, n. 402). For modern studies, see e.g. Trehub/Hannon/Schachner in the OHME 645–668. Ball 2010, 177, quotes several tests with infants made to assess the existence of innate interval preferences. He criticizes the validity of apparent preferences as tampered by possible previous exposure to music. But it is not evident that exposure determines pleasure or preference. While we might often prefer what we are used to, it does not follow that we *only* and *always* prefer what we are used to. Does someone like apples more than pears because it was the first fruit he ever ate? Could a first impression not also have been repugnant for some reason? It is obvious that few people enjoy the stench of blood although it was the first smell they perceived when newly born. The same objections would apply to Ball's analysis of cadence preferences (ibid., 181–182). See on this topic also the corresponding chapters in Patel 2008 with a helpful summary chart on p. 379 with supposedly innate biases relevant to music, with a following discussion of the evidence.
103. So e.g. Kivy 1990, 3–13; Juslin *et al.* in the OHME 624–628 include “survival value” as a factor to establish and describe psychological mechanisms that induce musical emotions; Budd 1985, 52–76, discusses and refutes Edmund Gurney's theory, based on a Darwinistic interpretation of musical emotion originally based on sexual arousal mechanisms. Evolution-based interpretation will always remain highly hypothetical, and “mating sounds” cannot hope for any archaeological proof.
104. So e.g. Cross/Tolbert in the OHMP 30: “questions such as whether the affective states that music appears to elicit arise through empathic processes, as Davies (2001) suggests, or arise directly in response to objective properties of musical structures have not been the sustained focus of experimental investigation.”

Consonance vs. Dissonance. One consideration may help paving the way a bit: ancient authors have frequently discussed the dichotomy between consonance and dissonance (especially for tones and intervals). Both terms are often used with positive or negative connotation. The difference between harmonic and melodic intervals is important here; a second interval is dissonant if two tones sound simultaneously, but for a melodic step of two tones sounding subsequently, the concept of dissonance does not apply. For me it remains a bit puzzling how the Greek theorists seem to pendulate between a harmonically relevant interval theory (meaning: simultaneous tones) and a melodically relevant tetrachord theory (intervals that determine the ethos of *harmoniai*/scales and hence of melodies). If it is true that the ancients did not know any polyphony beyond magadizing or bagpipe-like drone accompaniment, the emphasis on consonant and dissonant intervals is not fully clear—few musicians will have been tempted to magadize in second intervals. But apart from that, is a harmonic dissonance always bad? Listening to a harmonic minor or major second or to the augmented fourth (*tritonus*) is usually or perhaps even always considered dissonant and associated with negative musical emotions. Plotinus suggested that dissonances are in a way necessary to bring about harmony. Harmony can be defined as a successful combination of diverse (but not unrelated) elements, often of polar nature (see the next section), and as such it could be conceived as presupposing the combination between consonance and dissonance. And thus, in fact, we experience music: a piece without any sort of dissonance or tension in it appears to us flat and boring. What makes music “interesting” is the interplay between consonance and dissonance (as representatives of the general duality of relaxation and tension).¹⁰⁵ But why then should dissonance be bad at all? It seem that “dissonance” is used equivocally: it may mean first that something is “not consonant” in terms of harmonic theory (a more complex ratio between the frequencies of the tones composing the intervals).¹⁰⁶ This type is linked to specific

105. This is the point to recall from Tolkien’s image of the beginnings of the world in the *Silmarillion*, that the problem with Melkor’s style was not “dissonance” but “discord,” cf. above p. 3. With that in mind, one could engage in a discussion of the thesis on discordance in the world as proposed by Heller-Roazen 2011.

106. Patel 2008, 17–19, cites studies that point “against the notion that the primary force in shaping musical scales is the pursuit of intervals with simple, small-number ratios. Outside of Western culture, the dream of Pythagoras is not in accord with the facts.” On the other hand, Patel also says that “the lack of standardization between instruments may simply mean that listeners develop rather broad interval standards.” Non-Western cultures may not disagree with the Pythagorean ratios but merely not aim at or reach the ideal. The mathematical approach of the Greeks will have contributed to a finer formation of the ear. There is evidence that humans, in contrast to animals, prefer in general sounds that

musical emotions, but the wider context of musical development neutralizes these emotions, which by themselves perhaps pertain rather to the “negative” end, and gives them through the whole a positive value. On the other hand, “dissonance” may mean that something is “not sounding right,” that such sound should not be there (and sometimes it is said, therefore, that dissonant sound is no music at all, cf. above n. 82). Here one might think of even a single tone in a wrong pitch or of an unpleasant timbre. While in the first meaning, the context delivers dissonance from its ethical negativity, in the second meaning the context constitutes this negativity or is at least an important factor of it. It is sound at the wrong place (or time) or in the wrong way. It is not appropriate.

Now, for intrinsically bad music we would have to assume a kind that could in no context be judged positively.¹⁰⁷ Does such music exist? Beginning with the second meaning of “dissonance,” since it is a contingent musical or extra-musical context that determines the negative element, the concept of “intrinsic” does not apply. The first meaning of “dissonance” would suggest that this would be the case when a dissonant musical feature is not balanced out by a consonant one and harmony is not established. The negative musical emotion would remain prevalent and could elicit other “ordinary” negative emotions with consequences linked to them; at best it would remain neutral if suspended or mitigated by extra-musical factors. One might also challenge the existence of a negative musical emotion by claiming that the mind could be formed in such a way that it does not process any music as possessing negative ethos.¹⁰⁸ Whether this is possible

are defined as consonant, cf. Patel 2008, 397–399; lower pitch music (vs. higher pitched speech) is associated with more positive valence (p. 350). If West 1992, 42–44 & 276, shows that the Greeks “esteemed high notes more than low ones” and states that also “for much of the Middle Ages high singing was favored,” this does not contradict Patel’s assertion because Patel speaks of instrumental music while the singing voice is in its psychological effect closely related to speech.

107. Intrinsically good music is of less interest because no moral obligation follows from that; however, if there is intrinsically bad music, legislature as proposed by Plato would be justified to ban it.

108. Ball 2010, 178, suggests a tautology in the attempt of explaining dissonance/consonance by (dis)pleasure, assuming that dissonance by definition is unpleasant and what is unpleasant turns out to be dissonant. While such a circle may occur in some authors, it is important to distinguish both terms well: dissonance and consonance refer to a particular sensory experience, which is based on a specific physical reality that is mathematically describable, while (dis)pleasure is the emotional reaction to that experience, a reaction which is not wholly determined (since, as we have seen and Ball himself admits, one may well experience pleasure hearing a dissonance in a given context). Ball concedes that there seems to be a predisposition to perceiving certain sounds as consonant or dissonant, but he claims

remains a question to be answered by music psychology. If it turns out that all human beings are bound to feel “negatively” at certain musical characteristics (and, perhaps, even about essentially the same ones), a case for intrinsically bad music could be made.

The Central Place of Harmony

When explaining the ancients’ ideas about the origin of musical ethos, we referred back to their *mimēsis* theory along with Plato’s vision of basing ethos on the nature of music and explored how one could conceive this idea in modern psychological terms, especially within the mechanism of emotional contagion. We postponed reviewing the Pythagorean tradition of a mathematic-cosmic approach (see p. 424) to which now is the time to return, in a way as an appendix to the explanation of mechanism 9) for the arousal of emotion through harmony (see p. 434). The Pythagorean view of a world conceivable with mathematical precision and clarity and the intuition that music might be based on the very same logical principles was the foundation for developing music as the science of “harmonics.” Despite its further development into a highly abstract discipline, it has also always tried to produce criteria for “good” music, for music that can bring about “harmony” in a wider sense in the human soul and in society. We shall now explore this principle in two steps: first its derivation from the characteristics and effects that were attributed to music by ancient authors, and secondly the importance that music receives by means of this principle.

The Harmonic Triangle

We have observed that ancient authors overall give music as such a primarily positive value (cf. p. 72). Modern studies confirm the same for our times.¹⁰⁹ The list of positive musical characteristics is much longer than the one for the negative (see ch. 2), and so are the lists of positive effects of music (see the appendix). If we review the reasons why music is positive, poetic witnesses mention the pleasure felt, sweetness, softness, clarity and nobility; for the theoreticians the dominating criteria are that music should bring about enjoyment/pleasure, order, health, promote virtue (especially manliness, moderation, nobility), be

that the *preference* for consonance is not sufficiently demonstrated. About this see Stainsby/Cross who notice in the OHMP 51: “Of particular interest is the fact that even naive listeners have an intuitive sense of consonance as being the degree to which simultaneous notes sound pleasant, harmonious, or euphonious.”

109. See Sloboda/Juslin in OHME 87–89.

linked to reason, and it must be aesthetically well done. The most frequent negative characteristics in poetic texts highlight aspects of mourning, dread, harshness, discordance, and aesthetical repulsiveness; among the theorists, music is bad because it stirs up weak attitudes or immoral behavior, makes sick, leads to madness and lack of self-control, and it may be aesthetically displeasing. As a common denominator among almost all writers we can identify three criteria for good music. The first is that of *harmony and balance*, whereas many negative characteristics stem from excess in the one or the other direction (technical ones: volume, pitch, timbre; but also ethical ones: effects of relaxation, etc.). The second is that of *appropriateness*: the ethos of music should match the ethos of extra-musical content (if there is any), the (desired/aspired) ethos of the soul, and the context (cf. our ethical pyramid). These two criteria are related, for in order to achieve the ideal ethos in a human being (or society), which the ancients usually saw in the harmonic equilibrium of polar tendencies, the means (music being a prominent one) must be appropriate to the requirements of each situation. Aristides Quintilianus developed a sophisticated theory about how this can be carried out through education and therapy. The third criterion is that of *enjoyment* or pleasure. Plato and some of his followers were very reserved about it, but Plato nevertheless admitted that it plays a role—he just wanted to avoid it becoming a heuristic criterion for judging music in its objective value, but there is not evidence for him denying that good music should also be enjoyable. The omnipresent semantic field of ἡδύς/*dulcis* as the preferred characteristic for good music is simply a metaphorical way of saying that music is enjoyable, for lack of more music-specific vocabulary. These characteristics are only rejected in specific contexts, when it would mean *too* sweet/soft/relaxed, but not in themselves.

We could relate these three criteria in the following way: enjoyment, as the emotional valence in responding to good music, is sealed by the intellect's affirmative sentence about the integrity of the ethical pyramid, which is ensuring appropriateness, and when both emotion and intellect, converging in music, are in agreement elicits harmony. Or put from another angle: harmony is the overarching synthesis of both enjoyable and appropriate music. Music is enjoyable when it corresponds to or produces the interior harmony between intellect, emotions, and the body (as far as the body is involved) in the human being; and music is appropriate when there is a harmony within the ethical pyramid (that is, all of its ends are in agreement with each other). For music to be enjoyable, the emotions are involved by feeling satisfaction; for music to be appropriate, the intellect is involved by providing the value judgment. We could call this the "harmonic triangle." The following graphic illustrates this:




Figure 4-3. The harmonic triangle.

The Prominence of Music Through Harmony

Basic musical patterns correspond to basic patterns of “real-world” experience; these patterns may receive ethos and through it emotional charge, and this ethos may carry over into music. But even if this explains the *kind* of musical (and, at times, derived ordinary) emotions, only mechanism 9) seems to open a perspective towards the *intrinsic* emotivity or affective force of music, yet without the ethical specification which mechanism 4) contributes. For the question is still not really answered: why does music overall have a greater emotional impact than other art forms?¹¹⁰

110. I am referring mostly to the visual arts; the case of literature, film, and related genres is different because by means of the story they bring in the immediate emotional impact of human life experiences, even if only in a simulated form.

Why does the ethos of paintings or poems not have the same effect? Somehow, music seems to have always enjoyed a prominent place. When Plato declares it the most powerful influence on the human soul (e.g. *Resp.* 401d), especially for the young, it is important to notice that his statement is widely shared by modern neurophysiological and psychological studies.¹¹¹ “The brain that engages in music is also changed by engaging in music.”¹¹² Interesting is also that the brain of those who practice music differs significantly from those who do not.¹¹³ Patel, a prominent scholar in the field of research on music and the brain, gives music a relevance of Promethean dimensions:

Music may be a human invention, but if so, it resembles the ability to make and control fire: It is something we invented that transforms human life. Indeed, it is more remarkable than fire making in some ways, because not only is it a product of our brain’s mental capacities, it also has the power to change the brain. It is thus emblematic of our species’ unique ability to change the nature of ourselves.¹¹⁴

A multiplicity of ways of music influencing our lives can be gathered from the applications of music therapy, still to be touched upon in the next section. In view of all this, one might be tempted to see in music, as some of the ancients did, the underlying principle for everything else. This would mean inverting the perspective, in the lines of Aristides Quintilianus, in order to say that, instead of the mind applying “real-world” patterns to music, it organizes the “real-world” experience

111. E.g. Leins/Spintge/Thaut in OHMP 526: “Music as a complex, temporally structured ‘sound language’ arouses the human brain on a sensory, motor, perceptive-cognitive and emotional level simultaneously and stimulates and integrates neuronal pathways in a music-specific way;” and later (pp. 529–530): “music communicates arousal, motivation, emotion and meaning through the perception of its intrinsic symbol structure of musical elements as well as through emotional responses that have become connected to it through an associative learning process;” music is “the most intense emotional means of communication (...); the influence of music (a very complex stimulus) on consciousness is very powerful compared to other environmental stimuli.” Popularizing presentations of this reality, still including valuable information, are Jourdain 1997 (passing through the different musical parameters), Levitin 2006, and Ball 2010, 240–253.

112. Thaut 2005, 116.

113. Cf. Gaser/Schlaug 2003, Schlaug in OHMP 197–207, and Thaut 2005. Plato and Aristotle would have been surprised to learn about the many advantages it brings to intensely learn to play an instrument; this might have helped to overcome social reserves that suggested limiting active musical education to a minimum, mostly for purposes of understanding better the workings of music. Furthermore, certain results in music therapy require active participation, see e.g. Bailey/Davidson 2003.

114. Patel 2008, 412.

according to musical patterns. On the level of the individual development, this does not seem to hold, because an unborn or infant child can hardly be thought to construct its thoughts and feelings from musical experiences. On the other hand, it does seem that our world is organized according to polar forces that require proper balance and *harmony*.¹¹⁵

From the early dawn of Greek philosophy, harmony is perceived as the union of opposing but still somehow related entities; it is the proper arrangements of forces and elements in nature—"proper" meaning the avoidance of excesses and thus illness or other harms. The proper measure or mean becomes a leading criterion on all levels: metaphysics, physics, ethics, medicine, society, and art.¹¹⁶ When Aristides Quintilianus takes the path of assigning to the constitutive elements of nature male or female characteristics or at least some sort of polar ethical qualities, he intends to bring all previous speculation about harmonic principles ruling the universe into one great vision. After all, the Greeks were among the first to show a profound desire to give a unified explanation to all physical and metaphysical realities—quite similar to the modern pursuit of a Grand Unified Theory for quantum mechanics and astrophysics. The doctrine about the harmony of the spheres is but one of the fruits from the idea that musical mechanisms might be responsible for cosmic order on all levels, a vision that has not lost its fascination.¹¹⁷ But if audible music is nothing other than a perceivable form of a

115. It is interesting to notice that the Chinese tradition, very based on a polar (not dualistic) world-view, holds "that maintaining good health requires moderating one's desires, emotions, food consumption as well as physical activity" and that music is a very powerful tool to moderate these "and to bring them back to humanity in its righteous course," while "extremes of affection are thought to lead to evil," and if they "are not moderated, they trigger unbalanced thoughts and conduct." The goal is to return to the state of equilibrium and harmony (called "*he* 和") in which a human being is born and which is, "in addition to concordant musical sounds, at the same time harmony of mind and body, harmony among participants, harmony between participants and their environment, and even harmony among Heaven, Earth, and humans." (Wang in the OHPME 268–272). The differences between the Chinese conception and Plato's cosmic view of music seem to me less than Wang's following account suggests; a more detailed comparison would be worth undertaking.

116. See above the section beginning on p. 195.

117. In the case of the harmony of the spheres, its obvious physical impossibility from today's scientific knowledge in terms of being an *acoustical phenomenon* should not obscure the fact that there are fascinating mathematical correlations at work. Ratios of planetary motion, unfortunately, do not seem to translate into Cicero's *dulcis sonus*, as shown in the attempt by Willie Ruff and John Rodgers at Yale University to actually reproduce the planetary "harmony", based on Kepler's calculations (accessible at <http://www.willieruff.com/kepler.html>, accessed on May 8, 2013). The result is rather sobering, from an aesthetic point of

more universal principle of harmony, intimately related to beauty which, in metaphysics, has sometimes been included among the transcendentals,¹¹⁸ and if music exists in our mind anyhow in various ways, of which directly perceived sound is only one, then it is little more than a question of definition when we confer the name “music” also to non-sonic harmony; thus, wherever there is harmony, there is “music.”¹¹⁹ One would need synesthetic capacity to make these other “musics” sound or to “hear” other forms of harmony. The ancients saw in the harmonic structure of the world the reason for the exceptional power of music in our soul, as if the beauty and order of the whole universe were in some condensed way resonating in it. Human perfection and fulfillment would only be possible by “tuning in” to this order by music that truly reflects this order. The magic and power of music for healing stems from this connection; in their view, bad or corrupt music breaks with this order and thus with the source of health and virtue in man as established by the divinities.

To what degree we may be prepared to accept a universal principle of harmony in the world must be left open at this point.¹²⁰ If there is any truth to this, and if there is any substance to mechanism 9), the aesthetic awe when perceiving harmony in its original musical form, then this mechanism and the emotional power of music at all receive a still deeper meaning and explanation. Both pagan and Christian authors have undertaken to explain the origin of the world in musical, harmonic terms, and Tolkien has woven a modern myth of it. But as far as human life is concerned, the practical relevance of the harmonic principle, the properly measured and enjoyably balanced combination of distinct entities, has been perceived keenly by the ancient philosophers and might help us also today in a time not short of extremism and discord in many different forms.

view. But since we are told that only those can hear it upon whom the gods bestow this grace in accordance with personal virtue (see ch. 3, n. 689), maybe we simply all seem to fall short on this end.

118. See above n. 82. Notice also that harmony is an ingredient of “beauty” (*pulchritudo*), at least according to Thomas Aquinas; see above in ch. 3 n. 211.

119. We can use here the term “music (b)” as introduced in the introduction (p. 17).

120. Surely, earthly and cosmic processes can also give the impression of chaos and violence if we contemplate natural catastrophes and the, from a human point of view, hostile environment in deep space. After all, this remains subject to philosophical and theological interpretation. That there *is* order despite so much apparent chaos remains nevertheless a striking mystery.

Contributions From Music Therapy

Origins

In Greek culture, a healing influence of sound can be founded on three different sources: cosmic, mythological, and magical. Ancient peoples are quite keen on the psychosomatic reality of human nature: they have observed how mind and body form a unit and sustain each other.¹²¹ This takes place within the conception of a cosmic order, within which the different forces need to be kept in balance, and the human person is only a part of this, governed by the same universal principles.¹²² As we have seen, the Pythagoreans are said to have developed a complex theory about the numeric proportions in the universe, which is reflected in music, and so for them the very music becomes an instrument to instill this order again where it has been disturbed. The Muses are conceived as a mythological representation of that order; therefore their images are placed on tombstones so as to invoke their aide in purifying the soul of the deceased to make it fit to join the immortal and eternal harmony in heaven.¹²³ Christian authors, as much as today's music therapist hand books, readily mention the Old Testament example of David playing his cithara for Saul.¹²⁴

121. For this idea and how it is pursued throughout Greek culture, see Jaeger 1945, especially his analysis of the *Corpus Hippocraticum* with its ideal of balance and proportion in order to maintain health.

122. Anderson 1994, 108, comments, for example, that extended musical symbolism in Pindar's poems "will be found to rest on a correspondence between two things: the ordered fitting together of musical sounds, and order in the universe (*kosmos*). The former not only symbolizes the latter but embodies it and actively fosters it." Even though Anderson suggests rather Orphic than Pythagorean influence in Pindar's case, in any case, the concept is fairly universal in Greek culture. The analogy between cosmos and music is also present in the *Corpus Hippocraticum*, e.g. in *De victu* 1.8 (see above p. 273).

123. Cf. Wille 1967, 523.

124. In 1 Sam 16.14–23; see our references above in the section on Christian authors and the compilation of quotations in Wille 1967, 703 n. 1139. What is usually not mentioned is that David's "therapy" is not of lasting effect because of Saul's firm resolution to kill David (see 1 Sam 18.10–12; 19.1, 9–10). For other examples of ineffectiveness, see Quint 1.4.7 and Stat. *Silv.* 2.1.5–12. Rouget 1985, 154–158, analyzes the text and discards the idea of a musical therapy (or of an exorcism) in favor of "reestablishing God's presence, which means that he restores in Saul, in attenuated form, the state of an inspired prophet that he had momentarily lost." This, and his interpretation of the ultimate failure (as not being connected to music at all), is an interesting view but would require further discussion.

These ideas are carried on throughout antiquity¹²⁵ and transmitted into the Middle Ages through Renaissance figures such as Marcilio Ficino (1433–1499) who

attempted to combine Platonic philosophy (including its music theory) with Christian dogmas by formulating guidelines for a holistic health doctrine, ‘natural magic’. (...) Ficino considered carefully selected and performed music the most effective means to obtain this balance, harmony and unity.¹²⁶

Famous musicians, for example Beethoven and Schubert, are reported to have employed psychotherapeutic treatment by composing and playing pieces precisely for that purpose.¹²⁷ However, it took until the twentieth century before music therapy would slowly develop into a discipline no longer denigrated as charlatanism.¹²⁸ David Aldridge (for an approach to therapy through musical creativity) and Oliver Sacks (for neurology) are only two of many pioneers who paved the way to transform trial-and-error approaches into a more and more evidence-based methodology.¹²⁹ “Music therapy has grown substantially through research and clinical experience since 1950, and today is recognized in the medical community as a solid, thriving profession.”¹³⁰

Music Therapy and the Question of Good and Bad Music

The prevalently positive notion of music, which we have observed in ancient authors, resurfaces in the fact that music seems to be able to find constructive application in a multitude of pathological conditions. Clinical practice of music

125. For a more complete account of musical healing in antiquity see e.g. Meinecke 1948; Wille 1962 and id. 1967, 443–446.

126. Wigram/Pedersen/Bonde 2002, 27.

127. Examples are given in the chapter “The Healing Power of Music” in Solomon 2003, 229–241, not without explicit reference to Hom. *Od.* 19.519–519 and Saul’s healing in 1 Sam 16.23. Beethoven dedicated his String Quartet in A minor, op. 132, as a “Holy song of Thanks by a Convalescent to the Divinity, in the Lydian mode,” drawing from a tradition referring back to Cassiodorus, which classifies the Lydian mode as a “remedy for fatigue of the soul, and similarly for that of the body” (Gioseffe Zarlino, as quoted by Solomon, p. 236). See also Bach’s *Goldberg Variationen* as referenced in ch. 2 n. 87.

128. In terms of official acknowledgement, there is still a way to go. I am told that in Germany, for instance, music therapy is still not an ordinary treatment for which medical insurance would pay.

129. For a comprehensive discussion of the scientific methods used in music therapy research, see Wheeler 2005 and her chapter in OHMP 515–525.

130. Hurt-Thaut in OHMP 504. A good general historical overview provide Davis/Gfeller/Thaut 2008, 17–39.

therapy can be found mainly in the following areas: rehabilitation (sensorimotor, speech and language, memory and attention training), pain therapy, behavior treatment, psychoanalysis, psychiatry (mostly thought, personality, communication, and anxiety disorders, autism), geriatry (e.g. Parkinson's disease), and social and milieu therapy. Within each of these areas there is contained an impressive number of particular uses.¹³¹

Music therapy (in close connection to findings from music psychology) is able to provide valuable information regarding questions that arose in the discussion of the ancient authors. There are two main ways in which music therapy uses the emotive effect of music: "a client's active music-making processes wherein emotions might be expressed *in* or *through* music,"¹³² and the use of music in order to influence positively a client's emotion. The second application is the most relevant for us as it builds on the effect of music on the human person.

A number of points have been mentioned in the footnotes throughout the current chapter. Some others are:¹³³

- The profound capacity of music to influence emotions, emotional states (moods), and human behavior is evidently confirmed.¹³⁴
- Musical mood-induction techniques produce "stronger and longer lasting results than other non-musical techniques in affect modification."¹³⁵
- Music serves as an analogy or metaphor for extra-musical experiences and thus provides an emotional connection (with capacity of change) towards them.¹³⁶

131. As a summaric description of music therapy in relationship to emotion might serve the following expression provided by Thaut/Wheeler in OHME 830: "Music therapy, as a powerful tool impacting affective behaviour processes, offers a specialized set of clinical techniques aimed at restoring and strengthening an individual's ability to organize emotional experience internally, as well as to conduct emotional communication verbally and non-verbally."

132. Hiller 2015, 29.

133. The references for each point are just exemplary and could be multiplied by many other sources.

134. Cf. the summary by Thaut/Wheeler in OHME 832.

135. Hurt-Thaut in OHMP 506–507, citing individual studies. See as an example ch. 27 in Thaut 2014 ("Music in Psychosocial Training and Counseling," by Barbara Wheeler).

136. See the corresponding section in Wigram/Pedersen/Bonde 2002, 97–111.

- The neurological processing of rhythm as an experience of time “is at the core of what we consider meaning in music” and is responsible for much of the emotive and ethical import.¹³⁷
- The dominating method in music therapy follows the allopathic principle,¹³⁸ even though also catharsis is used as a “release of difficult, repressed, or unconscious feelings” (...) with regard to the symbolic nature of a client’s expressive music making.”¹³⁹
- Text and content are significant for the emotional impact of music, which is boosted by extra-musical meaning.¹⁴⁰
- Emotions are an essential part of cognitive processing.¹⁴¹ Hence, music is able to provide certain learning advantages.¹⁴²
- Music allows identifying the ethos of a person.¹⁴³

A lot of potential lies in the empirical material accumulated over time in this discipline in order to gain criteria for what type of music might be beneficial and what not. A certain disadvantage, probably due to the fact that music therapy is

137. Thaut 2005, 59, who says further about the dimension of time: “We may have reason to contemplate—if not the structured flow of time, made audible in music’s temporal architecture of sound, rhythm, and polyphony—what it is that excites, moves, and gives order to our feelings, thoughts, and sense of movement when we engage in music.”

138. Wigram/Pedersen/Bonde 2002, 110 explain the method as follows: on the vegetative level (sense of tempo, excitement and relief), “music must be selected that matches the mood of the client in the beginning, and then gradually induces the intended mood;” on the emotional level, the “compensation principle” is applied for which “music must be selected that contrasts the mood of the client and thus gradually (re)attunes the client’s mood.”

139. Cf. Hiller 2015, 30 (citing a 2007 study by Aigen) and O’Callaghan *et al.* In Wheeler 2015, 474.

140. Wigram/Pedersen/Bonde 2002, 57: “Most research shows that the effects of music are greater when the music has more meaning for the listener.”

141. See n. 135.

142. Thaut 2005 exemplifies this for the area of rhythm. Here the whole discussion on the famous “Mozart effect” would be of interest (whether listening to Mozart or other specific types of classical music makes children “smarter”); hard core evidence for the music of Mozart in particular is rather slim; by the scientific community, the effect is considered rather a legend. Some evidence for epilepsy patients is reported (see <http://www.epilepsy.org.uk/info/treatment/mozart-effect>, accessed on May 11, 2013); the debate is ongoing: e.g. Campbell 1997 and 2000 (in favor) and Bangerter/Heath 2004 (against); for a basic overview, see Ball 2010, 240–253. See also the concept of “emotional intelligence” as outlined by Hallam in OHME 807–808.

143. Aldridge 1996, 33: “Music is the ideal medium to discover how people are composed and how they come into the world as whole beings both to create and sustain identity.”

still aiming to accrue more recognition, lies in the fact that much of the literature emphasizes merely the positive effectiveness of the employment of music in medical or psychological treatment. The focus of research demonstrates *that* music helps and *how*, but not so much *why a particular type of music* helps. Frequently, the music is used according to that it is preferred or liked by the patient—obviously with the idea that the patient's positive emotional condition towards "his" music promises a positive outcome on the treatment.¹⁴⁴ Test results are organized according to the objective, not according to the type of remedy. In addition, certain therapy goals do not depend on emotions and hence do not need to consider them much.¹⁴⁵ What would be desired is a systematic study of the reasons for the *appropriateness* of specific music in a given setting so as to identify better those musical parameters which are helpful or not.¹⁴⁶ On a related note is the question to what degree the positive effect that music has on someone depends on personal preferences, or whether there are parameters that are (at least for a good part) universal and independent of such preferences. Certainly, a lot of information could be extracted from the existing studies and methods; a systematic review of these would be fruitful to gather objective data on the positive or negative influence of music.¹⁴⁷ The question about "bad music" still requires more attention. One problem is that tests about finding out what causes damage are not so easy to perform with human beings, precisely to avoid inflicting harm on the testees; still, with some dedication to the matter, especially when analyzing the causes of existing pathological conditions, more information may be expected for the future. Oliver Sacks mentions possible hazards from music in the neurological field:

There seems to be in us a peculiar sensitivity to music, a sensitivity that can all too easily slip out of control, become excessive, become a susceptibility or a vulnerability. Too-muchness lies continually in wait, whether this takes the form of 'earworms', musical hallucinations, swoons and trances, or music-induced seizures.¹⁴⁸

144. E.g. in Eifert/Carey/O'Connor 1988. This depends, of course, on the nature of the diagnosis. The allopathic method will not necessarily indicate a specific musical style.

145. Cf. Thaut/Wheeler in OHME 821–822; see also p. 823: "Emotion has always played an important role in explaining music's therapeutic effect, although scientifically based models for the role of music-evoked emotions in Music Therapy have been absent."

146. That means concretely: what effects can be observed from specific rhythms, melodic qualities, instruments, musical styles, etc.?

147. For instance, Trappe 2009 states the general healing power of classical music and that positive effects of heavy metal or techno is practically non-existent; he cites no studies for this but does refer to studies that show the efficiency of particular styles according to specific needs of patients.

148. Sacks 2006, 2532.

Questions of particular interest that would elucidate points from our previous discussion are the following:

1. How can we describe the emotional effect and, related, the ethos of individual musical parameters and their various forms independent from other musical and extra-musical factors? Can the ancient ethos-attributions to these parameters be confirmed (e.g. the different effect of cithara and *aulos*, of various rhythms, modes, etc.)? To what degree are these attributions due to convention, custom, and education, and is there anything universal in them?¹⁴⁹
2. As a particularly important sub-category of the previous point: what are the psychological reasons for the ethical effect of musical modes (i.e. the sequence between full and half tone (or even smaller) steps within the scale? And are there any grounds for assuming a different ethos for scales on different pitch levels (without mode changes)?¹⁵⁰
3. What roles do variation and newness play?¹⁵¹
4. How does musical timbre affect the emotions?¹⁵²
5. What is the psychological difference between simple and complex musical parameters? Indications exist that, under certain conditions, the raw emotions are easier aroused by simple patterns.¹⁵³

149. A starting point is the analysis of the relationship between musical parameters or structures and the (perceived) musical expression; results of corresponding studies are presented by Gabriellson in OHMP 141–150 which includes even studies about perceiving pieces as “male” or “female.”

150. Powell 2010, 175–179, gathers evidence against this observation held “stubbornly” by many musicians, me included. I have no good explanation to offer but cannot deny the subjective experience which is not bound to simply higher or lower but to the involvement of more or fewer flats or sharps.

151. We have reviewed the different takes of Plato (restrictive, but not absolute) and Diogenes of Halicarnassus and Philostratus (among others, in favor) on variety and change. One will need to distinguish levels of change (just tunes, or patterns, or ethos, or whole styles) and the interplay of sameness and variation; here, the study of musical expectancy, as brought forth by Huron 2006, can give much light.

152. The issue of timbre as such is little discussed by ancient authors, but the choice of instruments is related to it (for it affects the overtone series). Ball 2010, 228–239, gives an overview of the issue and notes that timbre is the major distinctive feature of pop music; hence that parameter deserves greater attention nowadays.

153. “Raw emotion” means here a less refined but basic emotional response, often combined with bodily involvement (dance) and augmented by increased volume. Ball 2010, 263–264, makes the point and justly adds the caveat that emotionality should not be the (sole) measure for aesthetic quality or greatness of music (or goodness, we may add). It is striking how

6. What are the psychological effects of other qualities of modern-day popular music, such as electronic sound, the employment of extreme low- or high frequency pitches, etc.?

One last question, which would exceed the field of music therapy but could still draw from results found there, is the one we set out with and which was among the first to prompt the philosophy of musical ethos (in Damon and Plato): Is there any evidence for actual changes in culture and society due to changes in musical law or style?¹⁵⁴ Since it is hard to substantiate any of the historical examples ancient authors provided to prove the point, the most fruitful object of analysis would be the cultural changes that occurred during the twentieth century. Some authors have argued strongly in favor of the theory that the both the political and sexual revolutions were significantly sustained, if not initiated, by consciously changing musical styles and applying parameters with purposely induced effects.¹⁵⁵ Enough witnesses and documents exist to show that there was an explicit intention of manipulating through music people's moral convictions and behavior, and that these changes did actually occur. However, much research is still needed to distinguish causes from consequences and to understand better the part which music has

much of modern popular music works with very simple rhythmical and melodic patterns and, especially, with extensive repetition of the same; this fact calls for further analysis and evaluation. Here an important point of comparison would be all that the ancients reported about "ecstatic" musical experiences, which means the eclipse of reason and the total submission to an emotional state—basically a return to music as "magic;" cf. Rouget 1985. There is much debate about under what conditions and to what consequences music has effects similar to drugs (cf. e.g. Dorell 2005, Salimpoor *et al.* 2011).

154. The point here is not the one which Plato, at least in part, might have had in mind, that trespassing musical laws may lead to an attitude of lawlessness out of lack of respect for existing traditions, but that a change of musical ἦθος causes changes in social ἔθος. For Plato's *Republic*, an important factor is that he assumes that the ideal State will have developed its ideal music, deviating from which for him then can only mean deterioration (cf. above p. 200). The idea is also based in the conception that there is an ideal tuning of the individual soul, but this, of course, would not indicate generalized musical features on the interpersonal level of society; in that sense, the proper therapeutic ethos and the general State ethos might become rivals, something that Plato does not really resolve.
155. E.g. Kimball 2000. Jones 1994 even traces this process back to Richard Wagner and follows it through to the 1960s. It would be worth studying, on the psychological level (and not only on the level of individual testimony for which he presents good evidence), whether the *music* of Wagner's *Tristan* indeed elicits any of those effects Wagner intended to promote through it. That Nietzsche and perhaps a whole generation became enthralled by it might have happened through various factors. The same analysis would be needed for what Jones later writes about the effects of Jazz, the Beatles, and others.

really played in these changes and what conclusions could be drawn for possible statements about good or bad music in our present time.

The factor that seems to stand out is the one also most emphasized throughout antiquity: the ideal of the harmonized soul, of the well-balanced individual; that spiritual and bodily health consists in a proper proportion and order between the various (polar) constituents of the person. These principles seem to govern the methods of music therapy as well.¹⁵⁶ We might expect that harmony, understood in this way, could be a general criterion to distinguish good from bad music.

156. E.g. Hanser in OHME 849–850: “As a music therapist, my job is to use music in pursuit of the health and well-being of my clients. (...) The World Health Organization (1999) defines health as ‘a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease, or infirmity’. Health is a broad term that refers to the comprehensive nature of one’s physical and emotional status as it develops throughout a person’s life. The phrase ‘health and well-being’ is not a technical term; therefore, it could encompass anything that an individual strives for in the process of becoming more *whole, balanced, and positive in mind, body and spirit*” (emphasis mine).

Conclusion

The study of Greek and Roman music traditions and theories reveals a complex and multi-faceted panorama, one so rich in human understanding that even our own advanced worldview and life experience—if somewhat numbed by acoustical overcharge—can still gain much insight by venturing into it. The Greeks deserve praise for their pioneering work in developing science as a rational, empirically backed penetration of reality. This rationality found expression in the attempt to define the world by means of the abstraction of numbers and mathematical principles; the discovery of music being essentially governed by numeric proportions lead eventually to suggest musical harmony as a, or even *the*, cosmic principle. Thus the status of music developed from an archaic-magical experience and interpretation of its almost coercive power into a force that can be understood and used, in addition to being enjoyed. Observing the impact that music has on human behavior and hence on their common life, Greek philosophers designed ways to employ it for influencing the human interior (soul) according to a preconceived ideal state (form), namely of harmony and balance, either forming it through education or redeeming deviations through therapy. This required evaluating the effects of individual musical parameters such as tone, pitch, melody, rhythm, and timbre (mostly through the choice of instruments and the use of the human voice) and the relationship between music, text (content), context, and the soul. The qualities responsible for those effects were gathered under the concept of “ethos.” Once the

theorists identified ethical patterns of interrelation between musical elements and human dispositions, educational or therapeutic purposes called for the criterion of appropriateness in the application of music within the social environment.¹

Modern human science partially confirms or modifies the intuitions of ancient thinkers and are able to give them a more philosophically consistent, structured, complete, and evidence-based form. Neurophysiological experiments show the singular influence that music has on the human brain, with significant repercussions for all areas of the human person: body (especially in its motor and neural functions), soul (the import on emotions and moods), and intellect (e.g. the development and support of rational processing). Music therapy discovers ever more applications in areas as diverse as autism, pain relief, and Alzheimer's disease, following principles at times quite akin to those devised by Aristides Quintilianus and based on Plato's general idea of "fine-tuning" the soul for a sophisticated, individual treatment to recover the necessary balance for health and proper behavior.

An important complement to the great benefit of using *appropriate* music is the damage that would be caused by *inappropriate* music. This side of the coin has not received sufficient attention yet, as the research efforts in music therapy concentrate on the constructive part. The Greeks became quickly aware of this danger, symbolized very early in the deceitful song of the Sirens and suspected in the morally corruptive influence of "modernizing" musical trends. However much credibility the historical cases of experience contributed by Plato and others give to the point, the case of possible hazard deserves consideration. Any human invention and artifact, in itself positive and advantageous, bears the possibility of abuse. In the case of music, the ancients possessed perhaps a greater sense for the moral relevance because for them the concepts of beauty and goodness (and even truth) were intimately united. That is shown by the ambivalence of their vocabulary, at least in the Greek language, where terms such as *καλός* or *ἀγαθός* frequently evoke both aesthetical and moral connotations. The modern approach

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1. It is important to notice that the power of music, then, is only in part identifiable in particular musical qualities but deploys its full effect only in consonance with many other factors—a wisdom that the Chinese tradition of *gugin* has been aware of for more than a thousand years: "Music's powerful influences seem to follow when we engage in certain musical practices, in certain ways, with certain intentions: deliberately and systematically developing certain habits and dispositions and inclinations rather than others. (...) In order for music to cultivate virtues and character, close attention needs to be paid to the way it is actually practiced. (...) Most important, music's ethical power may be best developed when artistic and ethical goals are unified as one." (Wang in the OHPME 279).

of aesthetics has often judged this fused conception negatively as if constantly relating artistic performance to moral, political, religious, educational, or whatever other purposes meant that the ancients did not possess a real appreciation of beauty. Besides the objection that we can hardly deny that ideological purposes are very much present in the artistic world of our time as well—the complete purposelessness of artistic enjoyment may be no more than a Romantic fiction—I believe we are not doing justice to the cultural achievements of antiquity if we deny that the Greeks and Romans possessed a very deep appreciation for what is beautiful, in and of itself. This already emerges from the vast employment of aesthetical vocabulary, as we have demonstrated in the case of music. The fact that Plato and others forcefully warned of a mere pleasure-centered approach to music consumption shows that an ethos-centered vision of music was not even mainstream at his time.

This being said, ancient philosophers intuited a fact that only today can we support with scientific evidence: that the exposure to music is *never without any effect*. Making and listening to music always has consequences and leaves traces, in our brain, in our emotional world, in our ethical disposition, and, hence, in our way of feeling, thinking, and acting, for the good and also for the bad. These effects may be imperceptibly minuscule or vigorous, fleeting or of lasting impact, whatever the inner- or extramusical parameters and factors may promote. At any rate, music, as a mental process, is “functional,” whether we want it or not, and even simply “enjoying music” is already one of its functions. On the emotional level, the effects of music often occur unconsciously and can only be detected by a careful study of symptoms. Such studies should be able to provide more objective criteria for discerning positive and negative influences.

Our analysis has shown that judging a specific music piece or event adequately requires taking into account a lot of aspects. First one needs to clarify the level to which the judgment should apply (artistic, in view of a specific purpose, and moral, see Figure 1.1) and the functions which music may exercise (see Figure 2.1). When the judgment is motivated by a purpose or moral concern, then, there come into play all the various factors that may modify the impact that music has on the human person, reaching from the musical event itself over the dispositions of the recipient to the conditions of the environment (see Figure 4.1). Lastly, since the impact of music distributes throughout the whole human being and is mostly effective on the level of the emotions, one needs to distinguish the ways (or mechanisms) of how body, intellect, and soul (emotions) are affected by music and how exactly the transition from music to ethos and emotion works, with the result of shaping the ethos of the person exposed to music (see Figure 4.2). Only after considering all these elements together will we be able to determine the effect

of music in a particular instance and, hence, what music would be appropriate in view of the goal or ideal in mind. Generic statements about certain music being “good” or “bad,” voiced in the public debate since the “decadent” “ant-tracks” of Timotheus’ modulations in the fifth century BC down to phenomena such as serial atonality or Heavy Metal in our days would need to be reviewed with respect to what has to be said in each case about the various evaluative criteria.

Plato would not have hesitated long in agreeing that the “cultural revolution” of the 1960s had its roots, to some degree, in the ideologically driven employment of particular musical styles and features.² If certain music were indeed found inappropriate to our nature and to a desired ethos, it would not seem out of place to apply caution, especially in education, as formulated in the “Policy Statement—Impact of Music, Music Lyrics, and Music Videos on Children and Youth” by the American Academy of Pediatrics.³ However, more evidence from past and present studies on the impact of music needs to be harvested before concrete conclusions can be drawn, based on objective data, about criteria to judge specific music as appropriate or not and under what conditions. On the positive end, most people would probably agree that harmony, seen as a state in which divergent forces are reconciled, within the human person and between people, peoples, nature, and—for the believer—God, is something to be desired and that any music that promotes such harmony should be called good.

My hope is that the present study, guided by the insights of authors at the origin of our civilization, has achieved a greater and systematic understanding of concept, principles, problems, and possible solutions related to the effect and value of music. The distinction between good and bad music lies in much more than taste. The ancients can teach us that the practice of music is not ethically indifferent and that true enjoyment of music, true beauty, must go along with good ethos, which is to be judged by rational criteria. Furthermore, not few ancient writers have traced the musical paradigm even as a universal reality. If harmony, in its widest sense but genuinely experienced in the music we sing, play, hear, and

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2. See on this e.g. Jones 1994, ch. 4, and Kimball 2000, 11–13, who further writes on p. 33: “It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of rock music to the agenda of cultural revolution,” see also *id.* pp. 187–188; 200–201.
 3. Council on Communications and Media 2009, at <http://www.pediatrics.org/cgi/content/full/124/5/1488> (accessed on May 10, 2013). See also Kilpatrick 1992, 172–189, and Dunlap 2007, 52–53: “People in our culture have a knee-jerk reaction against any suggestion of ‘censorship’; yet, as parents, is it not a key responsibility for us to monitor what goes on in the minds and hearts of our impressionable children? Certain types of music, even if the words seem positive or at least neutral, can be detrimental just by the nature of the melody.”

enjoy, is a constitutive element of the world, and if music, by its intrinsic affinity to harmony, is justly credited with the power to acquire or recover it in human beings and in culture at large, then the ancients have helped us to see better how musical harmony can be a way to restore balance, concord, and beauty in ourselves and in the world around us.

Synoptic Tables of References

In lieu of an index of citations, the following tables assemble, as completely as possible, all direct references about the ethical impact of music for all the texts cited or referred to in ch. 3 down to Aristides Quintilianus (with cursory references to some of the remaining authors). They allow a comprehensive vision of all functions and effects of music mentioned throughout by the different schools and authors. Some terminological issues will be discussed in a number of footnotes. There is a total of four tables: two for positive value, and two for negative value. For each value, there is a table organized by function and effect, and a second which is grouping together similar vocabulary across the functions. I have tried to arrange the entries in each section as much as possible in a logical order, juxtapositioning similar concepts and thus onward. Within the same concept, entries are in chronological order. I have also sought to combine as many similar references as possible so as to reduce space.

The references in each field are given in an order first of language (Greek, Latin) and secondly, within each of these, of approximate chronology. A semicolon in one column separates entries parallel to equal separations in other columns. Many of the source references are simplified (e.g. only codex column/line numbers instead of book/chapter numbers, if both exist). Aristides Quintilianus is referenced only by the page and line numbers according to Winnington-Ingram.

Notice that some authors (especially Philodemus and Sextus Empiricus) are cited with effects that they deny; however, they are witnesses for the fact that others affirm these effects, wherefore they are included. Since it is not always clear whether an author means an effect of music (or of one or more of its elements) or a simple characterization of music,¹ many of such characterizations have been included to give a fuller picture of the range of terms used. Frenzy or ecstasy are marked in the “negative” table only if there is explicitly a negative judgment or the context suggests one, for in the religious context frenzy is widely accepted and not seen negative in itself, not even by Plato. The ambiguous effect of music is clear in Iambl. *Myst.* 3.9.3–11: music can either lead into or out of an ecstatic state.

For fields left empty, the content from the last filled field of the same column applies (especially for “function” and “effect”).

1. E.g. a text may talk of a “manly” melody but really mean that the melody creates a manly ethos in the person who plays or hears this melody; this sort of hypallage is very frequent (cf. the observation of Sext. Emp. *Mus.* 36 on this point).

Good Effects in Music (English)

Table App.-1. Positive effects of music—arranged by functions and effects.

Function	Effect	Musical characteristic	Elements involved	References
character formation/ education	educates in the <i>ēthē</i>	music	music	Ath. 623f (Theoph.)
	teaching of moderation, educational, corrective of <i>ēthē</i>	singing, playing the lyre and aulos (in school)	singing, lyre, aulos	Strabo 1.2.3 (C16)
	educating savages	music	music	AQ 61.26–27
	molding the <i>ēthē</i> ; molding the will of each person from youth onward	<i>harmoniai</i> , from childhood on; fitting melodies	<i>harmonia</i> , melody	AQ 55.4–5; 63.30–31
	education (of the best)	cithara, manly music (Apollo)	cithara	AQ 91.2–3
	good words, nature, and habits, good/beautiful appetencies, resulting in the finest actions	good/beautiful melodies	melody	AQ 64.10–12
	indicator of ethos	melodies, rhythms	melody, rhythm	AQ 63.31–64.11
	make education more exciting	seasonings of music	melody, meter, rhythm	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 769c
	highest learning/culture (education)	instrumental and vocal music	instrument, voice	Cic. <i>Tusc.</i> 1.2.4
	most powerful (in education, beyond anything else)	music	music	AQ 62.25–26

	education	Dorian <i>harmonia</i>	<i>harmonia</i>	Procl. <i>In R.</i> 1.62.5
	manliness ¹	<i>mimēsis</i> of sounds of some-one who is manly (warfare, enduring in failure, forced) (Dorian)	<i>harmonia</i> , instruments, rhythm	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 399a; cf. <i>Leg.</i> 655a; 802e (for men); Ath. 624d (Heraclid. Pont.)
		observe rhythms of an well-ordered and manly life/speech	rhythm, <i>harmonia</i>	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 399e
		(leads to, prepares for some-one who is deprived of it; incitement for it; acquisition of it)	music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D109.35–38; Ath. 626f; 629c
	magnificent, manly, well-ordered/moderate	music	music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D117.31–33
	with decency, m	dance	dance	Ath. 628e
	magnificent, steadfast	Hypodorian <i>harmonia</i>	<i>harmonia</i>	Ar. <i>Pr.</i> 922b15–16
	more austere life, more deliberate action, admiring teaching/people	Dorian <i>harmonia</i>	<i>harmonia</i>	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 83f
	magnificent, dignified; war-like, moderate	Dorian <i>harmonia</i>	<i>harmonia</i>	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1136d; e; cf. Ath. 624d

1. ἀνδρεία is the second “capital virtue” presented in Pl. *Resp.* 429a–430b, important to maintain the conviction about what should be feared and not lose it because of suffering or pleasure, desires, or fears.

Function	Effect	Musical characteristic	Elements involved	References
	manliness, magnificence, not relaxation or cheerfulness, severity, vehemence, neither changefulness nor much-turning; severe	Dorian <i>harmonia</i>	<i>harmonia</i>	Ath. 624d (Heraclid. Pont.; f (Lasus)
	august	Dorian <i>harmonia</i>	<i>harmonia</i>	Clem. Al. <i>Strom.</i> 6.11.88 (Aristox.)
	vigor, weight; orderly	lower <i>systemata</i> , Dorian <i>tropos</i>	<i>systema, tropos</i>	AQ 81.7–8 & 18; 82.1
	weightiness, pretense of nobleness ²	Aeolian <i>harmonia</i>	<i>harmonia</i>	Ath. 625a
	vehemence	salpinx	salpinx	AQ 85.4
	weighty and splendid influence	enharmonic genus	genus	Vitr. <i>De arch.</i> 5.4.3
	gentleness, moderation	music	music	Ath. 633c
	gentle	equal diatonic genus	genus	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 38.31
	suitable and appropriate movement	dance	dance	Quint. 1.10.26
	strengthen soul of a moderate man	certain compositions (e.g. spondaic) ³	composition	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1137a
	good order and body training for the military	dance	dance	Ath. 628f

2. This characteristic is a bit ambiguous and could also go to the negative section; I put it here because it is considered close to Dorian and because the Aeolian was just before (Ath. 624f) recommended as the proper mean.

3. About the use of this term, with its possible implications, see GMW 1.122 n. 120.

	magnificence, elevation of a manly soul, heroic deeds	diastaltic ethos of melic composition	melody	Cleonides 13
	arousing the spirit	diastaltic ethos of melic/rhythmic composition	melody, rhythm	AQ 30.13–14, 40.14–17
	exaltation, confidence	Aeolian <i>harmonia</i>	<i>harmonia</i>	Ath. 624e (Heraclid. Pont.)
	moderation, resignation ⁴	<i>mimēsis</i> of sounds of someone who tries to persuade someone but with moderation and resignation, voluntary (Phrygian)	<i>harmonia</i>	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 399b–c; <i>Leg.</i> 802e (for women)
	pursuing something well ⁵	concentration on representing one thing in one way	being rhapsode or actor; comedy or tragedy; [<i>harmonia</i>] ⁶	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 394e–395c; 397d–398b

4. σωφροσύνη plays a major role as the third “capital virtue” in 430e–432a, significantly linked to συμφωνία and ἀρμονία and necessary to dominate the human tendency to pleasure-seeking.
5. This point refers back to *Resp.* 370a–c where the need for specialization within the city is explained. In 434a–c it is connected to the “capital virtue” of justice (δικαιοσύνη). Three out of four of the fundamental virtues of the city are intimately related to musical education, while the first (σοφία) lies on another level, that of philosophy, which transcends the “musical” stage of education. In the *Law*, however, wisdom (there called φρόνησις) is, along with fortitude, the virtue required for those who have to cast the proper judgment about music (*Leg.* 658e–569c).
6. Plato does not explicitly take up this principle in the musical section, but one can easily deduce that he would favor musicians specialized in particular modes or *harmoniai* as much as specialists in particular instruments; what most matters, however, is that the musicians in the ideal State specialize on those elements that correspond to the “good” content as properly exposed by the poets.

Function	Effect	Musical characteristic	Elements involved	References
	stability [in person and State], moderation	simplicity (no multi-chord, -harmonic instruments, etc.), continuity (no innovation, or only if it is deemed helpful); music	<i>harmoniai</i> , instruments; rhythms; music; music	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 397b–398b; 399c–d; 400a; 404b–e; 410°; <i>Leg.</i> 656c–657b
	turning towards what is more exciting, the more astringent; moved active (way of life)	higher <i>tonoi</i> (e.g. Mixolydian)	<i>tonos</i>	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 99.18, 20; 23–24
	moderate, orderly (way of life)	intermediate <i>tonoi</i> (e.g. Dorian)	<i>tonos</i>	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 99.21–22
	turning towards what is more sedate, more slackening; loosened, sluggish (way of life) ⁷	deeper <i>tonoi</i> (e.g. Hypodorian)	<i>tonos</i>	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 99.19–20; 24–25
	quietness, “free-spirited and peaceful condition”	hesychastic ethos of melic composition	melody	Cleonides 13
	leading the soul into quietude	intermediate ethos of melic/rhythmic composition	melody, rhythm	AQ 30.14–15, 40.14–17
	evenness, ease	continuous <i>systemata</i>	<i>systema</i>	AQ 81.13–15
	diffusing, slack, soothing	slow tempo of rhythm	tempo, rhythm	AQ 84.5
	calm, agreeable	soft, musical sound according to order, defined numbers	melody	Macrobi. <i>In Somn.</i> 2.1.5–6
	gentleness, harmony	harmony, rhythm	harmony, rhythm	Pl. <i>Pri.</i> 326a–b; <i>Resp.</i> 522a

7. Even though this would usually belong to the negative section, Ptolemy does not treat it explicitly so and thus I left all three *tonoi* together for easier comparison.

	gracefulness ⁸	good rhythm	rhythm (and text)	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 400c; 401; 522a; Xen. <i>Symp.</i> 2.15
	suitable; more gracious	modulations between concordant intervals	modulation	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 62.13–15; AQ 22.17–18
	familiarity with and discernment of what is good or bad; health; love for the beautiful; purification of perception	exposure to what is good/beautiful	music (and arts) in general, harmonizing form/ethos in the good	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 400d–403c (esp. 401b–c); 411d; cf. Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D 112.21–24; 136.10–22
	earnest/serious, observant to the norm	mode/style of music	style	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 424e–425a
	earnest/serious	dance	dance	Ath. 631d
	proper/noble order in soul/mind; harmonized soul	good rhythm and harmonia; learning the cithara	sound/rhythm; cithara	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 398c–403c; Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 11
	perfectly ordering of every stage of life, life as a whole, and every action	music	music	AQ 1.18–19; cf. 2.6–7
	ordering (soul), setting in order (body)	beauties of <i>harmoniai</i> , comely rhythms	<i>harmonia</i> , rhythm	AQ 2.8–9
	rendering the body more harmonious	rhythms, from childhood on	rhythm	AQ 55.5–6
	in orderly manner moving the mind	rhythm	rhythm	AQ 31.14
	leading the soul to the better	certain melodies	melody	AQ 80.19; 82.2–3

8. About this term, see GMW 1.134 n. 39.

Function	Effect	Musical characteristic	Elements involved	References
	harmonizing (the soul), (making it) composed	<i>aulos</i> and various musical elements	<i>aulos</i> , style, combinations, variations, ethos of <i>harmoniai</i>	Philostr. <i>VA</i> 5.21
	creating appropriateness, tuning	harmonic ratios	harmony	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 95.8–10
	virtue; goodness	proper tuning, according to nature; best rhythmic com- position; music	harmony; rhythm; har- mony, rhythm	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 97.4–7; AQ 40.17–18; 61.8–9
	blessed on account of virtue and any knowledge and exceeding in humanity	learning and good use of music	music	AQ 63.19–22
	good/beautiful (ethos); (tonos); (genus)	spondaic <i>tropos</i> ; Dorian <i>tonos</i> ; enharmonic genus	style (<i>tropos</i>); <i>tonos</i> ; genus	ps.-Plut. Mus. 1137c; e; 1145a
	elegant	music molding and structuring	music	ps.-Plut. Mus. 1140b
	noble and beautiful soul	noble and beautiful songs and dances	song, dances	Ath. 14.628c (Damon)
	nobility, earnestness	music	music	Phld. Mus. D115.8–12
	piety	music	music	Phld. Mus. D126.16
	moderation, manliness, gentleness	softening by balancing out the hardening effect of gymnastics	music	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 410c–410e; 411 a–b; 412a; <i>Ti.</i> 88b–c
	rendering souls merciful, sympathetic, gentle (from opposite state)	melodies	melody	Phld. Mus. D147.1–6

	bringing (human life) to moderation, restrain passion of the soul	enchanting persuasions; music	music	Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 6, 9; 15; 20
	moderation, more tamed, better in rhythm and harmony, useful for speaking and acting	learning the cithara, familiarity with rhythms and harmonies	rhythms, <i>harmoniai</i>	Pl. <i>Prt.</i> 362a–b ⁹ ; cf. Quint. 1.10.2–33
	stillness of the soul, bringing rest; disposing well, soften down	sweet, graceful, gentle, voice/melody of <i>aulos</i> ; melody and rhythm plucking and playing of <i>aulos</i>	voice, melody, <i>aulos</i> ; melody, rhythm, <i>aulos</i>	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 713a; b
	put out, take hold of, restrain (in heated dinner discussions)	musical entertainment	music	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 713e–f
	moving, ordering the soul (in children)	music	music (and its pleasure)	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D 82.41–43, 91.31–36
	being very much able to move souls	voice, dance	voice, dance	Censorinus, <i>DN</i> 12.1 (Theophr.)
	moving	musical sounds, after experiencing the “mental harmony”	music	Plotinus <i>Enn.</i> 2.9.16
	moving the passion always	melody	melody	AQ 56.13; cf. 56.15
	moving the soul naturally	instruments	instrument	AQ 86.14
	vehement, condensed, stimulating to action	abbreviated rhythms	rhythm	AQ 84.6–7

9. In answer to Barker's remarks in 2005, 59: While this passage shares with the *Republic* the idea of music as an educational tool for character, in the mouth of Protagoras the objective is submitted to the sophistic ideal of rhetorical excellence; this is where Socrates differs, not on the idea as such of ethical training through music. Something similar, *mutatis mutandis*, would have to be said about *La.* 188e–d.

Function	Effect	Musical characteristic	Elements involved	References
	useful (for all human beings)	practice of “truly” music	music; harmony, rhythm	Polyb. 4.20.4; cf. Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D32.34, 140.8–9
	useful (for intellect)	music (harmony: definitions, distinctions, demonstrations)	music/harmony (theory?)	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D48.22–30; 135.24–136.9; cf. AQ 3.5
	useful for all areas of life, many or all virtues	music	music (<i>mimēsis</i>)	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D49.13–20; cf. D87–88, 91.6, 124.32, 137.40– 138.4, 147.12–14
	useful for grasping to understand Holy Scriptures and spiritual things	music	music	August. <i>De doctrina christiana</i> 2.18.28
	serviceable for children, adults (beauties of metrical diction, discourse), elderly (nature of numbers and intricacies of proportions, understanding of individual and universal soul)	beautiful melodies, rhythm, harmonic ratios	melody, rhythm, harmony	AQ 2.9–17
	useful (for the best, for common people)	music	music	AQ 90.31–91.1
	useful (for character); (for nobility, moderation, good order/discipline); (for enjoyment); (for acquiring virtue and ethos)	music; (for virtue/ethos: the musical and cosmical intervals)	music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D107.41– 42; 121.12–15; 132.5–7; 144.19–24; cf. Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 23–27

	being of benefit with pleasure, educating by habituation"	music	music	AQ 55.11–12
	useful (for education)	certain lyre (Hermes)	lyre	AQ 91.6
	being of use rarely	certain <i>aulos</i> music (Athena with knowledge and moderation)	<i>aulos</i>	AQ 91.13–17
	useful (for guarded State); (for all situation and serious endeavor, esp. dangers of war); (for meals and symposia)	certain <i>harmoniai</i> ; music	<i>harmonia</i> ; music	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1136f; 1140b–c; 1146a–b, e; f, Ath. 627e
	"useful for those worn out from continuous working and business and those suffering toils"	certain <i>aulos</i> music (Athena)	<i>aulos</i>	AQ 91.21–23
	utility (for oratory; for delight)	music (control of voice and movements); human voice	melody, dance; voice	Quint. 1.10.22–29; Apul. <i>Flor.</i> 17.80
	constant treasure (for learning and education)	music	music	Ath. 623f (Theoph.)
	self-control, moderation, justice, manliness	melodies, esp. in enharmonic genus	melody, genus	P. <i>Hib.</i> 3.13.13–15
	taking away gloominess, creating mildness and free-man's joy"	music	music	Ath. 627e–f

Function	Effect	Musical characteristic	Elements involved	References
	playful ¹⁰	comic dance	dance	Ath. 630e
	manliness, moderation, justice	singing and playing the cithara	song, cithara	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D22.10–15, 100.37–45; cf. 138.9–35
	magnificence, moderation, manliness	music	music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D20; cf. D14, 22; Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 9
	noble, manly	song, dance figures	song, dance	Ath. 628d
	august, noble, simple, pure	enharmonic genus	genus	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D117.22–23
	unite, compose, intensify	enharmonic genus	genus	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 1096b
	tame/civilized, persuasive	chromatic genus	genus	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D117.27–28
	relax, liquefy	chromatic genus	genus	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 1096b
	simplicity, dignity	musical style (fewer chords or dances), ¹¹ old music; enharmonic genus	style; genus	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1135d, cf. 1136b, e; 1144f; 1145a
	more moderate/fitting	new <i>pyrrhiche</i> dance	dance	Ath. 631a
	moderate	rhythm of intermediate structure	rhythmser	AQ 84.10

10. Depending on the translation (Barker GMW 1.289 has “frivolous,” cf. n. 149), this would be a negative one.
11. Depending on the textual reading.

	august, manly; a. & fitting	old music; earlier innovations	music	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1136b; 1140f
	august, divine, heavenly, good/beautiful, marvelous; a.	harmony; song	harmony; ¹² song	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1139b (Arist.); Ath. 633c (Alexis)
	noble, holy, august	songs	song	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 706e
	grave, august	tragic dance	dance	Ath. 630e
	august, vigorous; simple, noble, more natural	diatonic genus	genus	Theon 54.14–15; 56.3–5
	august	melody, dance	melody, dance	AQ 60.1–2
	more manly, austere	diatonic genus	genus	<i>Anon. Bell.</i> 2.26
	more austere	diatonic genus	genus	[AQ] 92.23–24
	august, manly, helping to behave like a man	melodies, rhythms	melody, rhythm	AQ 84.13–15
	austere, fit to provide dignity	enharmonic genus	genus	Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 36
	august, refined	certain melodies	melody	Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 35
	well-ordered	enharmonic genus	genus	Theon 55.17
	stimulant, soothing	enharmonic genus	genus	[AQ] 92.29
	living in a good/beautiful way	harmony, rhythm	harmony, rhythm	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D32.36

12. About the meaning of the term here see GMW 1.229 n. 150; the context suggests that the proportionality in music is meant. The passage includes a quote which can be referenced in Aristotelian fragments.

Function	Effect	Musical characteristic	Elements involved	References
	clear from any sordid action and unharmonious deeds or words, always and everywhere keeping what is appropriate, moderate, well-ordered	music education	music education	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1146b
	reason and passion rules over the desires	relaxing, softening, and taming	harmony, rhythm	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 442a
	truthful magic	variety/Dionysian influence		Pl. <i>Leg.</i> 665c–666c
	virtue, respect/dignity	music learning	music	Democr. DK 68 B 179
	virtue, education, under-standing, shrewdness	music	music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D107.38–41, cf. 126.11–21, 135.24–41, 137.4–5
	inspire (to the fervor of virtue)	music	music	Macrobian. <i>In Somn.</i> 2.3.7
	softening and taming nature hardened by other conditions, thus avoiding savagery and crime in the State	intensive music practice	music	Polyb. 4.20–21
	pursue virtue	charming the souls of children	ethical <i>mimēsis</i> songs with lyre	Pl. <i>Leg.</i> 812c
		harmonia/rhythm follow the text	<i>harmonia</i> , rhythm, text	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 398d; 400a–d; <i>Leg.</i> 669d–670c
	pursuit and safekeeping of virtue	music	music in general	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D13

	correcting	music	music	AQ 57.12
	“calls from path derailed souls back again to the original harmony,” justice, “embellishes the soul according to reason, calling it back to the original nature and rendering it again the way God the creator had made it at the beginning”	divine music which is according to reason, melody	music, melody	Calcidius 267
	turning the mind upon the zeal for what is good”	music	music	Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 14, cf. Plut. <i>Lyc.</i> 4.2
	training good habits	music	harmony, rhythm	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D33.115
	observance to the law, recover order	following the established (musical) laws	mode/style	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 425a
	civic virtue	performing specific melodies, rhythms, instruments	melody, rhythm, instruments, active performance	Arist. <i>Pol.</i> 1340b29
	restoration of arrangement and concord in soul	audible <i>harmonia</i>	music, rhythm	Pl. <i>Ti.</i> 47c-e; cf. Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D8
	enjoyment on the part of the musical judge	natural correctness in expressing postures and melodies of moderate, manly, wholly good men	music; rhythms, <i>harmonia</i>	Pl. <i>Leg.</i> 656c-657a; 660a
	concord, in agreement with the law, persuade of truth	musical enchantment (with zeal, invocation)	songs (chorus)	Pl. <i>Leg.</i> 659e; 664b-c

Function	Effect	Musical characteristic	Elements involved	References
	lead young men to embrace good ethos and virtue	ethically correct and appropriate songs/charms (promoted and sung by well-trained elders)	rhythm, <i>harmonia</i> ; melody	Pl. <i>Leg.</i> 670d–671a; cf. Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D80–81, 94.29–44, 140.14–21
	preparing the way for the soul towards wisdom/longing for virtue	music	music	Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 26
	praising and accepting what is good/beautiful, censuring the opposite (in all matters)	music education	music education	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1146a–b
	knowing and desiring what children will achieve in earnest later on in life	mimeses and likenesses of ethos and pathos in music	music	AQ 57.4–10
	“keeping the good/beautiful and the moderate” ¹³	hymns to gods	hymns	Ath. 628
	the greatest good	singing the best songs	songs (old men’s chorus)	Pl. <i>Leg.</i> 665d
		instrument in accord with voice	lyre	Pl. <i>Leg.</i> 812d
	mind gets watered, reduced to order, exercised—leading to supreme knowledge	most graceful and beautiful melody of the celestial spheres	harmony of the spheres (not sonic)	Iambl. <i>VP</i> 15.66–67
	exercise and sharpening of the mind	music (contributes)	music	Ath. 628b–c

13. This effect may be thought to be brought about directly by the gods and not the music—but one does not need to think in terms of strict causality in this context.

	sensitivity	music	music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D18
	conducive to education for its pleasure	harmonies and rhythms akin to the harmony of the human soul	<i>harmoniai</i> , rhythms	Arist. <i>Pol.</i> 1340b10–19.; cf. Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D34.37–45
	to rejoice correctly	music	music	Arist. <i>Pol.</i> 1339a25; cf. Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D91.36–92.2
social life	enjoyment, good fortune	proper teaching and religious performing (according to ethos rules)	chorus (dancing, singing, rhythm)	Pl. <i>Leg.</i> 813a
	city united in the same enjoyments, living in the same way, well and blessed living	stability in dancing and singing according to the established law	dance, rest of music	Pl. <i>Leg.</i> 816c–d
	binding together the state, maintaining the bond	music	music	AQ 63.25–26
	agreement; mutual love and unanimity	music through its harmonizing force	music	Pl. <i>Symp.</i> 187c
	best regulated (State)	cultivation of noble music	music	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1146b
	unwarlike/peaceful, good order	cithara (Apollo)	cithara	Pind. <i>Pyth.</i> 5.65–67
	resolving conflicts, establishing peace; softening ethos (→ zeal for what is good)	song (Terpander, Stesichorus); melodies and rhythms (in their order and calmness: Thaletas, in ps.-Plut.: Terpander)	song; melody, rhythm	Phld. D47; 132.33–134.27; Plut. <i>Lyc.</i> 4.2; <i>Mor.</i> 779a; ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1146b–c; cf. Sext. <i>Emp. Mus.</i> 14

Function	Effect	Musical characteristic	Elements involved	References
	settling a perturbed mind; “smoothener,” relaxing the mind	lyre; certain songs	lyre; song	Sen. <i>Dial.</i> 3.9.2
	wars coming to an end	abandoning war dance (<i>pyrrhichai</i>)	dance	Ath. 631a
	inducing clemency	song	song	Macro. <i>In Somn.</i> 2.3.9
	unifying diverse elements, concord	harmony	harmony	Cic. <i>De or.</i> 1.42.187; <i>Rep.</i> 2.47.69
	soften the high-spirited people and debates; Achilles; the souls of the opponents at negotiations, stubbornness	music; cithara playing; <i>aulos</i> and cithara, music	music; cithara; cithara, <i>aulos</i> ; music	Ath. 623f (Chamae- leon); 624a; 627d–e (Theopomp.)
	rectifying civil disorder and ending hostilities between neighboring cities and races	exercise of music together with virtue	music	AQ 64.13–16
	“ending mutual aggres- siveness, replacing it by kindliness”	music (at festivals)	music	AQ 64.17–19
	order	Heavenly Love Muse (harmony)	music (harmony)	Pl. <i>Symp.</i> 187d–e
	sympathy	sharing a commonly known melody	melody	Arist. <i>Pr.</i> 921a32–39

	acquiring, keeping, increasing love for order and humanity; leading together to friendship with oneself and with one another, safeguard of mutual concord	music	music	AQ 64.23, 65.3
	exalting private feasts and public festivals	music	music	AQ 57.25; cf. 61.28–62.2
	love relationship	music	melody, music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D43
	pleasing the beloved one	suiting melodies	melody	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D128.18–22
	more heated (the lover)	<i>aulos</i>	<i>aulos</i>	Philostr. <i>VA</i> 5.21
	friendship, friendliness	music	music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D47.12, 17, 19; 132.8–16
	profit or reputation	knowing music	music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D152.2–4
	to loosen, gladden soul, disposes to reconciliation, to end disturbance, change to quiet (in men and animals); causing to cease discord and upheaval in men and animals; binding to halt quarrels and discord (among gods)	music, melody, very sweet song; <i>phorminx</i> and singing of Muses	music, melody; <i>phorminx</i> , song	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D47.20–22, 30–42, D49.31–45, D78, cf. Plut. <i>Lyc.</i> 4.2, ¹⁴ Mart. Cap. 9.926; ps.–Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1146b; Ath. 627

14. About Thaletas in Sparta; cf. also Plut. *Maxime cum principibus philosopho esse disserendum* 4 = *Mor.* 779a where it is said to be Thales: “τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων στάσιν πᾶν ἐπιδὼν καὶ παραμυθούμενος ὡς Θαλῆς.

Function	Effect	Musical characteristic	Elements involved	References
entertainment, aesthetics	contributing to a correct behavior regarding love	melody	melody	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D127.17–18
	enjoyment, pleasure, delight	<i>harmonia</i> and rhythm in dance and song	<i>harmonia</i> , rhythm	Pl. <i>Leg.</i> 653e; 670d ¹⁵
		constantly changing and varying of songs ¹⁶	enchanting songs	Pl. <i>Leg.</i> 665c
		most diverse tones, well tuned	variety in melody	Hippoc. <i>De victu</i> 1.18.5–22
		whatever one has become used to since childhood	music	Pl. <i>Leg.</i> 802c–d
		song accompanied by <i>aulos</i>	melody, <i>aulos</i>	Xen. <i>Symp.</i> 6.4
		melody and gestures corre- spond to the argument of text or situation ¹⁷	melody, dance (gestures)	Xen. <i>Symp.</i> 6.4–5
		sweetness; soft tone	consonant intervals	Theon 51.2–4

15. That music, properly done, is enjoyable as a gift from the gods (*Leg.* 653d–654a), and here certainly understood in the literally “aesthetical” sense (“ἡμῖν δὲ οὐκ εἴπομεν τοὺς θεοὺς συγχορευτὰς δεδωσθαι, τοῦτοιοι εἶναι καὶ τοὺς δευκοτάς τὴν ἐνυθμίον τε καὶ ἐναρμόνιον αἰσθῆσαν μεθ’ ἡδονῆς”). The second passage (670d) mentions the “harmless pleasures” (ἡδοναὶ ἀσινεῖς), which the chorus of the elders will enjoy while singing the best songs for the benefit of the younger ones; the term connects, even though not literally, back to 667e (ἀβλαβὴ ἡδονή) where such joys, without further significance on their own, equal a “children’s play” (παιδίη)—a classification, which Plato dismissed for music in *Resp.* 424d and in the *Lysis* whenever music has an ethical impact (and hence relates to ὠφέλεια, ἀλήθεια, and οὐσιότης).

16. “ἄμωρ γὰρ πῶς αἰ μεταβαλλόμενα καὶ πάντως παρεχόμενα ποικίλαν”. Variation is positive here because it takes place within the allowed patterns and therefore constitutes no break with tradition, which is the critical point when rejecting change elsewhere—above all when it has ethical relevance (*Resp.* 424b–c; 797a–798d).

17. In a certainly somewhat ironic context, Socrates suggests that as the *aulos* makes song more pleasant (ἡδίων), and so will (musical) sound (φθόγγος), along with (dancelike) gestures with speech; and to the speech of someone refuted fits (πρέπει) a tune (αὐλημα) of “hissing” (συρηγμός—syrinx-like sound); thus we find here the same idea as in Plato: music, content, and ethos are expected to be in agreement.

		likeness to the achievement of an end ¹⁸	music	Arist. <i>Pol.</i> 1339b34
		organized movement, ethos, combination of related opposites	rhythm, melody, consonance	Ar. <i>Pr.</i> 920b28–921a7
		music; listening to music	music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D16–17; 132.5–7, 10
		music; listening to music	music	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1145f; Ath. 633a; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 706c; Cic. <i>Tusc.</i> 3.18.41; 5.40.116; Quint. 1.10.4
		music (Orpheus)	music	Dio Chrys. <i>Or.</i> 32.66
		certain melodies	melody	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 100.1
		organ (<i>nablas</i>); various instruments	organ; instruments; <i>bar-moniai, monaulos</i>	Ath. 175d; f; 176b
		good melody, rhythm	melody, rhythm	Dion. Hal. <i>Comp.</i> 11
	pleasure, to overcome the satiety of hearing words	song (melody, rhythm)	melody, rhythm	Cic. <i>De or.</i> 3.44.174
	cheerful, enjoyment, grace	music (in children)	music	AQ 55.17–19
	what is delightful (for the crowd)	certain “female” cithara music (Polhymnia)	cithara	AQ 91.3–5

18. “τὸ τῷ τέλει τῶν πράξεων ὁμοιωμά.”

Function	Effect	Musical characteristic	Elements involved	References
	enjoyment, softening	certain <i>aulos</i> melody (Euterpe, promoting both the good/beautiful and the sweet)	melody, <i>aulos</i>	AQ 91.9–12
	lasting delight	intermission, restraint, variety (along with adornment)	voice, melody	Cic. <i>De or.</i> 3.25.100
	delighting and moving (human) nature	art of music	music	Cic. <i>De or.</i> 3.51.197
	pleasant	mixed concord (rather than high or low)	concord	Arist. <i>De an.</i> 426b4–6
	delight (for the ear)	melody (to text)	melody	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D124.18–19; Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 22–26
	delight, amusement, furniture	music	music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D125.18–24; 133.33–34; 150.25; 151.14–15
	enjoyment, grace	music	music	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 1095c
	delight (heart)	song to <i>phorminx</i> (Achilles); certain tone, <i>harmoniai</i>	song with <i>phorminx</i> ; tone, <i>harmonia</i>	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1145e (cf. Hom. <i>Il.</i> 9.186–189); AQ 84.27–28
	delight	musician in theater	music	August. <i>Ep.</i> 120.1
	commensurate delight, quick benefit, esteemed and unmeasured enjoyment	music	music	AQ 2.30
	enjoyment, delight, amusement	music	music	AQ 60.29–61.3

	delight (greatest)	<i>aulos</i> and lyre combined	<i>aulos</i> , lyre	Ath. 618a (Ephippus)
	gladdening	playing the <i>aulos</i> ; flute, cithara, song, choir	<i>aulos</i> ; flute, cithara, song, choir	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 786c (Canus); 1096a
	enjoying, rejoicing more	hearing the <i>aulos</i>	<i>aulos</i>	Ar. <i>Pr.</i> 917b19–21
	rejoicing, setting in motion, delighting (dolphins)	<i>aulos</i> , melody, music	<i>aulos</i> , melody, music	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 162f
	rejoicing (soul) through the delightful, tickling	melody, rhythm, dance	melody, rhythm, dance	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 705a
	rejoice/delight, feel familiar; agreeable	diatonic genus (and those not too soft)	genus	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 38.2–5; 42.2
	cherishing; honoring	instrument in tone resonating one's own ethos	instrument, tone	AQ 84.30–85.2
	merriment (intellectual delight)	<i>mimēsis</i> of divine harmony	blend of high and low notes	Pl. <i>Ti.</i> 80b
	delight more for the minds than the ears	human voice (more restricted than animals)	voice	Apul. <i>Flor.</i> 3.17
	pastime, enjoyment, cheering, relaxation	instruments or instruments with voice; “invigorating” <i>harmoniai</i> ; melodies and rhythms	instruments, voice; <i>harmoniai</i> ; voice, cithara, dance; rhythm, melody	Arist. <i>Pol.</i> 1339b13–24; 1342a20–27; cf. Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D12, 46, 82, 95.2, 121.3, 130.24–28, 131.21–23; 132.16–25; 151.30 AQ 57.20–22
	pastime, with pleasure, well-ordered, useful (for ethos formation)	songs, dances, to which children are naturally attracted	song, dance	
	relaxation	certain melodies	melody	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 100.2

Function	Effect	Musical characteristic	Elements involved	References
	relaxing (for common people)	enjoyable melodies, dances	melody, dance	AQ 60.3, 8
	relaxation, softening (for appetitive part of soul)	certain lyre (Erato)	lyre	AQ 91.8–9
	recreation, increasing joy	exercise of music	music	AQ 3.4–6
	beneficial relaxation; harm- less relaxation	melody; music	melody, music	AQ 60.18; 90.33
	pastime (praised)	music	music	Ath. 623e
	more joy	<i>aulos</i> playing	<i>aulos</i>	Arist. <i>Pr.</i> 917b19–21; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 4.21
	to be more pleasing	singing/listening to a familiar melody	melody	Arist. <i>Pr.</i> 918a3–9; 921a32–36
		song moderately accom- panied with voice not obscured	voice, <i>aulos</i> , lyre	Arist. <i>Pr.</i> 918a22–29
		striking the tone better	instrument over voice	Arist. <i>Pr.</i> 918a30–34
		octave (over unison)	octave	Arist. <i>Pr.</i> 921a8–31
		structured complexity	melody, harmony	Arist. <i>Pr.</i> 921a8–31
		(voice with) <i>aulos</i> over (voice with) cithara	instrument	Arist. <i>Pr.</i> 922a1–20
		natural blend of sound	voice & <i>aulos</i>	Arist. <i>Pr.</i> 922a1–20
	most pleasing	octave after a divergent sound	octave	Arist. <i>Pr.</i> 921a28–30
	more well-harmonic	descending melody	melody	Arist. <i>Pr.</i> 920.19–23
	more well-sounding	lower note after higher	melody	Arist. <i>Pr.</i> 920.19–23
	most beautiful	octave	octave	Arist. <i>Pr.</i> 927.27–38

	beautiful/good	gracefulness and good order in dance	dance	Ath. 628d
	the best/most beautiful	melodic composition in enharmonic genus	genus	Aristox. <i>El. Harm.</i> 23.5
	sense for beauty/art	education in grammar and music	music	Dion. Hal. <i>Dem.</i> 49
	well moved, excited towards the good/beautiful (musician)	harmonious sounds, good rhythm and form	sound, harmony, rhythm, form	Plotinus, <i>Enn.</i> 1.3.22–28
	making that the soul takes consciousness of what is good/beautiful	<i>harmoniai</i> (melodies?, unaudible but creating the audible ones)	<i>harmoniai</i>	Plotinus, <i>Enn.</i> 1.6.28–30
	wonder, marvel	beauty of <i>systema</i> with enharmonic genus in Dorian <i>tonos</i> ; skillful performance, tuneful voice	<i>systema</i> , genus, <i>tonos</i> ; cithara, voice	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1134f–1135a; Ath. 623d
	serving reason towards what is good/beautiful, bad/ugly, useful	sound (harmony)	harmony	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 93.11–14, 20–23, 94.12
	supplying to sight: making visible things more “mimetic,” disposing the souls towards them	sound (harmony, song)	harmony, song	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 94.6–12
	delight, calling attention, enchanting, charming	sweetness, melodiousness of organ; <i>synaulia</i>	organ; <i>synaulia</i> ¹⁹	Ath. 174a–b; 617f

19. About this term, whether it is the combination of *aulos* and dance/rhythm, or various *auloi*, or *aulos* with lyre, see GMW 1.274 nn. 66, 68, 71 and above ch. 2 n. 32.

Function	Effect	Musical characteristic	Elements involved	References
	charming	the charming one among the arts	music	Ath. 633a
	drawing, bewitching, charming	good melody	melody	Dion. Hal. Com. 11
	making (feel) familiar, charming	good rhythm	rhythm	Dion. Hal. Com. 11
	to enchant, enchantment, bewitchment (of the irrational soul)	certain tunes, movements	melody, movement	Plotinus <i>Enn.</i> 4.4.40.24–26
	subdue by enchanting	cithara, beautiful song	cithara, song	Clem. Al. <i>Protr.</i> 2.31.3
	overcoming; enslaving; moving, seizing	delight of music; music	music	AQ 55.27–28; 55.29–30/59.30; 56.4–5
	attract	changeful varieties of sound and form, fitting to content	sound, form	AQ 59.30–32
	overpowering, seizing the soul	melody of instruments	melody, instrument	AQ 86.10–11
	mind is stricken more vigorously	depth of voices or songs	voice, song	Cic. <i>Div.</i> 1.36.80
	moving and calming affections	musical style	style	Quint. 1.10.31; cf. 9.143
	stirring up and relaxing (in sacred competitions)	specific songs/modes	song, mode	Quint. 9.4.11
	moving/stirring up the soul	music	music	Cens. DN 12.1
	enticing the mind of children	grace of music	music	AQ 55.19
	persuading most effectively	music, through <i>mimēsis</i>	music	AQ 56.27

	excite, calm down (for advance and retreat in battle)	song	song	Macrob. <i>In Somn.</i> 2.3.9; cf. Gell. 1.11.1–7; Cens. <i>DN</i> 12.3; Mart. Cap. 9.925; Boet. <i>Mus.</i> 1.1.186–187; Isid. <i>Etym.</i> 3.16.2
	captivate (every soul); blandishment	musical sounds	music	Macrob. <i>In Somn.</i> 2.3.7
	keeping (the affect of delights)	music	music	Macrob. <i>In Somn.</i> 2.3.7
	elegance, grace, charming (wholly)	good melody, rhythm, variety, appropriateness	melody, rhythm, variety, appropriateness	Dion. Hal. <i>Com.</i> 11
	rejoice	dance with instruments	dance, instruments	Ath. 183c (Epicharm.)
	(good) way of life, thought	music	music	Arist. <i>Pol.</i> 1339a25
	gladness	at Dionysian music	rhythm, <i>aulos</i>	Xen. <i>Symp.</i> 9.3
	adornment of a feast	song, dance	song, dance	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1146f (Hom. <i>Od.</i> 1.152)
	uncovers always something new for those who can conceive it	music	music	Ath. 623e–f
	happiness	music; harmonic order of universe, of instruments	music; harmony (of universe, instruments)	Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 21; 27
	express joy	music	music	Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 14
healing	health, purification	music	music	Iambl. <i>VP</i> 25.110; Aristox. fr. 26
	purification	enthusiastic	<i>aulos</i> , also <i>harmoniai</i>	Arist. <i>Pol.</i> 1341a23; 1342a7–11

Function	Effect	Musical characteristic	Elements involved	References
	delighting coarse/rustic spirits with admiration	music (Orpheus)	music	Quint. 1.10.9
	delighting (ears)	instruments, modes of song	instrument, mode	August. <i>De civ. D.</i> 22.24.3
	bestowing on the soul what is purifying, suitable, harmonious	music	music	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1146d
	healing of the passions, transforming roughly and savagely disposed souls,	music	music	Dio Chrys. <i>Or.</i> 32.57
	purifying the soul	music	music	AQ 2.5
	sedating, appease (the irrational part of nature), avert (dread), clearing (soul from madness contracted with body)	<i>mimēsis through</i> melody, dance (e.g. Bacchic) (active or just listened to)	melody, dance	AQ 129.1–15
	order of the soul	melody	melody	AQ 130.15–16
	purifying souls from stain of the body, a path to galactic circle of souls, gleaming of light	musical discipline, powerful songs	music, song	Favonius 19.3–6
	cheered up, harmonious, orderly	singing paeans to the lyre	song, lyre	Iambl. <i>VP</i> 25.110
	tranquilizing the aroused	certain sounds of songs	song	Cic. <i>Leg.</i> 2.15.38
	putting infants to sleep	mother singing charms and rocking	song	Pl. <i>Leg.</i> 790d–e

causing quiet sleep, open to auspicious and mantic dreams	fitting melodies; odes	melody	Iambl. <i>VP</i> 15.65; 25.114; cf. Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D36, 4.3.16–17; Quint. 9.4.12; Cens. <i>DN</i> 12.4; Boeth. <i>Mus.</i> 1.1.185
putting/lulling to sleep	certain melodies	melody	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 100.3
giving and taking away sleep	song	song	Macrobian. <i>In Somn.</i> 2.3.9 ²⁰
soothing (those inflamed with anger)	music (Achilles; Cleinias)	music	Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 9; Ath. 624a
stopping anger	cithara, beautiful singing (“Muses”)	cithara, song	Clem. Al. <i>Protr.</i> 2.31.3
causing or withdrawing worries	song	song	Macrobian. <i>In Somn.</i> 2.3.9
overcoming fear or madness (Bacchants)	dancing and charm- <i>aulos</i> playing	dance, <i>aulos</i>	Pl. <i>Leg.</i> 790e–791b; cf. Iambl. <i>Myst.</i> 3.9.6–7
overcoming intoxication and madness for being well-ordered; settling; dominating it	playing Dorian <i>aulos</i> ; spon-deus, grave melody	<i>harmonia, aulos</i> ; rhythm	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D42; Iambl. <i>VP</i> 25.112; Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 7, 17; Quint. 1.10.32; August. <i>Contra Iulianum</i> 5.5.23; Mart. Cap. 9.926; Boeth. <i>Mus.</i> 1.1.184–185

20. The quote is from Verg. *Aen.* 4.244, but there the subject is Mercury's *virga* without any allusion to music.

Function	Effect	Musical characteristic	Elements involved	References
	pure; "charming and healing the passionate and irrational part of the soul" (before sleeping)	strumming of the lyre	lyre	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 384a
	drawing away from and softening the heated force of wine; curing outrage and immoderation (at meals)	music	music	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1146f–1147a; Ath. 627e
	harmonizing, "relieving the perturbation from dreams" orderly, settled	lyre	lyre	Dio Chrys. <i>Or.</i> 32.57
	tranquilizing the aroused, relaxing the spirits; calming from strain	song (when sacrificing to gods) certain sounds of songs; <i>fistula</i> sound	song	Dio Chrys. <i>Or.</i> 32.57
	transferring minds from intensity of thoughts to tranquility	song and lyre	song; <i>fistula</i>	Cic. <i>Leg.</i> 2.15.38; <i>De or.</i> 3.60.225
	calming the minds so that they would settle if there were any agitated thoughts	lyre	song, lyre	Cic. <i>Tusc.</i> 4.2.3 (Pythagoreans)
	healing the harshness and relentlessness of passion [in mourning] and eliciting mitigation of grief"	a certain mode (<i>tropos</i>) of <i>aulos</i> with ode	lyre, melody, rhythm	Quint. 9.4.12 (Pythagoreans)
			<i>aulos</i> , song	Dio Chrys. <i>Or.</i> 32.57

	“providing spontaneous harmony and order into the soul,” (bringing about) tuning, moderation (to the agitation of drunkenness)	the power of music	music	Dio Chrys. <i>Or.</i> 32.58
	stillness, restraint (turning to)	certain melodies	melody	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 100.4
	changing awakening souls first into soft/gentle, pure, settled condition, ordered mildness, well-tempered, harmonious, thus prepared for the day’s works	music, melody	music, melody	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 100.9–11 (Pythagoreans) cf. Dio Chrys. <i>Or.</i> 32.57
	purger	cithara, lyre	cithara, lyre	AQ 92.11–12
	diagnosing and rectifying the conditions of the soul; therapy of the passions; amendment	complete melody	melody/music	AQ 30.15–17; 30.18; 30.23–24; cf. 80.10–22
	quiet, restraining, well-ordered, graceful, calm, settling effect on the mind, propriety (for the mind), health of the soul, leading to dignity	certain rhythms	rhythm	AQ 82.4–5, 5, 7, 10–11, 17, 24–25, 25, 83.5–6
	overcoming terrible ideas; mental illness	<i>aules</i> melody; magnitude of sound	<i>aules</i> ; sound (music)	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D96.29–37; D97.35–42
	overcoming “enthusiasm” and unbalanced perturbation	certain harmonies	<i>harmonia</i>	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D95.10–13

Function	Effect	Musical characteristic	Elements involved	References
	to relieve (from love's sufferings)	certain music	music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D43.31–32; 129.2–4
	the pleasure of hearing drives out out even hunger, when we rejoice exceptionally over a song or something heard	song	song	Aspasius, <i>In Arist. Eth. Nic.</i> 7.14 (Theophr.)
	stopping illness	song; music (Thaletas); (Thaletas); music	song; music	Hom. <i>Il.</i> 1.472–474; Paus. 1.14.4; ps.–Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1146c; Ath. 624a (Theophr.)
	relieving from sciatica; s. and epilepsy; pain (from sciatica) diminished	<i>aulos</i> in Phrygian <i>harmonia</i> ; <i>aulos</i> ; <i>tibia</i> , <i>modulis lenibus</i>	<i>aulos</i> , Phrygian <i>harmonia</i> ; <i>aulos</i> ; <i>tibia</i> , mode	Ath. 624b (Theophr.); Apollonius <i>Mir.</i> 49.1–2 (Theophr.); Gell. <i>NA</i> 4.13.1–2
	healing many of the sufferings of body and soul, just as swoon, fear and long lasting ecstasy of the mind	music	music	Apollonius <i>Mir.</i> 49.1–2 (Theophr.)
	restoring one who had lost his mind	<i>salpinx</i>	<i>salpinx</i>	Apollonius <i>Mir.</i> 49.2–3 (Theophr./Aristox.)
	“returned often the minds of the frantics, disturbed by illness, to their nature”	<i>symphonia</i> (Asclepiades)	melody	Cens. <i>DN</i> 12.4

	stopping a young man from patricide	singing to lyre verse of Homer	song, lyre, <i>harmonia</i>	Iambl. <i>VP</i> 25.113
	healing manners and passions, restoring the original harmonies of the powers of the soul, relief and healing of irrational bodily and psychic diseases ²¹ to lead the passion into the opposite direction	beautiful rhythms ad melodies, fittingly arranged; musical spells without words	rhythm, melody with particular genera; also dance, lyre; music without words	Iambl. <i>VP</i> 15.64; cf. 25.110–111; 114; cf. Phld. <i>Mus.</i> 144.24; Ath. 327f
	restraining/putting in order the movement of the soul that is sometimes kept by untempered passions	music	music	AQ 59.8–10
	(leading into a) sweet spirit	music	music	AQ 59.11
	restoring order and concord in soul	music as given by the Muses	music, rhythms	Pl. <i>Ti.</i> 47d; cf. Phld. D41.29–31
	unity, congruence, charity; concord in diversity	music, melody	music, melody	Favonius 19.26–30; 19.20; 20.19–21
	healing of pain from toil	music	music	Arist. <i>Pol.</i> 1339b17–18; cf. Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D79

21. Taylor 1818, 32, does not refer the last part about the diseases to music, but the tricolon and what follows indicates that it is still music that is meant to be the remedy for these things. Examples for the passions to be healed are: “sorrow, rage, and pity, absurd emulation and fear, all-various desires, angers, and appetites, pride, supineness, and vehemence” (tr. Taylor *ibid.*) or later (*VP* 25.111) also depression (ἀθυμία), remorse (δρηγμός, or lamentation if Taylor 1818, 59 n. 1, is right in amending the text to “ὀδυμμός”), anger, wrath, lust—“and any perturbation of the soul.”

Function	Effect	Musical characteristic	Elements involved	References
	healing diseases of bodies	song	song	Macro. <i>In Somn.</i> 2.3.9, cf. Tib. 1.5.12; Apul. <i>Apol.</i> 60; Cens. <i>DN</i> 12.3; Mart. Cap. 9.925; Boeth. <i>Mus.</i> 1.1, 185; Isid. <i>Etym.</i> 3.16.2
	moving to action (rowing, mowing, working on wine, pulling ships, construction); providing pleasure and alleviating distraction for work	melody (by its nature), specific instruments	melody; instruments	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D41.11–28; 121.22–122.36; cf. Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 18
	active; being busy	Hypophrygian; Hypodorian <i>harmonia</i>	<i>harmonia</i>	Ar. <i>Pr.</i> 1922b13; 25–26
	hot, active	swift tempo of rhythm	tempo, rhythm	AQ 84.4
	given to us as a gift to endure labors more easily, so when chant encourages the rower; the effort of many unites when some pleasant voice marks it; an individual's fatigue is eased by rough singing	songs; enjoyable voice; rough singing	songs; voice; singing	Quint. 1.10.16; cf. Cens. <i>DN</i> 12.3; Thuc. 5.7; Gell. 1.11.1–9, 17–19
	enticing (infants)	special song	song	Quint. 1.10.32

in high spirits, singing and, humming, trying to take away the toil from this profession (painting—Parrhasius)	song	song	Acl. <i>VH</i> 9.11 (Theophr.), cf. Ath. 543f
making sailing and rowing and the mechanical works not burdensome, becoming assuagement of the toils	music	music	AQ 57.27–29; cf. 91.21–23
weakening of sorrow	<i>aulos</i> playing	<i>aulos</i>	Arist. <i>P.</i> : 917b19–21; Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 14, 16; Philostr. <i>VA</i> 5.21; cf. Mt 9.23
breaking down the sharpness of unbroken emotion (in grief, done by barbarians)	melody	melody	AQ 57.30–31
roughness	lyre (barbitos?)	lyre (barbitos?)	AQ 85.10
adaptation, combination, treatment—to lead the soul's status towards the opposite passion	songs arranged	fitting songs	Iambl. <i>VP</i> 25.114; cf. Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D36, 117.19–20, 146, 30–147.11
freeing from upheavals and noises ²² of the day, purifying the agitated ²³ mind	appropriate melodies	melody	Iambl. <i>VP</i> 15.65; 25.114

22. “ἐννυχίσματα”: probably the noise from the day still ringing in one's ears, neutralized by soothing nocturnal melodies.

23. Perfect passive of “συνκλυδάζομαι”: LSJ refers to συνκλύω “to wash over,” hence “washed over, overwhelmed,” I do not think one has to interpret “influxive and effluxive waves of a corporeal nature” as Taylor does; it seems to be a simple metaphor for waves of random thoughts gushing through the mind at night.

Function	Effect	Musical characteristic	Elements involved	References
	stirring up the sluggish; tightening the spirits	certain sounds of songs	song	Cic. <i>Leg.</i> 2.15.38
	exciting, setting on fire the human mind, leading to cheerfulness	songs and rhythms	song, rhythm	Cic. <i>De or.</i> 3.51.197
	stirring up the relaxed (voice)	<i>fistula</i> sound	<i>fistula</i>	<i>De or.</i> 3.60.225
	incentive; rousing	certain songs; swift melody, trumpet of Mars	song, melody, trumpet	Sen. <i>Dial.</i> 3.9.2; 3.2.4
	delivering from nocturnal torpor, faintness, sluggish- ness; arousing	special songs, melodies, with solo lyre or also voice	song, melody, lyre, voice	Iambl. <i>VP</i> 15.65; 25.114; cf. Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D36, 117.14–15; 126.6–7, Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 15; Quint. 9.4.12
	arousing	music	music	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 984b–c (Pindar)
	stimulating, awakening	certain melodies	melody	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 100.3–4
	exciting wrath	song	song	Macrobian. <i>In Somn.</i> 2.3.9
	dispose intellect to sociability and more balanced behav- ior (after drunkenness)	certain melodies	melody	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D126.5–11
	change from instigation of love and lust to moderation and virtue	music	music	Iambl. <i>VP</i> 31.195
	healing inordinate passions	<i>aules</i> melody	<i>aules</i>	Iambl. <i>Myst.</i> 3.9.4–5
	therapy of the soul's passions	music	music	AQ 66.2–3

	cleansing the soul from irrational impulses	favorable melodies with the small lyre	lyre	AQ 91.30–31
	treating what is governing the inferior part (of the soul)	<i>aulos</i>	<i>aulos</i>	AQ 91.31–92.1
	loving and being agreeable towards what is in charge of the rational nature (of the soul)	lyre	lyre	AQ 92.1–3
	giving delight and remodeling (entire cities and races)	music	music	AQ 63.22–23
	conforming (passion to the content/subject matter)	rhythm	rhythm	AQ 56.14
	transferring a person suffering untamped emotion without notice and under compulsion into the proper state	fitting <i>tropos</i>	style	AQ 58.21–22
	augment or lessen an existing disposition of the souls	melody	melody	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D36.14, 117.21–22
	concord and harmony (between war spirit and music, in Sparta)	good melody	melody	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 238b
	leading into the opposite condition	music through its order and due proportion	music	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1147a
worship	most pleasing to the gods	music	music	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1135e
	joining humans to the gods	delight and well-craftedness of music	dance, rhythm, melody	Strabo, 10.3.9

Function	Effect	Musical characteristic	Elements involved	References
	gods themselves become present and possess humans	music resembling the divine harmonies	<i>aulos</i> , cymbal, drum, melody, song	Iambl. <i>Myst.</i> 3.9
	inspired/full of god, singing hymns	<i>aulos</i>	<i>aulos</i>	Philostr. <i>VA</i> 5.21
	enthusiasm, instigation of divine madness	music, song	music, song	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 623a, Aphthonius <i>De metris</i> 4.2 (Theophr.)
	holy, inspired; inducing possession	Phrygian <i>harmonia</i> ; melody of Olympus	<i>harmonia</i> ; melody	Procl. <i>In R.</i> 1.62.6 (cf. 1.61.27); 8
	enthusiastic, bacchic	Phrygian <i>harmonia</i> ²⁴	<i>harmonia</i>	Ar. <i>Pr.</i> 922b22–23; cf. Eur. <i>Bacch.</i> 155–159
	turning to madness, enthusiasm	certain melodies	melody	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 100.5
	adds the divine to paean	<i>aulos</i>	<i>aulos</i>	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 713a
	“to fill the spirit always with his divinity”	singing with a cithara before and after sleep	song, cithara	Cens. <i>DN</i> 12.4 (Pythagoras)
	beautifying the divine hymns and worship	music	music	AQ 57.24; cf. 62.1–2
	“it dignifies everyone’s mood/style”	harmonious song together with “word of the gods”	song	Ath. 628a
	to honor the divinity; piety	music	music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D134.28–135.23; 149.16–39

24. Hett translates wrongly “Hypophrygian.”

	for God	celestial hymn in strophe and antistrophe	melody, structure	Macrobius. <i>In Somn.</i> 2.3.5
	it dignifies everyone's mood/style	harmonious song together with "word of the gods"	harmonious song	Ath. 628a
	gods hearing the prayers with favorable mildness	music, melody: hymns, <i>aulos</i> , Egyptian <i>trigonon</i>	music, melody, hymns, <i>aulos</i> , <i>trigonon</i>	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 100.12–15
	"is pleasing to the gods," "for appeasing the gods"	festivals with plays, <i>tibia</i> player with prayers, for Mars	drama; <i>aulos</i>	Cens. DN 12.2
	appeasing the wrath of Apollo	musical games	music	August. <i>De civ. D.</i> 18.12
	honor, appease, soften, awaken gods	rich vocal/instrumental performance	singing, multiple instruments	Arn. <i>Adv. nat.</i> 7.32.1–4; cf. ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1146c (cf. Hom. <i>Il.</i> 1.472–474)
	knowledge of divine things	music	music	Quint. 1.10.10
magic	build city walls	lyre (Amphion)	lyre	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 779a
	all that lives is captivated by music	music	music	Macrobius. <i>In Somn.</i> 2.3.11
battle	leading in battle; making movements rhythmic; stimulate, causing manly courage	music; melody of <i>aulos</i> , lyre; salpinx, etc.	music; melody, <i>aulos</i> , lyre; salpinx, etc.	Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 8; 18
	increase the high spirit and readiness for war	salpinx, <i>aulos</i>	salpinx, <i>aulos</i>	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 452b
	bellicose	Dorian <i>harmonia</i>	<i>harmonia</i>	Procl. <i>In R.</i> 1.61.26
	bellicose, causing excitement	Phrygian <i>harmonia</i>	<i>harmonia</i>	Procl. <i>In R.</i> 1.61.27

Function	Effect	Musical characteristic	Elements involved	References
	so the Spartans would advance marching evenly in rhythm and not break up their order	<i>aulos</i>	<i>aulos</i>	Thuc. 5.70
	setting spirit on fire; auguring war outcome by songs (Germans)	songs, <i>baritus</i> , shield reverberation	song, <i>baritus</i> , reverberation	Tac. <i>Germ.</i> 3.1.1–2
	set on fire (Spartan army)	musical modes	tune	Quint. 1.10.14
	glory in wars excels	vigorous <i>concentus</i>	<i>concentus</i>	Quint. 1.10.14
	incentive to awaken high spirit and resolution and arousing an ecstatic and vigorous impulse, to stimulate towards manliness, boldness, and contempt for death	melodies, songs, marching rhythms, <i>aulos</i> (Sparta)	melody, song, rhythm, <i>aulos</i>	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 238a–b
	sharpen spirit for battle	most noble songs	song	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1145f (cf. Hom. <i>Il.</i> 9.186–189)
	expelling fear of death from the legions fighting in battle line	war-trumpet (<i>classicum</i>)	trumpet	Cens. <i>DN</i> 12.3
	stirring and settling wars and travels	music	music	AQ 57.26–27

animals	arouses impulse (in horses, for mating); makes them pregnant soon and produce beautiful foals	melody of <i>aulos</i>	melody, <i>aulos</i>	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 138b, cf. 704f; Ael. <i>NA</i> 12.44; 15.25
	making deer lay down out of pleasure (at hunt)	pipe (syrinx?), singing	pipe, singing	Arist. <i>Hist. an.</i> 611b26–30
	pacifying, charming; rejoicing, playing over with <i>aulos</i> (to hunt stingrays)	dance, good, harmonious song; dance <i>aulos</i>	dance, song; dance, <i>aulos</i>	Ael. <i>NA</i> 1.39; 17.18
	lure, enjoyment, make follow (to catch crabs)	music, <i>phoinix</i> /transverse pipe)	pipe	Ael. <i>NA</i> 6.31
	make leap/dance (to catch sprats)	most piercing melody, rattling castagnets	melody, castagnets	Ael. <i>NA</i> 6.32
	pacifying elephant	instrument (<i>scindapsus</i>)	instrument	Ael. <i>NA</i> 12.44
	charming (rocks, trees)	music (Orpheus, Amphion)	music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D41.21–25; 122.26–30; cf. Macrob. <i>In Somn.</i> 2.3.8
	“makes animals tame and musical,” approach, follow	ode, singing (Orpheus)	song, singing	Dio Chrys. <i>Or.</i> 32.62–64
	rocks and wilderness respond	song	song	Cic. <i>Arch.</i> 8.19
	“wild beasts are often bent and stand still through song,”	song	song	Cic. <i>Arch.</i> 8.19
	leading wild beasts, stones, trees	music (Orpheus)	music	Quint. 1.10.9

Function	Effect	Musical characteristic	Elements involved	References
	amazing, filling with fear, intemperate/irresistible enjoyment, charming, seducing, drawing, bewitching, subduing (wild boars and stags)	<i>aulos</i> , sweetest melody, music (played during a hunt)	<i>aulos</i> , melody, music	Acl. <i>NA</i> 12.46
	charming (non-rational animals, stags, mares; dolphins; crabs, owls for hunt; non-rational animals, barbaric and rough people: bringing the latter to a sense for enjoyment)	music, <i>aulos</i> , <i>syrix</i> ; <i>aulos</i> , melody; singing, clapping, dancing; songs	music, <i>aulos</i> , <i>syrix</i> ; <i>aulos</i> , melody; singing, clapping, dancing; song	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 704f; 162f; cf. 961e; Macrobi. <i>In Somn.</i> 2.3.8, 10; AQ 58.12–14
	charming vipers, spiders, scorpions, other animals, illnesses	enchanter	[music]	Pl. <i>Euthydemus</i> 290a
	move (dolphin); come up (dolphin)	song; singing	song; singing	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 704f–705a, 984b–c (Pindar); Dio Chrys. <i>Or.</i> 32.61 (Arion); cf. Hdt. 1.24
	arousing, lulling to sleep (animals)	hissings, harmonious whistlings, <i>syrix</i> , shell,	hissing, harmonious whistling, <i>syrix</i> , shell	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 713b
	to order quiet (to flock)	shepherd's pipe	<i>fstula</i>	Macrobi. <i>In Somn.</i> 2.3.10; Mart. Cap. 9.927
cosmic order	uniting opposing elements into harmony, government of the universe	harmonizing force	music	Theon 12.10–19

	motion of the universe, movement of the stars	music (generates and maintains)	music	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1147a
	universe is composed	music	music	Ath. 632c (Pythagoras)
	applying to all things the proper measure	music	music	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1147a
	good melody, rhythm, law, beauty; finds and creates with all exactness the distinction between the familiar forms; contributes completing the good; accomplishes order/gracefulness	harmonics	harmonics	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 92.14–15; 3–4; 22; 92.30–93.1
	bringing together in a harmonious relation all natural things	music	music	AQ2.18–20 (Panaceus)
	World Soul and all creatures receive life	music	music	Macrobi. <i>In Somn.</i> 2.3.11
poetic inspiration	Bacchic frenzy	dance, engage in <i>harmonia</i> and rhythm	dance, <i>harmonia</i> , rhythm	Pl. <i>Ion</i> 534a
	adds divine greatness and stronger incitement to speech	meters, melodies, rhythms	meter, melody, rhythm	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D142.5–22
artistic accuracy	painter achieves better similarity	cithara playing	cithara, melody, song	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D123.15–20, 30–39

Good Effects in Music (Original Language)

Table App.-2. Positive effects of music—arranged by original terms and expressions.

Original Language Term/Quote	Translation of the Term/Quote	Musical aspect/elements	References
“τὰ ἡθῆ παιδεύει”	“educates in the <i>ēthē</i> ”	music	Ath. 623f
σωφρονισμός, παιδευτικός, ἐπανορθωτικός τῶν ἡθῶν	teaching of moderation, educational, corrective of <i>ēthē</i>	singing, playing the lyre and aulos (in school)	Strabo 1.2.3 (C16)
πλάσσω τὰ ἥθη; π. προαίρεσιν ἐκ πρώτης ἡλικίας ἑκάστῳ	molding the <i>ēthē</i> ; molding the will of each person from youth onward	<i>harmoniai</i> , from childhood on; fitting melodies	AQ 55.4-5; 63.30-31
παιδεύω (διγριωτέρους)	educating (more savage people)	music	AQ 61.26-27
παιδευτικός	education (of the best)	cithara, manly music (Apollo)	AQ 91.2-3
“ἀγαθοὶ λόγοι φύσει τε καὶ ἔξει, καλὰ δὲ ὀρέξεις, ἄρισται δὲ συμβαίνουνσι πράξεις”	good words, nature, and habits, good/beautiful appetencies, they result finest actions	good/beautiful melodies	AQ 64.10-12
τεκμήριον ἥθους ἐπιγνώσεως	indicator of <i>ēthos</i>	melody, rhythm	AQ 63.31-64.1
“τὸ παιδεῦον αὐτοῦκινητικώτερον ἐποίησε”	“make education more exciting”	seasonings of melody, meter, rhythm	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 769c
παιδεία	education	Dorian <i>harmonia</i>	Procl. <i>In R.</i> 1.62.5
<i>summa eruditio</i>	highest learning/culture	instrumental and vocal music	Cic. <i>Tusc.</i> 1.2.4
ισχυρότατος (πρὸς παιδείαν)	most powerful (toward education)	music	AQ 62.25-26
“πρεπόντως ἂν μιμήσαιτο φύγγους τε καὶ προσωδίας”	one who properly express the sounds and voice-modulations [of men in exemplary situations, those following in the next two rows]	<i>harmonia</i>	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 399a

βίαιος; ²⁵ δυστυχῶν; ἀνδρείος; παρατεταγμένως, καρτερούντως	forced; unfortunate; manly; steadily, strongly [warding off fate]	<i>harmonia</i> (Dorian)	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 399a–c
ἐκούσιος; ²⁶ εὐτυχῶν, σώφρων, ²⁷ μέτριος	voluntary, fortunate, self-controlled, moderate	<i>harmonia</i> (Phrygian)	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 399b–c
σώφρων; ἀνδρείος; πάντως ἀγαθός	moderate; manly; wholly good	rhythm; <i>harmonia</i>	Pl. <i>Leg.</i> 660a
σύμμετρος	moderate	rhythm of intermediate structure	AQ 84.10
σωφροσύνη; ἡμερώτερος; εὐρυθμότερος; εὐαρμυστότερος	moderation; more tame; more well-rhythmic, more well-harmonic	cithara, rhythms, <i>harmoniai</i>	Pl. <i>Prt.</i> 326a–b; <i>Resp.</i> 522a
“τρέπεται πρὸς τὸ διεγερτικώτερον,” τὸ συντατικώτερον; κεινημένος, δραστικώτερος (διαγωγή)	“turns towards what is more exciting,” the more astringent; moved active (way of life)	higher <i>tonoi</i> (e.g. Mixolydian)	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 99.18, 20; 23–24
μέτριος, καθεσταμένος (διαγωγή)	moderate, orderly (way of life)	intermediate <i>tonoi</i> (e.g. Dorian)	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 99.21–22
“τρέπεται (...) πρὸς τὸ κατασταλτικώτερον,” τὸ χαλαστικώτερον; ἀνεμένος (διαγωγή)	“turns towards what is more sedate,” more slackening; loosened, sluggish (way of life)	deeper <i>tonoi</i> (e.g. Hypodorian,)	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 99.19–20; 24–25
ἡρεμότης ψυχῆς, “κατάστημα ἐλευηρίον τε καὶ εἰρηγικόν”	quietness, “free-spirited and peaceful condition”	hesychastic ethos of melic composition	Cleonides 13

25. See about this term Tartaglioni 2001, 305–306 who interprets it for this reference as “endurance,” excluding violence.

26. See about this term Tartaglioni 2001, 306–309.

27. This characteristic is later (423a) used as the ideal principle for the government of a city, which will make her great, avoiding both the excesses of richness and poverty—another case of the “golden mean.”

Original Language Term/Quote	Translation of the Term/Quote	Musical aspect/elements	References
“εις ἡρεμίαν τὴν ψυχὴν περιάγομεν”	“we lead the soul into quietude”	intermediate ethos of melic/rhythmic composition	AQ 30.14–15, cf. 40.14–17
ἀναβελλόμενος, ἀνειμένος, ἡσυχαστικός	diffusing, slack, soothing	slow tempo of rhythm	AQ 84.5
<i>compositus, consentiens</i>	calm, agreeable	soft, musical melody according to order, defined numbers	Macrobian. <i>In Somn.</i> 2.1.5–6
ἡρμισμένη	harmonized soul	music (cithara)	Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 11
ἀρμόζω, σφός (ψυχή)	harmonizing (the soul), (making it) composed	<i>aulos</i> and various musical elements	Philostr. <i>VA</i> 5.21
τὸ πρόσφορον, ἡρμισμένον	(creating) appropriateness, tuning	harmonic ratios	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 95.8–10
ἀρετή	virtue; goodness	proper tuning, according to nature; best rhythmic composition; harmony, rhythm	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 97.4–7; AQ 40.17–18; 61.8–9
εὐδαίμων ἀρετῆς ἔνεκεν καὶ ἐπιστήμης ἀπάσης καὶ ὑπεραίρων φιλανθρωπία	blessed on account of virtue and any knowledge and exceeding in humanity	learning and good use of music	AQ 63.19–22
τέρπω, μεταπλάττω	giving delight and remodeling (entire cities and races)	music	AQ 63.22–23
<i>animare (ad andorem virtutis)</i>	inspire (to the fervor of virtue)	music	Macrobian. <i>In Somn.</i> 2.3.7
εὐαρμοστότερος	more well-harmonic	descending melody	Arist. <i>Pr.</i> 920.19–23
εὐφωνοτέρως	more well-sounding	lower tone after higher	Arist. <i>Pr.</i> 920.19–23
καλλίστος	most beautiful	octave	Arist. <i>Pr.</i> 927.27–38

καλλίστος (σχεδόν)	(perhaps) the best/most beautiful	melodic composition in enharmonic genus	Aristox. <i>El. Harm.</i> 23.5
καλός	beautiful/good	gracefulness and good order in dance	Ath. 628d
ἐγκρατής, φρόνιμος, δίκαιος, ἀνδρείος	self-controlled, prudent, just, manly	melodies, esp. in enharmonic genus	<i>P. Hiz.</i> 3.13.13–15
ἀνδρεία; σωφροσύνη; δικαιοσύνη ²⁸	manliness, moderation, justice	song, cithara	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D22.10–15, 100.37–45, 138.9–35
σωφρονίζω, καταστέλλω (τὰ ψυχικὰ πάθη); κατασταλτικός; ἐπανόρθωσις τῶν παθῶν	bringing (human life) to moderation, restrain passion of the soul; restraining; correcting the passions	music (through enchanting persuasions)	Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 6, 9; 15; 20
καταστέλλω (“τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς κινήσεις ἅς ἐνίοτε ποιεῖται ἐπιθυμίας ἀκράτοις ἐνεχομένην”)	restrain/put in order (“the movement of the soul that is sometimes kept by untempered passions”)	music	AQ 59.8–10
“τὸ τε φαῦλον ὑποικουροῦν ἥθος ἐκκαλύφεις καὶ ἰάση καὶ βέλτιον ἐνθήσεις”	“you will uncover the mean/bad ethos laying hidden and heal it and engraft a better one”	<i>harmoniai</i> in their proper effect	AQ 80.12–14
“παθῶν ψυχικῶν θεραπεία”	“therapy of the soul’s passions”	music	AQ 66.2–3
“τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἀλόγους ὀρμὰς ἀποκαθαίρεσθαι”	“cleansing the soul from irrational impulses”	favorable melodies with the small lyre	AQ 91.30–31
“τῷ τῆς λογικῆς ἐπιμελουμένῳ φύσεως φιλίῳν τε εἶναι καὶ κεχαρισμένον”	“being loving and agreeable towards what is in charge of the rational nature” (of the soul)	lyre	AQ 92.1–3

28. According to the text edited by Gomperz as in DK 37 and Wiliamowitz-Moellendorff 1921, 63–64, as well as D22.

Original Language Term/Quote	Translation of the Term/Quote	Musical aspect/elements	References
ἤσυχος, προκαταστέλλων, εὐφρόνστερος, χαρίεις, κατεσταλμένος, κατὰστασις τῆς διανοίας, κοσμιότης (διανοία), ὑγίεια τῆς ψυχῆς, προάγων ἐξ ἀξιώμα	quiet, restraining, well-ordered, graceful, calm, settling effect on the settled condition for the mind, health of the soul, leading to dignity	certain rhythms	AQ 82.4–5, 5, 7, 10–11, 17, 24–25, 25, 83.5–6
γλυκοθυμία (μετάγω)	(leading into a) sweet spirit	music	AQ 59.11
τὰ μεγαλοσπερτή, σωφροσύνη, ἀνδρεία	magnificence, moderation, manliness	music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D20; cf. D14, 22, cf. Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 9, 18
ἀνδρεία (προσάγω, παρασκευάζω; προτροπή)	(lead to, prepare for) manliness; (incitement for); (acquisition of)	music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D109.35–38; Ath. 626f; 629c
εὐγενής, ἀνδρώδης	noble, manly	song, dance figures	Ath. 628d
μεγαλοσπερτής, ἀνδρώδης, κόσμιος	magnificent, manly, well-ordered/moderate	music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D117.31–33
εὐσχημος, μεγαλοσπερτής	with decency, magnificent	dance	Ath. 628e
μεγαλοσπερτής, στασιμός	magnificent, steadfast	Hypodorian <i>harmonia</i>	Ar. <i>Pr.</i> 922b15–16
μεγαλοσπερτής, ἀξιοματικός	magnificent, dignified	Dorian <i>harmonia</i>	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1136d
πολεμικός, σώφρων	warlike, moderate	Dorian <i>harmonia</i>	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1136e
σκληρότερος, βραδυτέρος, θαυμαστός	more austere (life), more deliberate (action), admiring (teaching/people)	Dorian <i>harmonia</i>	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 83f

τὸ ἀνδρώδης, μεγαλοπρεπές, οὐ διακεχυμένον οὐδ' ἱλαρόν, σκυθρωπόν, σφοδρόν, οὔτε ποικλον οὔτε πολύτροπον; σύντονον	manliness, magnificence, not relaxation or cheerfulness, severity, vehemence, neither changefulness nor much-turning; intense/severe	Dorian <i>harmonia</i>	Ath. 624d; f
σεμνός	august	Dorian <i>harmonia</i>	Clem. Al. <i>Strom.</i> 6.11.88
τὸ γοργόν, ἐμβριθές; κόσμιον	vigor, weight; orderly	lower <i>systemata</i> , Dorian <i>tropos</i>	AQ 81.7–8 & 18; 82.1
ὄγκος, “τὰ προσποίημα τῆς καλοκάγαθίας”	weightiness, “the pretense of nobleness”	Aeolian <i>harmonia</i>	Ath. 625a
τὸ σφοδρόν	vehemence	salpinx	AQ 85.4
συνίστημι	unite, compose, intensify	enharmonic genus	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 1096b
<i>gravis et egregius auctoritas</i>	weighty and splendid influence	enharmonic genus	Vitr. <i>De arch.</i> 5.4.3
πραότης, σωφροσύνη,	gentleness, moderation	music	Ath. 633c
προσηνής	gentle	equal diatonic genus	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 38.31
<i>artus et decens motus</i>	suitable and appropriate movement	dance	Quint. 1.10.26
ἐπιρρώννυμι	strengthen (soul of a moderate man)	certain composition (e.g. spondaic)	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1137a
παραθήγω	sharpen (spirit for battle)	most noble songs	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1145f
“ <i>legionibus (...)</i> in acie <i>dimicantibus</i> <i>etiam metus mortis (...)</i> <i>depellitur</i> ”	“fear of death is expelled from the legions fighting in battle line”	war-trumpet (<i>classicum</i>)	Cens. <i>DN</i> 12.3
“πόλεμοι δὲ καὶ ὁδὸν πορεύει (...) ἐγείρονται τε καὶ καθίστανται” ²⁹	“wars and travels are stirred and also calmed”	music	AQ 57.26–27

29. Here I prefer Mathiesen's translation (instead of Barker: “gives vigor and support”) because the verb “καθίστημι” is elsewhere used in such context to mean “calm, settle” (e.g. Phld. *Mus.* D117.18–19, see also AQ 2.8–9).

Original Language Term/Quote	Translation of the Term/Quote	Musical aspect/elements	References
εὐταξία	good order (and body training for the military)	dance	Ath. 628f
εὐσέβεια	piety	music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D126.16; 149.37
καλῶς ζῆν	living in a good/beautiful way	harmony, rhythm	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D32.36
(συνεργέω) πρὸς ὀρθὴν ἀναστροφὴν ἔρωτι	contributing to a correct behavior regarding love	melody	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D127.17–18
χρήσιμος	useful	lyre, cithara	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 399d; <i>Prt.</i> 326b; Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D32.34
χρήσιμος	useful (for guarded State); (for all situation and serious endeavor, esp. dangers of war; for those who feast)	certain <i>harmoniai</i> ; music; <i>phorminx</i>	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1136f; 1140b–c; 1146a, e; Ath. 627e
χρήσιμος	useful (for education)	certain lyre (Hermes)	AQ 91.6
(πρὸς γενναιότητα καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ εὐταξίαν)	(to bring forth nobility, moderation, good order/discipline)	music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D121.12–15
ἐυχρηστία	utility	music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D124.32
χρηστός πρὸς σύνεσιν	useful for intellect	music (harmony: definitions, distinctions, demonstrations)	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D48.22–30; 135.24–25
ὠφέλεια κατὰ τὴν γνῶσιν	usefulness for knowledge	music	AQ 3.5
“τοῖς δὲ διὰ τὰς συνεχεῖς δημιουργίας τε καὶ ἐργασίας καματηροῖς τε καὶ ἐπιπόνους τῶν ἀνθρώπων χρησιμεύουσιν”	“useful for those worn out from continuous working and business and those suffering toils”	certain <i>aulos</i> music (Athena)	AQ 91.21–23

χρησιμεύω	useful (for all areas of life, many virtues); (for character); (for enjoyment)	music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D49.13–20; 107.41–42; 132.5–7; 137.40–138.4; cf. 147.12.–14
<i>ad intellegendas sanctas scripturas rapere; ad spiritualia capienda</i>	(useful for) grasping to understand Holy Scriptures and spiritual things	music	August. <i>De doctrina christiana</i> 2.18.28
πρόσοφορος	serviceable (for children, adults [beauties of metrical diction, discourse], elderly [nature of numbers and intricacies of proportions, understanding of individual and universal soul])	beautiful melodies, rhythm, harmonic ratios	AQ 2.9–17
χρήσιμος, ὠφέλεια, σπουδαίος, χρησιμεύων	useful(ness) (for the best/ for common people)	music	AQ 90.31–91.1
“ὠφέλει σὺν ἡδονῇ παιδαγωγοῦσα τῇ συνηθείᾳ,” “ἡ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὠφέλεια”	“is of benefit with pleasure, educating by habituation,” “usefulness toward virtue”	music	AQ 55.11–12; 61.3
πρόσοφορος; χαρίεστερος	suitable; more gracious	modulations between concordant intervals	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 62.13–15; AQ 22.17–18
ὄφελος	useful	“truly” music	Polyb. 4.20.4
ὠφέλεια; ὠφέλιμος	being of use; beneficial (for acquiring virtue and correcting ethos)	melody, rhythm; intervals (as in music and cosmos)	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D140.8–9, 144.19–24
ὠφέλεια, ὄφελος; ὠφ. & βοήθεια μεγίστη; ὠφ.	(greatest) usefulness, useful (for individual and State); greatest usefulness, help (in meals, symposia)	music	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1146b; f; Ath. 627f

Original Language Term/Quote	Translation of the Term/Quote	Musical aspect/elements	References
ὠφελῆω σπανίως	being of use rarely	certain <i>aulos</i> music (Athena)	AQ 91.13–17
<i>utilitas</i>	utility (for oratory; delight)	music (control of voice and movements); human voice	Quint. 1.10.22–29; Apul. <i>Flor.</i> 17.80
θησαυρός βεβαίος	constant treasure (for learning and education)	music	Ath. 623f
κόσμος; ἀνδρείος	well-ordered, moderate; manly	rhythm	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 399e
ἀνδρικός; ἀνδρείος	masculine, manly; manly	melody, postures	Pl. <i>Leg.</i> 654a–655b
ἔπανδρος	manly	music	Sext. <i>Emp. Mus.</i> 12
μεγαλοπρέπεια; ἀνδρεία	magnificence; manliness	<i>harmonia</i> , rhythm	Pl. <i>Leg.</i> 802d–e (for men)
μεγαλοπρέπεια, διάγραμμα ψυχῆς ἀνδρῶδες, πράξεις ἡρωικαί	magnificence, elevation of a manly soul, heroic deeds	diastaltic ethos of melic composition	Cleonides 13
“τὸν θυμὸν ἐξεγείρομεν”	“we arouse the spirit”	diastaltic ethos of melic/ rhythmic composition	AQ 30.13–14, cf. 40.14–17
“αὐξοῦσι τὸ θυμοειδὲς καὶ μάχιμον”	“increase the high spirit and readiness for war”	salpinx, <i>aulos</i>	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 452b
πολεμικός	bellicose	Dorian <i>harmonia</i>	Procl. <i>In R.</i> 1.61.26
πολεμικός, ἐκστατικός	bellicose, causing excitement	Phrygian <i>harmonia</i>	Procl. <i>In R.</i> 1.61.27
<i>accendo</i>	set on fire (Spartan army)	musical modes	Quint. 1.10.14
“ <i>accendant animos futuraeque pugnae fortunam ipso cantu augurantur</i> ”	“they set the spirits on fire and augur the war outcome by the very song”	songs, <i>baritus</i> , shield reverberation	Tac. <i>Germ.</i> 3.1.1–2
<i>praesto (gloria in bellis)</i>	(glory in wars) excels	vigorous <i>concentus</i>	Quint. 1.10.14

“ἵνα ὁμαλῶς μετὰ ῥυθμοῦ βαίνουντες προσέλθοιεν καὶ μὴ διασπασθεῖν αὐτοῖς ἡ τάξις”	“so they would advance marching evenly in rhythm and not break up their order”	<i>aulos</i>	Thuc. 5.70
“ἀφαιροῦσι... τὸν θυμὸν”	“they take away the anger”	<i>aulos</i> (for Spartan soldiers)	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 458e
“κέντρον ... ἐγερτικὸν θυμοῦ καὶ φρονήματος καὶ παραστατικὸν ὀρμῆς ἐνθουσιώδους καὶ πρακτικῆς”	“incentive... awakening high spirit and resolution and arousing an ecstatic and vigorous impulse”	melodies, songs (Sparta)	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 238a
“ῥυθμοὶ παρορητικοὶ πρὸς ἀνδρείαν καὶ θαρραλεότητα καὶ ὑπερφρόνησιν θανάτου”	“rhythms stimulating towards manliness and boldness and contempt for death”	marching rhythms, <i>aulos</i>	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 238b
συμφωνία, ἁρμονία	concord and harmony (between war spirit and music)	good melody	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 238b
ἐπεγερτικός, ἄτιος ἀνδρικοῦ λήματος	stimulate, causing manly courage	melody of <i>aulos</i> , salpinx, etc.	Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 18
ἐξηρμένον, τεθαρρηκός	exaltation, confidence	Aeolian <i>harmonia</i>	Ath. 624e
“τὸ κόσμιον καὶ σώφρον”	what is well-ordered and moderate	<i>harmonia</i> , rhythm	Pl. <i>Leg.</i> 802d-e (for women)
εὐσχημοσύνη ³⁰ , εὐρυθμία	gracefulness	rhythm; arts; rhythm/ <i>harmonia</i> ; rhythm	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 400c; 401a/c; 401d; 522a

30. Barker 2007, 31, explains the term as follows: “*The euschēmosunē* of a well-formed body is something like ‘gracefulness’; and a person whose character is *euschēmôn* is ‘refined’ or ‘civilised’, in a sense that conveys ethical as well as cultural approval. All these meanings leave traces in the present passage, but a specifically musical application is also at work here; *schēmata*, in musicological jargon, are the ‘shapes’ or visual patterns formed by a dancer’s postures and movements, and a dancer’s *euschēmosunē* is the gracefulness or propriety with which he or she executes them.”

Original Language Term/Quote	Translation of the Term/Quote	Musical aspect/elements	References
“ἵχνεύειν τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ εὐσχήμονος φύσιν”	to hunt after the appearance of the good/beautiful and the graceful	arts	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 401c
“εἰς ὁμοιότητά τε καὶ φιλιαν καὶ συμφωνίαν τῷ καλῷ λόγῳ ἄγουσα”	leading to the likeness(es) and friendship and concord with the good/beautiful λόγος	arts	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 401d
ἐπαινέω, ἀποδέχομαι τὸ καλόν, ψέγω τὸ ἐναντίον	praising and accepting what is good/beautiful, censuring the opposite (in all matters)	music education	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1146a–b
“τηρῆται τὸ καλὸν καὶ σωφρονικὸν”	“keeping the good/beautiful and the moderate”	hymns to gods	Ath. 628
σωφροσύνη; ἀνδρεία; ἐλευθεριότης; μεγαλοπρέπεια	self-control; manliness; liberality; magnificence	arts and elsewhere	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 402c; <i>Leg.</i> 802e (for men)
“περιαρουμενή γὰρ τὴν στυγνότητα ποιεῖ πραδότητα καὶ χαρὰν ἐλευθέριον	“taking away gloominess, it creates mildness and free-man’s joy”	music	Ath. 627e–f
παιγνιώδης	playful	dance	Ath. 630e
εὐσχήμων	elegant	music molding and structuring	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1140b
ἐλευθέριος, καλός; ἀνδρώδης	noble, good/beautiful; manly	song, dances	Ath. 628c–d (Damon); cf. 829b
καλός	good/beautiful (ethos; <i>tonos</i> ; genus)	spondaic <i>tropos</i> ; Dorian <i>tonos</i> ; enharmonic genus	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1137c; e; 1145a (superlative)
γενναϊότης, σπουδή	nobility, earnestness	music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D115.8–12

σεμνός, γενναῖος, ἀπλός, καθαρός	august, noble, simple, pure	enharmonic genus	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D117.22–23
ἥμερος, πιθανός	tame/civilized, persuasive	chromatic genus	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D117.27–28
διαχέω	relax, liquefy	chromatic genus	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 1096b
ἀπλότης, σεμνότης; σ. & τὸ ἀπεριεργον; σ.	simplicity, dignity	musical style (fewer chords or dances); old music; enharmonic genus	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1135d, cf. 1136b, e; 1144f; 1145a
σεμνός, ἀνδρώδης; σ. & πρέπων	august, manly; fitting	old music; earlier innovations	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1136b; 1140f
σεμνός, θεῖος, καλός, δαιμόνιος; σ.	august, divine, heavenly, good/beautiful, marvelous	harmony; song	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1139b (Arist.); Ath. 638c
γενναῖος, ἱερός, σεμνός	noble, holy, august	songs	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 706e
βαρύς, σεμνός	grave, august	dance	Ath. 630e
σεμνός	august	melody, dance	AQ 60.1–2
τερπνός, ἐπιστρέφω, θέλω, κατακρλέω; θ.	delightful, calling attention, enchanting, charming	sweetness, melodiousness, of organ; <i>synaulia</i>	Ath. 174a–b; 617f
κρηλικός	charming	music	Ath. 633a
ἄγω, γοιτεύω, κρλέω	drawing, bewitching, charming	good melody	Dion. Hal. <i>Com.</i> 11
οικειόω, κρλέω	making (feel) familiar, charm	good rhythm	Dion. Hal. <i>Com.</i> 11
ᾠρα, χάρις, κρλέω (πάνυ)	elegance, grace, charming (wholly)	good melody, rhythm, variety, appropriateness	Dion. Hal. <i>Com.</i> 11
θέλω, ἐπιφιδή, γοιτεία, κρλέω	to enchant, enchantment, bewitchment (of the irrational soul)	certain tunes, movements	Plotinus <i>Enn.</i> 4.4.40.24–26

Original Language Term/Quote	Translation of the Term/Quote	Musical aspect/elements	References
κατεπάδω	subdue by enchanting	cithara, beautiful song	Clem. Al. <i>Protr.</i> 2.31.3
ἡττάω; καταδουλόω; κινέω, αἰρέω; δουλόω	overcoming; enslaving; moving, seizing; enslaving	the delight of music; music; melody	AQ 55.27–28; 55.29–30; 56.4–5; 59.30
ἐπισπάω	attract	changeful varieties of sound and form, fitting to content	AQ 59.30–32
καταναναγκάζω, ἀλίσκομαι	overpowering, seizing (soul)	melody of instruments	AQ 86.10–11
κινέω	moving	musical sounds, after experiencing the “mental harmony”	Plotinus <i>Enn.</i> 2.9.16
κινέω (πάθος ἀει)	moving the passion always	melody	AQ 56.13; cf. 56.15
“ψυχὴ κινεῖται φυσικῶς”	“soul is moved naturally”	instruments	AQ 86.14
σφοδρός, συνεστραμμένος, εἰς τὰς πράξεις παρακλητικός	vehement, condensed, stimulating to action	abbreviated rhythms	AQ 84.6–7
“ut pellantur animi vehementius”	“that the minds are stricken more vigorously”	depth of voices or songs	Cic. <i>Div.</i> 1.36.80
<i>moveo, lenio (adfectus)</i>	moving, calming (affections)	musical style	Quint. 1.10.31; cf. 9.143
<i>concito, remitto</i>	stirring up and relaxing (in sacred competitions)	specific songs/modes	Quint. 9.4.11
<i>permoveo</i>	moving/stirring up (soul)	music	Cens. <i>DN</i> 12.1
δολιχὰ δάονα	enticing the mind (of children)	grace of music	AQ 55.19
πείθω (ἐνεργέστατος)	persuading (as most effective)	music, through <i>mimēsis</i>	AQ 56.27

<i>excitio, sedo (ad bellum progressui/ receptui)</i>	excite, calm down (for advance and retreat in battle)	song	Macrob. <i>In Somn.</i> 2.3.9
<i>capio (omnis anima); delenimentum</i>	captivating (every soul); blandishment	musical sounds	Macrob. <i>In Somn.</i> 2.3.7
<i>tenere (oblectamentorum affectu)</i>	keeping (the affect of delights)	music	Macrob. <i>In Somn.</i> 2.3.7
<i>“capitur omne quod vivit”</i>	“all that lives is captivated”	music	Macrob. <i>In Somn.</i> 2.3.11
σεμνός, εὐτονός; ἄπλοῦς, γενναῖος, μάλλον κατὰ φύσιν	august, vigorous; simple, noble, more natural	diatonic genus	Theon 54.14–15
ἀνδρικώτερος, αὐστηρότερος	more manly, austere	diatonic genus	<i>Anon. Bell.</i> 2.26
αὐστηρότερος	more austere	diatonic genus	[AQ] 92.23–24
σεμνός, ἀρρενωπός, εἰς τὸ ἀνδρίζεσθαι συναιρομένος	august, manly, helping to behave like a man	melodies, rhythms	AQ 84.13–15
αὐστηρὸς, σεμνότης	austere, fit to provide dignity	enharmonic genus	Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 36
σεμνός, ἀστεῖος	august, refined	certain melodies	Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 35
ἡρμοσμένον	well-regulated	enharmonic genus	Theon 55.17
διεγερτικός, ἥπιος	stimulant, soothing	enharmonic genus	[AQ] 92.29
ἡδέϊα; προσηνῆς φωνή	sweetness; soft tone	consonant intervals	Theon 51.2–4
εὐάρμοστος	well-joined, harmonious	diction/ <i>harmonia</i> /rhythm; <i>harmonia</i>	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 400d; 522a
“καθαρός πάσης ἀγεννοῦς πράξεως,” “μηθεὶν μήτ’ ἐργῳ μήτε λόγῳ χρῶμενος ἀναρμόστῳ,” “σῶζον ἄει καὶ πανταχοῦ τὸ πρέπον καὶ σῶφρον καὶ κόσμιον”	“clear from any sordid action” and unharmonious deeds or words, “always and everywhere keeping what is appropriate, moderate, well-ordered”	music education	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1146b

Original Language Term/Quote	Translation of the Term/Quote	Musical aspect/elements	References
ἀνάρημα δαυτός	adornment of a feast	song, dance	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1146f (Hom. <i>Od.</i> 1.152)
εὐταίθητος	keen perception	music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D18
συμφωνούντος	harmonizing	beauty loved by musician	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 402d
ἀποδέχομαι, στέργω τὸ καλὸν/ἀγαθόν	approve, feel affection for the good/beautiful	music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D112.21–24; cf. Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 23, 26
εὐμουσία	sense for beauty/art	education in grammar and music	Dion. Hal. <i>Dem.</i> 49
εὐκίνητος, ἐπισημένος πρὸς τὸ καλόν	well moved, excited towards the good/beautiful (musician)	harmonious sounds, good rhythm and form	Plotinus, <i>Enn.</i> 1.3.22–28
“τὴν ψυχὴν σύνεσιν καλοῦ λαβεῖν ἐποίησαν”	“make that the soul takes consciousness of what is good/beautiful”	<i>harmoniai</i> (melodies?, unaudible but creating the audible ones)	Plotinus, <i>Enn.</i> 1.6.28–30
“ὁμόνοια τῶν πραγμάτων, ἔτι καὶ ἀριστοκρατία τοῦ παντός”	concord of all things and the rule of the universe	music (harmonizing force)	Theon 12.18–19
ὁμολογία; “ἔρωτα καὶ ὁμόνοιαν ἀλλήλων ἐμπούησα”	agreement; “producing mutual love and unanimity”	music (harmony)	Pl. <i>Symp.</i> 187c
εἰρηνικός	peaceable	Phrygian <i>harmonia</i>	Procl. <i>In R.</i> 1.61.25
εἰρηνικός, καταστηματικός	peaceable, calming	Dorian <i>harmonia</i>	Procl. <i>In R.</i> 1.61.28
ὁμολότης, ραστώνη	evenness, ease	continuous <i>systemata</i>	AQ 81.13–15
κόσμιος/κοσμιώτερος	(more) well-ordered	the Heavenly Muse	Pl. <i>Symp.</i> 187d–e
ἐμμέλεια, εὐρυθμία, εὐνομία, εὐκοσμία; “μετὰ πάσης ἀκριβείας εὐρίσκουσάν τε καὶ ποιοῦσαν τὰς τῶν οἰκείων εἰδῶν διαφορὰς;” “συναπεργάζεται τὸ εὖ;” “κατορθοῖ (...) τάξιν/ἐμμέλεια	good melody, rhythm, law, beauty; “finds and creates with all exactness the distinction between the familiar forms;” “contributes completing the good;” “accomplishes order”/ gracefulness	harmonics	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 92.14–15; 3–4; 22; 92.30–93.1

ἀπλούς; ἐπεικής; σωφοροσύνη; ἀνδρείος	simple; fitting/reasonable; moderation; manly	gymnastic/music	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 404b–e; 410a; 410e
καλός; ἀγαθός	good	gymnastic/music	Pl. <i>Ti.</i> 88b–c
μαλακία; ³¹ ἡμερότης; κόσμιος	softness; gentleness; well-ordered, moderate	music	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 410d–e
ἐλέημων, συμπαθής, ἡμερος ³²	(rendering souls) merciful, sympathetic, gentle (from opposite state)	melodies	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D147.1–6
συμφωνία	concord	songs—musical enchantment	Pl. <i>Leg.</i> 659e
συνίστημι πολιτῆαν, συστᾶσαν διαφυλάττω	binding together the state, maintaining the bond	music	AQ 63.25–26
κατακόσμησις; συμφωνία	arrangement; concord (in soul with herself)	<i>harmoniai</i> , rhythm	Pl. <i>Ti.</i> 47c–e
<i>unitas, congruentia, caritas; concordia;</i> <i>concentus (diversis vocibus; quicquid</i> <i>absonum canere videbatur)</i>	unity, congruence, charity; concord (in diversity)	music, melody	Favonius 19.26–30; 19.20; 20.19–21
“ἀληθέστατα ἐροῦμεν ἅμα, καὶ μᾶλλον πείσομεν (...) ἢ ἐὰν ἄλλως πως φθεγγώμεθα λέγοντες”	“we shall speak true things at the same time and persuade better (...) than if we uttered speaking in any way differently”	three choruses	Pl. <i>Leg.</i> 664b
“μέγιστ’ (...) ἀγαθὰ”	“the greatest good”	old men’s chorus singing the best songs	Pl. <i>Leg.</i> 665d

31. This effect is seen earlier negative (see table below), but in the proper measure and in balance with gymnastics it is positive; how this works is described with detail in 411a–412a.

32. About this term, see Delattre 2007, 307 n. 2.

Original Language Term/Quote	Translation of the Term/Quote	Musical aspect/elements	References
“ἡγεμόνες ἡθῶν χρηστῶν ἀσπασμοῦ;” ἀρετή	“leading to embrace good <i>ēthē</i> ,” virtue	rhythms, <i>harmoniai</i> ; melodies	Pl. <i>Leg.</i> 670e; cf. Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D80–81, 94.29–44, 140.14–21
ἀρετή, τὸ αἰδεῖσθαι; αἰδώς	virtue, respect/dignity	learning music	Democr. DK 68 B 179; cf. Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D13
ἀρετή, παιδεία, σύνεσις; ³³ ἀγχίνοια	virtue, education, understanding; shrewdness	music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D107.38– 41; cf. 135.24–41, 137.4–5
“μάλ᾽ αὖτε κινῶν τὸ τῆς φύσεως αὔθαδες καὶ σκληρόν;” “τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀτέραμνον διὰ τῆς τῶν ἔθισμῶν κατασκευῆς ἐξημεροῦν καὶ πραῦνειν”	soften, temper the stubbornness and harshness of nature; tame, mitigate hardened souls	intensive music practice	Polyb. 4.21
“ <i>curas et immitit et retrahit</i> ”	“causes or withdraws worries”	song	Macrob. <i>In Somn.</i> 2.3.9
ἐπικειότερος	more moderate/fitting	new <i>pyrrhiche</i> dance	Ath. 631a
“εἰς ἀρετῆς ἔπεσθαι”	“to pursue virtue”	charming ethos <i>mimēsis</i> songs with lyre	Pl. <i>Leg.</i> 812c
“ἐπὶ τὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ζῆλον τὴν διάνοιαν προτρέπεται”	“turns the mind upon the zeal for what is good”	music	Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 14, cf. Plut. <i>Lyc.</i> 4.2

33. About this term see Neubecker 1986,169.

“προοδοποιεῖν τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς σοφίαν;” “πρὸς τὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐφίεσθαι”	“preparing the way for the soul towards wisdom;” “towards longing for virtue”	music	Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 26
“εἰδέναι τε καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν (...) τῶν ἐν ἡλικίᾳ μετὰ σπουδῆς ἐπιτελουμένων”	“knowing and desiring what (children) will achieve in earnest later on in life”	mimeses and likenesses of ethos and pathos in music	AQ 57.4–10
“πρὸς γυμνασίαν δὲ καὶ οὐσιότητα διανοίας συμβάλλεται”	“contributes to exercise and sharpening of the mind”	music	Ath. 628b–c
ἀρετὴ πολιτικὴ	civic virtue	performing specific melodies, rhythms, instruments	Arist. <i>Pol.</i> 1340b29
ἡδονὴ ὁσαύτως; “ζῆν εὖ τε καὶ εὐδαιμόνως”	[having] enjoyment in the same manner; “well and blessed living”	dance, rest of music	Pl. <i>Leg.</i> 816c–d
εὐνομώτατος	best regulated (State)	cultivation of noble music	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1146b
συμπαθία	fellow-feeling, sympathy	sharing a commonly known melody	Arist. <i>Pr.</i> 921a32–39
τὸ κόσμιον, φιλόνηθρον, “ἐξ φιλίας ἕκαστον αὐτῷ καὶ κοινῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους συναγωγῇ,” τήρησις τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὁμονοίας	(acquiring, keeping, increasing love for) order and humanity; “leading together to friendship with oneself and with one another,” safeguard of mutual concord	music	AQ 64.23, 65.3
“ἐορταὶ δὲ ἴδιαι καὶ πανηγύρεις πόλεων ἀγάλλονται”	“private feasts and public festivals are exalted”	music	AQ 57.25
ἐκκαλέω (“πρὸς τὰς συνουσίας;” “γυναικάς”)	to call for (relationship between men and women; women, for adulterer)	music; song with instruments	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D43.11–13; Ath. 638e
“συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὴν ἐρωτικὴν ἀρετήν;” ὑπέκκαυμα	unites/contributes to the virtue of eros; incentive	melody	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D43.37–39, 36

Original Language Term/Quote	Translation of the Term/Quote	Musical aspect/elements	References
ἐπανόρθωσις	correcting	music	AQ 57.12
“ <i>exorbitantes animas a via recta revocare demum ad symphoniam veterem, iustitia, exornat animam rationaliter ad antiquam naturam revocans et efficiens talem demum, qualem initio deus opifex eam fecerat</i> ”	“calls from path derailed souls back again to the original harmony,” justice, “embellishes the soul according to reason, calling it back to the original nature and rendering it again the way God the creator had made it at the beginning”	divine music which is according to reason, melody	Calcidius 267
θερμότερος (ἐρώων)	more heated (the lover)	<i>aulos</i>	Philostr. <i>VA</i> 5.21
“πονηρὸς ὑπέκκαυμα πολλοῖς, διδόναι τινὰς ἀφορμάς”	badly (being) an incentive to many things... giving certain origin	music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D129.12–15
“ἀρέσκεσθαι τοὺς ἐρωμένους”	“that the beloved be pleased”	suited melodies	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D128.18–22
ἀπόλεμος, εὐνομία	unwarlike/peaceful, good order	cithara (Apollo)	Pind. <i>Pyth.</i> 5.65–67
φιλία, φιλοφροσύνη; ὁμονοία	friendship, friendliness; unanimity	music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D47.12, 17, 19; 132.8–16, 27–28
περιουσία, δόξα	profit, reputation	music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D152.2–4
ἀνιήμι, ἀφιλάρω τὴν ψυχὴν, διαλυτικός ποιῶ, τῆς ταραχῆς παύω, διαλλάσσω, ἡσυχίαν μεθίστημι; “στάσεων καὶ ταραχῶν καταπαυστικόν,” “παύσασθαι γὰρ ἔδει τὰ νείκη καὶ τὴν στάσιν”	to loosen, gladden soul, disposes to reconciliation, to end disturbance, reconcile, change to quiet; “causing to cease discord and upheaval” (in men and animals); “binds to halt quarrels and discord” (among gods)	music, melody; very sweet song; <i>phorminx</i> and singing of Muses	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D47.20–22, 30–42, 49.33–34, cf. D78, 132.16–33; cf. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 779a, ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1146b; Ath. 627f

“τὸς πολέμους καταλῦθῆναι” <i>concentus, concordia</i>	wars coming to an end concord	abandoning war dance (<i>pyrrhichai</i>) harmony	Ath. 631a Cic. <i>Rep.</i> 2.47.69; cf. <i>De or.</i> 1.42.187
καταπραίνω (τὰ ἦθη; “τὸς θυμοειδείς καὶ τὰς γνώμας διαφόρους;” “τῶν ἐναντίων τὰς ψυχὰς”)	soften down (ethos → overcoming strife, zeal for what is good; “the high-spirited and the disagreeing opinions;” “the souls of the opponents” at negotiations)	melodies/rhythms (in their order, calmness); music; cithara (Achilles); <i>aulos</i> , cithara	Plut. <i>Lyc.</i> 4.2; Ath. 623f–624a; 627d–e
“διωρθυτο στάσεις καὶ πρὸς τοὺς πέλας πόλεόν τε καὶ ἔθνων ἔχθρας ἔπαυσε”	“rectified civil disorder and ended hostilities between neighboring cities and races”	exercise of music together with virtue	AQ 64.13–16
“τῆς μὲν ἐς ἀλλήλους ἀγριότητος παύσασα, τὸ δ’ ἦπιον ἀντισταγαγοῦσα”	“ending mutual aggressiveness, replacing it by kindness”	music (at festivals)	AQ 64.17–19
“ <i>clementiam suadet</i> ”	“induces clemency”	song	Macrobi. <i>In Somn.</i> 2.3.9
ἀνιήμι; παραμυθέομαι; ἡμερώω	to loosen; soothe; tame	music	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 442a
παραμυθέομαι	sooth/console (in unhappy love)	music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D129.2–4
καταπαύω	stop (anger)	cithara, beautiful singing (“Muses”)	Clem. Al. <i>Protr.</i> 2.31.3
κόσμος; <i>compono</i> ; <i>resideo</i> ; <i>perdomo</i>	(overcoming intoxication and madness for being/ well-ordered; settling; dominating it	playing Dorian <i>aulos</i> ; spondeus, grave melody	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D42; Iambl. <i>VP</i> 25.112; Sext. <i>Emp. Mus.</i> 7, 17; Quint. 1.10.32; August. <i>Contra</i> <i>Iulianum</i> 5.5.23; Mart. Cap. 9.926; Boeth. <i>Mus.</i> 1.1.185

Original Language Term/Quote	Translation of the Term/Quote	Musical aspect/elements	References
“ἀντισπᾶν καὶ πρανύνει τὴν τοῦ οἴνου ὑποθεριμὸν δύναιμι;” “ἱατρὸν λαμβάνη τῆς ὕβρεως καὶ τῆς ἀκοσμίας”	“to draw away from and softening the heated force of wine,” curing outrage and immoderation (at meals)	music	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1146f; cf. 1147a; Ath. 627e
ἀρμόζω, “ἀποπαύοντες τῆς διὰ τῶν ὀνειράτων ταραχῆς”	harmonizing, “relieving the perturbation from dreams”	lyre	Dio Chrys. <i>Or.</i> 32.57
εὐτακτος, καθεστηκός	orderly, settled	song (when sacrificing to gods)	Dio Chrys. <i>Or.</i> 32.57
ἀπαλλάσσω; καθίστημι, μετατίθημι	deliver from terrible ideas; settle, change (mental illness)	<i>aulos</i> melody; magnitude of sound	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D96.29–37; 97.35–42
ἐντείνω (τὴν διάνοιαν) “πρὸς τὴν ὁμιλίαν καὶ τὴν ἀμώττουσαν ἀναστροφὴν”	dispose (intellect) “to sociability and more balanced behavior” (after drunkenness)	certain melodies	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D126.5–11
“ἐπανορθούμενος πρὸς ἀρετὴν”	restoring virtue (away from irrational passions)	fitting melodies; Music	Iambl. <i>VP</i> 15.64; Ath. 627f
ἐξάρτυσις, συναρμογή, ἐπαφή	adaptation, combination, treatment	fitting songs	Iambl. <i>VP</i> 25.114
“ἱατρεῦειν τὰ πάθη τῆς παρατροπῆς”	healing inordinate passions	<i>aulos</i> melody	Iambl. <i>Myst.</i> 3.9.4–5
“τὸ τῆς χείρονος μοίρας προεστὼς θεραπεύειν”	treating what is governing the inferior part (of the soul)	<i>aulos</i>	AQ 91.31–92.1
οἰκειόω (πάθος τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις)	conforming (passion to the content/subject matter)	rhythm	AQ 56.14
“ἀγνοοῦντας ἐκ προσαγωγῆς ἐς ὀρθὴν κατάστασιν ὑπαγόμενος”	“transferring without notice and under compulsion into the proper state” (person suffering emotion)	fitting <i>tropos</i>	AQ 58.21–22

ἐπινόρθωσις; σωφροσύνη, ἀρετή	improvement: (change from instigation of love and lust to) moderation, virtue	music	Iambl. <i>VP</i> 31.195
ἀρμονία; “εἰς κατακόσμησιν καὶ συμφωνίαν ἐαυτῇ σύμμαχος”	harmony; “aiding towards order and concord in the soul”	music as given by the Muses	Pl. <i>Ti.</i> 47d
“πᾶσα μὲν ἡλικία καὶ σύμπας βίος, ἅπαντα δὲ πράξις (...) τελέως ἂν κατακοσμηθῇ”	“every stage of life, life as a whole, and every action can be perfectly ordered”	music	AQ 1.18–19
κοσμέω, καθίστημι	ordering (soul), setting in order (body)	beauties of <i>harmoniai</i> , comely rhythms	AQ 2.8–9
κατασκευάζω τὸ σῶμα ἐμμελέστερον	rendering the body more harmonious	rhythms, from childhood on	AQ 55.5–6
“τεταγμένως δὲ κινουῦντα τὴν διάνοιαν”	“in orderly manner moving the mind”	rhythm	AQ 31.14
διατίθημι	to dispose/arrange (body and soul)	music	Phld. D41.29–31
ψυχαγωγέω; ψυχαγωγία	leading the soul (to the better); leading souls	certain melodies	AQ 80.19; 82.2–3
<i>medeor</i> (<i>corporum morbis</i>)	healing (diseases of bodies)	song	Macrob. <i>In Somn.</i> 2.3.9
σπουδαῖος, ἔννομος	earnest/serious, observant to the norm	mode/style of music	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 424e–425a
σπουδαῖος	earnest/serious	dance	Ath. 631d
“αἰεὶ τε καὶ ἀνὸν ἐξευρίσκει”	“uncovers always something new” (for those who can conceive it)	music	Ath. 623e
ἄσμενος	well-pleased, glad	Dionysian rhythm played on <i>aulos</i>	Xen. <i>Symp.</i> 9.3

Original Language Term/Quote	Translation of the Term/Quote	Musical aspect/elements	References
ἡδονή; χαρά	enjoyment, pleasure; joy	good harmony, rhythm, dance, song	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 653e–654a
ἡδονή	enjoyment	constantly changing and varying of songs;	Pl. <i>Lag.</i> 665c
ἡδονή	enjoyment	good melody, rhythm	Dion. Hal. <i>Comp.</i> 11
ἡδονή, χάρις	enjoyment, grace	music	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 1095c
ἡδονή	enjoyment	certain melodies	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 100.1
φαιδρός, ἡδονή, χάρις; τέρψις	cheerful, enjoyment, grace; delight	music (in children)	AQ 55.17–19; 55.27
ἡδονή, τέρψις, ψυχαγωγία	enjoyment, delight, amusement	music	AQ 60.29–61.3
τὸ τέρπνόν	what is delightful (for the crowd)	certain “female” cithara music (Polhymnia)	AQ 91.3–5
ἡδονή, κολακεύων	enjoyment, softening	certain <i>aulos</i> melody (Euterpe)	AQ 91.9–12
τέρψις (ἀκοῆς); τέρπω	delight (for the ear)	melody	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D124.18–19; Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 22–26
τέρψις, ψυχαγωγία, κατασκευή	delight, amusement, furniture	music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D125.18–24; 133.33–34; 150.25; 151.14–15
τέρψις σύμμετρος, ταχὺ ὠφεληθῆναι, ἡδονή ἔνδοξος καὶ οὐ μετρία	commensurate delight, quick benefit, esteemed and unmeasured enjoyment	music	AQ 2.30–3.1
τέρπειν	delighting (heart)	song to <i>phorminx</i> (Achilles); certain tone or <i>harmonia</i>	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1145e (cf. Hom. <i>Il.</i> 9.186–189); AQ 84.27–28

ἡδομαι	enjoying (animals)	music (Orpheus)	Dio Chrys. Or. 32.66
<i>delectare</i>	delighting	music	Cic. <i>Tusc.</i> 5.40.116
<i>voluptas</i>	pleasure	listening to music	Cic. <i>Tusc.</i> 3.18.41; Quint. 1.10.4
<i>voluptas, delectatio</i>	pleasure, delight	song (melody, rhythm)	Cic. <i>De or.</i> 3.44.174
<i>delectatio diuturna</i>	lasting delight	intermission, restraint, variety (along with adornment)	Cic. <i>De or.</i> 3.25.100
<i>moveo, delecto</i>	delighting, moving (human nature)	art of music	Cic. <i>De or.</i> 3.51.197
<i>delecto</i>	delight	musicians in theater	August. <i>Ep.</i> 120.1
<i>“mentibus quam auribus delectatio”</i>	“delight more for the minds than the ears”	human voice (more restricted than animals)	Apul. <i>Flor.</i> 3.17
τέρψις (μεγίστη)	delight (the greatest)	<i>aulos</i> and lyre combined	Ath. 618a
τέρψις	delight	most diverse tones, well tuned	Hippoc. <i>De victu</i> 1.18.5–22
εὐφραίνω	gladdening	<i>aulos</i> playing; flute, cithara, song, choir	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 786c (Canus); 1096a
χαίρω, διώκω, τέρπω	rejoicing, setting in motion, delighting (dolphins)	<i>aulos</i> , melody, music	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 162f
χαίρω, τὸ ἐπιτερές, γαργαλίζον	rejoicing, the delightful, tickling	melody, rhythm, dance	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 705a
ἀπολαύω, χαίρω μᾶλλον	enjoying, rejoicing more	<i>aulos</i>	Ar. <i>Pr.</i> 917b19–21
χαίρω	rejoicing	organized movement, ethos, combination of related opposites in rhythm, melody, consonance; various instruments; listening;	Ar. <i>Pr.</i> 920b28–921a7, cf. Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D16–17; Ath. 175f; 633a

Original Language Term/Quote	Translation of the Term/Quote	Musical aspect/elements	References
χαίρω, συνήθης; εὐμεταχείριστος	rejoice/delight, familiar; agreeable	diatonic genus (and those not too soft)	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 38.2–5; 42.2
ἀγαπᾶω, θαυμάζω	cherish; honor/admire	instrument resembling in tone one's own ethos	AQ 84.30–85.2
εὐφοροσύνη	merriment (intellectual delight)	blend of high and low notes as <i>mimēsis</i> of divine harmony	Pl. <i>Ti.</i> 80b
διαγωγή	“way of life,” leisure	music	Arist. <i>Pol.</i> 1339a25; cf. Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D12, 131.21
παιδιά, ἀβλαβής ἡδονή, εὐφραίνω, ἀνάπαυσις	pastime, harmless enjoyment, to cheer, relaxation	instruments only or with voice	Arist. <i>Pol.</i> 1339b13–27
διαγωγή, σὺν ἡδονῇ, δόσιμος, χρήσιμος	pastime, with pleasure, well-ordered, useful (for ethos formation)	songs, dances, to which children are naturally attracted	AQ 57.20–22
ἀντήμι; ψυχαγωγία	relaxing (for common people); amusement	enjoyable melodies, dances; music	AQ 60.3; 60.8
παιδιά	pastime	music	Ath. 623e
ἄκουσμα χαρόντων	sound of those who express joy	music	Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 14
ἄνεσις, παιδιά; τέρπσις	relaxation, pastime; enjoyment	song, cithara, dance; music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D46, 130.24–28; 82.32–33, 95.2, 121.3; cf. 147.20–21
διάχυσις	relaxation/softening	certain melodies	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 100.2
διάχυσις, ἐκμειλιττόμενος	relaxation, softening (for appetitive part of soul)	certain lyre (Erato)	AQ 91.8–9

ῥαψῶνῃ, ἐπιφῶρων θυμῷ	recreation, increasing joy	exercise of music	AQ 3.4–6
ἄνεσις ὠφελίμῃ; ἄνεσις ἀβλαβῆς	beneficial relaxation; harmless relaxation	melody; music	AQ 60.18; 90.33
ἐπιτερπῶς (διατίθῃμι)	(disposing) pleasingly	listening to music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D132.10–12
χαίρειν ὀρθῶς	to rejoice correctly	music	Arist. <i>Pol.</i> 1339a25
ἡδονή, φιλέω, χαίρω ὡς δεῖ	enjoyment, to love, rejoice as it should be; (in symposia)	music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D91.36– 92.2; 132.5–7; cf. D151.30
ἡδύς	pleasant	mixed concord (rather than high or low)	Arist. <i>De an.</i> 426b4–6
ἡδύς	pleasant	music; <i>harmoniai, monaulos</i>	ps.–Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1145f; Ath. 176b
ἡδονή	enjoyment	organ; music	Ath. 175d; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 706c, 623a (Theophr.)
<i>voluptas</i>	pleasure	song	Aphthonius, <i>De metris</i> 4.2 (Theophr.)
γῆθεω	rejoice	dance with instruments	Ath. 183c
μᾶλλον χαίρω	to rejoice more	<i>aulos</i> playing	Arist. <i>Pr.</i> 917b19–21
ἰλαρώτερος γίγνομαι	to become merrier	<i>aulos</i>	Philostr. <i>VH</i> 5.21

Original Language Term/Quote	Translation of the Term/Quote	Musical aspect/elements	References
ἥδιον	more pleasing	song moderately accompanied with voice not obscured; instrument strikes tone better than voice; octave, complex sound; familiarity with melody; <i>aulos</i> better than cithara, natural blend of sound	Arist. <i>Pr.</i> 918a22–29; 918a30–34; 921a8–31; 918–9 & 921a32–36; 922a1–20
ἥδιος	most pleasing	octave after a divergent sound	Arist. <i>Pr.</i> 921a28–30
εὐδαιμονία; μακαριότης	happiness	music, harmonic order of universe, of instruments	Sext. <i>Emp. Mus.</i> 21; 27
διαδογή, φρόνησις	(good) way of life, thought	music	Arist. <i>Pol.</i> 1339a25
θαυμάζω	wonder, marvel	beauty of <i>syntēma</i> with enharmonic genus in Dorian <i>tonos</i> ; skillful cithara performance, tuneful voice	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1134f–1135a; Ath. 623d
τὸ καλόν, τὸ αἰσχρόν, τὸ χρήσιμον	(serving reason towards) what is good/beautiful, bad/ugly; useful	sound (harmony)	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 93.11–14, 20–23, 94.12
μμητικώτερος, συνδιατίθημι τὰς ψυχάς	(supplying to sight: making visible things) more “mimetic,” disposing the souls towards them	sound (harmony, song)	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 94.6–12
καλλιτεχνία	beauty of workmanship	music	Strabo 10.3.9
εὐψυχία	goodness of the soul	[proper] musical teachings	Pl. <i>Lag.</i> 795d
κάθαρσις	purification	“enthusiastic” <i>harmonia</i>	Arist. <i>Pol.</i> 1342a7–11
τὸ καθάρσιον, ἔμμελές, ἐναρμόνιον	(bestowing on the soul) what is purifying, suitable, harmonious	music	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1146d

θεραπεία τῶν παθῶν, μεταστρέψεω ψυχᾶς ἀπηνῶς καὶ ἀγρίως διακειμένης,	healing of the passions, transform- ing roughly and savagely disposed souls,	music	Dio Chrys. Or. 32.57
καθαρίζω	purifying (soul)	music	AQ 2.5
καταστέλλω, ἀπομειλίττομαι (τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἄλγον), ἀποτρέπω (φοβόν), ἐκκαθαίρω	sedating, appease (the irrational part of nature), avert (dread), clearing (soul from madness contracted with body)	<i>mimēsis through</i> melody, dance (e.g. Bacchic) (active or just listened to)	AQ 129.1–15
κόσμος ψυχῆς	order of the soul	melody	AQ 130.15–16
" <i>purgatos animos faciat labe corporea,</i> " <i>via "in usque illum circulum, qui</i> <i>dicitur galaxias, animarum beata luce</i> <i>fulgentem"</i>	purifying souls from stain of the body, a path to galactic circle of souls, gleaming of light	musical discipline, powerful songs	Favonius 19.3–6
<i>mulceo (rudes/agrestes animos</i> <i>admiratione)</i>	delighting (coarse/rustic spirits with admiration)	music (Orpheus)	Quint. 1.10.9
<i>mulceo (aures)</i>	delighting (ears)	instruments, modes of song	August. <i>De civ. D.</i> 22.24.3
ὕγεια, κάθαρσις	health, purification (of the soul)	music	Iambl. <i>VP</i> 25.110; Aristox. fr. 26
ἀρδόμενος, "τὸν τοῦ νοῦ λόγον εὐτακτούμενος," σωμασκούμενος	watered, "having reduced to order the reasoning of the mind," exercised	most graceful and beautiful melody of the celestial spheres	Iambl. <i>VP</i> 15.66
"κατακοιμίζειν τὰ δυσπνιούντα τῶν παιδίων"	"lull to sleep the infants who can't sleep"	mother singing and rocking	Pl. <i>Leg.</i> 790d–e

Original Language Term/Quote	Translation of the Term/Quote	Musical aspect/elements	References
πραῖνῳ, εἰς ἡρεμίαν καθίστημι; π.; π. αὐθαδεῖαν	soften, settle down to quiet (a rushing soul); soften; soften stubbornness	melody; lyre; music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D117.18–19, cf. D36; Ath. 624a; 627e
compono (perturbationes animi); blandimentum, “mens resolvatur”	settling (the perturbation of the mind); “smoother,” “the mind be relaxed”	lyre; certain songs	Sen. <i>Dial.</i> 3.9.2
“διεκάθαυρέ τε συγκεκλυδασσμένον τὸ νοητικόν”	“purified the agitated mind”	fitting melodies	Iambl. <i>VP</i> 15.65; cf. 25.114
“τῆς γὰρ διὰ τῶν πόνων λύπης ἰατρεία”	healing of pain from toil	music	Arist. <i>Pol.</i> 1339b17–18; cf. Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D79
περισπαστικός, περισπᾶω; ἀνθέλκω	distracting (mind, from pain of work)	melody; (<i>aulos</i>) music	Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 16; 18
πρακτικός; πράσσω	active; being busy	Hypophrygian; Hypodorian <i>harmonia</i>	Ar. <i>Pr.</i> 1922b13; 25–26
θερμῖος, δραστήριος	hot, active	swift tempo of rhythm	AQ 84.4
“ad tolerandos facilius labores volut munerī nobis dedisse, si quidem et remigem cantus bortatur;” “plurimum conatus praeunte aliqua iucunda voce conspirat;” “singulorum fatigatio (...) se rudi modulatione solatur”	“given to us as a gift to endure labors more easily, so when chant encourages the rower;” “the effort of many unites when some pleasant voice marks it;” “the fatigue of individuals is eased by rough singing”	song; enjoyable voice; rough singing	Quint. 1.10.16; cf. Cens. <i>DN</i> 12.3, AQ 91.21–23

“ναυτίλις τε καὶ εἰρεσίας καὶ τὰ χαλεπώτατα τῶν χειρωνακτικῶν ἔργων ἀνεπαχθὴ ποιεῖ τῶν πόνων γινομένη παραμύθιον”	“makes sailing and rowing and the mechanical works not burdensome, becoming assuagement of the toils”	music	AQ 57.27–29
τραχύτης	roughness	lyre (barbitos?)	AQ 85.10
<i>adlectatio (infantibus adhibetur)</i>	enticing (applied to infants)	special song	Quint. 1.10.32
εὐθύμως, ῥαδίως, καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἦδε καὶ ὑποκινυρόμενος τὸν κάματον τὸν ἐκ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἐπειράτο ἐπελαφρύνειν”	in high spirits, “used to sing and tried, humming, to take away the toil from this profession”	song	Ael. <i>VH</i> 9.11, cf. Ath. 543f
λυπέω, πονέω ἤττον	suffering less	<i>aulos</i> playing	Arist. <i>Pr.</i> 917b19–21
παρηγόρημα, ἐπικουρίζω (τὴν λύπην)	consolation (for the grieving), lightening (grief)	<i>aulos</i> playing	Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 14; cf. Mt 9.23
κοιμίζω (τὴν λύπην)	putting (sorrow) to sleep	<i>aulos</i> playing	Philostr. <i>VA</i> 5.21
“τῆς κατὰ τὸ πάθος ἀκρότητος (...) παραθραύσουσα” (τοῖς κήδεσι)	“breaking down the sharpness of unbroken emotion” (in grief, done by barbarians)	melody	AQ 57.30–31
εὐφραίνομαι, ἐμμελής, εὐρυθμῖος	cheered up, harmonious, orderly	singing paeans to the lyre	Iambl. <i>VP</i> 25.110
κινέω; ἀφικνέομαι	move (dolphin)	song; singing	Plut <i>Mor.</i> 704f–705a, 984b–c (Pindar); Dio Chrys. <i>Or.</i> 32.61 (Arion); cf. Hdt. 1.24
κινέω, ῥυθμίζω ³⁴ τὰς ψυχάς	moving, ordering the souls (in children)	music (and its pleasure)	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D 82.41–43, 91.31–36

34. About this verb see Delattre 2007, 175 n. 3.

Original Language Term/Quote	Translation of the Term/Quote	Musical aspect/elements	References
" <i>animis permovendis plurimum valet</i> "	"is very much able to move souls"	voice, dance	Censorinus, <i>DN</i> 12.1 (Theophr.)
" <i>languefacit excitatos</i> ;" " <i>remittit animos</i> ;" " <i>a contentione revocaret</i> "	"tranquilizes the aroused;" "relaxes the spirits"; "to call back from strain"	certain sounds of songs; <i>fstula</i> sound	Cic. <i>Leg.</i> 2.15.38; <i>De or.</i> 3.60.225
" <i>mentes suas a cogitationum intentione ad tranquillitatem traducere</i> "	"transfer their minds from intensity of thoughts to tranquility"	song and lyre	Cic. <i>Tusc.</i> 4.2.3
" <i>lenire mentes, ut, si quid fuisset turbidiorum cogitationum, componerent</i> "	"calming the minds so that they would settle if there were any agitated thoughts"	lyre, melody, rhythm	Quint. 9.4.12
" <i>ἰωμένων οἶμαι τὸ σκληρὸν καὶ ἄτεγκτον τοῦ πάθους, θηλυτέραν δὲ τὴν λύπην ἐργαζομένων</i> "	healing the harshness and relentless-ness of passion [in mourning] and eliciting mitigation of grief"	<i>aulos</i> with ode	Dio Chrys. <i>Or.</i> 32.57
" <i>ἁρμονίαν καὶ τάξιν αὐτόματον ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐπεισάγουσα</i> ," <i>ἐμμελές, μέτριον</i>	"providing spontaneous harmony and order into the soul," (bringing about) tuning, moderation (to the agitation of drunkenness)	the power of music	Dio Chrys. <i>Or.</i> 32.58
γαλήνη, ἡσυχάζω; εὖ τίθημι, καταπραύνω	stillness (of the soul), bringing rest; disposing well, soften down	sweet, graceful, gentle, voice/melody of <i>aulos</i> ; melody and rhythm plucking and playing of <i>aulos</i>	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 713a; b
κατασβέννυμι, ἐπιλαμβάνω, ἐπίσχω	put out, take hold of, restrain (in heated dinner discussions)	musical entertainment	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 713e–f
ἡσυχία, καταστολή	stillness, restraint (turning to)	certain melodies	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 100.4

προσηνής, ειλικρινής, κατάστασις, πραότης τεταμένης, εὐάρμοστος, σύμφωνος; “αὐτοὺς ἡρμόσαντο”	(changed into) soft/gentle, pure, settled condition, ordered mildness, well-tempered, harmonious (souls, prepared for the day’s works); “they harmonized themselves”	music, melody; lyre	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 100.9–11; Dio Chrys. <i>Or.</i> 32.57
καθαρός, “τὸ ἐμπαθεῖς καὶ ἄλογον τῆς ψυχῆς ἐξεπάρχοντες οὕτω καὶ θεραπεύοντες”	pure; “charming and healing the passionate and irrational part of the soul” (before sleeping)	strumming of the lyre	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 384a
εὐαγεστερός	purer	cithara, lyre	AQ 92.11–12
“τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς καταστήματα (...) ἐθεωρεῖτό τε καὶ διορθοῦτο;” θεραπεία τῶν παθῶν; κατόρθωσις	“diagnoses and rectifies the conditions of the soul”; therapy of the passions; amendment	complete melody	AQ 30.15–17; 30.18; 30.23–24
ἥσυχος, εὐ όνειρος, μαντικός; ὀλιγόνηρος	quiet, auspicious, prophetic (sleep); with few dreams	fitting melodies; odes	Iambl. <i>VP</i> 15.65; 25.114; Quint. 9.4.12; Cens. <i>DN</i> 12.4; Boeth. <i>Mus.</i> 1.1.185–186
καρόν, κατακοιμίζω	putting/lulling to sleep	certain melodies	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 100.3
“ <i>dat somnos adimitque</i> ”	“gives sleep and takes it away”	song	Macrobi. <i>In Somn.</i> 2.3.9 ³⁵
παρηγορέω	soothing (those inflamed with anger)	music	Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 9
“ <i>incitat languentes;</i> ” “ <i>animos contrahit</i> ”	“stirs up the sluggish;” “tightens the spirits”	certain sounds of songs	Cic. <i>Leg.</i> 2.15.38

35. Macrobius quotes Verg. Aen. 4.244, but there the subject is Mercury’s *virga* without any allusion to music.

Original Language Term/Quote	Translation of the Term/Quote	Musical aspect/elements	References
<i>excito, incendo, "ad hilaritatem (...) saepe deducimur"</i>	exciting; setting on fire (the human mind), "we are often lead into cheerfulness"	songs and rhythms	Cic. <i>De or.</i> 3.51.197
<i>conciatamentum; insiŕgo</i>	incentive; rousing	certain songs; swift melody; trumpet of Mars	Sen. <i>Dial.</i> 3.9.2; 3.2.4
ἀπαλλάσσω	setting free (from torpor, faintness, sluggishness)	special songs, melodies, with solo lyre or also voice	Iambl. <i>VP</i> 15.65; 25.114
ἐγείρω; διεγερτικός	arousing (soul from immobility and rest); stimulant	melody	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D117.14–15; cf. D36, 126.6–7 (ἐπ); Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 15; cf. 18
"remissum excitaret"	"to stir up the relaxed"	<i>fistula</i> sound	<i>De or.</i> 3.60.225
<i>excito (animos) "quo essent ad agendum erectiores"</i>	stirring up (the spirits) "so they be more alert for action"	lyre	Quint. 9.4.12
ἐρεθίζω ³⁶	arousing	music	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 984b–c (Pindar)
παρορμάω, διεγείρω	stimulating; awakening	certain melodies	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 100.3–4
"iram suggerit"	"excites wrath"	song	Macrobian. <i>In Somn.</i> 2.3.9

36. The verb has usually a negative ring (in the context of anger, fight, etc.), but the current context makes it sound positive; the parallel passage (*Mor.* 704f) has κινέω ("to move") instead.

“αἱ περὶ τὰ τῶν Κορυβάντων ἱάματα;” etc.	“remedy for those (suffering from) Corybants,” Bacchic frenzy, etc.	movement of dance and music (charm singing, <i>aulos</i>)	Pl. <i>Lag.</i> 790d–791b; cf. Iambl. <i>Myst.</i> 3.9.6–7
παραινεύεσθαι	relieving (from love’s sufferings)	certain music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D43.31–32
“πέιναν ἐξελαύνει καὶ ἀκοῆς ἡδονή, ὅταν ᾄσασιν ἢ ἄλλοις τισὶν ἀκούσασι διαφερόντως χαίρωμεν”	“the pleasure of hearing drives out out even hunger, when we rejoice exceptionally over a song or something heard”	song	Aspasius, <i>In Arist. Eth. Nic.</i> 7.14
καταστολή, ἀφρηνισμός	relief, healing (of bodily and psychic diseases)	fittingly designed beautiful rhythms and melodies; musical spells without words	Iambl. <i>VP</i> 15.64; 25.114
“πολλὰ τῶν ἐπὶ ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα γιγνομένων παθῶν ἱατρεύειν, καθάπερ λιποθυμία, φόβος καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ μακρὸν γινομένης τῆς διανοίας ἐκστάσεις”	“healing many of the sufferings of body and soul, just as swoon, fear and long lasting ecstasy of the mind”	music	Apollonius <i>Mir.</i> 49.1–2
παῦν νόσον; καταλήγω (λοιμός); ἴσται νόσον	stopping illness; stop (plague); heal illness	music (Thales); (Terpander); music	Paus. 1.14.4; ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1146c; Ath. 624a
ἄπρονος ἰσχυακούς; ἱάται... καὶ ἰσχύαδα καὶ ἐπληψίαν; <i>minui dolores (ischia)</i>	relieved from sciatica; “healing sciatica and epilepsy;” pain (from sciatica) diminished	<i>aulos</i> in Phrygian <i>harmonia</i> ; <i>aulos</i> ; <i>tibia</i> , <i>modulis lenibus</i>	Ath. 624b; Apollonius <i>Mir.</i> 49.1–2; Gell. <i>NA</i> 4.13.1–2
“καταστήναι τινα ἐξιτάμενον”	“restoring one who had lost his mind”	voice of the <i>salpinx</i>	Apollonius <i>Mir.</i> 49.2–3

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<i>“p̄breneticorum mentes morbo turbatas saepe (...) suae naturae reddidit”</i>	“returned often the minds of the frantics, disturbed by illness, to their nature”	<i>symphonia</i> (Asclepiades)	Cens. <i>DN</i> 12.4
θέλγω	charming (rocks, trees)	music (Orpheus, Amphion)	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D41.21– 25; 122.26–30
“τὰ θηρία ἡμέρου καὶ μουσικὰ ἐποίει,” προσίτηι, συνέπομαι	“makes animals tame and musical,” approach, follow	ode, singing (Orpheus)	Dio Chrys. <i>Or.</i> 32.62–64
<i>“saxa atque solitudines vocī respondēt”</i>	“rocks and wilderness respond to the voice”	song	Cic. <i>Arch.</i> 8.19
<i>“bestiae saepe immanes cantu flectuntur atque consistent”</i>	“wild beasts are often bent and stand still through song”	song	Cic. <i>Arch.</i> 8.19
<i>duceo (feras, saxa, silvas)</i>	leading (wild beasts, stones, trees)	music (Orpheus)	Quint. 1.10.9
θέλγω, κηλέω; κ. & ὑπεριδομαι, ὑπαυλέω	pacifying, charming; rejoicing, play- ing over with <i>aulos</i> (stingrays)	dance, good/harmonious song; dance, <i>aulos</i>	Ael. <i>NA</i> 1.39; 17.18
“ὥσπερ ὀρχούμεναι ὑπὸ τῷ μέλει πηδῶσι, καὶ ἐμύπτουσι τοῖς θηράτροις”	“like women dancing they leap to the melody and fall into the nets” (sprats)	melody, castagnets	Ael. <i>NA</i> 6.32
δέλεαρ, “ὑπὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐλκόμενοι,” “ἐπονται”	lure, “captivated by the enjoyment,” “they follow” (crabs)	music, <i>photinx</i> /transverse pipe	Ael. <i>NA</i> 6.31
κατάδω, θέλγω, πραύνω, ὑποστella, στόρνυμι, δέω	charming, pacifying, reducing, soothing, binding (elephant and his wrath)	instrument (<i>scindapsus</i>)	Ael. <i>NA</i> 12.44

πραυνω, ημερώ, “δάκρυσα ὑφ’ ἡδονῆς,” καταυλέω	pacifying, taming, “tears of enjoyment,” charming with <i>aulos</i> (mares)	<i>aulos</i>	Ael. <i>NA</i> 12.44
ἐπαιίδω, θέλω	enchanting, charming (mares)	<i>aulos</i> , melody	Ael. <i>NA</i> 15.25
ἐκπλήσσω, ὑποπλήρημι δέματος, ἄκρατος/ἄμαχος ἡδονή, κηλέω, ἀναρείθω, ἔλκω, καταγοιγεύω, χειρώ	amazing, filling with fear, intemper-ate/irresistible enjoyment, charming, seducing, drawing, bewitching, subduing (wild boars and stags)	<i>aulos</i> , sweetest melody, music	Ael. <i>NA</i> 12.46
κηλέω	charming (non-rational animals, stags, mares; dolphins; crabs, owls for hunt)	music, <i>aulos</i> , <i>syrinx</i> ; <i>aulos</i> , melody; singing, clapping, dancing	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 704f; 162f; cf. 961e
άλισκω	seize (non-rational animals)	pleasure of music (<i>syrinx</i> , <i>pektis</i>)	AQ 58.12–14
<i>traho</i> (<i>animalia ratione carentia; saxa; gentes... ad sensum voluptatis</i>)	drawing (non-rational animals, rocks; barbaric-rough people, bringing the latter to a sense of pleasure)	songs	Macrob. <i>In Somn.</i> 2.3.8
“in retia sponte decurrant”	(all sorts of animals) “fall on their own into traps”	“ <i>invitante cantu</i> ”	Macrob. <i>In Somn.</i> 2.3.10
κήλησις (ἐπωδός)	charming (vipers, spiders, scorpions, other animals, illnesses)	(music of an) enchanter	Pl. <i>Euthydemus</i> 290a
ἐγείρω, κατευναζω	arousing, lulling to sleep (animals)	hissings, harmonious whistlings, <i>syrinx</i> , shell,	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 713b
“ <i>quietem impere</i> ”	to order quiet (to flock)	shepherd’s pipe	Macrob. <i>In Somn.</i> 2.3.10

Original Language Term/Quote	Translation of the Term/Quote	Musical aspect/elements	References
ἦδονή, κατακλίνω	pleasure, making lay down (deer, at hunt)	pipe (syrinx?), singing	Arist. <i>Hist. an.</i> 611b26–30
ἐπ' ἀνθρώποις ³⁷ πολυωφελεστάτης τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἡθῶν τε καὶ βίων	the in many ways most useful improvement of human <i>ē/hē</i> and lives	music	Iambl. <i>VP</i> 25.114; cf. Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D144.24
“ἀπ’ ἄλλης ὀρμῆς ἐπ’ ἄλλην ἀποστρέφειν”	“to turn the soul away from an impulse towards another”	melody	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D117.19–20; cf. D36, 146,30–147.11
“εἰς τὴν ἐναντίαν κατάστασιν ἄγει”	“leads into the opposite condition”	Music through its order and due proportion	Ps.–Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1147a
“τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν διάθεσιν εἰς αὐξησιν ἄγειν καὶ ἐλάττωσιν”	“to augment or lessen an existing disposition”	melody	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D117.21–22; cf. D36.14
θεῖος μέγεθος, μείζων παρόρμησις	divine greatness, stronger incitement (bestowed on speech)	meters, melodies, rhythms	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D142.5–22
“ut <i>animum sua semper divinitate imbueret</i> ”	“to fill the spirit always with his divinity”	singing with a cithara before and after sleep	Cens. <i>DN</i> 12.4
“θεῖοι μὲν ὕμνοι καὶ τιμαὶ (...) κοσμοῦνται”	beautifying the divine hymns and worship	music	AQ 57.24
“ἐπιτυχεῖν τῆς ὁμοιότητος;” “τεχνικωτέρους...ποιεῖν”	painter achieves better similarity and artistry	cithara, melody, song	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D123.16–17, 35–36

37. About the use of this word, see Neubecker 1986, 190.

“συνεπιφθέγγεται τῷ παιᾶνι τὸ θεῖον”	adds the divine to paeans	<i>aulos</i>	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 713a
<i>cognitio rerum divinarum</i>	knowledge of divine things	music	Quint. 1.10.10
ἀρέσκω (θεοῖς μάλιστα)	most pleasing to the gods	music	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1135e
θεοσιπέσιος, θεοῖς φίλος	divinely sounding, beloved by the gods	old music	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1136b
“εἰς τοὺς θεοὺς εὐχάριστός, ... ἀμοιβή”	“grateful recompense for the gods”	music	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1136c
ἐνθελώτερόν, ὕμνώδης	inspired/full of god, singing hymns	<i>aulos</i>	Philostr. <i>VA</i> 5.21
ἐνθουσιασμός, <i>enthusiasmos</i> , <i>sacri furoris instinctus</i>	enthusiasm, instigation of divine madness	music, song	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 623a, Aphthonius <i>De metris</i> 4.2 (Theophr.)
ἐνθουσιαστικός, βακχικός	enthusiastic, bacchic	Phrygian <i>harmonia</i>	Ar. <i>Pr.</i> 922b22-23; cf. Eur. <i>Bacch.</i> 155-159
ιέρος, ἐνθεασμός; φῶς καροκοχὴν	holy; inspired; inducing possession	Phrygian <i>harmonia</i> ; melody of Olympus	Procl. <i>In R.</i> 1.62.6 (cf. 1.61.27), 8
οἶστρος, ³⁸ ἐνθουσιασμός	madness, enthusiasm (turning to)	certain melodies	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 100.5
“ἀποσεμνύνει τὸν ἐκάστων τρόπον”	“it dignifies everyone’s mood/style”	harmonious song together with “word of the gods”	Ath. 628a

38. The word means originally “gaddy” and hence a sting that drives to madness.

Original Language Term/Quote	Translation of the Term/Quote	Musical aspect/elements	References
τιμάω τὸ θεῖον	to honor the divinity	music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D134.30–31
<i>dicandus deo</i>	for God	celestial hymn in strophe and antistrophe	Macrobian. <i>In Somn.</i> 2.3.5
“μετὰ πραΰτητος εὐμενοῦς ἐπακούειν (...) τῶν εὐχῶν”	(gods) “hear the prayers with favorable mildness	music, melody: hymns, Egyptian <i>trigonon</i>	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 100.12–15
“ <i>grata esset deis immortalibus</i> ” “ <i>placandorum deorum causa</i> ”	“is pleasing to the gods,” “for appeasing the gods”	festivals with plays, <i>tibia</i> player with prayers, for Mars	Cens. DN 12.2
“ <i>ut placaretur ira eius</i> ”	“that his wrath be appeased” (of Apollo)	musical games	August. <i>De civ. D.</i> 18.12
<i>honorifice, “ferventes animos irarum oblivione deponent; mulceo, “molita indignatione flaccescunt; remeo ad vigilias</i>	as honor, “set aside the minds boiling of wrath in forgetfulness,” quiet, “become mild with indignation softened,” awaken (gods)	rich vocal/instrumental performance	Arn. <i>Adv. nat.</i> 7.32.1–4
τῶν ὄντων φορὰ, τῶν ἀστέρων κίνησις	motion of the universe, movement of the stars	music	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1147a
σύγκειμαι (ἡ τοῦ παντός οὐσία)	(universe) is composed	Music	Ath. 632c
ὀρμῆς ἐπεγερετικός; ἔρωτα ἐμβάλλει	arouses impulse (in horses, for mating); “throws into love passion”	melody of <i>aulos</i>	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 138b, cf. 704f; Ael. <i>NA</i> 12.44, cf. 25.15
“τὸ παντὶ τὸ προσηκόν μέτρον ἐπιτιθέναι”	“to apply to all things the proper measure”	music	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1147a
“πάνθ’ ὅσα φύσιν ἔχει συνάγειν τε καὶ συναρμώσσειν”	“bringing together and harmonizing together all natural things”	music	AQ 2.18–20

Bad Effects in Music (English)

Table App.-3. Negative effects of music—arranged by functions and effects.

Function	Effect	Musical characteristic	Elements involved	References
character formation/ education	evils (expressed in bad words, gestures, movements/ thoughts) ¹	certain melodies	melody	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D146.1–21
	vice; badness	improper tuning, against nature; worst rhythmic com- position; music	harmony; rhythm; harmony and rhythm	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 97.4–8; AQ 40.18; 61.8–9
	made for pleasure, excites sometimes vices	certain music	music	Calcidius 267
	becoming enslaved ignominiously	enjoyment of corrupt music	music	Dio Chrys. <i>Or.</i> 32.67
	imprinting strange and not pretty forms of ethos”	fondness for not desirable melodies (and poems)	melody	AQ 59.19–21
	agitated, moved, hot, enthu- siastic, throwing the soul into disorder, arousing the mind high, emotional, very disturbing	certain rhythms	rhythm	AQ 82.6, 11, 16, 28–29, 30, 83.1–2, 4, 7, 9
	“lead the mind astray into not little confusion”	composed rhythms, in their unevenness imposing multi- ple movements on the body	rhythm	AQ 83.15–17

1. The last word is corrupt and the sense depends on the reading.

Function	Effect	Musical characteristic	Elements involved	References
	“pull the soul violently in opposite directions, forcing it to accompany every turn and to make itself alike to variation”	modulations between rhythms	rhythm	AQ 83.18–21
	harmful, to be avoided, leading to evil/vice and corruption	certain melody (Sirens)	melody	AQ 90–27–29
	not useful, adducing pleasure for those seeking wisdom	certain <i>aulos</i> music	<i>aulos</i>	AQ 91.20–21
	make what is harmful more inevitable	seasonings of music	melody, meter, rhythm	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 769c
	sickness	distracting modulations		
	ungracefulness	bad rhythm (and text)	rhythm (and text)	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 400c; 401a
	not noble and good/beautiful soul	not noble and good/beautiful songs and dances	song, dance	Ath. 14.628c
	unharmonic, what is not one in the melodies or the rhythms	music	music	Plotinus <i>Enn.</i> 1.3.26–27
	intemperance, lust	certain melody	melody	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D82.1–14
	gathering of great evil in soul	<i>mimēsis</i> of what is bad (in any art)	music (and art) in general	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 401b–c
	licentiousness, intemperance	mixed variety (ποικιλία)	<i>harmoniai</i> , rhythm	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 404d–e ²

2. Musical *panharmonia* and *panrhythmia* are compared with the unhealthy results of an exuberant mixture of food, which would be contrary to gymnastic exercise.

	intemperate, providing great and excessive enjoyments in order to fully avoid being distressed and suffering	songs	songs	Aspasius, <i>In Arist. Eth. Nic.</i> 7.14
	insolent/wanton, ostentatious, “by no means having the freeman’s sound”	<i>aulos</i>	<i>aulos</i>	Iambl. <i>VP</i> 25.111
	vulgar; coarse pleasure, base	adaptation to base pleasures of the audience	<i>aulos</i> , music of professional performers	Arist. <i>Pol.</i> 1339b9; 1341b9–19
	disordered pleasures ³	constant novelties, not according to norms	dance, music	Pl. <i>Leg.</i> 660b; cf. <i>Ti.</i> 47d
	cowardness/vileness, rudeness	not balanced by gymnastics	music	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 411a; cf. <i>Leg.</i> 654e–655b
	being a coward	as a musician (Orpheus)	music	Pl. <i>Symp.</i> 179d
	vileness	specific melodies, esp. chromatic genus	melody, genus	<i>P. Hib.</i> 1.13.15
	loosen, slack	New Music	music	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1141e; cf. Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 398e
	convivial	certain <i>harmoniai</i>	<i>harmonia</i>	Procl. <i>In R.</i> 1.61.20
	loosened	Ionian <i>harmonia</i>	<i>harmonia</i>	Ath. 624f (Pratin.)

3. In the text, these pleasures are the cause for the novelties; but as we have seen, there is a vicious cycle (which Plato, almost desperate, seems to consider irredeemable: *Leg.* 660c) so that the novelties for their part also cause wrong pleasures.

Function	Effect	Musical characteristic	Elements involved	References
	softness, licentiousness, relaxation	style	style	Ath. 633c
	cowardess, lack of discipline, ugliness/evil	certain music	music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D20
	womanish weakness	certain music	music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D43.14; 138.37
	make the mind womanish	broken tunes, womanish rhythms	melody, rhythm	Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 12
	lasciviousness, corrupting, declining, defiling; unable to enact justice and occupy noble offices	weak/broken sounds, sweetness of voices	song, voice	Tac. <i>Ann.</i> 14.20
	softened ethos, weakness, corruption, perverting	sweetness, soft songs	songs	Cic. <i>Leg.</i> 2.15.38
	ruining all States through bad desires and bad ideas	pest (of softened, stilted singing style)	song style	Cic. <i>Leg.</i> 2.15.39
	sweetness, softness	songs	song	Cic. <i>Leg.</i> 2.15.38
	being mollified, weakened	songs, rhythms	song, rhythm	Cic. <i>De or.</i> 3.51.197
	to release (to the weakness of pleasure)	music	music	Macrobian. <i>In Somn.</i> 2.3.7
	effeminate, light; eff.	new theater music; <i>aulos</i> player	music; <i>aulos</i>	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1136b; Plut. <i>Dem.</i> 4

	enervate/weaken	cithara, pipe, lyre, voice with rhythm (in theater)	cithara, pipe, lyre, voice, rhythm	Ov. <i>Rem. am.</i> 753–754
	effeminate and broken in shameless modes;” “it razed what remained in us of manly vigor”	New Music	music, psalterium, <i>spadix</i>	Quint. 1.10.31
	effeminate, nervless, dancing in most impudent modes of castagnets;” sweet	rhythm	rhythm	Quint. 9.4.142–143
	weak, uncultivated	new <i>aulos</i> music	<i>aulos</i> music	ps-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1140d
	dealing with the bodies affectively in undue way	mean/bad music	music	AQ 63.13
	soft/lax life, precipituous action, contemptuous of teachings/people	Lydian <i>harmonia</i>	<i>harmonia</i>	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 83f
	relaxed	Lydian <i>harmonia</i>	<i>harmonia</i>	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1136e
	supine, flabby	expanded rhythms	rhythm	AQ 84.8–9
	sweetening	chromatic genus	genus	Aristox. <i>El. Harm.</i> 23.18
	pleasant/sweet enjoyment	chromatic genus	genus	Vitr. <i>De arch.</i> 5.4.3
	sordid/mean	style, ignorant of music	style	Ath. 633f (Philetaerus)
	base, unmanly, rash	music	music	Phdl. <i>Mus.</i> D 117.31–34
	dejection, unmanly condition	systematic ethos of melic composition	melody	Cleonides 13
	setting in motion a distressing passion	systematic ethos of melic/rhythmic composition	melody, rhythm	AQ 30.12–13, cf. 40.14–17

Function	Effect	Musical characteristic	Elements involved	References
	base, sordid	certain melodies	melody	Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 35
	sordid; mean/ordinary (Roscius); s.; meanness/badness	rhythm, dance; melody; bad music	rhythm, dance; melody; music	AQ 61.10; 61.24; 63.11
	sordid; leading to feebleness	<i>sambukē</i>	sambuca	AQ 85.10–12
	mean/bad things being brought forward	melody	melody	AQ 64.4
	defiling (ears, soul), dragging down (to earth)	<i>aulos</i> ; all wind instruments	<i>aulos</i> ; wind instruments	AQ 91.29; 92.11
	wretched/knavish	song, <i>nomos</i>	song, <i>nomos</i>	Ath. 638b (Phaenias)
	foreign, rustic	equal diatonic genus	genus	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 30–31
	dangerous and object of suspicion for intemperance and disorder in Bacchic rites	teaching music	music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D121.16–20
	melting/pouring forth/away, weakening the spirit, cutting out the “nerves” of the soul; weak, unstable, quickly roused to anger and calmed, full of discontent	unrelented and exclusive exposure to sweet/soft, dirge-like music	<i>harmoniai</i>	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 411b–c; cf. Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D146.30–39
	greatest damage, bad ethos; laughter	combining elements with contrary <i>ēthē</i> ; song or instruments without words	various elements	Pl. <i>Leg.</i> 669b–670a

	hard learning	ornamentation, combining musical opposites	melody, intervals, tempo, rhythms	Pl. <i>Leg.</i> 812d–e
	hindering other activities, vulgarize the body, useless for exercise and study	music studies	music	Arist. <i>Pol.</i> 1341a6–9
social stability	destruction, danger to the whole State, change ⁴ and overturning of the greatest political laws and all private and public things; excessive liberty; shamelessness, etc.	innovations, transgression of musical laws	style, modes (<i>tropoi</i>)	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 424b–d; <i>Leg.</i> 700a–701b
	leading the way in any change in the State	music	music	AQ 63.28–29
	overturning all the personal and common life	habituation to bad ethos in music	figure, form, text, melody, pleasure	AQ 64.7–9
	greatest pleasure-seeking for the greatest number ⁵	innovations, seeking out above all skillfulness	dance; music	Pl. <i>Leg.</i> 657e–
	insensibility and crudeness towards people	unmusical and abominable melodies and music, theater performances	melodies, music, theater	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 999c

4. This famous quote reads in the original: “οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ κινούνται μουσικῆς τρόποι ἀνευ πολιτικῶν νόμων τῶν μεγίστων.” “κινέω” means “to move, remove, disturb, stir up”—a world field of which “change” seems to be the common denominator, especially since such change is said to creep in often without notice, declared a children’s game.

5. “τὸν πλείστους καὶ μάλιστα χαίρειν ποιούντα.”

Function	Effect	Musical characteristic	Elements involved	References
	corrupting (in hearing), effeminate; c., “effeminate the mind and harm moderation”	sweet and strange cithara playing; different rhythm and more varied melody, little change of harmony	cithara, rhythm, melody, harmony	Dio Chrys. <i>Or.</i> 32.67; 33.57
	obscene pursuits of singing and dancing keep young people effeminate”	singing, dancing	singing, dancing	Sen. <i>Controv.</i> 1, pref. 8
	soft, weakened	softness of song	song	Sen. <i>Ep.</i> 90.19; cf. 114.1
	intemperance in pleasure-seeking	variety in music (Polymnia)	music	Pl. <i>Symp.</i> 187e
	unmanly, vulgar/coars, unfree	chromatic genus	genus	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D116.24–25
	unmanly, loving luxuriousness, softness, womanish temper	bad music, shameful songs	music, songs	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 20a
	vulgar, disorder	dance	dance	Ath. 628d; cf. Hdt. 6.129
	more vulgar, novel-seeking, popular, showy	new musical style (Timotheus)	style	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1135c–d
	impassioned	Mixolydian <i>harmonia</i>	<i>harmonia</i>	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1136c–d ⁶
	soft, convivial; too sluggish	Iastian, slack Lydian <i>harmonia</i>	<i>harmonia</i>	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 398e; AQ 19.4–5; cf. AQ 59.22, 63.13

6. This reference is not clearly negative; it is simply stated that this *harmonia* is fitting (“ἁρμόζουσα”) for tragedy.

	neither flowery nor cheerful, austere, hard	Ionian/Iastian <i>harmonia</i> (old)	<i>harmonia</i>	Ath. 625b
	more dainty	Ionian <i>harmonia</i> (new)	<i>harmonia</i>	Ath. 625b
	austere, despotic	enharmonic genus	genus	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D116.26–27
	mournful, passionate	chromatic genus	genus	Theon 55.6–7
	mournful, shrill	high <i>syntēmata</i> , higher Phrygian <i>syntēma, tropos</i>	<i>syntēma, tropos</i>	AQ 81.13 & 24–27
	mournful, like a dirge	Phrygian <i>aulos</i>	Phrygian <i>aulos</i>	AQ 85.4–5
	most sweet, most mournful	chromatic genus	genus	<i>Anon. Bell.</i> 2.26
	most sweet, mournful	chromatic genus	genus	[AQ] 92.26
	shrill, like a dirge	chromatic genus	genus	Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 36
	somewhat harsh, clownish	diatonic genus	genus	Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 36
	distracting, makes inattentive	music	music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D129.5–6; 140.9–14; 142.22–35
	disorderly in thinking, drunk, loving martial rhythm at any time, excessive in wrath, frenetic for war	mean/bad music	music	AQ 63.17
	drunkenness, derangement, “you speak more foolishly than those [drunk] and move around worse and are more likethose intoxicated”	hearing, voice	hearing, voice	Dio Chrys. <i>Or.</i> 32.56
	going against the longing towards virtue	music	music	Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 26

Function	Effect	Musical characteristic	Elements involved	References
	calling for relationship between men and women; women for adulterer	music; song with instruments	music; song, instruments	Phld. Mus. D43.11–13; Ath. 638e
	uselessness	music; pure melody and rhythm	music; melody and rhythm	Phld. Mus. D125.25; 143.42–43
lamentation ⁷	useless ⁸	Mixolydian, tense Lydian, etc. <i>harmonia</i>	<i>harmonia</i>	Pl. Resp. 398d–e; Leg. 800c–e, AQ.9.3–4

7. In Plato's State, therefore, funeral wailing/singing is to be avoided or at least kept short and done by a group of foreigners (Leg. 800c–e).

8. There appears to be an inconsistency when Plato later (411a–b) claims that someone "passionate" (θυμαιοδής) is relaxed by sweet (γλυκύειος), soft (μαλαρός), and dirge-like (θρηνώδης) *harmoniai* into something useful (χρήσιμον) like iron. Why did Plato first exclude something, which now is described as useful? Barker 2005, 49–54, elaborates on the difficulty of reconciling this with the previous passages and surmises that Plato fused together ideas from different sources. Another solution could be that the softening effect is only meant to be pursued quasi "medical" in a strictly educational environment but not in the ideal State at large. However, since the earlier passage talks about education as well, it is more probable that Plato admits a positive impact even from the previously rejected (and here still derogatorily painted) *harmoniai* only in order to make the point of balance against the hardening effect of gymnastics more striking—this passage might, therefore, not mean at all an endorsement of blatantly soft songs in the "forbidden" modes. "Manly" tunes, though to a lesser degree, would still work "softening" simply because Plato attributes this quality to music as a whole when seen in contrast to gymnastics (and that he speaks in general terms and not only of "lamentations" is clear from the fact that at 411c he even refers to the "content" part (philosophy) of μουσική in the widest sense). We could still ask why he then not allows any music as long as all harmful effect is balanced out by something else. But this cannot be because it would create a deeper problem: the homogeneity of the "ethical triangle" would be at variance with the principle of the ideal middle achieved through harmonizing extremes. The final pedagogical result of the process of character "tuning" would arrive with the mean at the point exactly identical with the ethical ideal, but the dynamic process to reach this point, permitting graduality, would conflict with the static concept of the ethical triangle, knowing only the labels "allowed" and "not allowed." For this reason, Plato justly does not intend to offer a range of "tuning options" *within music* (from softer to less soft), but the tuning takes place only through the control of the quantity (amount of exposure) between (only ethically good) music and gymnastics with their respective overall effects.

	mourning (tragedy, dirge)	Lydian, Mixolydian <i>harmoniai</i>	<i>harmonia</i>	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1136b–c, e
	tragic, emotional	change to recitative	melody	Arist. <i>Pr.</i> 918a10–12
	mournful (lamentation)	special <i>aulos</i>	<i>aulos</i>	Ath. 174f (Xen.)
	pity/lamentation, contraction/pusillanimity	certain melodies	melody	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 100.2
	leading often away into sadness	songs, rhythms	song, rhythm	Cic. <i>De or.</i> 3.51.197
sickness	intoxicated; mad/to get inflamed, excited (to commit a crime)	Phrygian <i>aulos</i>	Phrygian <i>harmonia</i> , <i>aulos</i>	Iambl. <i>VP</i> 25.112; Quint. 1.10.32; Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 7, 17; August. <i>Contra Iulianum</i> 5.23; Mart. Cap. 9.926; Boeth. <i>Mus.</i> 1.1.185
	charm with <i>aulos</i> , intoxicate, induce to restraintless clapping, shouting, dancing, close to madness	<i>aulos</i> , licentious dancing	<i>aulos</i> , dance	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 704d
	losing the mind, suffering, being driven mad	salpinx, playing a military tune	salpinx, tune	Apollonius, <i>Mir.</i> 49.2 (Theophr./Aristox.)
	driving into madness and suicide	piping in Phrygian mode	mode, <i>tibia</i>	Quint. 1.10.33
	“producing inordinate passions”	<i>aulos</i> melody	<i>aulos</i>	Iambl. <i>Myst.</i> 3.9.4–5
	(entice to) bad intercourses between men and women	certain melodies	melody	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D128.33–35
	being a bad incentive to many things (in the area of love)	music	music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D129.12–15

Function	Effect	Musical characteristic	Elements involved	References
	to disturb, cause terror, agitate reason in an irrational way	rushed Dionysian tones and rhythms	tone, rhythm	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D59.5–9
	haughtiness, turgidity, conceit	Aeolian <i>harmonia</i>	<i>harmonia</i>	Ath. 624e (Heraclid. Pont.)
	disturbing	certain melody	melody	Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 15
	rage; passionate love; madness	song, singing	ode; singing, <i>aulos</i>	Dio Chrys. <i>Or.</i> 32.41; 51
	“you cannot hold peace any longer”	hearing a string as if it were a salpinx	string	Dio Chrys. <i>Or.</i> 59
	being carried away, losing sense, shuddering	ode, cithara	song, cithara	Dio Chrys. <i>Or.</i> 65
	“being of empty and senseless character”	music	music	Dio Chrys. <i>Or.</i> 65
	rougher, disturbing, mind-boggling	transient <i>systemata</i> with sudden changes	<i>systema</i>	AQ 81.15–17
	destroying the hearing, causing pain	too high or low pitch	pitch	Arist. <i>De an.</i> 426a30–426b7
	corrupt/ruin (young people), enfeebling	melodies (of poets); music in theater; music everywhere	melody; music; <i>aulos</i> , music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D128.8–15; ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1140e; Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 706c
	lack of self-control, softness, passion for pleasure, (leading/ corrupting/pouring down) more pungent/varied than food/smell	melody, rhythm	melody, rhythm	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 705e–706a

	pleasing the crowds	sordid melodies	melody	AQ 61.23–24
	taking hold of judgment and understanding	enjoyments (of melody and rhythm)	melody, rhythm	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 706a–b
	wanton and licentiousness desire shameful and womanish ticklings	corrupt music	music	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 997c
	arousing heartaches, harboring all sorts of temptations; distracting the soul from attending to its welfare	singing; music	song; music	Theophr. fr. 722; 723 ⁹
	causing pain	bad tuning of the μέγχι	tuning the tonal center of scale	Arist. <i>Pr.</i> 919a13–23; cf. 920b7–15
	no pleasure; pain	no variety; bad tuning	variety; tuning	Hippoc. <i>De victu</i> 1.1.7–23
	relaxing the love for enjoyment	certain <i>harmoniai</i>	<i>harmonia</i>	Procl. <i>In R.</i> 1.61.21
	intensifying the love for suffering	certain <i>harmoniai</i>	<i>harmonia</i>	Procl. <i>In R.</i> 1.61.21
aesthetics	decay to (morbid) state of enjoyment	bad musical education	music	Strabo 10.3.9
	less pleasant	instrument obscuring voice	voice, <i>aulos</i> , lyre	Arist. <i>Pr.</i> 918a22–29
	makes feel weary, displeased, annoyed, annoyance	bad/badly performed melody and rhythm	melody, rhythm	Dion. Hal. <i>Comp.</i> 11

9. These quotes are from Arabic sources; tr. from Fortenbaugh 1992.

Function	Effect	Musical characteristic	Elements involved	References
	heavy satiety, distasteful, unharmonic	lack of variety or propriety	instrumental music with song or dance	Dion. Hal. <i>Comp.</i> 11
	“they turned [you from humans] into crude and uneducated beings”	cidaredes	cithara	Dio Chrys. <i>Or.</i> 32.62
	chaotic, crude, offends the ear	unorganized clash, in no way ordered, loose and harsh noise	sound	Macrobian. <i>In Somn.</i> 2.5–6
	erase the thought of a poem	melody	melody	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D124.24–28
	pain	<i>monaulos</i>	<i>monaulos</i>	Ath. 174b
	grief	music	music	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 623a (Theophr.)
	anger	songs	songs	Aphthonius <i>De metris</i> 42. (Theophr.)
	ugly/bad	vulgarity, disorder	dance	Ath. 628d
	mean/common/bad	dance	dance	Ath. 631d
general	out of abundance; luxuriousness, superfluity	music	music	Democr. DK 144; Polyb. 4.21.1
	guile, trick (against people)	music	music	Polyb. 4.20.5 (Ephorus)

Bad Effects in Music (Original Language)

Table App.-4. Negative effects of music—arranged by original terms and expressions

Original Language Term/Quote	Translation of the Term/Quote	Musical aspect/elements	References
κακία (ἀισχρὰ σήμηματα, etc.)	evils (expressed in bad words, gestures, movements/thoughts)	certain melodies	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D146.1-21
κακία	vice; badness	improper tuning, against nature; worst rhythmic composition; melody, rhythm	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 97.4-8; AQ 40.18; 61.8-9
<i>“ad voluptatem facta excitat vitia non nunquam”</i>	“made for pleasure, excites some-times vices”	certain music	Calcidius 267
δεδούλωμαι ἀγεννῶς	becoming enslaved ignominiously	enjoyment of corrupt music	Dio Chrys. <i>Or.</i> 32.67
“ιδιότητά τινα ἥθους οὐκ ἀστείαν ἀπομαρτομένους”	imprinting strange and not pretty forms of ethos”	fondness for not desirable melodies (and poems)	AQ 59.19-21
τεταραγμένος, κεκνημένος, θερμός, ἐνθουσιαστικός, συνταράττων τὴν ψυχὴν. ἐς ὕψος τὴν διάνοιαν ἐξεγείρων, παθητικός, πολὺ παραχώδης	agitated, moved, hot, enthusiastic, throwing the soul into disorder, arousing the mind high, emotional, very disturbing	certain rhythms	AQ 82.6, 11, 16, 28-29, 30, 83.1-2, 4, 7, 9
“οὐκ ἐς ὀλίγην παραγὴν τὴν διάνοιαν ἐξάγουσιν”	“lead the mind astray into not little confusion”	composed rhythms, in their unevenness imposing multiple movements on the body	AQ 83.15-17
“εἰς ἔτερα βιαίως ἀνθελκουσὶ τὴν ψυχὴν. ἐκάστη διαφορὰ παρέσθαι τε καὶ ὁμοιοῦσθαι τῇ ποικιλίᾳ καταναγκάζοντες”	“pull the soul violently in opposite directions, forcing it to accompany every turn and to make itself alike to variation”	modulations between rhythms	AQ 83.18-21

Original Language Term/Quote	Translation of the Term/Quote	Musical aspect/elements	References
βλαβερός, φευκτικός, ἐς κακίαν καὶ διαφθορὰν ὑπαγόμενος	harmful, to be avoided, leading to evil/vice and corruption	certain melody (Sirens)	AQ 90–27–29
“ἐποίησε ... τὸ βλάπτων ἀφυλακτότερον”	“make what is harmful more inevitable”	seasonings of melody, meter, rhythm	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 769c
ἄχρηστος; σύντονος; μαλακός; συμποτικός; χαλαρός	useless; strained tight/tense; soft; convivial; slack	certain <i>harmoniai</i>	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 398e ¹⁰
συμποτικός	convivial	certain <i>harmoniai</i>	Procl. <i>In R.</i> 1.61.20
μαλακία, ἀκολασία, ἄνεσις	softness, licentiousness, relaxation	style	Ath. 633c
ἀνήμι, ¹¹ χαλαρός	loosen, slack	New Music	New Music ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1141e
ἀνεμμένος	sluggish	Ionian <i>harmonia</i>	Ath. 624f
<i>dulcedo, mollitia</i>	sweetness, softness	songs	Cic. <i>Leg.</i> 2.15.38
<i>lenior, languesco</i>	being mollified, weakened	songs, rhythms	Cic. <i>De or.</i> 3.51.197
<i>resolvo (ad molliem voluptatis)</i>	to release (to the weakness of pleasure)	music	Macrobi. <i>In Somn.</i> 2.3.7

10. Barker 2005, 25–27, analyzes in detail meaning and usage of σύντονος; μαλακός; and χαλαρός, the first referring to “tension” as in lamentations—our table above contributes evidence for the high-pitch characterizations of mourning—and the other two identifying “relaxation;” while μαλακός (used by Socrates) is no technical term, χαλαρός (in Glaucons response) covers the three levels of technical musical vocabulary (“slackened strings,” referring to tuning), of describing an impression elicited by the musical pattern, and of identifying a specific human character as a result of exposure to music with this ethos. “μαλακός” appears again in 410e as a general effect of music, which needs to be balanced out by gymnastics. See also Leg. 817d where this word is attributed to the Muses to whom foreign musicians are said to belong.
11. This verb is also listed among the positive terms; but the context here clearly gives it a negative meaning together with “χαλερωτέρων τ’ ἐποίησέ,” which “carries the suggestion of luxuriousness, lack of discipline” (GMW 1.236 n. 198).

“τὸ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν”	pleasing the crowds	sordid melodies	AQ 61.23–24
τρυφάω	to be luxurious	[music in the] city	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 399e
“ἐκ τοῦ περιέντος,” τρυφή, περιουσία	“out of abundance,” luxuriousness, superfluity	music	Democr. DK 144; Polyb. 4.21.1
ἀπάτη, γοητεία	guile, trick (against people)	music	Polyb. 4.20.5 (Ephorus)
ποικίλος	changeable	certain rhythms	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 399e
ἀνελευθερία; ὕβρις; μανία; ἄλλαι κακίαι	illiberality; insolence; madness; other evils	certain rhythms; not loved by musician	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 400b; 403a–b
ἀσχημοσύνη	ungracefulness	rhythm; arts	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 400c; 401a
τὸ κακὸς, ἀκόλαστον, ἀνελεύθερον, ἀσχημον	the ill-disposed, undisciplined, unfree, shameful	art <i>mimēsis</i>	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 401b
ἀνάρμοστος	out of tune, not harmonious	diction/harmonia/rhythm	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 400d
ἀνάρμοστος, “τὸ μὴ ἐν τοῖς δομένοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς”	unharmonic, “what is not one in the melodies or the rhythms”	music	Plotinus <i>Enn.</i> 1.3.26–27
λυτέω, ἀνάρμοστος	causing pain, out of tune	bad tuning the μέση (tonal center of the scale)	Ar. <i>Pr.</i> 919a13–23; cf. 920b7–15
“ἀγρίους πεποίηκασι καὶ ἀπαιδευτοὺς”	“they turned [you from humans] into crude and uneducated beings”	citharedes	Dio Chrys. <i>Or.</i> 32.62
<i>turbidus, inconditus, “offendit auditum”</i>	chaotic, crude, “offends the ear”	unorganized clash, in no way ordered, loose and harsh noise	Macrobius. <i>In Somn.</i> 2.5–6
οὐκέτι τέρας; λύπη	no pleasure; pain	no variety; bad tuning	Hippoc. <i>De victu</i> 1.1.7–23
χαλάω τὸ φιλιθδονον	relaxing the love for enjoyment	certain <i>harmoniai</i>	Procl. <i>In R.</i> 1.61.21
συντείνω τὸ φιλόλυπον	intensifying the love for suffering	certain <i>harmoniai</i>	Procl. <i>In R.</i> 1.61.21

Original Language Term/Quote	Translation of the Term/Quote	Musical aspect/elements	References
ἀσυμφωνος	not harmonious	not loved by musician	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 402d
<i>absonus; dissonus</i>	inharmonious; dissonant	interval	Favonius 20.21; 21.26
οὐχ ἡδίων	not more pleasant	instrument obscuring voice	Arist. <i>Pr.</i> 918a22–29
διοχλέω, ἀγανακτέω, δυσαρσεστέω, ὄχλησις	makes feel weary, displeased, annoyed, annoyance	bad/badly performed melody and rhythm	Dion. Hal. <i>Comp.</i> 11
βαρύς κόρος, ἀρδής, μὴ ἀρμόττων	heavy satiety, distasteful, unharmonic	lack of variety or propriety in instrumental music with song or dance	Dion. Hal. <i>Comp.</i> 11
ἀκολασία; λαγνεία	licentiousness/intemperance; salaciousness	all aspects of music; music	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 404e; <i>Symp.</i> 187e; cf. Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D81; Sext. <i>Emp. Mus.</i> 26
“ἀπάθεια πρὸς ἀνθρώπους καὶ ὠμότης”	“insensibility and crudeness towards people”	unmusical and abominable melodies and music, theater performances	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 999c
διαφθείρω, τρυφερός; δ., “θηλύνειν τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι τὰ τῆς σωφροσύνης”	corrupting (in hearing), effeminate; c., “effeminate the mind and harm moderation”	sweet and strange cithara playing; different rhythm and more varied melody; little change of harmony	Dio Chrys. <i>Or.</i> 32.67; 33.57
“cantandi saltandique obscena studia effeminatos tenent”	“obscene pursuits of singing and dancing keep (young people) effeminate”	singing, dancing	Sen. <i>Controv.</i> 1, pref. 8
<i>mollis, infractus</i>	soft, weakened	softness of song	Sen. <i>Ep.</i> 90.19; cf. 114.1
ἀκολασία, ὕβρις	intemperance, lust	melody	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D82.1–14

συνουσίαι κακαί	(entice to) bad intercourses between men and women	certain melodies	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D128.33–35
ἐπιφάλης/ὑποπιος πρὸς ἀκολασίαν καὶ ἀταραξίαν βακχευούσαις	dangerous/object of suspicion for intemperance and disorder in Bacchic rites	teaching music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D121.16–20
ἀκόλαστος, “μεγάλας καὶ σφοδράς ἡδονὰς” πορίζω	intemperate, providing “great and excessive enjoyments” (in order to fully avoid being distressed and suffering)	songs	Aspasia, <i>In Arist. Eth. Nic.</i> 7.14
“ἄτακται ἡδοναί;” ¹² ἡδονὴ ἄλογος	“disordered pleasures;” irrational pleasure	constant novelty in music; music	Pl. <i>Leg.</i> 660b; <i>Ti.</i> 47d
“ἐμποιῖν (...) τὰ πάθη τῆς παρατροπῆς”	“producing inordinate passions”	<i>aulos</i> melody	Iambl. <i>Myst.</i> 3.9.4–5
ὑβριστικός, πανηγυρικός, “οὐδαμῶς ἐλευθέριον τὸν ἦχον ἔχειν”	insolent/wanton, ostentatious, “by no means having the freeman’s sound”	<i>aulos</i>	Iambl. <i>VP</i> 25.111
βάναισος; ἡδονὴ φορτική, πονηρός	vulgar; coarse pleasure, base	<i>aulos</i> , music of professional performers	Arist. <i>Pol.</i> 1339b9; 1341b9–19
φορτικός	vulgar	dance	Ath. 628d; 631d
ἀταξία	disorder	dance; music	Ath. 628d; 633b
ῥυπαρός	sordid/mean	style, ignorance of music	Ath. 633f

12. See n. 2 above.

Original Language Term/Quote	Translation of the Term/Quote	Musical aspect/elements	References
μοχθηρός	wretched/knavish	song, <i>nomos</i>	Ath. 638b
ξηνικότερος, ἀγροικότερος	foreign, rustic	equal diatonic genus	Ptol. <i>Harm.</i> 30–31
“ἐκπτώσις πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον;” ἡδυπάθεια	“decay;” (morbid) state of enjoyment	bad musical education	Strabo 10.3.9
δελός; ἄγροικος	cowardly/vile/wretched; rustic/ rude	unbalanced between music and gymnastics	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 411a; cf. <i>Leg.</i> 655a–b
μαλθακίζομαι	being softened/a coward	being a musician (Orpheus)	Pl. <i>Symp.</i> 179d
δελός	cowardly/vile	specific melodies, esp. chromatic genus	<i>P. Hib.</i> 1.13.15
τὰ δειλά, ἀκόλαστα, αἰσγρά	cowardess, lack of discipline, ugliness/evil	certain music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D20
γυναικισμός; θρύπτω	womanish weakness; enfeebling	certain music; melody	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D43.14; 128.14–15, 37
<i>lascivia, corrumpo, degenero, polluo</i>	lasciviousness, corrupting, declin- ing, defiling	weak sounds, sweetness of voices	Tac. <i>Ann.</i> 14.20
“ <i>mores lapsi; corruptela, depravo</i> ”	softened ethos, weakness, corrup- tion, perverting	sweetness, soft songs	Cic. <i>Leg.</i> 2.15.38
“ <i>malis studiis malisque doctrinis repente totas civitates everteret</i> ”	“it would ruin all States through bad desires and bad ideas”	pest (of softened, stilted singing style)	Cic. <i>Leg.</i> 2.15.39
κατεαγώς, κωτίλος; κατ.	effeminate, light	new theater music; <i>aulos</i> player	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1136b; Plut. <i>Dem.</i> 4
<i>enervo</i>	enervate/weaken	cithara, pipe, lyre, voice with rhythm (in theater)	Ov. <i>Rem. am.</i> 753–754

“ <i>effeminata et impudicis modis fracta</i> ,” “ <i>si quid in nobis virilis roboris manebat, exiit</i> ”	effeminate and broken in shameless modes,” “it razed what remained in us of manly vigor”	new music, psalterium, <i>spadix</i>	Quint. 1.10.31
<i>effeminatus, eneruis, “lascivissimis syntonorum modis saltat;” dulcius</i>	effeminate, nerveless, “it dances in most impudent modes of castagnets,” sweeter	rhythm	Quint. 9.4.142–143
ἀσθενής, οὐ κεκρυμμένος	weak, uncultivated	new <i>aulos</i> music	ps-Plut <i>Mus.</i> 1140d
ὠραῖζω (τὰ σώματα οὐ δέον)	dealing with the bodies affectively in undue way	mean/bad music	AQ 63.13
θρηνώδης	dirge-like, mournful	Mixolydian, tense Lydian, etc. <i>harmonia</i>	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 398d–e, AQ 9.3–4
γοερός, ἐκβοητικός	mournful, shrill	high <i>systemata</i> , higher Phrygian <i>systema, tropos</i>	AQ 81.13 & 24–27
γοερός, θρηνώδης	mournful, like a dirge	Phrygian <i>aulos</i>	AQ 85.4–5
μαλακώτερος, προπετέστερος, καταφρονητός	soft/lax (life), precipituous (action), contemptuous (of teachings/people)	Lydian <i>harmonia</i>	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 83f
ἐκλελυμένος	relaxed	Lydian <i>harmonia</i>	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1136e
ὑπτιος, πλαδαρός	supine, flabby	expanded rhythms	AQ 84.8–9
θηλύνω (τὸν νοῦν); κατεαγός	make (the mind) womanish; effeminate	broken tunes, womanish rhythms	Sext. <i>Emp. Mus.</i> 12
ἄνανδρος, φορτικός, ἀνελεύθερος	unmanly, vulgar/coars, unfree	chromatic genus	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D116.24–25
ἄνανδρος, (ἀγαπῶν) τρυφήν, μαλακίαν, γυναικοκρασίαν	unmanly, (loving) luxuriousness, softness, womanish temper	bad music, shameful songs	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 20a

Original Language Term/Quote	Translation of the Term/Quote	Musical aspect/elements	References
φορτικώτερος, φιλόκαινος, φιλάνθρωπος, θεματικός	more vulgar, novel-seeking, popular, showy	new musical style (Timotheus)	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1135c–d
παθητικός	impassioned	Mixolydian <i>harmonia</i>	ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1136c–d
μαλακός, συμποτικός; σ. & λίαν ἀνεμμένος	soft, convivial; c. & too sluggish	Iastian, slack Lydian <i>harmonia</i>	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 398e; AQ 9.4–5; cf. AQ 59.22, 63.13
“οὐτ’ ἀνθρὸς οὐτε ἰλαρός,” αὐστηρὸς, σκληρὸς”	neither flowery nor cheerful,” austere, hard	Ionian/Iastian <i>harmonia</i> (old)	Ath. 625b
τρυφερώτερος	more dainty	Ionian <i>harmonia</i> (new)	Ath. 625b
αὐστηρὸς, δεσποτικός	austere, despotic	enharmonic genus	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D116.26–27
θρηνοποιός	producing tears/lament	certain <i>harmoniai</i>	Procl. <i>In R.</i> 1.61.20
γοερός; παθητικός	mournful; impassioned	chromatic genus	Theon 55.6–7
ἥδιστος, γοερώτατος	most sweet, most mournful	chromatic genus	<i>Anon. Bell.</i> 2.26
ἥδιστος, γοερός	most sweet, mournful	chromatic genus	[AQ] 92.26
οἶκτος, συστολή	pity/lamentation, contraction/pusillanimity	certain melodies	Pol. <i>Harm.</i> 100.2
“ad tristitiam saepe deducimur”	“we are often lead away into sadness”	song, rhythm	Cic. <i>De or.</i> 3.51.197
λιγυρός, θρηνώδης	shrill, like a dirge	chromatic genus	Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 36
ἐντραχὺς, ὑπάγροικος	somewhat harsh, clownish	diatonic genus	Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 36
τραγικός, παθητικός	tragic, emotional	change to recitative melody	Ar. <i>Pr.</i> 918a10–12
γοερός	mournful	special <i>aulos</i>	Ath. 174f
ταπεινός, ἀνανδρος, θρασύς	base, unmanly, rash	music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D 117.31–34
γλυκαίνω	sweetening	chromatic genus	Aristox. <i>El. Harm.</i> 23.18

<i>suavior delectatio</i>	pleasant/sweet enjoyment	chromatic genus	Vitr. <i>De arch.</i> 5.4.3
ταπεινότητα, ἄνανδρον διάθεσιν	dejection, unmanly condition	syntactic ethos of melic composition	Cleonides 13
“πάθη λυπηρὰ κινούμεν”	“we set in motion a distressing passion”	syntactic ethos of melic/rhythmic composition	AQ 30.12–13, cf. 40.14–17
ταπεινότερος, ἀγεννής	base, sordid	certain melodies	Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 35
ἀγεννής, φαῦλος; ἄ. φαυλότης	sordid; mean/ordinary (Roscius); s.; meanness/badness	rhythm, dance; melody; bad music	AQ 61.10; 61.24; 63.11
ἀγεννής, “εἰς ἔκλυσιν περοάγουσαν”	sordid; “leads to feebleness”	<i>sambukē</i>	AQ 85.10–12
“τὰ φαῦλα προσφέρεσθαι”	“mean/bad things being brought forward”	melody	AQ 64.4
μιαίνω; μ., “ἐπὶ τὰδε κατέλκον”	defiling (ears, soul); d., “dragging down to earth”	<i>aulos</i> ; all wind instruments	AQ 91.29; 92.11–13
“μαλθακός αἰχμητής”	“soft spearman”	excessive and exclusive exposure to soft music	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 411b
ἀσθενής; ὀξύρροπος; ταχὺ ἐρέθιζόμενος τε καὶ κατασβεννύμενος; ἀκράχολος; ὀργίλος; δυσκολίας ἐμπλεος	weak; unstable; quickly roused to anger and put out; irascible; inclined to anger; full of discontent	excessive and exclusive exposure to soft music	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 411b–c
κατατήκω (τὸ θυμοειδής)	melting (the high spirit)	certain music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D146.30–39
διαφθεῖραι; παρανομία; ἀσέλγεια	destroy; transgression of the norm, lawlessness; licentiousness	innovation or change of style	Pl. <i>Resp.</i> 424b–e
καθηγέομαι πάσης μεταβολῆς	leading the way in any change (in the State)	music	AQ 63.28–29

Original Language Term/Quote	Translation of the Term/Quote	Musical aspect/elements	References
ἀνατρέπω ἅπαντα τὸν βίον ἰδίᾳ καὶ κοινῇ	overturning all the personal and common life	habituation to bad ethos in music	AQ 64.7–9
ἐκκαλέω (“πρὸς τὰς συνουσίας,” “γυναικάς”)	to call for (relationship between men and women, women, for adulterer)	music; song with instruments	Phld. Mus. D43.11–13; Ath. 638e
ἐμποδίζω, “τὸ σῶμα ποιεῖν βάνανσον,” “ἄχρηστον πρὸς τὰς πολεμικάς καὶ πολιτικάς ἀσκήσεις”	hindering other activities, vulgarize the body, useless for exercise and study	music studies	Arist. Pol. 1341a6–9
ἀχρηστία; “ὠφελεῖν... οὐδέν”	uselessness; not at all being useful	music; melody and rhythm	Phld. Mus. D125.25; 143.42–43 ¹³
“οὐ πρόσοφον ἡδονὴν ἐπιφέροντας τοῖς σοφίας ἐφιμενεῖν”	not useful, adducing pleasure for those seeking wisdom	certain <i>aulos</i> music	AQ 91.20–21
περισπᾶω, ἀνετίβλητος; περισπασμός	distracting, makes inattentive; distraction	music; rhythms and melody (and meter)	Phld. Mus. D129.5–6; 140.11, 142.25–35
ἄτακτος, μέθυστος, φιλορηχστής τὰ ἐνόπλια, ¹⁴ περιττός τὴν ὀργὴν, ἀρεμανής	disorderly (in thinking), drunk, loving martial rhythm (at any time), excessive in wrath, frenetic for war	mean/bad music	AQ 63.17

13. Text here from Neubecker 1986, 77–78; Delattre’s text reconstruction reads differently.

14. For this dance, see references in GMW 2.467 n. 57.

μέθῃ, παράνοια, “μᾶλλον δὲ ληρέιτε ἐκείνων κάκιον καὶ παραφέρεσθε καὶ μᾶλλον εὐοίκατε κραπαλώσιν”	drunkenness, “you speak more foolishly than those [drunk] and move around worse and are more likethose intoxicated”	hearing, voice	Dio Chrys. <i>Or.</i> 32.56
“ἀντιβαίνει πρὸς τὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐφιεσθαι”	“goes against the longing towards virtue”	music	Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 26
“τοῦ ἐλευθέρου λίαν ἐπίδοσις βίου,” παρανομία; “εἰς πάντα σοφίας δόξα;” ἄδεια; ἀναίσχυντῃα; θράσος; “πονηρὰ ἀναίσχυντῃα;” “φεύγειν δουλείαν”	“too much free giving of free life,” lawlessness; “fancy of wisdom about everything;” fearlessness; shamelessness; insolence; “base impudence; “evading submission”	Bacchic, holding on to pleasure more than due, mixing musical genres and elements	Pl. <i>Leg.</i> 700a–701b
τὸ γαῦρον, ὀγκῶδες, ὑπόχαυνον	haughtiness, turgidity, conceit	Aeolian <i>harmonia</i>	Ath. 624e
ταράσσω, παρέχω ἐκπληξιν, σείω τὴν διάνοιαν ἀλόγως	to disturb, cause terror, agitate reason in an irrational way	rushed Dionysian tones and rhythms	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D59.5–9
ταρακτικός	disturbing	certain melody	Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 15
μαίνομαι; ἔρω, οἷστρος; μ.	rage; passionate love, madness; r.	ode; singing, <i>aulos</i> ; song	Dio Chrys. <i>Or.</i> 32.41; 51; 58
“οὐκ ἐτι δύνασθε εἰρήνην ἄγειν”	“you cannot hold peace any longer”	hearing a string	Dio Chrys. <i>Or.</i> 59
ἄγομαι, ἐξίστημι, φρίττω	being carried away, losing sense, shuddering	ode, cithara	Dio Chrys. <i>Or.</i> 65
“εἶναι δὲ τῷ τρόπῳ κοῦφον καὶ ἀνόητον”	“being of empty and senseless character”	music	Dio Chrys. <i>Or.</i> 65
τραχύτερος, παρακεκινημένος, ἀντρεῖνοντος	rougher, disturbing, mind-boggling	transilient <i>systemata</i> with sudden changes	AQ 81.15–17

Original Language Term/Quote	Translation of the Term/Quote	Musical aspect/elements	References
φθείρω, λυπέω	destroying (the hearing), causing pain	too high or low pitch	Arist. <i>De an.</i> 426a30–426b7
ἀλγηδών	pain	<i>monaulos</i>	Ath. 174b
λύπη	grief	music	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 623a (Theophr.)
<i>ira</i>	anger	songs	Aphthonius <i>De metris</i> 42. (Theophr.)
αἰσχρὸς	ugly/bad	vulgarity, disorder in dance	Ath. 628d
φαῦλος	mean/common/bad	dance; style	Ath. 631d; 633c
φαῦλος	mean/common/bad	melody; music	AQ 60.23; 61.8
διαφθείρω	corrupt/ruin (young people)	melodies (of poets); theater music; <i>aulos</i> , music	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D128.8–13; ps.-Plut. <i>Mus.</i> 1140e; cf. Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 706c, 997b
ἀκρασία, μαλακία, ἡδυπάθεια, (ἄνω/διαφθείρω/ καταχέω) δριμύτερος/ποικιλώτερος,	lack of self-control, softness, passion for pleasure, (leading/ corrupting/ pouring down) more pungent/ varied (than food/smell)	melody, rhythm	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 705e–706a
“αἰσχρὰς ποθεῖ ψηλαφήσεις καὶ γυναικώδεις γαργαλισμούς”	(wanton/licentiousness) “desires shameful and womanish ticklings”	corrupt music	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 997c
“τοῦ κρίνοντος ἀπτόμεναι καὶ τοῦ φρονούντος”	“taking hold of judgment and understanding”	enjoyments (of melody and rhythm)	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 706a–b

“μέγιστ’ ἄν βλάπτοιο, ἦθη κακὰ φιλοφρονούμενος;” γέλως	“he would damage most greatly, embracing bad ethical dispositions;” laughter	combining elements of contrary ethos; song or instruments without words	Pl. <i>Leg.</i> 669b–670a
δυσμαθία	hard learning	ornaments, opposing musical elements in school	Pl. <i>Leg.</i> 812de
οἰνωμένος, μανικός / ἐξάπτομαι, ἀνάωπυρέομαι	intoxicated; mad/to get inflamed, excited (to commit a crime)	Phrygian <i>aulos</i>	Iambl. <i>VP</i> 25.112; cf. Quint. 1.10.32; Sext. Emp. <i>Mus.</i> 7, 17; August. <i>Contra Iulianum</i> 5.23; Mart. Cap. 9.926; Boeth. <i>Mus.</i> 1.1.185
καταυλέω, μεθύσκω, (ὥσπερ) μανία	charming with <i>aulos</i> , intoxicating, (similar to) madness	<i>aulos</i> , licentious dancing	Plut. <i>Mor.</i> 704d
ἐξίστημι, πάσχω, μαινομαι	losing the mind, suffering, being driven mad	salpinx, playing a military tune	Apollonius, <i>Mir.</i> 49.2
“ <i>acto illo in insaniam et per praecipitia delato</i> ”	“driven into madness and fallen off a precipice”	piping in Phrygian mode	Quint. 1.10.33
δια-/προσαποκνάω	erase the thought of a poem	melody	Phld. <i>Mus.</i> D124.24–28

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